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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI3969, INDIAN FOCUS ON FROZEN, WET, AND SOFT PAK BORDERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI3969 2005-05-27 12:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IN PK INDO PAK
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOCUS ON FROZEN, WET, AND SOFT PAK BORDERS 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3745 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: New Delhi is currently focused on three 
Indo-Pak territorial disputes, with senior officials in 
Islamabad discussing two of them, demilitarizing Siachen 
Glacier (May 26-27) and demarcating the international border 
at Sir Creek (May 28-29).  Conventional thinking in Delhi is 
that, absent one side climbing down significantly or 
proposing a creative compromise, progress on these 
territorial disputes will be incremental, despite these 
issues having been fast-tracked by PM Manmohan Singh and 
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in their April 18 Joint 
Statement.  If the PM has given the Indian delegations a 
sufficiently strong directive to reach closure, however, a 
deal is possible, and the atmospherics appear positive. 
Meanwhile, Delhi-based Pakistan-watchers see little new in 
Musharraf's latest proposals for Kashmir, and some are 
annoyed at his recent calls for a speedy solution, a role for 
the "international community," and an end to "human rights 
excesses."  End Summary. 
 
Politics, Emotions Govern Demilitarizing Siachen 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (C) Although the absence of an indigenous population 
makes demilitarizing the Siachen Glacier in theory an easier 
nut to crack than the inhabited areas of Kashmir, the MEA and 
the Indian military appear firm in wanting Islamabad to agree 
to delineate the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) -- both 
sides' current troop locations -- to seal a deal.  Defense 
Secretary Ajai Vikram Singh is leading the Indian delegation 
 
SIPDIS 
for the ninth set of bilateral talks on the issue; media 
reports say the meetings started on a positive note because 
"both sides mean business this time." 
 
3.  (C) A small but growing cadre of influential Indian 
strategists -- including C Raja Mohan, AG Noorani, and the 
officer who was responsible for India seizing the upper ridge 
in 1984, Lt. Gen. (ret) ML Chibber -- discount Siachen's 
strategic worth.  Nevertheless, as NDTV Defense Correspondent 
Col. (ret) Ajai Shukla told Poloff recently, Siachen retains 
a large symbolic value, especially with the Indian military 
which echoes MEA's concern that vacating positions on the 
high ground would be an invitation for the Pakistan Army to 
launch a second Kargil-like operation (Reftel).  Mohan 
recently reflected that "the Indian Army has shed so much 
blood and treasure over Siachen, and now pours good money 
after bad," rather than withdraw without an agreed AGPL.  He 
advocated using national technical means to "reasonably 
satisfy" the military's concerns without forcing Islamabad 
into a political corner on the AGPL.  An Army spokesman 
earlier this year told reporters that over 100 soldiers die 
annually on Siachen. 
 
4.  (C) Indian Army Chief JJ Singh reiterated the importance 
the military places on an AGPL to reporters in Delhi on the 
first day of the May 26-27 talks.  Mapping the currently held 
positions would give India future justification for punitive 
action, should Pakistan reneg on an agreement to de-induct 
its forces.  It will also prove that the Indian Army is in 
possession of the main glacier and ridgeline, versus Pakistan 
holding the Lower Saltoro Ridge.  Mapping positions could 
also affect a future agreement on alignment of the LoC (and 
perhaps a soft border) north of marker NJ9842, which is the 
last codified point on the LoC per the 1972 Simla Agreement. 
 
5.  (C) NDTV's Shukla told Poloff that the Army is concerned 
that Musharraf is using the "peace euphoria" to leverage the 
Indian political leadership into conceding on "the emotional 
and political issues surrounding Siachen."  An Indian 
concession on Siachen would have to be matched by related 
Pakistani concessions, either troop withdrawals along the LoC 
or visible action against Pakistan-based terrorist groups 
that operate in Kashmir, he continued.  Shukla also reported 
recently that, while the Indian team was preparing for the 
talks, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee authorized "a sharp 
increase" in extreme cold weather combat gear, of the type 
used by troops stationed at Siachen.  "Leaving is easy, 
returning is well-nigh impossible," Shukla concluded. 
 
6.  (C) Officials who attended a May 24 Cabinet Committee on 
Security briefing preparatory to the Siachen talks have 
remained tight-lipped about the delegation's marching orders. 
 For example, when asked by reporters if New Delhi expected 
positive movement at the talks, Defense Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee replied, "We'll see."  The "Indian Express" on May 
25 claimed the GOI would propose the following CBMs as a 
modus vivendi until a demilitarization plan is concluded: 
-- Freezing troop levels and positions; 
-- No attempts to seize additional territory; 
-- Continuing the cease-fire, with respect both to artillery 
and small arms; and 
-- No airspace violations. 
 
