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Viewing cable 05HANOI835, VIETNAM: IAEA Additional Protocol and Other Arms

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI835 2005-04-08 10:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM ABUD VM AROC CWC CBW OPCW APEC
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM: IAEA Additional Protocol and Other Arms 
Control Issues 
 
REF: A. STATE 58314; B. HANOI 364; C. STATE 63117 
 
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST for NP and EAP/EP.  Please 
see Paragraph 8. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  We met with our primary GVN 
arms control and nonproliferation counterpart April 6 to 
discuss a wide range of outstanding arms control/nonpro 
issues and the constraints faced by the GVN.  Vietnam is, on 
the whole, supportive of global nonproliferation efforts. 
Slowness in acceding to or implementing international 
agreements and other initiatives is due to a lack of human 
resources in Hanoi, not to any reluctance to participate. 
The United States can assist by making it as easy as 
possible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate 
necessary GVN interagency efforts to generate consensus for 
ratifying and implementing nonproliferation instruments, for 
example by providing supporting documentation translated 
into Vietnamese.  The GVN is very concerned for the future 
of the NPT due to what it sees as reluctance by some 
countries to press for nonproliferation gains without 
equivalent disarmament efforts by nuclear powers.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) On April 6, Poloff met with MFA Arms Control expert 
Vu Van Mien and delivered Ref A demarche on the IAEA 
additional protocol.  Mien admitted that Vietnam is "no 
closer" to signing the Additional Protocol than it was when 
the USG approached the MFA on the subject in mid-February 
(ref B).  "The additional protocol is still under study at 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment," 
Mien advised.  "That agency is the professional focal point 
for the Additional Protocol."  Mien said that the GVN hopes 
to host a national workshop on nonproliferation issues and 
to create an interagency nonproliferation working group. 
"Reviewing these potentially serious commitments takes 
time," Mien cautioned.  "I do not think, personally, that 
Vietnam will meet the 2005 deadline set during the APEC 
meetings.  We are more likely to approve the Additional 
Protocol in 2006." 
 
CWC ARTICLE VII 
--------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Regarding implementation of Article VII of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, Mien said that the implementing 
decree "is in the final stages of drafting" and will soon be 
complete.  Vietnam will complete the implementing degree and 
have it signed "before the next meeting of the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)," he said. 
This would occur in either the second or third quarter of 
2005. 
 
THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT 
------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Mien confessed that Vietnam is no closer to 
ratifying the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC).  "This one is 
the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND)," Mien said.  "We can only encourage MND to address 
the issue expeditiously."  Unfortunately, Mien continued, 
MND is unlikely to do anything about the HCOC until the MFA 
provides a Vietnamese translation of the relevant documents, 
including the Code of Conduct itself.  Translators at the 
MFA are so scarce, he went on, that it would be necessary 
for him to do the translation himself.  "I handle every 
single arms control issue for the Ministry," Mien 
complained, "and I do not even have a secretary or 
assistant.  I have to prepare all the papers, attend all the 
meetings and make all the recommendations to my senior 
officers on how to instruct our overseas Missions to vote. 
This is a very important reason why it takes us so long to 
implement all of these disarmament and nonproliferation 
agreements and commitments.  It is because I personally do 
not have the time or resources to do it."  (Note: Embassy 
Hanoi subsequently provided an unofficial Vietnamese 
translation of the HCOC to the MFA to help them move the 
issue along.  End note.) 
PSI: VIETNAM STILL NOT COMFORTABLE 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Mien reported that the GVN is "still wondering 
about the legal aspects" of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  In particular, Mien said, it is not clear 
to the GVN whether it is possible to carry out PSI 
activities while still complying with the International Law 
of the Sea.  Mien said that GVN would welcome any input the 
United States would be willing to provide considering the 
international law implications of PSI.  Considering it 
exclusively from a Vietnamese law perspective, Vietnam does 
not need the PSI, Mien said, because Vietnamese law already 
requires any ships carrying any weapons or dangerous 
materials to declare that cargo before entering Vietnamese 
waters.  Ships carrying either are subject to boarding in 
Vietnamese waters, regardless of how the GVN discovers those 
weapons or materials, he added. 
 
