This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1339
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, 
USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD PUBLICLY ACCUSES SUDAN OF AIDING CHADIAN 
REBELS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 962 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 405 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 441 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 543 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: On April 8, the Chadian Government convoked 
the diplomatic corps to accuse Khartoum publicly of 
"maintaining, arming, and financing" Chadian rebel groups 
inside Sudan.  There are 3,000 Chadian rebels near El 
Geneina, Sudan, according to the Minister of Justice.  Chad 
has long suspected Sudanese support for its opponents.  This 
public accusation is an indication of President Deby's 
frustration with the Government of Sudan over the Darfur 
peace process and what he believes is its assistance to his 
enemies.  It also comes at a time when Deby is considering 
possible ways to assist the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). 
End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - 
STRONG WORDS 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U)  On April 8, Minister of Justice Kalzeube Payimi 
Deubet, in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister, convoked 
the diplomatic corps to convey the Government of Chad's 
concerns about Sudanese support for Chadian rebels.  Kalzeube 
stated that subject of the Council of Ministers meeting on 
April 7 was the security and stability of Chad. 
Specifically, the presence of 3,000 Chadian rebels 
concentrated in Sudan near Makjar, Sudan not far from El 
Geneina.  Kalzeube noted that Chad has made multiple 
bilateral demarches to bring an end to GOS support for the 
Chadian rebels.  Despite its assurances and promises, the 
communique states that the GOS's "special services have 
continued to maintain, arm, and finance the Chadian opponents 
that have established themselves in Sudanese territory."  The 
Chadians convoked the Sudanese Ambassador on April 7 to 
discuss Chad's preoccupation with the situation and to lodge 
a formal protest.  In addition, the Chadian Government 
demanded an explanation. 
 
¶3.  (U)  The communique also states that given "the 
indifference of the Sudanese Government", the Chadian 
Government "felt it is important to inform friendly countries 
and international organizations accredited to Chad of this 
grave situation on our borders and of legitimate 
counter-measures that may need to be taken."  The communique 
also noted that Chad continues to host 300,000 refugees with 
only limited means.  Despite the GOS's "hostile attitude", 
the Chadian Government continues with its Darfur mediation 
efforts and uses all of its influence with the rebel 
movements to negotiate in good faith and to accept a peaceful 
solution to the crisis.  The communique notes that "Chad does 
not allow the Sudanese rebel movements to use Chadian 
territory as a rear base." 
 
¶4.  (U)  The Government of Chad also reiterated its friendly 
policy relations, cooperation, and good neighborliness with 
Sudan.  The communique notes President Deby's personal 
involvement with bringing an end to the Darfur crisis and 
Chad's continuing availability to pursue a political 
solution, which depends upon the good will of the GOS. 
 
- - - - - - 
BACKGROUND 
- - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) On June 17, 2004, Presidential Advisor Allam-mi Ahmad 
publicly alleged that Chadian Arabs were being recruited into 
the jandjaweed.  (Ref A) At that time, he noted the existence 
of Chadian rebels associated with the Renewed National Front 
of Chad (FNTR) inside Sudan, but stopped short of accusing 
the GOS of supporting them.  The Chadian Government has long 
been concerned about potential linkages between jandjaweed 
and Chadian rebels and the potential for spillover into Chad. 
 Over the past year, we have received reports from Chadian 
Government ministers, Sudanese rebel groups, and African 
Union observers about the presence of Chadian rebels inside 
Sudan.  The Chadian rebel groups are allegedly of Tama and 
 
