This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PGOV AG MO WI
SUBJECT: JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS 
AND WESTERN SAHARA WITH BELKHEIR 
 
REF: A. STATE 122658 
     ¶B. ALGIERS 1250 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) In an extended exchange July 3 with Presidential Chief 
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador reviewed reftel talking points, 
expressing strong U.S. disappointment over recent setbacks in 
Moroccan-Algerian relations, noting that provocative actions 
from both sides had contributed to the current serious 
impasse, and underscoring the need for restraint and renewed 
efforts at rapprochement.  Belkheir reviewed the litany of 
Algerian grievances against Morocco; repeated previous 
arguments that by rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had 
missed a chance to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a way 
that would meet its concerns; and initially insisted that 
Algerian references to the Sahrawi right to independence, not 
just self-determination, was a longstanding Algerian 
position.  He contrasted this behavior to Algeria's 
unswerving and principled support over the last three decades 
for a UN-based solution to the Western Sahara issue that 
honored the principle of self-determination. 
 
¶2. (C) Belkheir also argued that if the United States really 
wanted to help, it should press Morocco to accept the Baker 
Plan, just as Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept it. 
 Belkheir later in the day briefed the Ambassador on 
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche.  In the 
clearest explanation to date as to why Algerian rhetoric may 
have hardened in recent weeks, Bouteflika said that in the 
context of current unacceptable Moroccan behavior, as long as 
Morocco was rejecting "international legality" by reversing 
its position on the holding of a referendum and by refusing 
to accept Baker, Algeria reserved the right, in reaction, to 
speak about Sahrawi rights to both self-determination and 
independence.  Should Morocco accept "international 
legality," Algeria would respond accordingly.  In the 
meantime, however, it would not accept a "fait accompli" on 
the Western Sahara.  Septel will offer an analysis and 
recommendations, from an Algiers perspective, on how we might 
manage -- and reverse -- the current setback in 
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. (End Summary) 
 
U.S. DISAPPOINTED OVER SETBACK TO 
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) During July 3 morning meeting with Presidential Chief 
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador expressed strong U.S. 
disappointment over recent setbacks in Moroccan-Algerian 
relations, triggered in part by provocative Algerian 
statements, and underscored the need for both sides to act 
with restraint and renew efforts at rapprochement.  Reviewing 
each of the talking points and noting that we understood 
Algerian frustrations, Ambassador argued it that both sides 
had contributed to the current impasse and that it was in 
both sides' interest to get things back on track.  Algeria 
and Morocco were neighbors and would always be so, and it 
served neither their interests nor the interests of the 
region to allow the current state of affairs to continue. 
Sooner or later, both sides would have to take up the work of 
resuming rapprochement, as they have periodically done in the 
past, so they might as well resume their efforts sooner 
rather than later.  Ambassador emphasized we were counting on 
the vision and statesmanship of President Bouteflika to 
choose a course of action that reflected Algeria's interests 
in regional cooperation and improved relations with Morocco. 
 
BELKHEIR: ALGERIA CAN'T ENGAGE WHEN MOROCCO 
IS CONTINUING SUCH UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Covering familiar territory, Belkheir reviewed the 
litany of Algerian complaints against Morocco, among other 
things, its rejection of the Baker Plan, its rejection of a 
referendum Morocco had previously agreed to, the extremely 
insulting manner in which the Moroccans had treated the 
Algerian prime minister by abruptly canceling his visit, the 
organization of anti-Algerian demonstrations by the Moroccan 
services, the violent suppression of Sahrawi demonstrators, 
insinuations that Algeria -- as opposed to Moroccan 
stonewalling -- was behind current Sahrawi unrest, inflows of 
Moroccan drugs, which was corrupting Algerian youth.  If this 
was the posture Morocco chose to adopt, so be it.  Algeria 
did not wish Morocco ill, but it could not engage with 
Morocco if it persisted in taking such positions. 
BELKHEIR:  IT'S TOO SOON TO 
RESUME RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador pushed back, repeating that continued 
tension helped no one and that both sides needed to find a 
way to rebuild confidence and get things back on track. 
Belkheir appeared to take the point but said it was too soon 
to consider such steps.  In this regard, he noted that after 
the cancellation of the Ouyahia visit, Moroccan Deputy 
Interior Minister al-Himma had called him to say they needed 
to continue dialogue.  Belkheir said he told al-Himma it was 
hard to talk about dialogue in the context of such publicly 
insulting behavior toward the Algerian head of government. At 
the very least, Ambassador rejoined, Algeria should avoid 
steps and declarations that would further complicate the 
situation.  Belkheir argued unconvincingly that, in any case, 
both the Polisario letter language and subsequent statements 
reflected longstanding Algerian positions. 
 
