This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETRD PGOV XR XF
SUBJECT: ARAB-SOUTH AMERICA SUMMIT: BRAZIL LOSES CONTROL 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1229 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1230 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 1231 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PHILLIP CHICOLA, REASONS 1.4 (b 
& d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY and INTRODUCTION:  Despite its confident 
demeanor going into the Arab-South America Summit, the GOB 
has stumbled in its handling, trying to manage an event 
involving heads of state when national interests are 
incongruent.  It is proving to be beyond Itamaraty's ability. 
 Perhaps the most embarrassing moment for President Lula was 
the sudden departure May 10 from Brasilia of President 
Kirchner who appeared to have reached his limit with 
Brazilian insensitivity to Argentine interests.  Close behind 
was Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim's inability to keep 
problematic political language out of the Summit Declaration 
which radical Arab participants had sought.  The USG had 
earlier pointed out to the GOB the possible consequences of 
such language.  While Itamaraty, desirous to be all things to 
all people, tried to reassure the USG that our concerns would 
be addressed, nonetheless, Amorim and company, as part of the 
effort to please their Arab guests, felt obliged to accept 
the Arab-drafted language.  We also note that the only 
visible South American leader, besides Lula and Kirchner, is 
that master scene stealer, Hugo Chavez. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The GOB has clearly lost control of the Summit which 
concludes Wednesday, and many pundits here are already 
questioning the value of the entire endeavor. While it is too 
early to determine the consequences of the chaotic Summit on 
Brazil's global leadership aspirations, Brazil's reputation 
has not been enhanced by it.  End Comment 
 
Kirchner Walks 
-------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  During the first day of the Arab-South America 
Summit May 10, President Lula and the Government of Brazil 
appear to have lost control of events.  Most serious for 
Brazil was the abrupt May 10 departure of Argentine President 
Nestor Kirchner from Brasilia, standing up President Lula for 
a scheduled dinner and leaving a trail of recriminations in 
his wake.  According to press reports, Kirchner felt the 
political purpose of the Summit had become "exhausted," 
although the final Summit Declaration issued Tuesday did 
contain language calling on both Argentina and Great Britain 
to reopen negotiations over the Falkland Islands.  While 
Kirchner's anger with the politicized nature of the Summit 
and the attacks on non-attending countries may have been 
real, his keenest frustration was bilateral -- with Brazil. 
Weeks of controversy led by Argentine Foreign Minister Rafael 
Bielsa over Brazil's soaring trade surplus with Argentina, 
and Argentina's own efforts to remedy the commercial 
imbalance, boiled over during a "neuralgic" May 9 dinner with 
Kirchner, Lula, and Hugo Chavez, according to press reports. 
Reportedly, the straw that broke the camel's back was 
Brazil's decision not to assist Argentina in its negotiations 
with the IMF, as requested by the GOA. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Kirchner's abandonment of the Summit could not have 
come at a worse time for President Lula, as the GOB's own 
ability to retaliate, in the midst of the highest profile 
international event ever held in the Brazilian capital, was 
severely constrained.  While some senior Brazilian officials 
hinted at a "hardening" of Brazil's relations to its southern 
neighbor, an irritated Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and 
President Lula's Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia 
sought, unconvincingly, to minimize the damage. 
 
Arab Hardliners and Chavez Have Their Way 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Meanwhile, inside the Convention Center, Brazilian 
diplomacy appears to have taken a backseat to the Arab States 
and Venezuelan President Chavez.  Frontpage headlines in 
Brazilian newspapers May 11 stated boldly that Israel and the 
United States were the Summit's targets, and numerous 
national statements made mention of both countries. 
Interrupting Iraqi President Jalal Talabani during his 
speech, Chavez shouted a rejection of the (U.S.-led) invasion 
of Iraq. His words, reportedly, were met by a "choking 
silence" from the other leaders.  Summit Co-chair Algerian 
President Bouteflika retorted that friends of Iraq were 
friends of the Arab countries.  However, he then sought to 
conciliate Chavez: "We do not accept state occupations in any 
part of the world. Nevertheless, I do not believe there is a 
difference between the ideals of Presidents Chavez and 
Talabani."  Later, according to reports, "with a smile on his 
face" Talabani rebuffed Chavez by saying (he) "needs to know 
more about the history" of Iraq. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The GOB appears to have given way in every important 
instance.  That there was something for almost every Arab 
state in the final Summit Declaration is well borne out.  All 
evidence to the contrary, the Government of Sudan is praised 
for "facilitating international assistance to the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur."  Despite repeated Brazilian 
promises over many months that the Summit Declaration would 
not contain language inimical to Middle East peace efforts, 
the final text contains problematic paragraphs that existed 
in earlier declaration drafts.  In addition to the demand 
that Israel withdraw to its June 4, 1967 frontiers, the 
declaration also calls on Israel to comply with the 
International Court of Justice July 2004 decision on 
dismantling the security wall.  In its only specific mention 
of the United States, the Summit Declaration "Expresses 
profound concern with the unilateral sanctions imposed on 
Syria by the Government of the United States and considers 
the so-called 'Syria Accountability Act' a violation of the 
principles of international law and constitutes a 
transgression against the objectives and principles of the 
United Nations..." 
 
¶7.  (C) As contained in earlier drafts, the Summit 
Declaration calls for combating terrorism "in all its forms 
and manifestations" and calls for a United Nations conference 
"to study this phenomenon and to define terrorism as a 
crime."  However, as the USG had feared the text also 
"Reaffirms the non-acceptance of foreign occupation and 
recognize the right of states and peoples to resist foreign 
occupation in accordance with the principles of international 
legality and in compliance with international humanitarian 
law." 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment:   It appears the Summit has become exactly 
what the GOB assured the USG it wanted to avoid: an 
opportunity for the Arab states to criticize the U.S. and 
Israel.  It has also been a disappointing effort towards 
achieving stronger economic and commercial ties between the 
two regions, the ostensive purpose of the Summit in the first 
place.  Even while the Summit is in progress, at least three 
Arab delegations interested in purchasing Brazilian defense 
equipment reportedly were unable to get substantive audiences 
with Brazil Defense Minister/Vice President Jose Alencar who 
appears to have lost interest in his defense portfolio.  An 
international spotlight -- if one were needed -- on 
intra-South American squabbles lays open Brazil's own 'tin 
ear' for the concerns of its smaller neighbors.  Although the 
final Summit declaration calls for reform of the United 
Nations -- codewords for Brazil's blind ambition to obtain a 
permanent Security Council seat -- the inability of President 
Lula and the GOB to keep the cats herded while in Brasilia 
calls into question Brazil's ability as a leader of the 
"South" in the international community. Indeed, the overall 
tone of Brazilian media coverage ranges from reserved 
skepticism to strong criticism of the GOB's handling of the 
event, and questions the value of the initiative for Brazil 
in real terms 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment cont.:  While it is too soon to say the 
Summit will backfire on Brazil's own global leadership and UN 
Security Council aspirations, at this stage it is certain 
that Brazil's cause was not enhanced.  Emotions within GOB 
leadership will no doubt rise to the surface after the Summit 
(mercifully) ends May 11.  We expect that when Brazilian 
commentators pronounce on the GOB's poor performance, 
Itamaraty will seek to blame the poor turnout of Arab leaders 
and the Summit's disappointing outcome on the United States. 
Never mind that Iraqi President Talabani was one of the few 
Arab leaders to show up in Brasilia. 
 
Chicola