This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/K 
HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PARM PHUM KN KS TH DPRK
SUBJECT: THAILAND-DPRK RELATIONS: RTG SEES ITSELF AS 
CREDIBLE "MEDIATOR" 
 
REF: A. STATE 97063 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 3590 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 3283 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 3128 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1  (C)  SUMMARY: In past and recent high-level meetings 
between senior U.S. and Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
officials, the Thais have noted their willingness to serve as 
a "mediator," or otherwise be helpful in international 
efforts to return North Korea (DPRK) to the Six-Party Talks. 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Deputy Prime Minister 
Surakiart Sathirathai (when he was foreign minister) and 
Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon have all indicated 
their personal readiness to become involved in the issue. 
MFA interlocutors have indicated that several Thai 
initiatives are already underway.  FM Kantathi will travel to 
Pyongyang July 8-12 to lay the ground work for a possible 
visit by Prime Minister Thaksin to meet with Kim Jong Il. 
While Thailand does have commercial interests in the DPRK, 
the Thai goal of playing some role in Korean peninsula 
diplomacy appears to be based primarily on PM Thaksin's 
ambitions that he and Thailand raise their leadership profile 
in the region, and on DPM Surakiart's aggressive, ongoing 
campaign to become the next UNSYG.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THAI PROPOSAL: "LET US SERVE AS MEDIATORS WITH THE DPRK" 
 
¶2.  (C)  During Deputy Secretary Zoellick's and PACOM 
Commander Admiral Fallon's visits to Bangkok in May, Foreign 
Minister Kantathi raised the possibility of Thailand playing 
a "mediating" role with the North Koreans "in order to get 
them re-engaged with the international community" (reftels 
C,D).  During a May 31 meeting with Polcouns, MFA Deputy 
Director General for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Chakarin 
Chayabongse and Director of Korean Affairs Suprapon Petch-Vra 
(reftel B) made a direct offer for Thailand to serve as a 
mediator.  Chakarin noted that Thailand is interested in 
contributing to stability in the region and intended to 
respond to North Korean overtures for closer ties in 2005, 
the 30th anniversary year of Thai-North Korean relations. 
"The anniversary gives Thailand an opportunity to play an 
important contribution, and move the Six-Party Talks forward 
from the standstill they are at now," said Chakarin. 
 
RECENT THAI ENGAGEMENT WITH THE KOREANS 
 
¶3.  (C)  In outlining Thailand's suitability for some kind of 
role, MFA officials emphasize the RTG's "closeness" to the 
U.S. and China and what they regard as a "unique" level of 
trust between the RTG and the DPRK.  North Korean officials 
apparently went to great lengths to pursue a bilateral 
meeting on the margins of the April 22-23 Asia-Africa Summit 
in Indonesia between PM Thaksin and Kim Yong Nam, President 
of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium.  During that 
meeting Thaksin and Kim reportedly discussed the possibility 
of Thaksin visiting North Korea to meet with Kim Jong Il. 
(Note: Thaksin met Kim Jong Il in North Korea as a private 
businessman, before he became Thailand's PM.  End Note.)  The 
North Koreans reportedly told Thaksin in Jakarta that they 
consider him -- and Thailand -- to be trusted interlocutors. 
During his June 6 meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld (septel), 
Thaksin confirmed that he had offered to serve as a mediator 
and was prepared to meet personally with Kim Jong Il. 
Thaksin said Foreign Minister Kantathi would travel to North 
Korea July 8-12 to discuss this possibility with the North 
Koreans. 
 
¶4.  (C)  MFA officials told poloffs on May 31 that the RTG is 
in contact with the North Koreans at several levels and that 
recently there have been positive indications from the DPRK 
on their willingness to rejoin the Six-Party talks. 
(Comment:  This could be wishful Thai thinking as the MFA 
officials were not very explicit about the exchanges and had 
no details to offer about the circumstances under which this 
might happen.  End Comment.)  The MFA officials said that the 
North Koreans had asked them to quietly approach other 
countries on their behalf to assure them that North Korea is 
not a threat. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Kim Hong-Kyun, Political Counselor of the ROK 
Embassy in Bangkok, recently confirmed to poloffs that during 
Thaksin's May 24-27 visit to South Korea the PM also told 
President Roh that he was willing to play a mediating role 
between North Korea and the international community.  Thaksin 
reportedly told Roh that he was prepared to personally meet 
with Kim Jong Il.  Counselor Kim said the ROK understands 
that the purpose of FM Kantathi's July visit to North Korea 
is primarily to lay the ground work for such a Thaksin 
meeting. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kim reported that the ROK Embassy has frequent 
exchanges with the Thai MFA about the Thai offer to be a 
"mediator" with North Korea.  Kim noted that Thailand enjoys 
good relations with both the DPRK and the ROK.  He said the 
ROK welcomed the Thai offer to play a role as long as the 
clear message delivered to the DPRK is that North Korea 
should return to the Six-Party talks. 
 
WHY ARE THE THAIS SO INTERESTED IN NORTH KOREA? 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Thai interest in the Korean Peninsula is 
probably based on two primary factors: Thaksin's desire for a 
larger personal leadership role and a higher diplomatic 
profile for Thailand in the region; and Deputy Prime Minister 
Surakiart's overt campaign to become the next UNSYG.  ROK 
Counselor Kim Hong-Kyun and Dr. Vitit Muntarbhorn (a 
respected academic and human rights activist, and currently 
the first UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK 
by the UN Human Rights Commission) both share this 
assessment.  Vitit opined to poloffs that the RTG saw the 
potential publicity surrounding Thailand's involvement with 
North Korea as a possible huge boost to their international 
image, which would greatly bolster Surakiart's bid to become 
UN Secretary General. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Vitit also noted what many other regional observers 
have been pointing out for some time: Thaksin is very serious 
in his drive to be recognized as a prominent leader in Asia. 
Thaksin understands that he has a window of opportunity now 
given the relatively weak leadership offered by Thailand's 
neighbors and other ASEAN countries, and wants to firmly 
establish Thailand and himself as Southeast Asia's undisputed 
leader, and a force in Asia writ large. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Besides the personal ambitions of Thaksin and 
Surakiart, commercial factors probably should be considered 
when analyzing the recent Thai interest in North Korea.  But 
the Thai try to minimize that factor.  During poloffs' 
meeting with MFA DDG Chakarin, he said that Pyongyang is 
overdue in paying the RTG 150 million dollars for past rice 
sales, and that the pursuit of close ties with the DPRK was a 
matter of establishing "trust not trade."  Nevertheless, the 
main thrust of Thaksin's overall foreign policy as "CEO Prime 
Minister" is an expansion of trade and commercial 
opportunities, and the Thai may see long-term potential in 
North Korea for their telecom and agricultural sectors. 
BOYCE