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Viewing cable 05DJIBOUTI407, DJIBOUTI: FOOD SECURITY AND REFUGEES UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DJIBOUTI407 2005-04-24 12:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Djibouti
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ACOA AMTC AMGT ASEC PREF
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: FOOD SECURITY AND REFUGEES UPDATE 
 
1. REDSO/FFP OFFICER TRAVELED TO DJIBOUTI 5-7 APRIL, 
MET WITH WFP, UNHCR AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, TRAVELED 
TO HOLL-HOLL AND ALI ADDE REFUGEE CAMPS AND VISITED 
FOOD INSECURE AREAS OF ALI SABIEH DISTRICT. 
 
2. FFP RECENTLY CONTRIBUTED AN ADDITIONAL $500,000 TO 
WFP'S PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION (PRRO) 
FOR REFUGEES, BRINGING ITS FY2005 TOTAL TO $1,000,000. 
DUE TO PIPELINE SHORTAGES, WFP REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS 
TO 50% FROM MARCH UNTIL AT LEAST JUNE WHEN THE FIRST 
FFP COMMODITIES ARE DUE TO ARRIVE. DUE TO WHAT ARE 
BELIEVED TO BE EXAGGERATED OFFICIAL REFUGEE POPULATION 
FIGURES, NO ADVERSE NUTRITIONAL EFFECTS ARE 
ANTICIPATED FROM THIS REDUCTION. FROM JUNE, OUR TWO 
CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD SOLIDIFY WFP'S PIPELINE THROUGH 
THE END OF CY2005. 
 
3. UNHCR PLANS TO REPATRIATE 8,000 REFUGEES (MAINLY 
SOMALILANDERS) THIS YEAR. WHILE CURRENT REFUGEE 
REPATRIATIONS HAVE BEEN SLOW - 2,319 PEOPLE OUT OF 
4,380 PLANNED TO DATE - VOLUNTEERS ARE NOW INCREASING 
RAPIDLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED FOOD 
RATIONS. 
 
4. DUE MAINLY TO POOR HEYS/DADA RAINS AND INCREASED 
STRESS ON PASTORALISTS SEARCHING FOR WATER AND 
PASTURE, THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION FOR RURAL 
DJIBOUTIANS HAS BECOME QUITE FRAGILE, AND IS LIKELY TO 
DETERIORATE FURTHER IN THE BLISTERING SUMMER MONTHS. 
WFP IS CURRENTLY PROVIDING EMERGENCY TWO-MONTH FOOD 
RATIONS TO 25,000-30,000 AFFECTED PEOPLE. BASED ON THE 
UPCOMING WFP/FEWSNET ASSESSMENT IN LATE APRIL, WFP 
WILL LIKELY DEVELOP A SMALL EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP) 
BEGINNING IN JUNE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO APPROXIMATELY 
50,000 PEOPLE FOR SIX MONTHS. 
 
5. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF 
ETHIOPIAN AND SOUTHERN SOMALI REFUGEES WILL CONTINUE 
TO REQUIRE SOME SUPPORT FOR THE TIME BEING, WE ARE 
CONCERNED AT THE RELUCTANCE OF SOMALILANDERS TO RETURN 
HOME. IN ORDER TO ALLOW THESE REFUGEES TO REPATRIATE 
VOLUNTARILY, WE BELIEVE THAT STRONG INERTIA-INDUCING 
DRAGS TYING THEM TO THE CAMPS SHOULD BE REMOVED, AND 
THAT WFP IS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN MAINTAINING THE REDUCED 
REFUGEE RATION. 
 
6. WE RECOMMEND THAT - ONCE THE EMOP IS APPROVED IN 
MAY - FFP TRANSFER ITS SECOND $500,000 TRANCHE FROM 
THE REFUGEE PRRO TO THE DJIBOUTIAN EMOP. THIS WOULD BE 
DOUBLY BENEFICIAL FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, ALLOWING WFP 
BOTH TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS AS WELL AS TO 
CONTINUE REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS WITH A SOMEWHAT LESS- 
ROBUST PIPELINE. END SUMMARY 
 