7. (SBU) Among our other diplomatic colleagues, the Japanese 
are the most active on PSI issues with the Vietnamese. 
According to Japanese Poloff Yuji Tokita, Vietnam was 
invited to the "Team Sunrise 4" PSI maritime exercise in 
October 2004 in Tokyo Bay, but chose not to send anyone. 
Most recently, Japan raised PSI with Vietnam in the context 
of the Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in 
Tokyo on February 9.  (Other topics, he said, were North 
Korea, weapons of mass destruction and the IAEA Additional 
Protocol.)  "As far as we have heard," Tokita said, "Vietnam 
considers PSI very new and requiring a great deal of study." 
 
8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: To move the Vietnamese on PSI, it 
would be useful to have documentation of PSI's consistency 
with (or inapplicability to) the International Law of the 
Sea.  To ensure that this information gets further than the 
desk officer level at MFA, we also request the Department to 
provide an unofficial Vietnamese translation of any 
additional documents. 
 
IAEA IN GENERAL AND THE NPT 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Mien also discussed Vietnam's tenure on the IAEA 
Board of Governors, which ends in September 2005.  The 
experience had been "somewhat difficult" for Vietnam, he 
acknowledged, but was a necessary obligation of membership 
in the IAEA.  "We will be happy to give the opportunity to 
other states," he continued, "but will not shirk our duty 
when it becomes our turn again."   Serving on the BOG has 
provided valuable experience to Vietnam in holding 
multilateral leadership positions and given Vietnam a chance 
to make a positive contribution to the debate on "meaningful 
global issues."  Vietnam is less strong in general on 
technical matters, Mien conceded, but is nonetheless proud 
of its ability to have positive input on global political 
issues. 
 
10. (SBU) Strengthening the IAEA is a hard question, he 
continued.  In Vietnam's view, before significant action is 
taken to change the IAEA, the BOG should conduct a 
comprehensive review and assessment of IAEA's 
accomplishments and contributions.  New mechanisms, such as 
the Special Committee, are potentially a duplication of 
effort that would weaken, not strengthen the IAEA.  Why not 
have the BOG do the work of the Special Committee directly, 
he asked rhetorically. 
 
11. (SBU) The NPT as a whole is in trouble, Mien opined. 
With India, Pakistan and Israel outside the NPT altogether, 
with Iran and North Korea causing political problems and 
with the "have" countries blocking the "have not" countries' 
desire to see stronger progress on disarmament, it seems 
impossible that the NPT review conference (RevCon) will 
succeed.  "There is no agenda for the RevCon yet," Mien 
said.  "All we know is that there is a very, very small 
chance of success." 
12. (SBU) One reason for the weak state of the NPT, Mien 
said, is the growing dissatisfaction of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) states (he also periodically used the term 
"non-nuclear" states) with the pace and extent of 
disarmament by the "have" states.  "The `haves' won't talk 
about disarmament and will not comply with Article 6 of the 
NPT," Mien complained.  "The 2000 review conference produced 
a 13-step roadmap to disarmament that is not yet complete, 
despite the fact that it passed by consensus five years 
ago."  Complicating the issue even further are the suspicion 
and fear of smaller states resulting from the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq.  "Some countries now fear that incorporating the 
Additional Protocol into the NPT would simply provide an 
additional pretext or trigger for coercive action against 
them," Mien said.  "They see it as a potential excuse for 
the bigger countries to interfere in their internal 
affairs."  Vietnam is not one of those countries, he 
hastened to add.  "Vietnam will ultimately support the 
Additional Protocol," he said.  "We intend to have nuclear 
power in the future, and if we want to be able to acquire 
the necessary technology and material, we have to sign." 
 
13. (SBU) COMMENT: We have a good dialogue in place with the 
GVN on nonproliferation issues, a fact attributable to our 
basic mutual interest in advancing these issues.  The 
biggest obstacle to Vietnam's participation in global 
nonproliferation efforts is a lack of human resources 
capacity, a fact that may also drive the openness of their 
discussion with us on these issues.  The GVN wants us to 
understand that their slowness in adopting the Additional 
Protocol or implementing CWC Article VII is not due to any 
desire to develop, possess or use WMD but instead to a lack 
of capacity to do so. 
 
14. (SBU) Comment continued:  Taking them at their word on 
this, we believe that we can help them move faster on these 
issues by taking on some simple tasks for them, such as 
providing Vietnamese translations of primary and all 
necessary supporting documentation.   We believe that 
assistance of this sort will be effective in building 
Vietnam's comfort level with nonproliferation, arms control 
and other security-related issues relevant to APEC, a USG 
goal as described in ref C.  End Comment. 
 
MARINE