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Viewing cable 05ABUJA953, NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ABUJA953 2005-06-02 07:14 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/RSA; INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015 
TAGS: MCAP MASS PGOV PINR KDEM KPKO NI POLMIL
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES 
 
REF: A. 04 ABUJA 1813 
     B. 04 ABUJA 1997 
     C. ABUJA 676 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (S)  Summary.  Nigeria's military is the largest in West 
Africa, but is significantly less capable than its size and 
equipment inventory would indicate.  A large percentage of 
the Army is capable of little more than basic defensive 
operations, and most of Nigeria's ships and aircraft are 
inoperable.  The leadership of the military, from junior to 
senior levels, recognizes the role that the Armed Forces play 
as Nigeria's most effective national institution, and the 
principal one committed to its unity.  We do not know as much 
as we would like about the attitudes and motivations of the 
mid-grade officers, and they have missed opportunities to be 
exposed to U.S. training during periods of IMET suspension. 
The military continues to be intensively employed, and 
stretched thin, with significant (and increasing) internal 
and external deployments.  There may come a point, perhaps 
soon, when Nigeria's military can no longer meet all of its 
commitments, particularly if one or more new internal 
security crises erupt.  The U.S. security assistance program 
for Nigeria, while significant, can hope to do little more 
than influence the direction Nigeria moves in, particularly 
if Nigeria continues to fail fully to commit itself to the 
modernization and improvement of its Armed Forces.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  This is the first in a three cable series 
examining the current state of the Nigerian military, and 
particularly its role in Nigerian politics.  This cable 
provides a broad overview of the military, its current 
operations, and U.S. security assistance programs.  The 
second cable will delve into the "nuts and bolts" of the 
major players in the defense establishment and the power 
dynamics visible to Post.  The final cable will examine the 
question of whether the military is truly done in politics in 
Nigeria, and the circumstances that could trigger a renewed 
involvement. 
 
------------------------ 
ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES 
------------------------ 
 
3.  (C)  As a large, complex organization, the Nigerian 
military contains a number of contradictions, incongruities, 
and internal disjunctions.  It is the largest, most capable 
military in West Africa with major foreign deployments under 
ECOWAS and the AU, as well as extensive UN PKO commitments. 
At the same time, chronic under-resourcing has led to low 
operational readiness, lack of training, and relatively poor 
conditions of service.  These problems, along with endemic 
corruption, have made the Nigerian military somewhat of a 
hollow giant resting on its reputation -- more capable than 
any other force in the sub-region, but considerably less 
capable than it should be with 80,000 troops and a large 
stock of major weapons systems and other equipment.  A high 
percentage of the heart of the force -- the 60,000-soldier 
strong Army's 25 infantry battalions -- are capable of little 
more than basic defensive operations.  Most of Nigeria's 
ships and aircraft are inoperable.  Of its 8 C-130s, only one 
is operational, and a recent USAF technical inspection 
revealed that even this one serviceable aircraft does not 
meet USAF airworthiness standards.  There are six times as 
many general officers and flag officers in the Nigerian Air 
Force (NAF) and Nigerian Navy (NN) as there are operational 
ships and aircraft. 
 
4.  (S)  Nevertheless, the Nigerian Armed Forces, 
particularly the Army, retains its role as the bulwark 
against Nigerian anarchy.  It is the nation's one 
indispensable institution, committed to Nigerian unity and 
sovereign survival -- a role military leaders revel in and 
brag about.  The Armed Forces is also arguably Nigeria's most 
effective national institution.  The leadership of the Armed 
Forces, at the highest levels, consistently makes public 
statements supporting civilian control of the military, and 
recognizing the military's appropriate role in a democracy. 
The senior leadership seems to understand the penalties that 
would result if the military should "misbehave" again.  They 
recognize the missed training opportunities that have 
resulted as the U.S. and other international partners have 
suspended important programs in the wake of coups and human 
rights abuses.  Nigeria's top military leaders also 
frequently comment about the need to "reprofessionalize" the 
officer ranks.  We do not know as much we would like about 
the attitudes of mid-grade officers, and we have had little 
opportunity to influence them -- they are among the lost 
generations who have not been able to benefit from U.S. IMET 
training during the years the program has been suspended. 
What we do know is that the Army is frequently used in 
internal security operations -- currently there are 10-12 
battalions committed internally, including four in the 
Bakassi peninsula.  Whenever the Army is employed in this 
manner, the availability for training is low and the 
potential for human rights violations is high. 
 
5.  (S)  This high level of internal security operations, 
combined with participation in foreign peacekeeping missions, 
has stretched the Armed Forces thin (Ref A).  However, they 
always seem able to find the resources for just "one more" 
mission.  For example, they were able to come up with a 
battalion for Darfur in October 2004 when, on the face of it, 
all their battalions were fully committed, and they have now 
pledged an additional two battalions for Sudan (whether for 
Darfur or the North/South peace process is not clear yet). 
They are also from the "just do it" school of deployments. 
They were able to deploy to Darfur in mid 2004 and then in 
early 2005 using their own C-130s (even though one broke down 
during the initial operation).  The Nigerians recognize that 
logistics and strategic lift are major weaknesses and have 
repeatedly expressed an interest in U.S. assistance in these 
areas (but have thus far taken little initiative on their 
own).  So far, the Nigerian military has been able to take on 
and sustain "one more" mission, but we need to recognize 
that, in the end, personnel, supplies, and equipment are 
finite resources, and one day "one more mission" will be one 
too many.  Given the military's significant role in quelling 
domestic violence, there could well be tensions in the face 
of competing priorities for military manpower. 
 
