This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241114Z Jun 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT SET TO DECIDE 2003 ELECTIONS CASE 
JULY 1 
 
REF: A. A) 04 ABUJA 2104 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. B) ABUJA 435 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The two-year saga of Nigeria's 2003 
elections is due to close its final legal chapter on or about 
July 1 when the Supreme Court is slated to announce its 
decision in the case brought by ANPP candidate Buhari against 
PDP's President Obasanjo over abuse of security forces, 
lapses in voting procedures and other elements of the 
severely flawed elections. The public aspect of the Supreme 
Court was short, but typified the delaying tactics of the 
Obasanjo's and INEC's attorneys throughout the ordeal. Behind 
the scenes, pressure on the judiciary and other participants 
has been strong and continues in anticipation of the ruling. 
Buhari, who pledged to pursue the court process without 
public pressure, seems to be warming up his campaign machine 
even as the pro-Obasanjo camp and other members of government 
have begun showing their concern over possible outcomes. The 
concerns are real, as the case presents potential disruptions 
to the already fragile fabric of the Nigerian state 
regardless of the decision. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  The two-year saga of Nigeria's 2003 elections is due 
to close its final legal chapter on July 1 when the Supreme 
Court is slated to announce its decision in the case brought 
by ANPP candidate Muhammadu Buhari against PDP's President 
Olusegun Obasanjo over abuse of security forces, lapses in 
voting procedures and other elements of the severely flawed 
elections. Throughout the trial, Buhari's attorney, Mike 
Ahamba, presented evidence claiming that Obasanjo and Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar used governmental authority to 
disrupt the electoral process and directed now-sacked 
Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun to use the Nigeria 
Police Force to ensure a "PDP victory" (ref A). He also 
presented a series of election day tabulation sheets that 
were at odds with those provided late in the trial by the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The case 
saw INEC refuse to provide official elections results in 
spite of several court orders. 
 
---------------------- 
THE SUPREME COURT SITS 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The public aspect of the Supreme Court was short but 
typified the delaying tactics of the Obasanjo's and INEC's 
attorneys throughout the ordeal.  Both sittings of the 
Supreme Court took place in a six-story courtroom amid heavy 
security and a standing-room-only audience of Buhari 
well-wishers.  Buhari's attorney Mike Ahamba (a Christian 
Igbo) asked that the documents filed be amended to correct a 
number of typographic errors and then asked to have one of 
the Appellate Court decisions amended based on the 
handwritten notes of the Justice that wrote it.  The 
President's attorney Afe Babalola (a Christian Yoruba) and 
INEC's attorney Joe Gadzama (a Middle Belt Christian) 
attempted to delay the second sitting through several 
interventions.  Two separate justices, including Chief 
Justice Mohammad Uwais, admonished them, stating "don't waste 
our time."  Gadzama again argued that "INEC cannot be 
responsible for" complaints about the party affiliation of 
Resident Elections Commissioners in each state; "it is up to 
the President to appoint whomsoever he chooses." 
 
--------------------- 
PRESSURE ON THE COURT 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Behind the scenes, pressure on the judiciary and 
other participants has been strong and continues in 
anticipation of the ruling. According to the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court Mohammad Uwais, attempts have been made to 
bribe, blackmail, intimidate and threaten him. After a break 
in at his office (ref B), the pressure turned to threats and 
he told PolOff that he has been cautious about his public 
appearances and personal travel. Just before the latest 
bribery allegations (septel), he told PolOff that he was 
"committed" to seeing the process through and had never 
considered walking away from the challenge. He provided a 
glimpse into his thought processes with an evaluation of the 
merits and faults of the to candidates. He characterized 
Buhari as "honest, hardworking and sincere," and commented 
that Buhari would eliminate corruption. He criticized Buhari 
for having an "ineffective campaign organization." "He is too 
loyal to those who have helped him in the past and is 
reluctant to dismiss some who are detrimental to his 
efforts," Uwais said. 
¶5.  (C)  On the other hand, Uwais said that Obasanjo was 
"mean, insincere and not trustworthy." "He would turn on 
anyone for petty personal reasons," he said, and continued 
that Obasanjo was "increasingly addicted to the office of the 
Presidency." After complaining that Obasanjo was almost 
"completely out of touch" with the thoughts and needs of 
Nigeria, he commented that "at least Obasanjo has appointed 
some advisers with credentials even if their actions and 
motives are suspect." Uwais stressed that his analysis was 
"personal" and that the Supreme Court was not "trying to 
select Nigeria's next President," but rather deal with the 
legal and political issues raised in the case. As usual, 
PolOff did not ask for particulars on the case and Uwais 
declined to discuss details. 
 
----------------- 
BUHARI'S STRATEGY 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Buhari, who pledged to pursue the court process 
without public pressure, seems to be warming up his campaign 
machine. After a successful outing in Kaduna in April, Buhari 
is trying to cement his new relations with politicians in the 
Southwest. His appearance at a June 12 rally in Lagos 
(septel) brought together elements of the political 
structures from the North, the Southwest and the Southeast. 
According to Embassy contacts, he has been reaching out to 
his allies throughout the country in recent weeks and is 
"looking forward to the decision, regardless of the outcome." 
Buhari told PolOff that he hopes to begin a "thank-you tour" 
throughout the country shortly after the ocurt decision. His 
previous attempts holding political meetings have generally 
been aborted by government officials for "security reasons," 
but he believes that he can organize political rallies 
without excessive problems from the government agents. 
 
