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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD3113, DULAME AND RUBAIE DISUCSS IRAQI SECURITY WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD3113 2005-07-27 16:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: MOPS PINS MARR IZ PRESL
SUBJECT: DULAME AND RUBAIE DISUCSS IRAQI SECURITY WITH 
AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a), (b) and 
 
 (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. On July 24 at the dinner table, 
Ambassador discussed Iraq's short-term security challenges 
with Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie and 
Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulame.  The latter identified 
the ITG's primary objectives as delivering security to Iraq's 
citizens, implementing a powerful public relations campaign, 
pursuing economic development, and ensuring that the 
electoral process advances on time at an appropriate level of 
security.  While the Ambassador and his guests concurred in 
this list of goals, opinions varied on how best to achieve 
them. Major debate centered on the role of militias and 
"neighborhood watch" groups, elimination of government 
subsidies to meet IMF conditionality, and the likelihood of 
Sunni Arabs voting in the constitutional referendum and 
elections. 
 
2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT continued:  The lack of trust between 
Dulame, a Sunni, and Rubaie, a Shia, was evident.  While both 
were forthcoming when questioned, Dulame seemed particularly 
reticent to speak frankly on issues like the meager defense 
budget and MoD's failure to pay troop life support costs. END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
------------------- 
ADVANCING SECURITY 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad hosted a dinner at his residence 
for Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie and 
Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulame on July 24.  In 
attendance were DCM Satterfield, MFN-I CG Casey, MG Findley, 
IRMO Senior Advisor Yellin, and Pol-Mil Counselor Litt. 
 
4. (C) Rubaie said a newly formed joint committee, which he 
chairs and which is charged with developing a 
conditions-based strategy for transferring security 
responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces, is key to 
improving security in Iraq.  He asserted that the gradual 
withdrawal of Coalition Forces from secure Iraqi 
neighborhoods will inspire citizens in the less secure areas 
to cease their support of insurgents in order to free 
themselves also from the Coalition Forces.  The Ambassador 
and General Casey agreed and offered appropriate assistance. 
 
5. (C) Rubaie acknowledged the importance of disbanding the 
militias, but said it is politically difficult to do so.  As 
an alternative, he is considering the feasibility of 
recommending armed or unarmed "neighborhood watch" groups. 
General Casey expressed his doubts about such groups, and the 
Ambassador asked what might be done to ensure that these 
groups not last forever. The Ambassador recalled the negative 
consequences that had flowed from warlordism in Afghanistan. 
They proved to be the infrastructure for a civil war and an 
obstacle to building a sucessful Afghanistan.  Pol-Mil 
Counselor added that the ITG's refusal to address the militia 
problem forthrightly might send the unintended message to the 
public that the government is not capable of protecting the 
people. 
 
6. (C) Having arrived late for the dinner, Dulame was not 
present for this part of the evening's discussion. However, 
before departing, he pulled DCM Satterfield aside and warned 
that the ITG's failure to deal with the militias, coupled 
with ongoing Operation Thunder inside Baghdad, could be the 
last straw for many Sunni Arabs.  The same can be said for 
armed or unarmed "neighborhood watches". Too many Sunni 
Arabs, he argued, are convinced that the USG and the ITF are 
blatantly anti-Sunni Arab.  Earlier that day, Dulame had 
confided to Pol-Mil Counselor that he will resign from the 
ministry if the problem of militias is not resolved. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Bringing the Message to the People 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Rubaie emphasized the Iraqi government's need to 
undertake a serious information outreach/public relations 
campaign.  He opined that the Iraqis, including the leaders, 
rely solely on the media for information, and the media 
report only disasters, not progress.  According to Rubaie, 
the media distortion is so bad that even the PM believes 
"he's on the verge of loosing control." Rubaie has ordered 
his staff to find ways to give Iraqi citizens an accurate 
picture. 
 
8. (C) Rubaie's strategy would require each of the fifty 
ministers and top-level officials in the ITG to give 
televised speeches every week.  The Ambassador responded 
positively and asked why Iraq's leaders do not speak out 
publicly.  Rubaie replied that many of the leaders do not 
want to associate themselves with the fledgling government. 
In addition, the ITG's media outreach capacity is limited. 
Although Dulame is now bringing media reps along with him on 
troop visits to report on progress, he mused that media 
embeds perhaps do more harm than good, judging from current 
television coverage. 
 
9. (C) General Casey reaffirmed the importance of getting 
accurate information out not only to the Iraqi citizens, but 
also to the Iraqi leaders.  With that in mind, he said his 
staff will begin to provide a daily operations and 
intelligence update to the PM's Chief of Staff, Dr. Abdul 
Aziz al-Tamimi, to keep al-Ja'aferi informed.  He recommended 
that Rubaie invite the PM to his office once or twice a week 
to learn directly from Rubaie what is going on in the field. 
Rubaie agreed, noting that he currently provides a daily 
intel report to the PM, and oversees intergovernmental bodies 
to ensure that information is coordinated and disseminated to 
senior officials. 
 
