This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2015 
TAGS: EAID ELTN ENRG EPET PREL IZ KCRS
SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON KEY INITIATIVES FOR THE 
THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING AUGUST 19, 2005 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3162 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2962 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 2785 
     ¶D. BAGHDAD 2534 
     ¶E. BAGHDAD 2362 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶F. KIRKUK 91 
     ¶G. ANKARA 2912 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Following is Embassy Baghdad's latest update on the 
status of Key Initiatives.  See reftels for prior updates. 
 
------------------ 
ELECTRICITY UPDATE 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C/NF) Status: 
 
-- Generation: Iraq Electricity - During the reporting 
period, the average peak generation for each of the last 
three weeks increased from 4,338 to 4,509 megawatts (MW), 
finally reaching 4,683 MW.  Total electricity generation for 
the past week averaged 103,934 megawatt hours (MWh) per day. 
The average hours of power nationwide for the last two weeks 
remained steady at 12 hours per week after dipping below 12 
hours during the first week.  The average demand for the last 
week rose to 8,727 MW, a 10 MW increase from the previous 
week, continuing a slowly increasing trend for the period. 
 
-- Generation: Baghdad Electricity - During the reporting 
period, the average peak availability for Baghdad was 1,294 
MW (364 MW more than the previous week, returning to the same 
levels from the start of this period).  During the first 
week, power distribution dropped 21 percent due to tower 
loss, with an additional 6 percent lQ the second week.  By 
the third week, the total average electricity distribution 
reached 29,409 MWh per day, a 43 percent increase due to a 
more balanced power transfer from the North and the West. 
Baghdad's power availability averaged eight hours per day 
after last week's average of 5 hours per day, and 7 hours per 
day the week before.  The South maintained an average of 15 
hours per day for the entire period.  Feeder rotation for 
Baghdad has been two hours of electricity on, four hours off: 
an improvement from the 1.5 hours on, 4.5 hours off rotation 
the first two weeks. 
 
-- Summer Action Plan - During the first week of the 
reporting period, constant attacks to the towers in the 
Samarra area, which transfer 600 MW to Baghdad; unscheduled 
outages of large thermal generation units; and a persistent 
fuel shortage eventually compromised another 300 MW.  These 
conditions will delay the goal of reaching 5,100 MW peak 
generation by several weeks.  Diesel quantities available for 
summer electricity will not exceed 3.5 million liters per day 
(ML/D) and will average closer to 3 ML/D.  After negotiations 
with the Ministries of Oil and Finance, the Ministry of 
Electricity (MoE) expected 6 ML/D by June 2005.  However, 
Turkish diesel suppliers have stopped additional deliveries 
pending resolution of current and arrears payments.  The loss 
of these supplies has resulted in a 400 MW reduction of power 
off the grid.  The Electricity Working Group is addressing 
this issue and coordinating projects expected for completion 
during winter 2005 and summer 2006. 
 
-- Transmission - The six towers downed due to conductor line 
failure on the Baghdad West to Baghdad North 400KV Line were 
raised, synchronized, and energized on August 11.  As a 
result, the Baghdad West substation will transit and 
distribute power more efficiently to the northern parts of 
the city, adding redundancy to the Baghdad transmission loop. 
 The damage to the 400KV transmission lines on the Khor 
Zubayr to Hartha line caused by the dust storm and high winds 
on August 8 has resulted in a one-day reduction in hours of 
power in Basrah. 
 
-- Additional Generation - The two thermal units at the 
Mussiab power plants that were down for unscheduled 
maintenance have been generating 325 MW this week.  At the 
Doura power plant, only one of four thermal plants has been 
running, adding only 80MW to the grid.  By the end of the 
week on August 11, the V64 gas turbine at Kirkuk went offline 
due to a changing of the gearbox. 
 
Import of Power - Imports of power from Syria, Turkey and 
Iran averaged 283 MW this week - an increase of 12 MW from 
the previous week, which was already up 27 MW from the week 
prior. 
 
Fuel Supply - The C-6 Natural Gas Pipeline that was 
interdicted 25 km north of the Thar Thar canal - near Samarra 
- returned to service this week, restoring fuel to the Taji 
and Daura power plants. 
 
-- Electric power for the reporting period: 
 
- Baghdad average hours of electric power: 8 hours per day 
during the last week, up from the 7 hours the previous week 
and 5 hours the first week. 
- National average hours of electric power: 12 hours per day 
during the second week of the reporting period, a decrease of 
2 hours from the previous week. 
 
- Total peak-electrical output for Iraq by the end of the 
period was 4,760 MW. 
---------- 
OIL UPDATE 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Status: 
 
-- Record Oil Revenues for Iraq (July, 2005) - Monthly oil 
exports have held fairly constant over the past eight months 
at around 1.6M barrels per day (Bbl/d).  Terrorist attacks on 
pipelines and refineries have hampered attempts to increase 
exports.  Recent record world oil prices have enabled Iraq to 
achieve an all-time high income from oil exports, which is 
badly needed for reconstruction and public support.  About 97 
percent of Iraqi revenue derives from oil exports.  The 
estimated revenue for 2005 increased from $12.7 billion to 
$13.3 billion. 
 
