This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/S DIR -MOZENA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LT UN
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON ARTICLE 98 
 
REF: MASERU 365 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador met July 19, 21 and 25 with Foreign Minister 
Moleleki concerning Article 98.  We learned from a United 
Kingdom (UK) source that arguments against Article 98 had been 
developed by the European Union (EU) at an informal Cabinet 
meeting chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) during the 
Prime Minister's absence the week of July 11.  According to 
Moleleki, FOMIN expressed strong opposition to the EU's position 
and advised that his colleagues in the Cabinet support Lesotho's 
becoming a signatory to an Article 98 Agreement with the U.S. 
During July 15 and subsequent conversations, Moleleki told 
Ambassador that he had observed a moderation in the position of 
the DPM who had previously been strongly opposed.  The DPM 
currently, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs, has 
observed that it is in "Lesotho's national interest"  to sign 
this agreement which obviously is a key concern for the U.S., a 
major ally of this nation. 
 
¶2.  (C) In discussing how best to make progress on this issue on 
July 25, Foreign Minister Moleleki said that all members of the 
Cabinet, he felt, were fully on board and recognized the 
necessity of signing; the only person who has not been convinced 
remained the Prime Minister, in his opinion.  Moleleki is aware, 
as are several members of the Cabinet, of the 2004 Nethercut 
Amendment which restricts some ESF funding to non-signatory 
countries.  He said he could fully understand the position of 
the U.S. legislature and any future other restrictions, 
particularly in light of the fact that so many African countries 
have become signatories in the past few years, including many of 
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) countries.  Ambassador 
stated that we recognized the continued presence and pressure 
that Lesotho felt from South Africa, a phenomenum Moleleki 
refers to as the "short man" scenario, i.e. Lesotho always feels 
as though it is being badgered by its taller and larger big 
brother next door.  However, FOMIN believes that it would be 
helpful for the PM to hear not only from us, but also from 
signatories in the region; that it would be especially useful 
for the PM to hear from Botswana's President Mogae.  He also 
suggested that Lesotho's own Ambassador to Washington call the 
PM and discuss the importance of this matter.  Moleleki felt 
that he himself was not the right person at this time to put 
pressure on the PM.  As we have reported previously, the PM can 
be a very prickly and difficult character with whom to deal. 
Moleleki has told us that he was spoken to dismissively by the 
Prime Minister when the FOMIN had come with a message the PM did 
not want to hear; he was told to "sit down and be quiet, young 
man."  Therefore, having a variety of messengers approach 
Mosisili at the right time seems to be key to swaying his 
opinion which we will continue to pursue.  Ambassador told 
Moleleki that we continue to raise this issue at high levels, 
with their perceived threatening neighbor, South Africa, and 
that there had been significant support from most African 
countries.  Moleleki thought a high level bilateral discussion 
on the edges of the UNGA could be helpful in persuading the 
Prime Minister on the Article 98 issue. 
 
¶3.  (C) Comment:  The Foreign Minister expressed his own very 
deep frustration in working with the Prime Minister.  We have 
heard rumors that he is beginning to consider resigning from the 
MFA post.  For the moment, it appears Moleleki will remain in 
place, but we should understand that the FOMIN is an extremely 
popular, charismatic individual who is also an elected official, 
which the PM is not, and it is easy to understand that the PM 
would see him as an internal rival within the ruling party.  A 
recent article characterized Minister Moleleki as one of the 
most powerful political leaders in the ruling party, and 
recalled that "he has his people everywhere, in every ministry." 
 It is now believed that the PM, who at one point observers 
believed would step down, will compete to hold on to his 
position and that he wishes to remain the incumbent following 
 
MASERU 00000373  002 OF 002 
 
 
the 2007 national elections.  It is clear that although many 
Basotho view Moleleki as the natural heir to the government's 
top job, Mosisili has his own ideas about succession.  This 
internal political drama may help to explain, to some degree, 
the PM's adamant stance against the Article 98 Agreement.  His 
is not the type of personality who likes to be "bested" in any 
competition.  His Cabinet, on the other hand, views the world 
through realpolitick lenses and wishes to move forward. 
Moleleki (according to sources in and out of government) has 
become the most vocal of those pressing a more realistic and, 
ultimately, beneficial approach to foreign policy, particularly 
in regard to the U.S. 
 
¶4.  (C) Against this backdrop, it becomes a bit clearer why 
rational, legal arguments do not work with PM Mosisili; this is 
not a question of logic, it is a question of personality, 
external forces (particularly South Africa and to some degree 
the EU) and internal political infighting.  That said, post 
agrees that the GOL Ambassador's call to the Prime Minister 
would re-emphasize the importance of this matter and that post 
continue to dialogue with PM, FOMIN and with other key 
ministers, e.g. Finance and Trade.  If progress is not obvious 
by mid-September, we suggest considering a bilateral at some 
point during the UNGA.  End Comment 
 
 
 
 
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