This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2025 
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND THE PKK: RAISING THE HEAT 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 3954 
     ¶B. ANKARA 3456 
     ¶C. ANKARA 4183 (DAO ANKARA IIR) 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Both the Turkish Deputy CHOD and MFA spokesman 
publicly confirmed July 19 that Turkey reserves the right to 
conduct cross-border operations against the PKK in northern 
Iraq.  Additionally, the D/CHOD, GEN Ilker Basbug, reported 
that the U.S. has ordered the arrest (or capture) of key PKK 
leaders (ref a).  The Turkish military has told us privately 
that the PKK is planning attacks--with KDP peshmerga 
assistance--against Turkish military positions in northern 
Iraq.  The Special Forces commander for these Turkish forces 
asserted Turkey would retaliate not only against the PKK but 
against those peshmerga who assisted the PKK; a TGS senior 
officer told us, however, that TGS had not taken such a 
decision.  End summary. 
 
Basbug: Cross-Border Ops Are Up to Us 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) TGS Deputy CHOD GEN Ilker Basbug told the press July 
19 that while the United States understands Turkey's concerns 
regarding the PKK's presence in northern Iraq, the USG has 
been indecisive.  He added, however, that "the U.S. has given 
an order for the arrest/capture of the PKK leadership" in 
Iraq.  (NOTE: The Turkish verb Basbug used can mean either 
"arrest" or "capture."  END NOTE.)  Early Turkish press 
stories reported that Basbug also indirectly answered CJCS 
GEN Myers July 14 comments (that Turkey must take up the 
question of cross-border operations with the ITG) by stating 
that Turkey has the right under international law to resort 
to such a step if necessary.  Additionally, Basbug 
distinguished between "hot pursuit" into northern Iraq (to 
pursue PKK terrorists who commit crimes in Turkey) and a 
possible "cross-border operation" (presumably to attack PKK 
targets).  "If Iraq does not do what is necessary," Basbug 
stated, "a cross-border operation would be justified."  He 
noted that discussions with Iraq regarding the PKK are 
ongoing. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Basbug's comments on cross-border operations have 
come in the middle of a swirling press cycle on the PKK 
issue.  The TGS leadership and PM Erdogan met for five hours 
July 1 to discuss the security situation in southeast Turkey. 
 Subsequent to the meeting, and in reaction to a story 
quoting an unnamed U.S. official as cautioning Turkey against 
any operations in Iraq, Erdogan has taken a harder public 
line on the PKK issue, telling the press July 13 that Turkey 
reserves the right to carry out operations against the PKK in 
Iraq if necessary. 
 
Deadly Bombings in Tourist Areas Add Fuel to the Fire 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (C) While the Turkish press has steadily reported on 
military and PKK casualties in the southeast this spring and 
summer, terrorist bombings in the western Turkish resorts of 
Kusadasi (July 16) and Cesme (July 10) have drawn 
international attention, particularly the Kusadasi bombing, 
which killed five people.  Turkish authorities believe both 
bombings were carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, 
which the Turks assert is a PKK front group. 
 
Turks Privately Warn Us of Possible 
Conflict in Northern Iraq 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) On July 16, the Commander of Turkish Special Forces in 
northern Iraq, BG Umut Kalender, called in the U.S. LNO to 
report intelligence that the PKK is planning to attack 
Turkish forces in Iraq on or after July 20.  During the 
two-hour exchange, Kalender further stated that a "nephew" of 
Masoud Barzani met with PKK leadership in the past week and 
told the PKK that "they knew what they had to do," meaning it 
was time for the PKK to make these attacks.  Kalender said 
there was ample evidence that the KDP supports the PKK, and 
that in the event of PKK attacks against Turkish positions in 
Iraq, Turkish forces would not only defend themselves but 
would also retaliate against KDP peshmerga who have assisted 
the PKK.  Kalender held up a list of potential KDP targets 
(but did not allow the LNO to read it). 
 