Sir Creek: More Economics Than Emotions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The eventual demarcation of the land border in the 
Sir Creek area between Gujarat and Sindh is important because 
the extension of the border into the Arabian Sea will mark 
the Indo-Pak maritime boundary and exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ).  The periodic arrests of fishermen that cross from one 
EEZ to the other in search of better catches has been a 
long-standing irritant, with hundreds of fishermen from both 
countries arrested each year; when they are released, it is 
often in groups of over 100.  The communications link agreed 
to by the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistani Maritime 
Security Agency on May 11 was designed, in part, to 
repatriate these fishermen more quickly. 
 
8.  (C) Interpretation of crude British-era maps ambiguously 
delineating the channel boundary and constantly shifting sand 
bars complicate resolution of this dispute.  The Indian and 
Pakistani Surveyors-General will discuss the Sir Creek border 
on May 28-29.  This will be the first meeting on Sir Creek 
following the January joint survey of the pillars in the 
horizontal segment of the International Boundary. 
 
Kashmir "Soft Borders" Proposal: "Iftar Musings" Redux 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
9.  (C) Veteran strategic analyst and National Security 
Advisory Board Convenor K Subrahmanyam summarized the 
widely-held Indian perception that Musharraf's remarks to the 
recent summit of South Asian parliamentarians -- of finding a 
"regional" vice "religious" or "territorial" solution for 
Kashmir -- are largely an updated version of Musharraf's 
October 2004 "Iftar musings" on dividing Kashmir into 
regions, demilitarizing them, and "changing their status." 
New here are Musharraf's references to "soft" and 
"irrelevant" borders, terms that have figured prominently in 
the Indo-Pak dialogue since the April 16-18 "Cricket Summit." 
 
 
10.  (C) That said, New Delhi-based Pakistan watchers now 
accept that off-the-cuff variations of Musharraf's "Iftar 
musings" have become part of the Indo-Pak landscape.  In 
contrast to earlier behavior, the GOI has not leapt to 
register public rejection of Musharraf's remarks. 
Subrahmanyam also noted that, as Musharraf has also said, 
soft borders are not a final solution; the GOI and GOP will 
need to flesh out the construct further, to determine whether 
soft borders will extend to residency and local governance as 
well as trade and travel. 
 
11.  (C) J&K Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Saeed and moderate 
Hurriyat Chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq were both upbeat on 
hearing of Musharraf's proposal, while leader of the 
pro-Pakistan Hurriyat SAS Geelani, who can always be counted 
on to act the spoiler, dismissed the proposal out of hand. 
"Hindustan Times" Associate Editor Vinod Sharma, who attended 
Musharraf's speech at the parliamentarians' summit, assessed 
that the Pakistani President's call for greater 
self-governance was a way to reach out to Kashmiris who seek 
independence from both India and Pakistan.  An assessment of 
what autonomy in Kashmir might mean will follow septel. 
 
12.  (C) The BJP and our Pakistan-watching contacts have 
reacted sharply to Musharraf's call for the "international 
community" to play a role in Kashmir, referencing the GOP's 
well-known opposition to any Indo-Pak proposal that includes 
third-party involvement.  Musharraf's connecting cross-border 
terrorism to India's "human rights excesses" -- a subject 
that had not been broached recently at senior levels -- 
similarly rankled observers in New Delhi, although some 
ignored the comment as a sop to his domestic audience. 
 
13.  (C) Indians are also less sanguine about Musharraf's 
renewed call for speeding up the peace process with respect 
to Kashmir, ostensibly to strike a deal while the Pakistani 
and Indian leaders have a positive rapport.  Observer 
Research Foundation Senior Fellow Wilson John told Poloff 
that the trust-building process between New Delhi and 
Islamabad is still in its infancy, and that Kashmir "should 
not be touched for at least five years," well beyond 
Musharraf's suggested timeline.  "We should not confuse 
liking Musharraf with trusting him," John cautioned.  He was 
also concerned that Musharraf's statement suggested that the 
peace process was resting exclusively on the rapport between 
the two leaders, and not on its own logic. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (C) Unlike the cross-LoC bus and other people-to-people 
CBMs which Delhi views as low-cost success stories, coming to 
closure on territorial disputes -- with their inherent 
zero-sum constructs -- comes with a potentially higher 
political (and for Sir Creek, economic) cost.  Agreement on 
either Siachen or Sir Creek may require a significant 
trade-off or a creative compromise that either combines these 
issues or brings in another high-profile dispute such as 
Baglihar Dam, which -- given the importance the PM gives to 
the peace process -- cannot be ruled out. 
 
15.  (C) The major factor in these talks will likely be how 
much energy and direction the PM imparted to the Indian 
delegations.  On Kashmir, Musharraf's recent pronouncements 
have garnered less public attention than in the past because 
his language tracks closely with the PM's on soft borders and 
Musharraf's formulation is being treated by the GOI as 
another trial balloon, and not a formal proposal requiring an 
Indian response. 
BLAKE