This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005049 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN CH US
SUBJECT: MISHRA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC TO U/S BURNS ABOUT 
INDIA-US TIES 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Meeting with U/S Burns and the Charge on 
June 25, former NSA Brajesh Mishra was cautiously optimistic 
on the US-India relationship.  One of the architects of 
India's greatly expanded ties with Washington, Mishra 
stressed that progress would be incremental and evolutionary, 
that both governments should not nurse high expectations, but 
remained unconvinced that India and the US have defined them 
or devised a framework for their realization.  He advised the 
Under Secretary not to expect dramatic changes in Indian 
voting behavior at the UN.  While agreeing that there was a 
need for balance in Asia between China and other nations, 
Mishra ruled out confrontation with Beijing.  He hopes to 
meet with Secretary Rice for further discussions when he 
visits Washington later in the year.  End Summary. 
 
Progress - but not Dramatic Progress 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) After brief welcoming remarks, the Under Secretary 
asked Mishra for his views on US-India ties, noting that 
while the two governments are pushing ahead, it would require 
opposition BJP support to realise the potential in bilateral 
relations. 
 
¶3.  (C) Mishra expressed satisfaction with the intense 
dialogue between the two governments in the past six months. 
He agreed that the "Indian establishment" sees much promise 
in closer ties with the US, but the "substance is not yet 
there," which was possibly a result of "old thinking." 
Mishra urged both countries to "decide what they want and 
require" for the relationship to blossom, commenting that 
India and the US have not yet come to such an understanding 
and are "proceeding cautiously."  He agreed with the Under 
Secretary that there is no hostility in India towards the US 
 
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(as exists in Pakistan and other countries), except in the 
Communist parties, where such hostility is ideologically 
driven. 
 
Need for Consensus on Bilateral Ties 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Mishra lamented that there is "no consensus" on the 
bilateral relationship in India, "as there is with the 
India-Russia relationship," which is "part of history."  He 
attributed this to both the USG and the GOI, as "we should be 
very clear what we expect."  It is very well that we have the 
"Next Steps in Strategic Partnership," more proposed 
cooperation on energy, space, and defense, but these had not 
yet attained a "critical mass."  Both countries must agree on 
the basic nature of the relationship for it to move forward, 
he stated. 
 
¶5.  (C) Recalling that a colleague had recently suggested 
that the US was ready to enter into a "NATO plus" 
relationship with India in defense, Mishra wondered whether 
India was willing to enter into one, as it would involve 
similar ties as the US and the UK currently enjoy.  He hoped 
that the many high-level visits would increase the level of 
dialogue, but predicted that each side would maintain its own 
expectations. 
 
The Need to Remove Obstacles 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Commenting that the US and India have a "framework" 
for their strategic partnership, the Under Secretary agreed 
that it must be filled in with more substance.  The 
bureaucracies, laws and regulations in both countries impede 
progress, which requires both countries to redouble their 
efforts to achieve a breakthrough -- another reason why it 
was crucial for PM Singh's July 18 visit to the United States 
to be a success. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Under Secretary added that during his meetings at 
the MEA, it was quickly apparent that India and the US have a 
broad relationship and that much can be achieved in the areas 
of space, energy, and military cooperation.  In addition, 
bilateral programs on HIV/AIDS, democracy and education were 
set to expand.  He had also observed very high public 
expectations regarding civil nuclear cooperation and UNSC 
expansion, which required quick progress on overcoming US 
regulations that inhibit cooperation on nuclear energy. 
 
¶8.  (C) Underlining that he could not speak for the 
opposition BJP (because he had resigned from the party in 
1998 upon becoming Principal Secretary to former PM 
Vajpayee), Mishra pointed out that Vajpayee also wants the 
bilateral relationship to move forward, but it was unclear 
how it would develop and what would emerge.  That is why both 
countries need to devise a "framework," he stated. 
 
Expanding the UNSC 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) On the UNSC, the Under Secretary underlined US 
interests in maintaining the Council's effectiveness.  The 
USG was not opposed to new members, as long as they 
strengthen the UN.  While the US was now thinking in terms of 
"two or so" new permanent members, the large gulf between US 
and Indian voting behavior illustrated the different ways of 
looking at the UN in the two countries.  With this in mind, 
the two countries' interests at the UN would take some time 
to converge, he predicted. 
 
¶10.  (C) Mishra agreed that it was not clear how an expanded 
Council would function and how new members would behave, 
although he "couldn't imagine" that India's behavior in the 
UN will change markedly in the direction the US would like. 
It would take a "major development" to bring about such 
change, which was in part a function of the much broader US 
agenda at the UN than that of India.  Mishra opined that 
movement towards expansion was well advanced and could not be 
stopped without an enormous amount of controversy. 
 
The Trouble with China 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Mishra pointed out that the Chinese Ambassador in 
New Delhi has expressed strong support for India's entry into 
the UNSC, that the Chinese Premier had provided similar 
assurances to PM Singh, and that China will "never agree to 
Japan."  When Burns responded that China has repeatedly 
stated during recent P-5 meetings that it would like to 
maintain the status quo in the Council, Mishra replied that 
he has had "wide experience" with the Chinese leadership at 
senior levels, and knew that they altered their public 
statements in different venues, but that their pro-India 
position should be taken as a matter of policy, as PM Wen had 
given such assurances to PM Manmohan Singh during his recent 
visit to New Delhi.  Th Under Secretary reiterated that the 
US is "more open" to UNSC reform than China is, and has been 
careful not to rule out an Indian seat. 
 
¶12.  (C) The Under Secretary pointed out that the US is now 
focused more on South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East 
than in the past, and that top USG priorities are dealing 
with Islamic terrorism and the competitive relationship with 
China.  The Chinese military buildup demonstrates that the 
PRC is spending major sums of money to counter the American 
navy.  The US did not view India as a "counterweight" to 
China, but has concluded that India's strategic interests are 
more closely aligned with those of the US than with China. 
This is valuable to the US-India relationship, he concluded. 
 
¶13.  (C) Mishra maintained that the bilateral relationship 
was "mutually rewarding," but that "contradictions" would 
remain, and that diplomats from both countries would have to 
overcome them.  He was also glad to hear that the US was not 
bent on a "confrontation" with China, as that would not work, 
especially since India has a vested interest in its 
relationship with China and would not be drawn into 
confrontation. 
 
The US Role in Asia 
------------------- 
¶14.  (C) The US is providing "balance" in Asia, and India 
would like that to continue, Mishra continued.  Whether the 
US and India increase their military cooperation to 
"equalize" the Chinese military is "open for discussion," but 
a confrontation would be out of the question.  India is also 
intent on forging closer ties with the countries of SE Asia 
and with ASEAN. 
 
¶15.  (C) Describing briefly the US strategy in Asia of 
linking countries to each other and to the US, the Under 
Secretary observed that the East Asian Summit sponsored by 
 
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China represents an attempt by Beijing to keep the US out of 
Asia and is "not friendly."  Mishra agreed, but pointed out 
that no countries in SE Asia oppose the US, and that they 
work together and pursue mutual interests in the Middle East, 
and the Persian Gulf, although differences on Iran remained. 
 
Invitation to Washington 
------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C) The Under Secretary concluded the meeting by 
inviting Mishra to Washington to meet with Secretary Rice, 
who had worked closely together while both were National 
Security Advisors.  Mishra confirmed plans to visit 
Washington later in the year and looked forward to seeing the 
Secretary. 
 
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¶17.  (C) The Under Secretary cleared this message. 
BLAKE