This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1374
INFO AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 
ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS  HO CHI MINH CITY 000422 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PGOV PINR VM CH HUMANR ETMIN CVR RELFREE
SUBJECT: (SBU) GVN ADVISOR THANH ON PARTY REFORM, CHINA, CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS AND VIETNAM-USG RELATIONS 
 
REF:  A) HCMC 127 B) 04 HCMC 1400 C) HCMC 55 D) HANOI 909 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  Special Advisor to the Prime 
Minister in the South Vo Viet Thanh described for the Consul 
General on April 18 his frustrations with the pace and tenor of 
reform in Vietnam and outlined ideas for change, particularly 
within Vietnam's Communist Party (CPV).  Thanh said that the 
majority of senior CPV members -- spurred by growing unease over 
China's strength in the region -- see a long-term convergence of 
interests with the United States and favor greater strategic 
dialogue with the USG.  Pro-Chinese elements and party ideologues 
are resisting this trend, however.  Thanh, who had just returned 
from a "fact finding" trip to the Central Highlands,  said that 
the GVN is striving to deal with hardline provincial officials 
that are obstructing implementation of Hanoi's new approach to 
resolve social, religious and economic problems involving the 
region's ethnic minorities, including family reunification (VISAS 
93) issues.  Thanh is aligned with the reformist wing of the Party 
and his comments seem to reflect an internal CPV debate on how the 
Party must adapt to changing domestic and international conditions 
in the run-up to the CPV's 10th Party Congress in 2006.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Consul General and PolOff met with Special Advisor to the 
Prime Minister for the South Vo Viet Thanh on April 18.  This was 
our third meeting with Thanh, who had returned from a weeklong 
"fact finding" trip to the Central Highlands.  Thanh had met with 
us twice before, in November 2004 and January 2005 (refs A and B). 
Thanh is a protege of former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, a leading 
advocates of economic and social reform within the CPV. 
 
Reforming the Party, Dissent and Human Rights 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Thanh spent a considerable amount of our three-hour lunch 
discussion focusing on his frustrations with the functioning of 
the Party.  Thanh said that to combat corruption, end cronyism and 
spur economic growth, the CPV needed substantial reform.  "I 
participated in the revolution to build a more democratic regime, 
not a dictatorship," Thanh said.   Thanh contended that the CPV 
must extend the right of the people to vote for their leaders to 
the senior-most levels of Government and Party.  (Vietnam has been 
experimenting with limited and controlled grassroots "democracy" 
at the village level.)  Thanh said that he also has been urging 
Vietnam's political elite to focus less on drafting and 
interpreting party resolutions and more on passing concrete laws 
that are needed to spur Vietnam's modernization, international 
integration and economic growth. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Thanh added that the Party must learn to accept far more 
criticism than it now tolerates.  Thanh, former Deputy Minister of 
Public Security, said that he is working on a proposal to redefine 
what is legally considered a dissident or a "reactionary element" 
so as to give the average Vietnamese more room for constructive 
criticism. The CPV also needs to recognize that it cannot remain 
isolated or separate from the evolution in international thinking 
on concepts of human rights and religious freedom.  These are 
universal norms, not U.S. constructs, that Vietnam and the CPV 
must embrace in order for Vietnam to integrate effectively with 
the rest of the world. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Thanh said that he recently had discussed the case of the 
Tuoi Tre journalist Lan Anh with the Minister of Public Security 
(ref C).  (Lan Anh is facing indictment for allegedly revealing 
"state secrets" while reporting on a price gouging scandal linked 
to the Ministry of Health.)  The Minister had explained that Anh's 
reporting had disrupted an ongoing corruption investigation.  The 
MPS is investigating whether or not there was corruption or 
malfeasance on the journalist's part that led her to break the 
story prematurely.  Thanh had cautioned the Minister that the case 
had attracted significant public attention and that the MPS 
"better be right" if they take this case to trial, or risk facing 
a scathing backlash. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Thanh said that he could not predict if the CPV would 
implement internal political reforms at the 2006 10th Party 
Congress, although over time, reform was "inevitable."   In our 
January meeting Thanh was more confident, telling us that 2006 
would usher in a period of political "Doi Moi" (renovation) 
comparable to the economic reform that Vietnam initiated in 1986. 
(Note: in a recent conversation with the Ambassador, Party 
External Relations Commission Chair Nguyen Van Son also said that 
the upcoming Party Congress would address "political doi moi." 
End Note.  Ref D.) 
 
