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Viewing cable 05ALGIERS1233, NEW PRO-REFORM FINANCE MINISTER MOVING QUICKLY ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ALGIERS1233 2005-06-15 18:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Algiers
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV AG
SUBJECT: NEW PRO-REFORM FINANCE MINISTER MOVING QUICKLY ON 
BANK PRIVATIZATION 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 883 
 
     B. ALGIERS 491 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, reason 1.4(b). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. Ambassador called on Finance Minister Mourad Medelci to 
extend congratulations and discuss the Minister's financial 
and economic vision for the country after his first five 
weeks in office.  Medelci was bullish on the need for reform; 
announced the imminent privatization of three state-owned 
banks, with majority ownership to be made available to 
interested foreign firms; and said the bank payment system 
would become electronically automated by the end of 2005 and 
the bank market completely opened by the end of 2006. 
Medelci approved of the sovereign financing approach for the 
East-West Highway project, saying it would stimulate other 
transportation-related infrastructure development, including 
rail line extensions and electrification.  Medelci eagerly 
sought foreign investment in the tourism sector.  He 
expressed the need to send positive signals to foreign 
investors, acknowledging with a shrug of the shoulders that 
the September 2004 banking directive had negatively affected 
Algeria's image.  Medelci intended to focus on three reforms: 
banking, budget, and land ownership.  Algeria sought budget 
management training and was drafting land reform laws to 
create a national property market.  (End Summary.) 
 
MEDELCI ON EAST-WEST HIGHWAY 
AND TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In a June 13 courtesy call to newly-installed Finance 
Minister Mourad Medelci, Ambassador discussed Algeria's 
approach to the East-West Highway project, highlighting some 
of what he had learned during the Ministry of Public Works' 
June 11 highway seminar.  If the project was to be completed 
by the 2009 deadline set by President Bouteflika, Ambassador 
noted, Algeria could not afford to waste more time in 
selecting contractors for the three highway segments.  The 
current approach could push a contracting decision into 
October, ensuring construction would not begin until well 
into 2006 and making it impossible for even a world-class 
firm like Becthel to meet the deadlines.  Given the magnitude 
of this project ($6-7 billion) and the fact that detailed 
designs did not exist, in selecting a contractor (or 
contractors) the GOA should be looking for a strategic 
partnership in which trust and proven capacity for quality 
were paramount. 
 
3. (C) Medelci acknowledged that Algeria had little 
experience in highway construction and that the project's 
plans were unfinished.  However, Algeria was fortunate to 
have attracted a pool of interested candidates.  The 
Ambassador was correct, Medelci said, in encouraging Algeria 
to opt for a sovereign financing approach rather than a 
consortium, which would have been more complex, more costly, 
and prone to delays.  Absent that choice, the number of 
partners in the project would have been unmanageable.  The 
prospect of a limited pool of candidates also appeared to 
captivate the imaginations of the project's directors.  Other 
future projects of large scale were now being planned, 
including the extension of east-west rail links and the 
electrification of Algeria's rail lines.  Experience on the 
highway project would give Algeria a point of reference for 
these infrastructure improvements.  Medelci invited 
Ambassador to maintain the same close-working relationship 
with him that Ambassador had with Benachenhou, who also 
happened to be Medelci's long-time friend and high-school 
classmate. 
 
SEEKING NON-HYDROCARBONS 
INVESTMENT: TOURISM TARGETED 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador said U.S.-Algerian relations had been 
growing in recent years, and that mutual interests would 
continue to bring the countries together.  Medelci replied 
that Algeria really wanted U.S. firms to invest in areas 
outside hydrocarbons.  Tourism was the one sector in which 
Algeria expected to see significant developments, Algeria 
being the last unexplored tourist destination on the 
Mediterranean.  Tourism was an important link in greater 
regional integration and globalization, which, Medelci 
argued, prevented war between countries.  Algerians needed to 
develop the proper mentality to promote tourism and create a 
positive investment climate for it.  Ambassador said it would 
be important to aim for quality tourism more than mass 
tourism. 
 