-------------- 
REFUGEE STATUS 
-------------- 
 
7. REDSO/FFP HAS FOR YEARS MAINTAINED THAT DJIBOUTI'S 
REFUGEE PROGRAM WAS ONE OF THE BIGGEST HEADACHES PER 
CAPITA WORLDWIDE - AND WE CONTINUE TO DO SO. WITH ONLY 
15,630 REFUGEES ON PAPER (AND PROBABLY LESS THAN 
10,000 IN REALITY), THESE FEW REFUGEES HAVE REFUSED 
UNHCR RE-REGISTRATION HEADCOUNTS SINCE 1997, THROWING 
LIBERAL AMOUNTS OF BOTH THREATS AND STONES, AND 
SOMALILAND REFUGEES CONTINUE THEIR STEADFAST 
UNWILLINGNESS TO REPATRIATE. THE SITUATION HAS 
CERTAINLY NOT BEEN HELPED OVER THE YEARS BY LOCAL 
PARTNER ONARS' INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION, TOGETHER 
WITH ITS STRONG SELF-INTEREST IN BLOCKING REFUGEE 
RETURN (SEE PARA 26). 
 
8. ALL THAT SAID, IT APPEARS THAT THE MIGRAINE MAY 
SLOWLY BE EASING, WITH UNHCR SHOWING SOME FORTITUDE, 
TOGETHER WITH GREATER HIGH-LEVEL GRD SUPPORT FOR 
REFUGEE RETURN. UNHCR PLANS TO REPATRIATE AROUND 8,000 
REFUGEES (MAINLY TO SOMALILAND) IN CY2005, AND WHILE 
ACTUAL REPATRIATION TO DATE HAS BEEN LOW - 2,319 
PEOPLE OUT OF 4,380 PLANNED - VOLUNTEERS HAVE BEEN 
INCREASING STEADILY SINCE WFP REDUCED THE FOOD RATION 
IN MARCH (SEE BELOW). 
 
9. IF SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO ADDITIONAL 
CONVOYS IN APRIL/MAY BEFORE THE SWELTERING SUMMER HEAT 
(THE APRIL/MAY BREAK WAS THOUGHT PRUDENT DUE TO POST- 
ELECTION UNCERTAINTIES IN DJIBOUTI, BUT IS NOW BEING 
RECONSIDERED), UNHCR MAY BE ABLE TO FACILITATE THE 
RETURN OF AN ADDITIONAL 1,500-2,000 REFUGEES. IF NOT, 
REPATRIATION WILL BREAK NOW UNTIL THE SEPTEMBER- 
DECEMBER PERIOD, DURING WHICH UNHCR HOPES TO 
REPATRIATE AN ADDITIONAL 5,400 REFUGEES. 
 
10. FFP RECENTLY CONTRIBUTED AN ADDITIONAL $500,000 TO 
WFP'S REFUGEE PRRO, BRINGING ITS FY2005 TOTAL TO 
$1,000,000. BEGINNING IN MARCH, AND AT LEAST UNTIL THE 
FIRST TRANCHE OF FFP COMMODITIES ARRIVES IN JUNE, WFP 
HAS REDUCED FOOD RATIONS TO THE 50% LEVEL. WFP WILL 
HOWEVER CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT TO SUPPLEMENTARY AND 
THERAPEUTIC FEEDING CENTERS IN THE CAMPS. 
 
11. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WFP MAINTAINED 50% REFUGEE 
RATIONS FOR SIX MONTHS IN 2004. THE MEDICAL NGO AMDA 
CONDUCTED MONTHLY NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENTS WITH WFP, 
AND NOTED NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM THIS REDUCTION. THIS 
WAS LIKELY DUE TO WHAT ARE BELIEVED TO BE 
SIGNIFICANTLY EXAGGERATED OFFICIAL REFUGEE NUMBERS. 
WFP OF COURSE WILL NOW CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE 
NUTRITIONAL SITUATION IN THE CAMPS WITH AMDA AS IT DID 
LAST YEAR. 
 
---------------------------------- 
DJIBOUTIAN FOOD SECURITY SITUATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
12. THE CURRENT FOOD SECURITY SITUATION OF RURAL 
DJIBOUTIANS ACTUALLY APPEARS TO BE WORSE THAN THAT OF 
THE REFUGEES. WHILE DJIBOUTI COULD NEVER BE DESCRIBED 
AS LUSH - WITH LESS THAN 150 MM AVERAGE ANNUAL 
RAINFALL - PASTORALISTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THIS MINIMAL 
RAINFALL TO SUSTAIN THEIR LIVESTOCK WITH WATER AND 
PASTURE. ACCORDING TO FEWSNET, THE RECENT HEYS/DADA 
RAINS ENDED EARLY AND WERE POORLY DISTRIBUTED. THE 
CURRENT DELAY OF DIRAA/SOUGOUM RAINS ARE ALSO NOT A 
GOOD SIGN. DUE TO SUCCESSIVE POOR RAINFALL SEASONS, 
PASTORALIST LIVELIHOODS ARE ESPECIALLY STRESSED. 
 
