This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS; AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; OVP FOR 
NULAND; NES FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE; USAID FOR NATSIOS, 
PEARSON 
DEPARTMENT PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: ECON EINV PGOV PHUM ZT
SUBJECT: GOZ TELLS AMBASSADOR, WFP FOOD SITUATION UNDER 
CONTROL 
 
Classified By: Classified by Eric T. Schultz, reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) In a June 2 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister for 
Social Welfare Nicholas Goche said Zimbabwe faced a shortfall 
of 1.2 million metric tons of maize, but that the GOZ had 
already locked in enough imports from South Africa to cover 
the shortfall.  In that framework, the GOZ was prepared to 
accept international assistance.  Goche added that the GOZ 
was also trying to build up a strategic reserve.  The 
Ambassador responded that we would only provide food if asked 
and if needed.  He urged Goche to keep in mind that it would 
take several months for U.S. food to reach southern Africa. 
At a June 1 meeting with the diplomatic corps, WFP Executive 
Director James Morris had reported receiving a similar 
message and noted that the GOZ had 60 days to increase 
imports or ask for assistance before food stocks were 
depleted and serious shortages ensued.  He also said he had 
delivered a personal message from Kofi Annan to Mugabe on the 
GOZ,s recent crackdown.  End Summary. 
 
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Goche Waxes Panglossian 
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¶2. (C) Goche said because of drought in February and March 
the maize harvest would be on the order of only 800,000 MTs. 
In times of drought, farmers tended to keep a larger 
percentage of their harvest.  The GOZ was therefore planning 
to receive only about 300,000 MTs from the harvest, against a 
national need of 1.5 million MTs.  The government had taken 
quick action earlier this year to fill the 1.2 million 
shortfall.  The GOZ had contracted at favorable prices to 
import the full amount from South Africa and was currently 
receiving roughly 25,000 MTs a week.  The food was likely to 
be distributed through the food for work program, as well as 
commercially. 
 
¶3. (C) However, Goche said there was a parallel effort 
underway by &other arms of the government8 to bring in 
additional imports and to build up the country,s reserves. 
The goal was to import 35,000 MTs a week.  He would 
personally not rest easy until they reached that figure, 
which would give the country a margin of safety.  Goche said 
international assistance was welcome within this framework, 
which was what he and President Mugabe had told the visiting 
Executive Director of the UN,s World Food Program (WFP), 
James Morris, the day before. 
 
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Ambassador: Don,t Wait Too Long To Ask 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. traditionally 
provided the bulk of WFP food assistance, especially maize. 
The U.S. was prepared to respond to a request from Zimbabwe 
for assistance provided a clear need was demonstrated.  The 
U.S. owed it to its citizens not to &choke8 Zimbabwe with 
food assistance, in the colorful words of President Mugabe, 
if it was not really needed.  He noted that it took a minimum 
of three months to procure and ship U.S. corn to southern 
Africa and advised Goche to keep this delay in mind should an 
appeal ultimately be forthcoming.  Goche took the point, 
noting that the real minimum time needed was more likely to 
be six months. 
 
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NGO Role 
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¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that distribution would be key. 
He understood that Morris and President Mugabe had agreed 
that WFP would use its traditional NGO implementing partners. 
 In that regard, he advised that the overall climate for NGOs 
was important and that the GOZ needed to reduce the 
bureaucratic demands it placed on them.  Goche said the GOZ 
had agreed to use the WFP,s traditional formula should an 
appeal be needed.  It had worked well in the past and there 
was no reason to depart from it.  This included an umbrella 
MOU between the WFP and GOZ that would cover the activities 
of all NGOs (contrary to what he had told Morris the day 
before ) that each NGO would need a separate MOU).  He added 
that the GOZ regarded most NGOs favorably, it was only a 
handful that had failed to comply with Zimbabwe laws that had 
created problems. 
 
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Morris Visit 
------------ 
 
¶6. (C) At a June 1 luncheon, WFP,s Morris provided the 
diplomatic corps with a readout of his visit.  He said he had 
come with a private message for Mugabe from Kofi Annan on the 
GOZ,s recent crack down, which Morris would only note 
included an appeal to treat people &humanely.8  On food 
assistance, Morris said Mugabe had told him the GOZ was 
importing 1.2 million MTs for immediate needs and another 
600,000 MTs for their reserve.  In that regard, there had 
been no response to Morris, request for an estimate of the 
scale of food needs and the GOZ had stuck to the line that 
though not needed any help volunteered would be welcome. 
However, based on field reports, the WFP had increased its 
estimate of regional needs to 700,000 MTs.  He added that the 
GOZ had food for the next 60 days, after which it could face 
serious shortages if imports did not arrive or assistance 
were not provided.  In the event of an appeal, Mugabe had 
agreed to allow the WFP to work through its traditional 
partners and had agreed that the GOZ would have no role in 
distribution nor would it interfere. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (C) We are highly dubious that the GOZ has enough foreign 
exchange to pay for 1.2 million MTs of corn, let alone 1.8 
million, and would appreciate the views of Embassy 
Pretoria,s Ag Counselor on whether South African exports to 
Zimbabwe have increased.  We believe it is equally unlikely 
the GOZ will be able to distribute such quantities through 
the food for work program, should they succeed in importing 
the grain.  Finally, if it is true that the GOZ has allocated 
sufficient foreign exchange to obtain the corn on its own, 
then it must be at enormous cost to the rest of the economy, 
including likely prolonged fuel shortages that will cripple 
economic activity. 
DELL