---------- 
MoD Update 
---------- 
 
10. (C) Ambassador asked Dulame for a status report on the 
Iraqi security forces.  Dulame, appreciating the Coalition's 
support, said their capability is improving, but he foresees 
a long road ahead.  When asked if paying life support and 
salaries remained a problem, he answered "no" and insisted 
payments continue to be made on time. Responding to General 
Casey's glance of playful skepticism, he quickly added, "at 
least for the next two months." 
 
11. (C) Asked how many former regime officers serve in the 
MoD, Dulame replied about 20 percent of its personnel.  He 
added that the CPA policy of dismissing all Iraqis in the 
military had only added to the insurgency. Dulame estimates 
that about 50 percent of the insurgents are former military 
personnel who are clearly running the insurgency operations. 
Dulame predicted that the number of insurgents will drop by 
50 percent once a pension program for military veterans  is 
approved by the TNA and implemented.  Rubaie concurred, but 
thought the percentage a bit high. 
 
-------------------- 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
-------------------- 
 
12. (C) Dulame and Rubaie agree that advancing economic 
development is critical to undermining the insurgency.  DCM 
Satterfield raised the importance of infrastructure security, 
pointing out that the northern pipeline could handle between 
400,000 - 600,000 barrels a day if it were secured and 
operating at full capacity.  When asked why many Iraqis fail 
to make the connection between the lack of electric power or 
income from oil and the insurgents' sabotage, Rabaie answered 
Iraq's culture explains the disconnect.  After decades of 
tyranny and abuse, Iraqis have come to distrust and despise 
government.  Resolving these problems, whatever the cause, is 
the government's responsibility.  It has not done so, and so 
it is to blame. 
 
13. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the desirability 
of reducing fuel and food subsidies to meet IMF conditions 
for a stand-by agreement. The DCM pointed to the IMF's 
September deadline and the need for formal ITG approval of 
these measures, although it is not clear to what extent the 
Iraqi Transitional National Assembly has to act on them. 
Dulame and Rubaie rejoined by strongly opposing a revision or 
a public discussion of the fuel or food subsidies before 
January 2006.  Both argued that doing so would be political 
dynamite, would feed the insurgency, and would retard the 
electoral process. Rubaie wondered whether monetizing the 
subsidies might give Iraq breathing space.  The DCM responded 
that the concept merits consideration. 
 
----------------- 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 
----------------- 
 
14. (C) All agreed on the importance of keeping the electoral 
process on track.  General Casey and MoD Dulame warned that 
the intimidation campaign leading up to the elections will be 
intense.  The Coalition and Iraqi Forces are formulating a 
plan of action to counter it.  Dulame conjectured that there 
will not be enough security for all areas, a point General 
Casey disagreed with. The ITG should  renew the emergency 
measures that had helped secure last January's election, he 
said. 
 
15. (C) General Casey discussed the strategy for the election 
period, which entails isolating the foreign terrorists and 
extremists from the fractious and restive Sunni Arab 
rejectionists, and countering the former Ba'athist 
hardliners.  Dulame and Rubaie agreed with this strategy, but 
Dulame cautioned that former Ba'athists will be very active. 
He explained that their objective is to disrupt the coming 
elections at all costs, particularly because they failed so 
miserably last time.  He went on that the stated goal of the 
Ba'athists is to make the country so ungovernable that the 
USG, out of frustration, will turn to them as the only group 
that can bring peace to Iraq.  Rubaie concurred. 
 
16. (C) Dulame, reflecting the minority opinion, argued that 
the Sunni Arabs will not turn out to vote.  While many Sunnis 
may be telling Mission and Coalition representatives that 
many Sunnis will vote, many more will stay home out of fear. 
Rubaie countered by saying that Sunni Arabs will not vote 
"no" on the constitutional referendum; therefore, any Sunni 
absence will be immaterial.  The electoral system will favor 
whoever shows up to vote even if the absolute numbers are 
small. 
 
17. (C) COMMENT:  The difference in views and the lack of 
trust between Dulame and Rubaie was evident.  While both men 
engaged in the dinner discussion, Dulame, a Sunni Arab from 
Ar-Ramadi, seemed particularly reticent to answer questions 
in the presence of his Shi'a colleague. Dulame has also been 
reluctant to appear before the media to publicize the need 
to end the insurgency and unite the nation. Deeply committed 
to this idea, he nonetheless is among the staunchest 
opponents of Sunni Arab violence and extremism.  He feels 
equally strong about the need to eliminate independent Shia 
and Kurd militias.  END COMMENT 
Khalilzad