This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004690 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETTC KNNP KSTC IN NSSP
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY: GET NSSP OUT OF THE WAY, THE 
INDIAN WAY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a June 16 meeting with A/S Rademaker and 
the Ambassador, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said he wanted 
to "get NSSP out of the way" before PM Manmohan Singh's July 
18 visit in order "to move on to the bigger 
things we can do together," but stressed that "our way of 
doing things will be different."  Observing that it takes a 
long time to obtain support from institutional and political 
players in India, he emphasized that "once we 
have made a commitment, we'll live up to it."  Saran 
underlined India's need to maintain a domestic political 
consensus, warning that "it will be virtually impossible to 
adopt the same procedures as the US."  A/S Rademaker 
complimented India on progress to date, urged the GOI to 
answer questions raised by the recently-passed WMD Act, and 
to focus on implementation mechanisms.  He pointed out that 
harmonization and adherence to international control regimes 
are not the same, and that although every country can 
approach these issues differently, there is a common 
denominator, and a commonality about how lists are 
administered which India must keep in mind.  Saran responded 
that India,s new WMD law incorporates many existing laws, 
all of which already have implementing regulations.  India is 
now drafting implementing regulations for the new elements in 
the law such as intangibles.  As for how India would 
harmonize its control lists with the NSG and MTCR, Saran said 
the US needed to accept that there needs to be acceptance of 
diversity in the manner in which states adhere.  Commenting 
that "the hardest part is behind us," he said that the 
challenges that remain are doable.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Foreign Secretary began by noting that he was 
very encouraged by the new US-India paradigm the Secretary 
had set forth in recent months, stressing that he wanted to 
"get NSSP out of the way to move on to the bigger things we 
can do together."  On the recently-passed Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act, he said President APJ Abdul Kalam had just 
given his assent to the Act, and that "we've done the major 
part of what we're trying to do."  India was working hard to 
demonstrate that it is in conformity with the NSG and MCTR 
("which we are"), and should have that done before the PM's 
July 18 visit to Washington.  Saran was pleased that the USG 
is "looking at India as a partner, not as a problem," and 
that "sooner or later we will be partners," asking for ideas 
about how to take the partnership forward.  "Although India 
is not a member of the NPT, our behavior is such that we 
are," he stated. 
 
¶3.  (C) As far as the international non-proliferation regimes 
are concerned, the Foreign Secretary said the GOI had been 
pursuing a careful policy, declining to make statements about 
the inequitable nature of the NPT, for 
example.  India recognized, however, that the NPT contained 
serious inadequacies, particularly non-state actors and 
loopholes, which presented new challenges.  There was a major 
need to go beyond existing non-proliferation 
instruments.  India has been participating in the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) and Maritime Security Initiative 
(MSI), and also wanted to be part and parcel of the PSI, "if 
we can be taken on board as a full partner," he observed. 
 
Good WMD Law, Questions on Implementation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The USG was very pleased with the passage of the WMD 
law, A/S Rademaker said, which had gone smoother and quicker 
than expected, although it had also raised a number of 
questions, particularly the matter of implementing 
regulations.  Ultimately, the test is whether the GOI control 
list is harmonized with other international control lists and 
how it is administered.  On the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), the problem was not India's 
membership in the Core Group, but rather the Group itself, he 
said.  If it were to be expanded, as India wants, it would 
suggest continued relevance.  Noting that it had last met 
more than a year ago, Rademaker added that its success 
lies in its ad hoc nature.  No decision has been made to 
abolish the Core Group, nor was he certain one would be made 
before July 18, he remarked. 
 
Harmonization Problems 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera 
Shankar responded that India is looking into how to achieve 
harmonization with the international export control lists, 
but emphasized that the GOI "needs political space" to come 
into conformity with the NSG and MCTR regimes.  Saran added 
that "it seems odd that the US needs to see more happening." 
As the WMD law is an umbrella law, incorporating many pieces 
of existing legislation, the implementing regulations for the 
existing laws already exist.  The GOI has only to update 
those regulations to incorporate new elements in the WMD law 
such as intangibles and non-state actors. 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Rademaker reminded Saran that the GOI does not 
now control all items of non-proliferation concern, and urged 
new regulations to be promulgated quickly to do so.  Likening 
such a step with EU aspirant countries internalizing the 
Acquis Communautaire, he encouraged India to confirm that it 
is prepared to accept the rules of NSG and MCTR members. 
 
Our Way, and the Need for Political Consensus 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Saran replied that there needed to be a discussion 
and acceptance of diversity in the manner in which states 
adhere to the NSG and MCTR regimes.  Observing "the way you 
do controls should not be the same way we do," the Foreign 
Secretary warned that "I want to be clear that if that is the 
 
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expectation, we will fall short."  India is ready to give 
broad commitments, but as long as it is not a member, it is 
difficult to conform to all the rules and regulations 
membership entails.  "India is willing to be in conformity 
with what the regimes wish to achieve, but our way of doing 
things will be different."  Observing that it takes a long 
time to obtain a commitment from the various institutional 
and political players, he stressed that "once we have made a 
commitment, we'll live up to it." 
 
¶8.  (C) Stressing that India's existing body of laws and 
regulations are already being applied, Shankar asked for 
flexibility in implementation for domestic political reasons. 
 The GOI knew the best way to steer a course through its own 
system, she said, and the USG should "leave it to us to 
decide what is the best way to adhere."  "We are going 
through that exercise now, and hope to complete it before the 
PM's visit."  The Foreign Secretary stressed 
India's need to maintain a domestic political consensus, 
adding that "if we have to submit to you what we will do, it 
will be virtually impossible to adopt the same procedures as 
the US, and it will be out of the window immediately." 
 
¶9.  (C) Shankar recalled that the NSG control lists were 
adopted after the GOI nuclear tests, which fed the "almost 
universal perception in India that they are targeting us." 
The nuclear and high-tech communities will all ask 
"what we are getting from it?"  Describing the major 
diplomatic effort expended to obtain passage of the law, 
Saran urged the USG "not to make it too difficult" to 
convince the skeptics (in the Department of Atomic Energy, 
Department of Space, MoD, and DRDO).  Noting that the MEA had 
spent much political capital to get these organizations on 
board, he said "we do not want to have the sense that the 
goalposts are being moved." 
 
¶10.  (C) A/S Rademaker pointed out that harmonization and 
adherence are not the same principles, observing that while 
every country can approach this issue differently, there is a 
common denominator agreed to by all members, as well as a 
commonality about how the lists are administered.  India 
should keep this in mind as it works through these issues, he 
noted.  Commenting that "the hardest part is behind us," he 
said that what remains presents challenges, but is doable." 
 
¶11.  (C) Concluding the conversation, Shankar flagged two 
issues.  New Delhi: 
 
-- wanted assurances that it was "not a country of 
proliferation concern;" and 
 
-- regarding PSI, had reservations about others' authority to 
board Indian ships.  Noting that France had reportedly issued 
its own reservation on this score, she said India may have to 
seek one as well. 
 
¶12.  (U) USG Participants: 
 
Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker 
Ambassador David C. Mulford 
DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. 
Director, Office of Strategic Transition Robert Gromoll 
A/Political Counselor Matt Boyse, Notetaker 
 
Indian Participants: 
 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran 
Additional Secretary Meera Shankar 
Under Secretary (DISA) Nutan Kapoor 
 
¶13.  (U) A/S Rademaker departed post before clearing this 
message, and it is being sent before U/S Burns' June 21 
departure for India where he will meet with FS Saran. 
MULFORD