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Viewing cable 05ALGIERS1836, DESPITE SOME EARLIER CONCERNS, GOA TAKING POSITIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ALGIERS1836 2005-08-29 10:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Algiers
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM AG MO WI
SUBJECT: DESPITE SOME EARLIER CONCERNS, GOA TAKING POSITIVE 
STANCE ON LUGAR MISSION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
-------------------- 
 
1. (C) Ambassador separately called on Minister-Delegate 
Messahel and Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir August 27 
to express appreciation for Algeria's role in the Moroccan 
POW release, take a temperature reading, and discuss the way 
ahead.  Both men expressed satisfaction over the success of 
Lugar's humanitarian mission and, suggesting earlier GOA 
concerns about our initial public reaction to the release had 
been assuaged, welcomed the President's message thanking 
President Bouteflika for having facilitated the POW release. 
Messahel hoped Morocco would respond to the release with 
humanitarian moves of its own; reiterated Algeria's firm 
policy that it is willing to help but is not a party to the 
Western Sahara dispute; and said President Bouteflika would 
shortly be sending a letter to President  Bush.  Both 
Messahel and Belkheir repeated Algerian arguments that in 
rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had missed an opportunity 
to secure an outcome to the Western Sahara dispute that met 
Morocco's needs.  Both men also reaffirmed Algeria's interest 
in pursuing improved relations with Morocco and expected 
Belkheir's appointment as ambassador to Rabat would help 
improve communication between Morocco and Algeria.  Neither, 
however, expected much could happen until after Algeria's 
national reconciliation referendum in late September or 
Belkheir's arrival in Rabat sometime in mid-to late October. 
(End Summary and Comment) 
 
U.S. APPRECIATION FOR GOA FACILITATION OF POW RELEASE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador separately called on Presidential Chief of 
Staff Belkheir and Minister-Delegate Messahel August 27 to 
review the situation and possible next steps in the wake of 
the successful Lugar Mission.  Deliberately seeking to set a 
positive tone for the discussion, Ambassador congratulated 
Algeria for its role in helping ensure the success of Senator 
Lugar's humanitarian mission.  Algeria had given the Senator 
an exceptionally warm welcome and had delivered just what it 
had promised -- Polisario's unconditional release of all 
remaining Moroccan prisoners.  The President's letter of 
thanks reflected his personal appreciation for the helpful 
role President Bouteflika had played in ensuring this 
positive outcome.  The POW release was an important 
humanitarian achievement.  Everyone won in such a situation 
and, as the President had written in his letter, we hoped 
both Algeria and Morocco would seize the opportunity that has 
been created to work for improved relations and a regional 
environment conducive to a Western Sahara 
 settlement. 
 
PRESIDENT'S LETTER ASSUAGES EARLIER DISAPPOINTMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (C) Both Belkheir and Messahel agreed the Lugar Mission 
was a success, removing an issue that had become a burden and 
paving the way for a hopefully more positive dynamic in the 
region.  Belkheir was especially satisfied that the quiet 
discussions with the Ambassador over the past five months had 
finally borne fruit. Messahel hoped Morocco could address 
humanitarian concerns such as the missing Polisario fighters, 
the recent incarceration of 37 Sahrawi demonstrators, and 
cooperation on family visits and other confidence-building 
measures.  Ambassador said we had been particularly active in 
encouraging Moroccan cooperation on the latter and wanted to 
see progress on all humanitarian issues.  Both Messahel and 
Belkheir also positively noted the President's letter, while 
notably avoiding comment on initial U.S. public reaction to 
the POW release, which Messahel in a previous conversation 
had termed "a disaster".  (Comment:  The President's letter 
thanking Bouteflika appears to have substantially assuaged 
earlier disappointment.  The importance of the letter for the 
leadership here was reflected in the fact that the text was 
published almost verbatim in the government-owned press and 
received wide coverage in the independent press as well.) 
 
BOUTEFLIKA SENDING PRESIDENT A LETTER 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Messahel, without providing any details, said that 
Bouteflika would shortly be sending a letter to President 
Bush.  Messahel commented that Senator Lugar had left a very 
positive impression, while noting that the Senator's comments 
in Morocco suggesting that Algeria and Morocco should 
directly negotiate an end to the Western Sahara dispute had 
perhaps unintentionally gone beyond what Algeria understood 
to be U.S. policy.  Ambassador said we knew Algeria's 
sensitivity on this point and thus were careful to refer to 
the need for Algeria and Morocco to improve relations and 
create a regional climate conducive to a Western Sahara 
settlement.  Messahel reiterated that Algeria was not a party 
to the dispute.  However, as it had in the elaboration of the 
Baker Plan, Algeria would of course be prepared to help the 
parties find a political solution, within the framework of 
the United Nations, that honored the principle of 
self-determination. 
 