-- Northern Exports at Record High - Crude oil exports 
through the Port of Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast 
have reached a daily average of 200,000 for the month of 
July.  Kirkuk production has held at 400,000 barrels per day 
(Bbl/d), the highest daily average since December 2004. 
 
-- Hydrocracker Commissioned for Operation at the Baiji 
Refinery - The hydrocracker unit at Baiji, used for the first 
time since 1983, will start operation this week at one-half 
of design capacity (30 million barrels per day).  The unit 
will help increase gasoline and diesel fuel production at the 
refinery by converting low value fuel oil into diesel fuel. 
The plant will burn the fuel in the thermal power operation 
as part of the $30 million hydrocracker project managed by 
Iraqi Ministry of Oil (MoO). 
 
-- Ministry Council Rejects Proposal for Fuel Price Reform - 
A task force led by the Ministry of Finance prepared a 
proposal for fuel price reform in Iraq.  The Ministry Council 
rejected the proposal, which called for an across-the-board 
increase in fuel prices in Iraq, pending the outcome of the 
referendum and general elections.  Current subsidies on fuel 
costs are believed to be detrimental to the growth of a 
vibrant free market economy. 
 
---------------- 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Status: Criminal Investigation Capacity - 
 
-- As the Iraqi criminal justice system struggles to absorb 
thousands of cases related to insurgent attacks, DOJ 
identified an urgent need to encourage a cooperative 
relationship between the Iraqi judiciary and police.  The 
lack of such a relationship hamstrings the Iraqi criminal 
justice system's ability to deal with the insurgency and 
contributes to a breakdown of legal order. 
 
-- The Iraqi criminal justice system relies on an 
Investigative Judge (IJ) as a central figure in criminal 
investigations.  The IJ is charged with directing the field 
phase of the investigation from the outset of the crime, 
conducting an in-court investigative hearing to compile 
evidence, and determining whether to remand the case for 
trial.  Historically, there has been a low level of trust 
between the Iraqi judiciary and the police, thereby limiting 
cooperation between IJs and police officers in criminal 
investigations.  Consequently, investigations are incomplete, 
perpetrators go undetected, and detainees are held for 
protracted periods without resolution of their charges.  In 
some cases, IJs order detainees released for insufficient 
evidence, and police disregard those orders, convinced the 
detainees are insurgents.  Should this practice become a 
pattern, the situation threatens a breakdown in legal order 
between courts and police. 
 
-- To address this problem, the Higher Juridical Council 
(HJC) has indicated a preference for a civilianized 
investigative process.  IJs would conduct criminal 
investigations, assisted by civilian judicial investigators 
working for the court, not police officers.  Forensic labs 
would operate under court direction.  DOJ attorneys have 
recommended to the HJC that it instead look to the French 
model, where police officers are placed under the operational 
control of IJs for the purpose of facilitating cooperative 
police-court investigations, but nonetheless remain police 
officers.  The Chief Judge of the HJC has indicated that he 
is not necessarily opposed to this arrangement, but is 
skeptical of Ministry of Interior (MOI) cooperation. 
 
-- In an effort to increase cooperation between the judiciary 
and police in criminal investigations, DOJ attorneys 
presently are working with MNC-I to assess the status of the 
investigative function in Iraqi court districts around the 
country.  The next step will be to encourage regular 
meetings, if necessary, between IJs and police investigators 
to discuss general problems and concerns in conducting 
criminal investigations and to formulate investigative 
strategies for specific cases.  Such meetings would be held 
under US leadership (JAG attorneys and/or International 
Police Liaison Officers, or IPLOs). 
 
DOJ believes these meetings would forge personal and 
professional relationships between IJs and police officers, 
thereby enhancing cooperation in criminal investigations. 
These meetings also would replicate the cooperative 
relationship between prosecutor and police necessary in 
criminal justice systems that embody strong guarantees of 
individual rights.  In designing its program to jointly train 
judges and police officials in management and investigations, 
the European Union recognized the same need for a strong 
IJ-police relationship. 
 
-- DOJ attorneys and CPATT also are working to implement a 
forensic evidence training program for Iraqi judges and other 
court personnel.  Iraqi judges report that such scientific 
knowledge was denied them under Saddam and there is an urgent 
need for such training in the judiciary.  CPATT trainers 
already provide forensic evidence training to Iraqi police in 
criminal investigations courses.  DOJ expects that the first 
training session for court personnel will be conducted within 
the next two months at the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in 
Baghdad.  Thereafter, the course will be offered to court 
personnel from other criminal courts. 
 
-- DOJ attorneys are working with CPATT to ensure that US 
IPLOs are familiar with operation of the Iraqi criminal 
justice system, allowing IPLOs to more effectively mentor 
police in moving cases through the court system. 
 