13. A JOINT GRD/WFP/FEWSNET ASSESSMENT 21-25 MARCH 
CONFIRMED THAT TRADITIONAL PASTURE AREAS HAD RECEIVED 
INSUFFICIENT RAINFALL, AND THAT WHILE DIKHIL AND ALI 
SABIEH DISTRICTS WERE WORST AFFECTED, THE PROBLEM 
AFFECTED PARTS OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. NOTE: A SIMILAR 
ASSESSMENT IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2004 FOLLOWING POOR 
RAINS RECOMMENDED SIX MONTHS OF WFP DISTRIBUTIONS; WFP 
DID DISTRIBUTE ONE-TWO MONTHS IN EARLY 2005, BUT WAS 
SOMEWHAT WARY OF CONDUCTING DISTRIBUTIONS SO CLOSE TO 
THE 8 APRIL ELECTIONS. END NOTE 
 
14. BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MARCH 
ASSESMENT, WFP IS NOW DISTRIBUTING A TWO-MONTH 
(APRIL/MAY) HALF-RATION TO 25,000-30,000 PEOPLE 
COUNTRYWIDE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE 
DISTRIBUTIONS DO NOT INCLUDE CEREALS AND ARE BORROWED 
FROM WFP'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IF EMERGENCY NEEDS 
SHOULD CONTINUE (OR INCREASE, AS APPEARS QUITE 
LIKELY), WFP WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THESE 
DISTRIBUTIONS WITHOUT SUBMITTING A NEW OPERATION FOR 
DONOR FUNDING. 
 
15. IF THE RAINS FAIL IN APRIL, THE SITUATION WILL 
BECOME MORE SERIOUS, AND THERE WILL LIKELY BE A NEED 
FOR A SMALL EMOP. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS IS A 
REGIONAL PROBLEM, AFFECTING NEIGHBORING AREAS OF 
ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA AS WELL. IN FACT, NOMADS SAY THAT 
IN GOOD YEARS, ETHIOPIA HAS THE BEST SUPPLY OF WATER 
AND PASTURE; BUT IN BAD YEARS, DJIBOUTI IS THE 
PREFERRED DESTINATION. SO DJIBOUTI IS CURRENTLY 
SUPPORTING MANY AFFECTED PASTORALISTS FROM THE 
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS WELL. 
 
16. USAID/WFP/FEWS VISITS TO NOMADIC WATER POINTS IN 
ALI SABIEH DISTRICT FOUND MOST CATCHMENTS COMPLETELY 
DRY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
RELATIVELY WELL-STOCKED AT THIS TIME OF YEAR. 
 
17. AT ONE CATCHMENT WITH A SMALL POOL OF WATER, THE 
TEAM MET AFAR HERDERS WATERING THEIR CAMELS AND GOATS 
IN 'IISE TERRITORY BECAUSE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN 
THEIR OWN AREAS. THEY HAD COME FROM ETHIOPIA SEARCHING 
FOR BETTER PASTURE, AND WERE UNCERTAIN WHERE THEY 
WOULD GO NEXT. WHILE SOME OF THEIR ANIMALS HAD 
REPORTEDLY DIED, THOSE REMAINING DID NOT APPEAR IN 
ESPECIALLY DIRE CONDITION. THE SITUATION WAS NOT 
CATASTROPHIC, BUT WAS CERTAINLY VERY POOR, AND SEEMED 
LIKELY TO WORSEN IN THE COMING MONTHS. 
 