6.  (U)  The Nigerian military has both suffered from and 
gloried in its PKO (peacekeeping operations) participation. 
The Nigerian military's reputation certainly took some hits 
in the early days of ECOMOG for its unprofessional 
performance.  They generally fought well (with a few notable 
defeats), but they also looted, engaged in corruption, and 
committed human rights violations.  The latter days of ECOMOG 
and ECOMIL's performance in Liberia in 2003 seem to have 
restored some pride in the military.  The senior Nigerian 
military leadership seems to see participation in 
peacekeeping missions, especially UN operations, as a means 
of restoring both soldiers' pride and public confidence in 
the military.  Current deployments include two battalions in 
Liberia, one battalion in Sierra Leone, and one (soon two) in 
Sudan.  Nigeria also has military observers in Cote d'Ivoire, 
DROC, Western Sahara, and Darfur.  President Obasanjo has 
mentioned the possibility of committing troops to missions in 
Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, and DROC, but he has not mentioned 
where these soldiers would come from.  Nigeria is starting to 
make an effort to keep units deployed outside of Nigeria on a 
6 month rotation schedule and has made a commitment to make a 
motorized infantry battalion and a variety of combat support 
and logistics elements available to the ECOWAS Standby Force. 
 
------------------- 
Security Assistance 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  The U.S. security assistance program in Nigeria has 
4 objectives:  the reprofessionalization of the military, 
reinforcement of the military's subordination to civilian 
control, improvement of Nigeria's capability to respond to 
regional threats and conduct peacekeeping operations, and 
enhancement of the military's capability to control Nigeria's 
borders and territorial waters, particularly as it relates to 
the Global War on Terrorism.  Underpinning all of this, we 
are also working to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on the 
Nigerian military.  Until the Nigerian government makes a 
real and sustained commitment to modernize and improve the 
Armed Forces, however, the impact of U.S. assistance will be 
minimal.  Our FMF (Foreign Military Financing) budget for 
Nigeria will never be enough to do more than influence the 
direction that Nigeria moves in.  IMET and various 
military-to-military events will remain the best and most 
effective way to guard U.S. long-term security interests in 
Nigeria.  IMET's positive impact on the military would be far 
greater than its relatively modest budget would suggest, were 
it restarted. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Sanctions placed on Nigeria after the failure to 
hold anyone accountable for the 2001 massacre of civilians at 
Zaki-Biam were lifted in 2005, but the subsequent sanctions 
relating to Charles Taylor remain.  These sanctions prohibit 
IMET training and the execution of new FMF cases.  Other 
forms of military engagement, however, are still permitted. 
We are working to schedule a series of joint exercises that 
will enhance the capability of the Army to work in riverine 
areas.  We are working to improve the tactical skills of the 
Nigerian Air Force.  We are attempting to bring Nigeria into 
an ACOTA partnership (Ref C).  We are also offering Nigeria 
the opportunity to participate in naval exercises, such as 
the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC). 
 
9.  (U)  The U.S. funded and helps to run the only Joint 
Conflict and Tactical Simulator (JCATS) in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Ref B).  This powerful simulator allows the Armed Forces to 
realistically plan and train for a wide variety of 
conventional peacekeeping and internal security operations. 
The JCATS program has been successful, but once it is 
entirely Nigerian-run in 2005, it will be difficult to 
sustain the current level of effectiveness due to budget 
constraints and the difficulty of retaining skilled and 
experienced Nigerian operators.  There are tentative plans, 
however, to link continued U.S. funding of the Simulator to 
Nigerian support for ECOWAS Peacekeeping training. 
 
10.  (U)  Another important area of cooperation is with the 
C-130 fleet.  Even though we have a 7.5M USD maintenance and 
training program (pre-sanction FMF), we will not begin to see 
major improvements in the C-130 fleet until Nigeria decides 
to dedicate a significant amount of its own resources to 
conduct the maintenance.  We are working with the Nigerian 
Air Force on a plan to reduce the size of their fleet so 
resources are better focused. 
 
11.  (U)  We have an ongoing sustainment program to support 
the four American-provided U.S. Coast Guard buoy tenders. 
These boats have proven to be effective, with some small 
modifications, in providing security to oil platforms.  The 
Nigerian Navy has recently taken delivery of the first 4 of 
15 U.S. Coast Guard Defender-class patrol boats (a Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) purchase), and the Chief of Naval Staff 
intends to push for the President to purchase more once these 
are all delivered. 
 
12.  (U)  Nigeria has an official HIV/AIDS prevalence of 
about 5%, and the rate in the military is believed to be 
significantly higher, particularly in units that have 
participated in foreign peacekeeping missions.  Nigeria is a 
PEPFAR country and the Nigerian military has proven receptive 
and energetic in working with the U.S. on combating HIV/AIDS. 
 In FY05, approximately 5.5M USD will be dedicated towards 
combating HIV/AIDS in the military.  A centerpiece of our 
efforts will be the start this year of a U.S. DOD/Nigerian 
HIV/AIDS Training Center.  This will also serve as a training 
laboratory to allow us to expand our effort to other Nigerian 
military health care facilities. 
CAMPBELL