REJECTING BAKER PLAN A "MISSED OPPORTUNITY" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) As in previous discussions, Messahel and Belkheir 
separately expressed regret that Morocco had rejected the 
Baker Plan, describing its "autonomy option" and referendum 
voting procedures as a "missed opportunity" that would have 
enabled Morocco to secure the outcome it needed.  Ambassador 
said we needed to move beyond the Baker Plan, since one side 
had clearly rejected it, while perhaps drawing on ideas in 
the Plan that might offer a way forward.  Messahel commented 
that the "lack of a real interlocutor" on the Moroccan side 
was a problem for Algeria.  Morocco needed to realize that 
its current course of unilaterally declaring Moroccan 
sovereignty over the Western Sahara -- at a time when no 
other country in the world accepted the legitimacy of this 
claim -- would not work. 
 
RESOLVING THE WESTERN SAHARA 
A STRATEGIC ISSUE FOR MOROCCO 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Western Sahara was a strategic issue for Morocco, 
but not for Algeria, Messahel continued.  He suggested that 
some in Morocco saw the Western Sahara issue as a way of 
diverting public attention from problems and rallying the 
public around the king and national unity.  In fact, however, 
the dispute was a drain, diverting energies and resources 
that were needed to address economic, social, Islamic, and 
terrorism challenges within the country.  The solution to the 
Western Sahara conflict did not rest with Algeria, but with 
Morocco itself, he contended.  Sooner or later, Morocco would 
have to understand that legitimacy could only be achieved 
through a process of self-determination.  The Baker Plan had 
offered such a process, one that would have worked in 
Morocco's favor while honoring the idea of 
self-determination.  Algeria had been very consistent in its 
position, he claimed, and needed to be patient and prepared 
for the Moroccans to come to this conclusion.  In a now 
familiar refrain, he argued that Hassan II had reached this 
conclusion toward the end of his life, as a result of Baker's 
efforts, and that there would have been a solution by now, 
had Hassan II lived. 
 
ALGERIA SEEKS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH RABAT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Messahel said Algeria agreed on the desirability of 
working to improve relations with Morocco.  In this regard, 
Algeria had viewed Prime Minister Ouyahia's planned June 
visit to Rabat, which the Moroccans canceled abruptly, as 
part of a process that would have re-energized the bilateral 
commission process, led to a series of ministerial visits, 
and culminated with a Bouteflika visit in December and the 
reopening of the border.  He discounted the idea that the 
visit had been canceled because of Moroccan disappointment 
over the insufficiently "political" composition of the 
Algerian delegation.  Algeria had specifically proposed, and 
the Moroccans had accepted, that to give more impetus to the 
bilateral commission process, it would be upgraded from the 
level of foreign ministers to that of prime ministers.  This 
was consistent with how Algeria handled bilateral commissions 
with Tunisia and Libya.  The Moroccans knew all along that 
Foreign Minister Bedjaoui was not on the delegation. 
Messahel claimed that from the outset, it had been determined 
that the Interior, Energy, and Commerce Ministers plus 
himself would be the ministerial component of the Algerian 
delegation. 
 
BUT NO NEW INITIATIVES ANYTIME SOON 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Asked about next steps, both Belkheir and Messahel 
agreed that the POW release, the naming of van Walsum as the 
Secretary General's Personal Representative for the Western 
 
SIPDIS 
Sahara, and Belkheir's appointment to Rabat as ambassador 
were all positive elements.  Both confirmed there were no 
current plans for a van Walsum visit, though they expected 
there would be a visit at some point. In any case, they 
doubted much could happen in coming weeks because Algeria was 
entirely absorbed by the campaign to win substantial approval 
of President Bouteflika's Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation in the September 29 referendum.  Other than 
saying it would be important to resume the work of the 
bilateral commissions, Belkheir avoided answering a direct 
question as to what it would take to get a meeting between 
the two Prime Ministers and their delegations rescheduled. He 
also reconfirmed that he had accepted the Ambassadorial 
posting in Rabat, despite press articles to the contrary, and 
would probably leave for Rabat in October.  His first 
priority would be to try to establish better communication at 
senior levels, especially in the King's immediate circle.  He 
also looked forward to close contact with Ambassador Riley. 
 
AMBASSADOR AGREES COMMUNICATION 
A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR BOTH SIDES 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Ambassador agreed that communication has been a 
serious problem for both sides.  He added that Belkheir, by 
virtue of his experience, access, and ability to speak with 
authority, would hopefully be able to improve communication 
and help both sides avoid the kind of miscues that have 
plagued their relationship.  Belkheir agreed, noting by way 
of example that if only the King had called Bouteflika in 
advance about the 2004 Moroccan decision to lift the visa 
requirement, it would have been received positively. 
Ambassador said both sides needed to be more sensitive to the 
needs of the other and to communicate informally and at high 
level before taking any public steps.  This would help ensure 
they were properly received and understood.  He added that 
Algeria had made a "serious error" in not responding more 
concretely to the King's significant gesture of attending the 
Arab League Summit in Algiers last March.  Algeria's 
perceived lack of response had thus needlessly angered and 
undercut those in the Moroccan leadership who sought 
rapprochement with Algeria.  Similarly, better communication 
signaling Algeria's serious interest in moving toward a 
reopening of the border might have averted Rabat's abrupt 
cancellation of the Ouyahia visit. 
ERDMAN