This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN DELAHUNT DISCUSSES HAITI POLICE REFORM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: During his April 15-16 visit to 
Port-au-Prince, Representative William Delahunt (D-MA) met 
with CIVPOL Commissioner Dave Beer and Haitian National 
Police (HNP) Director General Leon Charles to discuss the 
nature of violence in Haiti and the threat insecurity poses 
for the elections. Delahunt also questioned Beer and Charles 
regarding cooperation between UN forces and the HNP and the 
progress of HNP reform while the Embassy Police Advisor 
outlined U.S. and international assistance programs for the 
HNP. Septel will report Delahunt's other meetings. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Delahunt suggested that the labels once used to 
describe the political violence in Haiti no longer accurately 
explained the current security situation in Haiti. Political 
forces had transformed themselves into gangs of thugs and 
criminal elements were using politics to justify or cover 
their violent behavior. Beer concurred that there were very 
few individuals within the former chimeres and the remnants 
of the ex-military who were politically committed. He said 
the gangs who used to receive money from political patronage 
now sought funds from crime, including extortion, drug 
trafficking and kidnapping. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Foley explained that several notorious drug 
traffickers had been arrested but that others were stepping 
in to take their place and were enlisting the gangs for 
protection and general disorder in order to further their 
interests. He also said that some hardline pro-Aristide money 
was flowing to the gangs for the purpose of disrupting 
elections preparations, while other political forces sought 
to fund gangs in order to dominate gang territories ahead of 
the elections. Charles explained that criminal gangs were 
often manipulated by drug traffickers and politicians but 
that the HNP did not consider labels or motive in its effort 
to fight crime: "if they are criminals, we go after them, 
regardless of who they are." Charles lamented that the HNP 
still lacked the resources to fight the brutal and heavily 
armed gangs and pointed out that 42 police officers had been 
killed since September; eight of those deaths by vicious 
decapitation. 
 
¶4. (C) Delahunt asked for an evaluation of the level of 
cooperation between MINUSTAH and the HNP, and specifically an 
explanation of the facts surrounding the February 28 
demonstration in Bel Air that had led to tensions between the 
two. Charles said that the demonstration had been illegal 
because the demonstrators had not requested a permit. Despite 
this, the UN was eager to provide oversight of the march. The 
HNP observed that among the protesters were several armed 
individuals who were responsible for a series of shootings 
earlier in the day and sought to disperse the protesters. In 
the melee, one person was shot. Charles said both the HNP and 
the UN continue to investigate the incident but that a lack 
of evidence was preventing the two from coming to any 
conclusion. 
 
¶5. (C) Regardless, Charles said that since the incident, the 
HNP and MINUSTAH had come to an agreement on how to respond 
to demonstrations that has been working. Beer agreed that the 
HNP requirement that demonstrators receive a permit was a 
standard requisite throughout the world. He said the UN now 
supports that obligation and acknowledged that the HNP had 
never refused a request. According to Beer, in an attempt to 
provoke the UN and the HNP, demonstrators were refusing to 
apply for a permit and then demanding to march in the most 
provocative time and place in order to provoke a response 
that might discredit the UN, the HNP and the IGOH. He said 
that over the last few months, despite UN efforts, 
demonstrators had shown an unwillingness to negotiate and a 
resistance to cooperation. According to Beer, the cooperation 
between MINUSTAH and the HNP had improved significantly and 
that since February 28, they were both moving in the right 
direction. 
 
¶6. (C) Delahunt staff member Cliff Stammerman asked Charles 
about plans to incorporate some members of the ex-FADH into 
the HNP and the impact that might have on the mentality of 
the force. Charles explained that to date 200 ex-soldiers had 
entered the HNP and another 200 planned to join the next 
training class. He said they followed the same process as 
normal recruits, including a written test, a physical and 
medical exam, and human rights vetting. He said that most of 
the ex-FADH cadets had been assigned to small stations in 
Port-au-Prince where they could be easily monitored. No 
ex-FADH cadets, he said, had entered special units because, 
although they were disciplined, they were older and 
physically slower and not appropriate for SWAT or CIMO. 
 
¶7. (C) Beer said that the process of reforming the HNP was a 
long term project, but that the HNP was making good progress. 
For example, he said that while it was unfortunate that Ravix 
and three of his associates had been killed during a joint 
MINUSTAH/HNP operation on April 9, Beer noted that 18 others 
had been arrested, demonstrating that the HNP was improving 
its tactics and cooperation with the UN. Beer said it was 
important for CIVPOL to begin joint operations with the HNP 
and to send CIVPOL out to rural areas. 
 
¶8. (C) Beer also said that although the ex-FADH issue had 
improved since most of them had decided to participate in the 
UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-insertion (DDR) 
program, that program was not yet ready and the ex-FADH were 
quickly "getting restless." Ambassador Foley explained that 
nobody expected the ex-FADH to surrender so swiftly and that 
the program was scurrying to get off the ground. The U.S. has 
pledged $3 million to the program. Delahunt lamented the lack 
of urgency in Washington regarding Haiti and pledged to 
pursue the matter upon his return. He expressed hope that the 
U.S. and the rest of the international community would 
dedicate the resources necessary in both the short and long 
run for completing the task of reforming the HNP specifically 
and Haiti's peaceful transition and development in general. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Foley said that the U.S. had already done 
much for the HNP and would continue to support the program. 
Embassy Police Advisor Collins outlined the $5 million 
already spent for equipment, vetting, and training the HNP. 
He also outlined plans for future spending, including the 
improvement of HNP forensics and crime scene investigation 
capacity and in-service training for current officers. 
Collins said the emphasis was on a rigorous training program, 
saying that if the HNP remained unarmed and poorly trained, 
it would never improve. He said the recent weapons export 
license request submitted by the IGOH would be closely tied 
to training, support and monitoring before and after any new 
weapons were acquired. Moreover, he said, the U.S. intended 
to help fund CIVPOL administered programs for CIMO scrutiny, 
human rights training, and "use of force" instruction. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Charles and Beer's description of improved 
relations between CIVPOL and HNP is accurate and reflects a 
lot of hard work on both sides to come to an accord. 
Short-term benefits are already evident operationally but the 
longer-term impact will be even more significant once CIVPOL 
truly begins joint deployment. End comment. 
 
FOLEY