This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR ASEC PGOV AMGT EC CONS
SUBJECT: ECUADOR'S ABRUPT CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT: EMBASSY 
PREPARATIONS, RESPONSE AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The abrupt overthrow of the Gutierrez 
government on April 20 was not unprecedented here, but tested the 
Embassy's capacity to respond quickly to a crisis.  In this after 
action report we examine the lessons we learned from this 
experience, hoping that it will be useful for us and other posts 
when similar circumstances arise in the future.  End summary. 
 
Lesson One - Don't Ignore the Vice President 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Former Vice President and now President Palacios was a 
peripheral figure from early on in the Gutierrez government, 
disagreeing publicly with the president on many occasions. 
Although he was not involved in issues of particular interest to 
the Embassy, the Ambassador and other Embassy officials visited 
him, returned his calls, and maintained relations with him and 
his staff.  We have used this ongoing relationship to great 
advantage in the early days of his administration to open dialog 
and avoid early missteps on key issues such as the Forward 
Operating Location (FOL) in Manta and ongoing free trade 
negotiations that could have tainted our ongoing relationship. 
 
Cultivate Contacts and More Contacts 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Embassy officials spoke with literally hundreds of our 
contacts in the 24-hour period during and after the change in 
government.  These ranged from as high as the ex-president and 
incoming and outgoing cabinet members to working level 
secretaries with up-to-date information on the fast-breaking 
 
SIPDIS 
changes within their offices.  Since we had well-established 
relationships with these people, they answered our calls and we 
were able to put a certain amount of faith in the information 
they gave us.  Access to the Ecuadorian military high command and 
U.S. Southcom was particularly valuable, as was access to key 
politicians and government officials in Quito and Guayaquil.  We 
were also able to maintain contact with many police sources to 
keep informed about protests that might endanger the Embassy or 
US community.  Without this broad range of contacts, our analyses 
and our actions would have been less well informed, and might 
have been distorted by inaccurate media reports. 
 
Have Your House in Order Beforehand 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The RSO's emergency preparedness training over the past 
three years enabled the Mission to be ready for any eventuality. 
We conducted hands-on training for the emergency floor wardens, 
the Marine Security Detachment, the local guard force and the 
Ecuadorian police detailed to protect the perimeter of the 
Embassy compound.  This ensured that there were no injuries to 
USG personnel during the crisis - even though hundreds of 
Ecuadorians were injured and there were several deaths.  This 
training enabled us to evacuate and close the Embassy within 15 
minutes on April 22 when there was a credible threat to Embassy 
security.  We also had frequent meetings of the Emergency Action 
Committee (EAC) before the crisis, which allowed the Ambassador 
to give direct, clear instructions, and ensured that key members 
could exchange detailed information to coordinate responses. 
These meetings ensured that EAC members were well prepared on 
Emergency Action Plan procedures.  We set up an e-mail collective 
for EAC members so people could remain informed between meetings. 
Clearly written security bulletins detailing standard operating 
procedures were distributed to all Embassy employees on a regular 
basis before and during the crisis, which pre-empted panic and 
helped enable a quick and calm response during the evacuation of 
the Embassy building. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The safety of American citizens (Amcits) is always 
paramount in our minds.  During the evolving political crisis, 
our existing warden net, which communicates with the large Amcit 
community by e-mail and fax, was used to great effect.  By 
sending timely, accurate information, we helped control rumors 
and inhibit panic among the community.  As a result, we received 
virtually no calls from Amcits resident in Ecuador during the 
crisis.  When the Embassy opened operations at the Alternate 
Command Center (ACC), Consular officers established a Hotmail 
account to facilitate communications with wardens in the event 
that State Department systems failed. 
 
Good Management is Key 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Early preparations made by the Management section for 
emergency transport and fueling, provisioning the ACC, and 
checking and setting up primary and alternate communications 
systems proved invaluable.  Once the center was up and running, 
we found that there were not enough phone extensions at the ACC, 
and noted that a pre-positioned TV, radio, copier and shredder 
would have been useful.  The need for a small public address 
system at the ACC is being reviewed and issues addressed above 
are being rectified.  Management's initiative in safeguarding and 
transporting Embassy children who were dismissed early from 
several different schools was greatly appreciated by all, 
especially given the traffic jams and protests throughout the 
city on April 20.  We have now initiated a process to update the 
list of school-age dependents and respective schools every three 
months and are developing "pick-up" standard operating procedures 
to be reviewed by and distributed to parents. 
 
 
Political Asylum, Recognizing the New Government 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶7. (SBU) After Gutierrez fled the presidential palace, he flew to 
several locations before dropping temporarily out of sight. 
Foreseeing the possibility that he might come to the Embassy or 
Ambassador's residence to seek political asylum, we reviewed a 
recent instruction cable on the subject and called Washington to 
fully clarify the issue.  As it happened, Gutierrez sought asylum 
in the Brazilian Ambassador's residence, three blocks away from 
USG facilities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Another issue of concern for several days after the 
government changeover was whether the USG would "recognize" the 
new Palacios government.  Our consistent response was that the 
USG and GOE had never broken relations, and we advised Washington 
to respond similarly.  Since that time, the State Department's 
legal department has confirmed that the USG does not recognize 
new governments, except in rare circumstances for political 
objectives.  Ecuador's new government did not warrant special 
recognition or denial, and therefore the question became moot. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Shortly before the Gutierrez government fell, post began 
a review of former high-level government officials who might flee 
to the US.  There are already several high-profile asylum and 
extradition cases concerning Ecuadorians who fled to the U.S. 
after previous government overthrows or banking scandals.  Hoping 
to prevent a similar occurrence, we entered one official and are 
considering entering others into the visa lookout system as 
potential flight risks. 
 
Things We Will Do Different Next Time 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Post will incorporate the many lessons we learned into 
our Emergency Action Plan for future crises.  For example, we 
will designate an officer to serve as a clearinghouse for both 
incoming and outgoing information.  He/she can receive phone 
calls and e-mails from the USG and other interlocutors, clear 
cables and route information to the appropriate levels in the 
Embassy.  We will also schedule specific times for conference 
calls from key Embassy officers to disseminate updates to 
interested parties in the State Department and other USG 
agencies.  We will also help inform other Embassies in the region 
by greatly expanding our cable distribution and setting up a 
classified e-mail collective. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In retrospect, it is easy to see how the maelstrom of 
April 20 and afterwards could have easily overwhelmed an 
unprepared Embassy.  While our best efforts ultimately could not 
prevent an irregular change of government, other preventative 
actions paid off handsomely.  In the two years of the Gutierrez 
presidency, post cultivated a wide range of contacts and had 
excellent access to high government officials, the military high 
command, and civil society leaders and opinion makers.  We also 
prepared continuously for emergencies, taking into account the 
ever-present threat of protests and the risk of natural 
disasters.  Our management team was able to respond effectively 
because it is held to a high standard by demanding leadership. 
The fact that the Embassy's team was already well integrated and 
had prepared beforehand for such a crisis, permitted a calm, 
virtually seamless mobilization and response to April 20's 
events. 
 
KENNEY