------------------ 
GOVERNMENT ANXIETY 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Dismissive until now, some of Obasanjo's political 
operatives are discussing the outcome of the case. Still, 
their belief now, as it was early in the process, is that the 
"court will uphold the elections in the interest of 
stability."  The fact that they consider the case worthy of 
discussion is in stark contrast to their attitude in 2003. 
The stock answer belies a nervousness not evident a year ago, 
and many comment that they are concerned about the nation's 
stability even without specific reference to this case. The 
Vice President and his advisors are also looking into the 
possibilities of the various outcomes. While most of this 
camp, too, says that overturning the election is not likely, 
some admit to contacting Buhari to explore future cooperation 
against an Obasanjo-Babangida political challenge. Many of 
these politicians also justify upholding the 2003 elections, 
not for legal reasons, but because "holding a new election 
would be impossible to coordinate" within the 90-day 
constitutionally mandated timeframe. 
 
---------------------- 
COMMENTS AND SCENARIOS 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The concerns of Nigerians are real as this case 
presents potential disruptions to the already fragile fabric 
of the Nigerian state regardless of the decision. The two 
prime outcomes of the election would be to uphold the 
elections or to call for new elections within a few months. 
 
     TO OVERTURN THE ELECTION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  Overturning the elections brings up a cascading 
series of questions with potentially disruptive outcomes. The 
first question is whether or not Obasanjo will respect the 
Court's decision. If he does, then the biggest problem will 
be how the GON can prepare and run an election within the 90 
days required by the Constitution. A secondary issue is 
whether the elections could be an improvement over the 2003 
performance or another stage-managed effort with a scripted 
outcome. A scripted outcome would leave Nigeria's government 
with the same credibility problems it faces today. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The Obasanjo government has a history of ignoring 
Court rulings that it finds inconvenient, from revenue issues 
with Lagos state to the destruction of homes throughout 
Abuja, Port Harcourt and elsewhere. Ignoring this one, 
however, would rock the constitutional structure in ways the 
others have not because of the magnitude of the issues 
involved.  The legal basis of the regime's six years of 
governance would certainly be questioned by its critics. It 
could also be questioned by the military. 
¶11.  (S)  The military's response to this situation is 
unpredictable. While it remains reticent to take over on its 
own and is aware of the international repercussions, some 
parts of the military appear deeply unhappy with the Obasanjo 
government. While most accept that "democracy" is the 
preferred form of government, at least some are discussing 
whether the current Nigerian government qualifies. A Supreme 
Court verdict and Obasanjo's noncompliance could force an 
evaluation of military priorities, i.e., loyalty to the man 
versus loyalty to the Constitution. 
 
     TO UPHOLD THE ELECTION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Should the Supreme Court uphold the election, 
several difficulties could arise. First, with the widespread 
belief (and some admissions) that the elections were rigged, 
Nigerians are already suspicious of the Presidency and the 
Legislative branch. Further revelations and confirmation of 
the flaws of the elections, even contained in minority 
decisions, can only undermine Obasanjo's already weak 
acceptance throughout the nation. It could also embolden his 
challengers both within and without the ruling party. 
Another eventuality could be the near unanimous assessment by 
Nigerians that the Court decision was rigged. Nigerians have 
a low opinion of state and local courts, but the Supreme 
Court has insulated itself from this bad image through some 
important (and popular) decisions over the past few years. A 
widespread belief that the Justices colluded with Obasanjo in 
reaching a decision could destroy public confidence in the 
only remaining institution in Nigeria with a positive rating. 
A government with that level of public antipathy would be 
unable to tackle difficult reforms and policies and would 
likely limp along until a change occurred.  There is also the 
open question of how Buhari and Obasanjo's other political 
rivals will respond to a decision they are likely to find 
lacking in credibility.  In 2003, Buhari kept thuggery 
largely in check within his own party, and his public 
behavior during the court case has been exemplary.  If he 
loses the case, it is an open question whether his supporters 
will continue to operate within the same constraints. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
------------ 
 
¶13.  (S)  The scenarios outlined above all present 
difficulties for USG policy. If Obasanjo refuses to comply 
with this court order, as opposed to others he has ignored, 
the need to choose between the person and rule of law will be 
less ambiguous than it has been. Intervention by the military 
in this situation in defense of the Constitution presents a 
similar choice. 
 
¶14.  (S)  If the Supreme Court upholds the obviously flawed 
elections, the short term outlook might look better, but 
Nigeria's long term prospects are not improved. With waning 
confidence in governmental institutions and constitutional 
authority, instability could continue to mount with the GON 
unable to resolve the challenges facing the country.  While 
the decision is likely to be a close split, as of June 24, 
the establishment wisdom is that the court will uphold the 
2003 elections.  If this proves to be correct, the reactions 
of General Buhari, General Ojukwu and other opponents of the 
current government will be key to determining the short term 
course for the Nigerian state. 
CAMPBELL