18. THE LIFE OF A PASTORALIST IS CERTAINLY NOT EASY IN 
THE BEST OF TIMES, WITH TENUOUS FOOD SECURITY, AND 
INTAKE RARELY REACHING 2,100 KCAL DAILY. INTRODUCE A 
RELATIVELY SMALL SHOCK TO THIS, AND THE ALREADY 
FRAGILE COPING MECHANISMS CAN BE SHATTERED. THE POOR 
SITUATION NOW IS CURRENTLY MAINLY A PROBLEM OF WATER - 
PASTORALISTS NOTED THAT IT ALREADY FELT LIKE THE END 
OF THE DRY SEASON THOUGH THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLENTY 
OF WATER AND PASTURE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, IF THERE 
IS NO RAIN IN APRIL, PASTORALISTS WILL BE EXTREMELY 
VULNERABLE AS THE SCORCHING SUMMER MONTHS KILL 
WEAKENED ANIMALS AND FURTHER REDUCE THEIR OWNERS' FOOD 
SECURITY. 
19. WFP AND FEWSNET WILL UNDERTAKE A JOINT FOOD 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT COUNTRYWIDE IN LATE APRIL, WHICH 
WILL LIKELY BOTH JUSTIFY AND QUANTIFY A SMALL WFP 
EMOP, POSSIBLY FOR SIX MONTHS SUPPORTING UP TO 50,000 
PEOPLE. 
 
----------------------------- 
NEW WFP PRRO: DJIBOUTIANS OUT 
----------------------------- 
 
20. UP UNTIL MARCH 2005, WFP'S PRRO TARGETED REFUGEES 
AS WELL AS VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS. HOWEVER, IN ITS NEW 
PRRO, WFP HAS NOW SEPARATED OUT THE DJIBOUTIANS, 
LEAVING ONLY REFUGEES. WHILE VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS 
ARE STILL SUPPORTED UNDER WFP'S COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM - THROUGH FFW, SCHOOL FEEDING AND OTHER 
PROJECTS - FFP DOES NOT TYPICALLY SUPPORT INDIVIDUAL 
WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMS, INSTEAD CHANNELING THE BULK OF 
ITS DEVELOPMENTAL FOOD RESOURCES THROUGH NGO PARTNERS. 
 
21. COMMENT: OUR TWIN DILEMMAS THEN ARE HOW TO ASSIST 
VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS (WHICH HAD BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY 
THROUGH THE COMBINED PRRO) DESPITE NOT SUPPORTING THE 
WFP COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND AT THE SAME TIME 
HOW TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR WFP'S PRRO FOR REFUGEES 
DESPITE OUR STRONG DESIRE TO PROMOTE THEIR 
REPATRIATION TO SOMALILAND. END COMMENT 
 
----------- 
UNHCR VIEWS 
----------- 
 
22. UNHCR/DJIBOUTI REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT UNHCR WAS 
TIRED OF BEING MANIPULATED BY THE REFUGEES AND OF 
BEING SEEN AS INEFFECTIVE. WITH THE GRD MINISTRY OF 
INTERIOR NOW FIRMLY SUPPORTING REPATRIATION, UNHCR WAS 
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR RETURN. 
 
23. UNHCR IS HOPEFUL THAT IT CAN STILL REPATRIATE 
CLOSE TO ITS TARGET OF 8,000 PEOPLE IN 2005, WITH UP 
TO NINE MORE CONVOYS TOTALING 5,400 PEOPLE IN THE 
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER PERIOD. SOME PEOPLE CONJECTURE THAT 
THE SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES MAY WANT TO DELAY THE FINAL 
REFUGEE RETURN SOMEWHAT, BECAUSE WITH THEIR ETHIOPIAN 
AND DJIBOUTIAN CAMPS EMPTIED, ADDITIONAL REINTEGRATION 
ASSISTANCE WITHIN SOMALILAND WOULD DRY UP QUICKLY. 
THAT SAID, THE SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES HAVE COMMITTED 
TO ACCEPTING UNHCR'S TARGET IN CY2005. 
 
24. UNHCR/DJIBOUTI EXPRESSED "FULL SUPPORT" FOR WFP'S 
CURRENT FOOD REDUCTION AND A DESIRE FOR IT TO BE 
MAINTAINED AT THE 50% LEVEL AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW 
MONTHS, IF NOT LONGER. ANTICIPATING A POSSIBLE 
NEGATIVE REACTION TO THIS FROM GENEVA, UNHCR NOTED 
QUITE STRONGLY ITS POSITION THAT IF THE REFUGEES 
WANTED FULL RATIONS, THEY MUST THEN ALLOW THEMSELVES 
TO BE COUNTED. 
 