BELKHEIR UNFAVORABLY COMPARES 
CURRENT KING TO HIS FATHER 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) As in their previous conversation (Ref B), Ambassador 
said in the current context the "independence" rhetoric was a 
departure from the rhetoric of at least the last two years, 
which had stressed the right of self-determination, not the 
right to independence.  Morocco would never accept 
independence just as the Sahrawi would never accept 
integration.  That left autonomy as the only area of possible 
common ground, Ambassador continued.  So references to 
independence were not helpful in guiding expectations toward 
realistic outcomes.  Belkheir countered that the Baker Plan 
had provided a mechanism to achieve such an outcome by 
allowing all the inhabitants, Moroccan as well as Sahrawi, to 
vote in a referendum.  Unfavorably comparing Mohammed VI to 
his father, Belkheir argued the root of the problem was that 
Morocco lacked confidence and strong leadership.  Hassan II 
had been a tough adversary. 
 
¶7. (C) In the end, Belkheir claimed, Hassan (with whom he met 
many times as a secret emissary) understood what had to be 
done to protect Moroccan interests vis-a-vis the Western 
Sahara.  Accordingly, he had accepted a referendum and, 
subsequently, the autonomy approach Baker developed. 
Mohammed VI, by contrast, did not have his father's 
experience, was timid, and was surrounded by unhelpful 
advisers.  As a result, Morocco has rejected previously 
accepted positions and lost an opportunity -- via referendum 
voting procedures that would have allowed all Moroccan 
residents to participate -- to assure the outcome it needed. 
 
BELKHEIR STRESSES ALGERIA'S PRINCIPLED, 
UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) If the United States really wanted to help, it should 
pressure Morocco to abide by UN Security Council resolutions, 
just as Algeria had pressured the Polisario to accept the 
Baker Plan.  With some passion, Belkheir emphasized that no 
one had worked harder than he over the years for improved 
relations with Morocco and a settlement of the Western Sahara 
issue.  He also stressed the consistency of Algeria's 
position on self-determination over the years, noting Spanish 
Foreign Minister Moratinos' recent testimony that when Spain 
withdrew from the Western Sahara, it had transferred 
administrative responsibilities but not sovereignty to 
Morocco (and Mauritania).  He also cited Algeria's principled 
support for East Timorese self-determination, despite its 
very close and sentimental ties with Indonesia stemming from 
its support for Algeria's liberation struggle. 
 
BELKHEIR DISMISSES ANTI-SETTLEMENT 
ELEMENTS AS UNIMPORTANT IN GUIDING GOA POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador said he had no doubts about Belkheir's 
personal commitment to improve relations and resolve the 
Western Sahara issue in a manner that would address Moroccan 
concerns.  However, there were pockets of hardline thinking 
in the FLN as well as Algerian elements who had a vested 
interest in keeping the border closed and profiting from the 
illicit border trade.  Belkheir acknowledged that such 
attitudes existed but dismissed them as unimportant, 
insisting that the FLN, and especially minority elements 
within the FLN, did not/not make government policy.  As for 
the illicit border trade, the government was acutely aware of 
the problem and beginning to take strong measures against 
those involved.  (Note: in fact we have begun to see some 
interesting, relatively high profile anti-corruption 
prosecutions -- see septel.) 
 
BOUTEFLIKA: HARDENED ALGERIAN RHETORIC A 
RESPONSE TO ATTEMPTED MOROCCAN FAIT ACCOMPLI 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Later in the day, Belkheir phoned Ambassador to relay 
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche earlier in 
the day.  In the clearest explanation to date as to why the 
Algerian rhetorical position has hardened, and abandoning all 
pretense that current rhetoric simply reiterated longstanding 
positions, Belkheir explained that Bouteflika had become 
increasingly fed up with Morocco's behavior on the Western 
Sahara.  Morocco had reversed its previous acceptance of a 
referendum and had rejected the Baker Plan.  In so doing, it 
had rejected international legality.  "Tell the Ambassador," 
Bouteflika instructed Belkheir, "that until Morocco accepted 
this international legality, Algeria reserved the right to 
speak about the right of the Sahrawi people to 
self-determination AND independence."  Cutting to the chase 
and echoing comments in a recent interview with a Tunisian 
daily, in which he referred to Moroccan "chantage" 
(blackmail), Bouteflika vowed that Algeria would never accept 
a Moroccan fait accompli on the Western Sahara. 
ERDMAN