Relationship with the U.S. and China 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Thanh said that the majority of Hanoi's senior leadership 
believes that over the long term Vietnam and the United States 
will not have fundamental conflicts but only "shared interests." 
 
While a minority of conservative ideologues still want to keep the 
United States at arms' length, disquiet over growing Chinese 
influence in the region tipped the scales in favor of Vietnam 
forging improved ties with the United States.  In this regard, 
Thanh indicated that the GVN would welcome enhanced strategic or 
policy planning dialogue with the USG on China and the region.  At 
the same time, Thanh cautioned that the United States needed to 
avoid creating the impression that we are an immediate threat to 
the Vietnamese regime.  This would only strengthen the pro-Chinese 
lobby at senior levels of the Party.  The CG replied that, while 
we welcome and encourage strengthened dialogue, Vietnamese leaders 
had to become more sophisticated in approaching sensitive issues 
such as human rights and religious freedom. 
 
Central Highlands and VISAS-93 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Thanh said that the GVN sees clearly which provinces in 
the Central Highlands are implementing Hanoi's directives to 
resolve religious freedom issues and economic tensions involving 
ethnic minorities and which are not.   It is becoming increasingly 
clear in Hanoi that local officials are misusing concerns over 
"instability" in the region as an excuse to keep the pressure on 
ethnic minority and religious groups.  This is particularly the 
case in Dak Lak Province, where senior Party leaders have not 
"adjusted" to Hanoi's new approach on ethnic minority and 
religious issues.   However, the Prime Minister does not have the 
authority to remove CPV officials from their positions; Thanh 
maintained that the situation is particularly delicate in Dak Lak 
as some of the hardline officials, including the local Party 
Secretary, are from the ethnic minority community.  He said that 
 
SIPDIS 
personnel changes could occur following the provincial Party 
congresses in late 2005. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Thanh said that the GVN also is committed to resolve the 
problem of reunification of ethnic minority refugee families 
(VISAS-93 cases).  In February he had met with the Minister of 
Public Security and handed over our list of outstanding cases. 
The MPS Minister reportedly had said he was going to issue a 
directive to the provinces to speed up processing of the cases. 
Thanh advised that the MPS must be at the center of any solution 
to resolve the VISAS 93 issue and encouraged us to notify the 
Minister directly of continuing problems.  He characterized the 
MPS Minister as trustworthy and reasonably "progressive."  (Note: 
The Ambassador has on two occasions sent lists of outstanding 
VISAS-93 cases to the Minister of Public Security. End Note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  Thanh was unusually direct in discussing 
internal reform, distrust of China, and combating corruption and 
cronyism.  His message was very carefully and deliberately 
articulated; in fact, he did not want to leave until he had 
finished delivering his message on China, which was well past the 
second cup of coffee.  However, his themes are consistent with the 
position of many reformers within the Party, of which, Thanh is a 
loyal and respected member.  It is not clear why we are getting 
this message so strongly at this time, but the views that Thanh 
articulated appears to reflect reformers' concern that the Party 
must modernize or risk losing legitimacy.  It also reflects their 
concern -- as nationalists -- that the Party must reform to be 
able to address effectively Vietnam's security and economic needs. 
These reformers are locked in an ongoing internal debate with 
conservatives in advance of the 10th Party Congress.  End Comment. 
 
WINNICK 
 
 
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