 
Arab ethnic origin and may include disgruntled Chadian 
military officers that lost out in various military 
reshufflings.  The group reportedly has weapons and plans to 
overthrow President Deby and to prevent his son, Brahim, from 
coming to power, according to one of its members.  In In 
February, Minister of Defense Emmanuel Nadingar asked the 
Defense Attache if the U.S. could assist in providing 
information on the Chadian rebel groups.  Chadian military 
officials are unclear about the numbers and intentions of the 
Chadian rebels. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Chadian Government strongly suspects that 
Chadian rebels are associated with former Chadian Ambassador 
to Washington Ahmat Hassabalah Soubiane.  One group, the 
Front for the Defense of the Democracy and Constitution 
(FDDC), according to press reports, is headed by a relative 
of Soubiane and is trying to unify a number of Chadian rebel 
movements. There reportedly was a meeting in Paris in May 
2004 where the FDDC met with a number of other rebel leaders 
to form an alliance against President Deby.  (Comment: This 
group may be the FNTR referred to by Allam-mi and/or the 
military arm of the Coalition to Defend Democratic and 
Constitutional Rights (CDDC) led by Soubiane.  End Comment.) 
Press reports indicate that no agreement was reached at that 
time.  The Chadian press also has reported the existence of 
other Chadian rebel groups, such as the Democratic and 
Revolutionary Council (CDR), the Popular Resistance 
Convention (CPR), and the Council of National Resistance 
(CNR).  None of these appear to be a threat to the regime. 
 
¶7.  (C) Some of the Chadian Government's security jitters are 
being triggered by Deby's fears of a coalescing of opposition 
forces in the run-up to the public referendum to remove 
presidential term limits on June 6 and the presidential 
elections in 2006.  For example, two weeks ago, prominent 
opposition leader Jean Alingue's passport was seized, and he 
was prevented from attending a meeting of Chadian opposition 
leaders in Paris.  There were reports that Ahmat Hassabalah 
Soubiane was allegedly traveling to Paris at the same time. 
On the ground, humanitarian workers note an increase in the 
number of Chadian forces on the border with Sudan and an 
increase in the number of incursions by cattle thieves. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A CHADIAN REAR BASE FOR SUDANESE REBELS? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  Recent developments in President Deby's relationship 
with the SLM may also be linked to the Chadian protest over 
Sudanese support for the Chadian rebels.  (See Refs B, C, D) 
Deby's consultations with SLM may have been motivated by his 
desire to use SLM as a counterweight against Sudanese 
Government support for Chadian rebels.  Deby may also be 
discussing this issue this week with two of SLM Chairman 
Abdelwahid Nur's advisors who reportedly are en route to 
N'Djamena at Deby's invitation. 
 
¶9.  (C) The topics for discussion may be the inclusion of 
Eritrea as a facilitator in the Darfur peace process, 
according to Adam Shogar and two of Abdelwahid's field 
commanders.  The rebel movements and Chadian officials 
contend that Libya and Egypt were brought into the process 
because of their ability to influence key actors.  If there 
is to be a solution to the crisis, Eritrea must be included 
because of its support for rebel leaders.  The SLM leaders 
may be attempting to broker a better relationship between 
Chad and Eritrea. Deby may view Eritrea's involvement in the 
peace process as a counterweight to that of Egypt and Libya 
on the GOS's side, according to SLM members.   Secondly, the 
meeting is intended to improve the relationship between Deby 
and Abdelwahid.  Another final agenda item, according to SLM 
members, is a discussion of the possible use of Chadian 
territory for SLM's resupply or as a rear base, which would 
be a new and potentially destabilizing development. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) This is the first time that the Chadian Government 
has officially delivered such a blunt and confrontational 
charge against Sudan.  Deby has complained before about 
 
 
Khartoum's unwillingness to get serious about stopping 
violence in Darfur, but he has tried to keep good relations 
with Sudan.  Nonetheless, Deby and his advisors' concerns 
about potential destabilization in eastern Chad are 
long-standing and well-founded.  Deby himself staged two 
campaigns to change Chad's leadership in N'Djamena from 
Sudanese territory.  Deby will likely weigh his options 
carefully, because allowing SLM activity on Chadian soil 
would be an invitation for reprisals from Sudan. 
 
¶11.  (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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