25. WFP ALSO AGREED WITH THIS POSITION IN PRINCIPLE, 
BUT NOTED THAT IT COULD BE PERCEIVED POORLY IF IT 
CONTINUED REDUCED RATIONS WITH SUCH A BOUNTIFUL 
PIPELINE - THANKS TO THE LATEST FFP CONTRIBUTION. 
NOTE: FFPO EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR UNHCR'S VIEWS 
TO WFP, AND WE WILL ENSURE THAT WFP MAINTAINS REDUCED 
REFUGEE RATIONS. SEE RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION BELOW. 
END NOTE 
 
26. ONARS (GRD'S "OFFICE NATIONAL D'ASSISTANCE POUR 
LES REFUGIES ET SINISTRES"): ONARS' ENTIRE RAISON 
D'ETRE - AT LEAST IN TERMS OF CASH FLOW - IS THE 
REFUGEES, AND IT HAS THEREFORE NEVER FULLY SUPPORTED 
THEIR RETURN. UNHCR NOTED THAT ONARS ALSO MAINTAINED A 
BLOATED PERMANENT STAFF IT COULD NOT EASILY RETRENCH. 
HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE GRD INTERIOR MINISTRY REMAINED 
FULLY INVOLVED AND SUPPORTIVE OF REPATRIATION AT THE 
HIGHEST LEVELS, UNHCR BELIEVED THAT ONARS COULD NOT 
DRAG ITS FEET QUITE SO OPENLY ANYMORE. 
 
27. UNHCR NOTED THAT AOUR AOUSSA CAMP WOULD BE CLOSED 
IN MAY (AND CONSOLIDATED INTO ALI ADDE). IN ADDITION, 
THE NEARLY EQUAL-SIZED HOLL-HOLL AND ALI ADDE REFUGEE 
COMMUNITIES CURRENTLY HAD SHOWN SOME RELUCTANCE TO 
REPATRIATE, AS THEY PERCEIVED THAT THEIR CAMP WOULD 
THEN BECOME THE SMALLER AND BE CHOSEN NEXT FOR 
CLOSURE. TO COUNTER THIS, UNHCR WILL IN JUNE ANNOUNCE 
ITS INTENTION TO CLOSE HOLL-HOLL IN SEPTEMBER, AND NOT 
REQUEST ANY BUDGET FOR THE CAMP IN 2006. UNHCR WILL 
THEN TRY TO SORT OUT A BETTER POPULATION ESTIMATE ONCE 
ALL REFUGEES ARE IN A SINGLE CAMP: ALI ADDE. 
 
28. UNHCR BELIEVES THAT EVEN IN THE BEST-CASE SCENARIO 
- WITH 8,000 PEOPLE RETURNING TO SOMALILAND AND TWO 
CAMPS CLOSED IN 2005 - THERE WILL REMAIN AROUND 5,000 
REFUGEES MAINLY FROM SOUTHERN SOMALIA WHO WILL 
CONTINUE TO REQUIRE SUPPORT IN 2006 UNTIL A LONGER- 
TERM DURABLE SOLUTION IS FOUND. 
 
-------------------------- 
CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
29. WE BELIEVE THAT UNHCR IS HEADED IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION BY CLOSING AOUR AOUSSA CAMP IN MAY AND HOLL- 
HOLL BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WE RECOMMEND THAT UNHCR 
CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR ADDITIONAL RETURN CONVOYS IN MAY 
TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM, THOUGH REALISTICALLY WE 
RECOGNIZE THAT BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS BY THE SOMALILAND 
AUTHORITIES MAY NOT ALLOW THIS UNTIL SEPTEMBER. 
 
30. REGARDING WFP, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IT 
MAINTAIN REDUCED REFUGEE RATION LEVELS IN ORDER TO 
ALLOW SOMALILANDERS TO REPATRIATE VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT 
SUCH STRONG INERTIA-INDUCING DRAGS TYING THEM TO THE 
CAMPS. 
 
31. WE ADDITIONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE FOOD SECURITY 
PROBLEM IN DJIBOUTI IS SERIOUS, AND IF THERE IS NO 
RAIN IN APRIL, WFP IS JUSTIFIED IN DEVELOPING A SMALL 
EMOP TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE PASTORALISTS. 
 
32. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THESE LATTER TWO POINTS, WE 
RECOMMEND THAT ONCE THE EMOP IS APPROVED (LIKELY 
SOMETIME IN MAY), FFP TRANSFER ITS SECOND $500,000 
TRANCHE FROM THE REFUGEE PRRO TO THE DJIBOUTIAN EMOP. 
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THIS WOULD BE DOUBLY 
BENEFICIAL - ALLOWING WFP BOTH TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE 
DJIBOUTIANS AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE REDUCED REFUGEE 
RATIONS WITH A SOMEWHAT LESS-ROBUST PIPELINE. 
 
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