¶6. (S) Kalender went on to say that Turkish attempts to 
coordinate "hot pursuit" against the PKK in northern Iraq has 
not gone anywhere, and characterized recent USG statements as 
negative.  According to Kalender, the PKK feel perfectly free 
to operate with impunity in northern Iraq.  Kalender's staff 
made a point to tell the LNO how angry Kalender was at the 
intelligence he had received, and the staff followed up twice 
to be sure the LNO had reported his conversation with 
Kalender to Ankara.  For a fuller report on this meeting, 
please see ref c. 
 
¶7. (S) On July 19, Chief, ODC Turkey, Maj. Gen. Peter Sutton 
called on TGS Acting J3 Maj. Gen. Mehmet Eroz to follow up. 
ODC Chief explained that the LNO in Silopi had reported his 
conversation with Kalender, but we sought TGS's views on 
whether the intelligence Kalender cited was credible.  Eroz 
responded that a KDP newspaper in Iraq had reported on a 
two-phase effort to remove Turkish troops from northern Iraq: 
a 50,000-signature petition, followed by hunger strikes and 
demonstrations near Turkish military sites.  Additionally, 
Eroz stated that the Turks have learned that "a close 
relative" (NOTE: He did not say "nephew," as Kalender did. 
END NOTE.) of Masoud Barzani had held meetings with the PKK, 
and this relative had urged the PKK to prepare to attack 
Turkish outposts in northern Iraq.  Eroz surmised that the 
PKK would pursue terrorist action if the peaceful means 
outlined in the KDP newspaper were to fail.  (COMMENT: This 
would almost certainly push any attack beyond the July 20 
date noted by BG Kalender.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶8. (S) Eroz stated that he did not know if the intelligence 
report Kalender cited was reliable, but "it could be true." 
ODC Chief asked Eroz to confirm Kalender's statement that if 
the PKK attacked Turkish forces, Turkey would also retaliate 
against those who cooperated with the PKK.  Eroz responded 
that Turkish forces would defend themselves, and then 
"commanders and generals" would evaluate any attack and 
determine an "appropriate response." 
 
Comment: Turks Again Seek to Transfer Pressure to Us 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9. (S) As the military campaign in the southeast intensifies 
and now shifts to tourist areas, Turkey is once again feeling 
intense heat.  In turn, the Turks are looking at the U.S., 
the EU, and--both grudgingly and to a lesser extent--at the 
Iraqis to try to relieve the pressure.  On the EU front, 
Turkey can ill-afford to "take off the gloves" in the 
southeast (i.e., return to its heavy-handed 1980s and 1990s 
counterinsurgency tactics) for fear of alienating the 
Europeans; an uncoordinated cross-border operation into 
northern Iraq would likely have the same effect, especially 
as our chief coalition partner (the UK) holds the EU 
presidency.  As we have said before, a Turkish military 
incursion into northern Iraq (except in the unlikely event of 
Iraqi and coalition agreement) would be a policy disaster for 
the GOT.  It could be argued, though, that if pushed to 
exasperation by continued PKK attacks, AKP's lack of a 
coherent policy, and lack of U.S. action in northern Iraq, 
the military might at some point undertake such a move. 
 
¶10. (S) This Mission has consistently argued since 2003 (most 
recently ref b), that there are significant, non-kinetic (or 
low-level kinetic) actions that we can take against the PKK 
in northern Iraq.  (Additionally, we understand Washington is 
devising steps to cooperate with the Turks on diplomatic, 
intelligence, and law-enforcement steps we can take in 
Europe.)  Steps in Iraq could include: shutting down PKK 
offices (or front party offices) in major Iraqi cities where 
there is already strong CF and/or ISF presence, as well as 
arresting senior PKK leaders when they emerge from the 
mountains and into major Iraqi cities in the north.  We can 
alleviate the pressure on the Turks--and on our 
relationship--by agreeing to carry out missions such as 
these.  Should this current press controversy continue and 
accelerate, the PKK issue will once again threaten to 
overshadow our increasingly constructive relationship on 
Iraq.  End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered. 
MCELDOWNEY