-- Additionally, DOJ and FBI are working to establish a major 
crimes investigations task force partnering Iraqi police 
investigators and US federal agents.  The US agents would 
mentor the Iraqi officers in investigations of attacks aimed 
at Iraqi government officials.  This would provide the Iraqi 
officers with field training in building prosecutable cases 
based largely on forensic or other circumstantial evidence, 
rather than relying on confessions, as is the current 
practice.  The task force also would focus on establishing a 
close working relationship between the Iraqi police 
investigators and IJs of the Central Criminal Court of Iraqi, 
which prosecutes major insurgency cases. 
 
-- The INL Judicial Integrity Project facilitated judicial 
input into the constitution drafting process. The project 
assisted the HJC to hold meetings with constitution drafting 
committee members to voice concerns over sections that may 
prove problematic for rule of law and human rights. 
 
-- INL Rule of Law Program is supporting the HJC to determine 
funding priorities in preparation for the international donor 
process and the new Rule of Law Sector Working Group. 
 
¶5. (C) Next Steps: 
 
-- Ensure that US International Police Liaison Officers 
(IPLOs) and International Police Trainers (IPTs) working in 
Iraq are trained in operation of the Iraqi criminal justice 
system. 
 
-- Encourage regular meetings between Iraqi IJs and police 
investigators to institutionalize a cooperative working 
relationship between the Iraqi judiciary and police, thereby 
alleviating the courts' concern that the investigative 
function be civilianized. 
 
-- Establish a joint US-Iraq criminal investigations task 
force to deal with insurgent attacks aimed at destabilizing 
the government; field train Iraqi investigators; and 
encourage close cooperation between those investigators and 
IJs. 
-- Provide forensic evidence training to the Iraqi judiciary 
to better equip IJs to lead investigations. 
----------- 
RULE OF LAW 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Status: 
 
-- The Embassy's Rule of Law Task Force (RLTF) met for the 
second time on August 13. The Task Force's mandate is to 
develop a rule of law strategy that builds on the existing 
INL rule of law strategy, and lays the groundwork for 
comprehensive, coordinated USG assistance. 
 
-- The RLTF leadership traveled to Fallujah and met with USG 
representatives working on rule of law in Al Anbar, Karbala, 
An Najaf and Babil provinces.  There they obtained detailed 
information regarding the status of criminal justice systems 
in these areas.  This visit was the first in a series of 
trips to Iraqi provinces intended to assist the RLTF in 
developing its overall rule of law strategy. 
 
-- Justice Integration:  The INL Justice Integration Project 
has formed the inter-ministerial steering committee that will 
report to the Ministers of Justice and Interior, and the 
Chief Justice of the HJC.  This group is tasked with 
developing policies, procedures and IT solutions that 
integrate police, courts and prisons. 
 
-- The INL Rule of Law Program is continuing to take a lead 
in the new donor coordination process.  INL is working with 
relevant local stakeholders to develop an Iraqi strategy that 
can be presented at the Rule of Law Sector Working Group. 
 
------------ 
PRDC and PST 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C/NF) Status: 
 
-- All 15 (non-Kurdistan Regional Governmental) provinces 
have continued to hold Provincial Reconstruction and 
Development Committee (PRDC) meetings with varying levels of 
success and participation from provincial government 
officials.  Embassy representatives will continue to lead a 
comprehensive campaign to promote the PRDC initiative with 
provincial government officials, the Interim Iraqi 
Government, political leaders and other donors. 
 
-- Staffing appears to be a major concern in almost all of 
the Provincial Support Teams (PSTs).  Insufficient personnel 
hampers the organizations' ability to meet and interact with 
the Provincial Councils and PRDCs, greatly limiting their 
potential for success. 
 
-- All of the PRDC/PST organizations will soon be 
encountering time limits imposed by the use of CERP funds. 
Commanders must have their programs identified and sufficient 
documentation available to allocate money to the projects and 
to authorize the spending of those funds. Baghdad Province 
has identified August 29 as the last day to have final 
packages completed and submitted for CERP funding. 
 
-- This initiative stresses the improvement and creation of 
capacity development within the governance process. 
Provinces that do not promote democratic ideals should be 
held accountable for their actions.  A case in point is the 
PRDC in Baghdad.  This very successful program is being 
re-evaluated following the armed assault and takeover of the 
mayor's office by the provincial governor. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) Next steps: 
 
--Continue to encourage regular meetings with provincial 
leaders and coordination between PRDCs and PCs. 
 
-- Continue to discuss issues considered detrimental to the 
PRDC Initiative, and aggressively pursue those circumstances 
and relationships viewed as strengths. 
 
-- Continue to pursue various sources of funding and prompt 
PRDC and PC members to show initiative in also seeking 
funding sources. 
 
-- To enhance interaction between the PSTs, promote the idea 
of quarterly or monthly meetings between team chairpersons. 
Khalilzad