ON BANKING REFORM AND THE IMMINENT 
PRIVATIZATION OF THREE BANKS 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Asked what he thought about the reform process, 
Medelci said reform was a means to attain an objective.  The 
banking system, his priority for reform, needed to grow in 
transparency, efficiency, and security.  The means to this 
end would be through better organization, not legislation. 
Algerian banks were not yet modernized, but Algeria sought to 
convert them fully to an electronic payments system by the 
end of 2005.  By the end of 2006, the banking market would be 
fully open to competition.  However, Medelci acknowledged it 
would not be the mechanical improvements that would increase 
Algeria's experience in banking; the analytical work, 
customer contact, and service promotion had greater roles to 
play in developing the sector.  Algeria was still in the 
process of opening this market and would create a draft law 
on banking reform. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador asked where opening three state banks to 
private capital stood.  Medelci said privatization of three 
banks (CPA, BNA, and BDL) was imminent.  The tenders for the 
banks would be released "within a few weeks."  As a result of 
recent decisions, the GOA had dropped its earlier limits on 
private participation (first 30%, then 47%) and would now 
permit foreign 51-percent private majority ownership of the 
Algerian banks, and maybe more.  Until now, Medelci said, not 
many U.S. banks had expressed interest in acquiring state 
banks.  Requiring foreigners to hold minority stakes would 
lead to the degredation of the foreign banks, when the real 
goal was to bring in best-practices from abroad.  (Comment: 
The decision to proceed with three bank privatizations at 
once, instead of piecemeal, is significant in that the 
Ministry of Finance succeeded in establishing that there 
would be no foreign buyers if only minority stakes were 
offered. End Comment.)  Ambassador said this decision would 
enable foreign private banks to train a new generation of 
Algerian bankers in modern banking methods. 
 
7. (C) Turning to the September 2004 banking directive 
requiring public companies to hold accounts in public banks 
(leading to a 25% loss in business at Citibank Algeria), 
Ambassador emphasized it was important for Algeria to send 
positive signals to foreign investors.  The banking directive 
did the opposite.  Medelci, noting this had been a high level 
decision that he had to live with for now, said he understood 
"very well" this outcome and that his Ministry would 
progressively try to send positive messages to counteract the 
negative effects of the directive.  Ambassador also mentioned 
that during Temmar's late 2004 visit to the U.S., Paul 
Volcker had offered to review Algeria's banking reform plans. 
 Medelci said he would talk to Temmar to see if the plan was 
ready for review. 
 
MEDELCI'S TOP THREE PRIORITIES 
AND VIEWS ON THE INFORMAL MARKET 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Algeria's top three reform priorities from Medelci's 
perspective were banking reform, budget reform, and land 
reform.  With regard to budget reform, Algeria did not have 
good action plans to improve budget forecasting and 
management.  The execution of financial plans needed to be 
more transparent; Algeria had already sought World Bank 
assistance in this area.  On land reform, Medelci said 
Algeria needed to clarify land ownership, which was a source 
of many legal problems, and create a property market. 
Algeria was putting together a draft law to accelerate this 
transition.  The government was the sole authority for 
approving private land purchases, a process that needed to 
change.  Inter-ministerial talks would address this issue. 
 
9. (C) The most complex economic question, Medelci admitted, 
was that of the informal economy, which was "nourished by bad 
economic policies."  If the informal market was caused by 
people fleeing taxes, he wondered aloud, then perhaps the 
government needed to ask itself if the tax rates were too 
high.  Part of the motivation for the informal economy 
stemmed from a desire for mobility.  Algeria countered this 
by taking steps making it easier to apply for legitimate 
business licenses, reducing the number of approvals required 
to three.  The ANSEJ (youth employment agency) loans-to-youth 
program was expected to encourage the development of 150,000 
small businesses over three years.  This could have the 
effect of reducing the size of the informal market -- a 
market that already existed 15 years ago and was now 
three-times larger because of terrorism's intervening effects 
on the economy.  Algeria needed to catch-up and better 
control the informal market. 
10. (C) In closing, Ambassador suggested that the GOA and 
private sector needed to communicate better and see each 
other as strategic partners.  The government provided the 
playing field and the private sector provided the players, 
but both were necessary to score goals.  In this regard, he 
recalled a recent conversation with a leading Algerian 
business owner, who said the government should be making his 
life easier, not more difficult, because he paid over $100 
million a year in taxes and the government was thus in effect 
his largest share-holder.  GOA officials, continued 
Ambassador, in turn complained that the private sector still 
treated the government as an adversary despite the fact it 
has made clear its commitment to privatization and an open 
market system dominated by the private sector.  Medelci 
agreed with the need for dialogue and noted that he had 
invited members of business-owners organizations to attend 
lunch at the Ministry that same day.  It was the first time 
they had ever set foot in the Ministry!  (Comment: Ambassador 
gave a public speech June 4 in which he urged better 
government-private sector communication.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) Medelci is part of the same pro-reform class as his 
predecessor.  With three bank privatizations to be announced 
during his first few months in office, he will be overseeing 
a critical phase of Algeria's transition to a market economy. 
 His comments indicate he has a strong grasp of Algeria's 
economic weaknesses, and he has clearly prioritized his plan 
of action.  His focus on the tourism sector seems, from our 
perspective, to be astray; Algeria's plans for rapid 
development of tourism seem overly optimistic. The country 
lacks the proper infrastructure, the services, and the 
mindset (as Medelci admitted) for tourism to flourish. 
 
ERDMAN