Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05DARESSALAAM723, Financial Systems Assessment for Tanzania

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05DARESSALAAM723.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DARESSALAAM723 2005-04-13 08:16 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dar Es Salaam
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DAR ES SALAAM 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, S/CT, INL/C 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PTER KTFN EFIN TZ
SUBJECT: Financial Systems Assessment for Tanzania 
 
 
1.    (SBU) Summary: A multi-agency team from Washington and 
  the European Union visited Tanzania to assess Tanzania's 
  compliance with international standards to combat money 
  laundering and terrorist financing.  Their full report 
  follows below.  While Tanzania has signed and/or ratified 
  the relevant international agreements, its capacity to 
  enforce the standards is extremely limited.  New legislation 
  has been drafted but not yet passed that would extend the 
  definition of institutions covered by central bank (BOT) 
  supervision, formalize requirements for customer 
  identification and suspicious transaction reporting, and 
  establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).  Tanzania 
  lacks law enforcement and investigations expertise, and bank 
  examiners lack AML/CFT training.  The team makes a number of 
  recommendations (see paragraph 29).  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
BEGIN TEXT OF FSAT REPORT --INTRODUCTION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.   (U) A financial systems assessment team (FSAT) 
  comprised of Rob Stapleton, State S/CT, Carol Mesheske, 
  State INL/C, Susan Smith, DOJ/AFMLS, David Brassanini, FBI, 
  Mary Jo Melancon, FinCEN, Margreet Wenting, The Netherlands 
  Ministry of Finance, and Kai Kristoffersen, a private 
  consultant contracted by the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
  Affairs, traveled to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, Tanzania 
  the week of March 7-11, 2005.  Wayne Blackburn, the UN 
  Mentor to the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
  Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and Jerry Rowe and Bill Gilligan, 
  Treasury OTA, also participated in portions of the 
  assessment.  The purpose of the assessment was to determine 
  Tanzania's compliance with international standards to combat 
  money laundering and terrorist financing.  This is also the 
  first FSAT that had two European Union (EU) members on the 
  team in an effort to build cooperation and coordination on 
  the training and technical assistance front.  The team met 
  with the Directors of Public Prosecution for both the 
  Mainland and Zanzibar, the Tanzania Revenue Authority, which 
  is responsible for customs, the Ministry of Finance, the 
  Multi-Disciplinary Committee for Money Laundering, the 
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bank of Tanzania (BoT), the 
  Tanzania Bankers Association, the Police Commissioner and 
  the Director of Criminal Investigation, the Registrar for 
  Non-Governmental Organizations, the Zanzibar Ministry of 
  Finance, the Attorney General of Zanzibar, and a group of 
  Zanzibari Bankers.  The team also met with Mr. Michael Owen, 
  the Charge d'Affaires for the United States, Mr. Carsten 
  Nilaus Pedersen, the Danish Ambassador to Tanzania, and 
  Emile de Bont, head of the Economic & Trade promotion 
  department at the Dutch Embassy in Dar es Salaam.  Below are 
  the findings of the team and recommendations for training 
  and technical assistance for the Government of Tanzania 
  (GoT). 
 
3.   (U) Background: Tanzania and Zanzibar make up a 
  government that does not quite meet the definitions of a 
  union or a federal republic.  There is one central 
  government and a Parliament that passes laws that are 
  applicable to both the Mainland and Zanzibar.  However, 
  Zanzibar has its own House of Representatives and its own 
  President.  In addition, constituencies in Zanzibar elect a 
  number of members to the national Parliament.  Police, 
  financial issues (including banking), and issues of national 
  security are Union matters and apply to both the Mainland 
  and Zanzibar.  However, issues regarding criminal law are 
  not Union issues, unless they involve national security, 
  hence the need for two Directors of Public Prosecutions. 
  Tanzania currently has 28 banks.  Most financial 
  transactions are conducted outside the formal financial 
  system trough alternative remittance systems (see paragraph 
  14).  The public prefers using the alternative remittance 
  systems due to the absence of banks in rural areas, because 
  bank fees are high and the process of transferring money is 
  inefficient and can take longer.  Officials estimated that 
  less than 10 percent of the population uses the formal 
  banking system.  For a better analysis of the criminal 
  justice sector structure of Tanzania, please refer to the 
  Department of Justice's Office of Prosecutorial Development, 
  Assistance and Training's assessment from January 2004. 
 
--------------------------- 
Identification of customers 
--------------------------- 
 
4.   (SBU) Circular No. 8, issued by the BoT, requires banks 
  and other financial institutions to identify their customers 
  upon opening an account and conducting transactions, and 
  they must retain such documents for 10 years. The circular 
  does not give an exhaustive list of identification 
  documents, but there is an obligation to establish if 
  somebody is acting on their own accord or on behalf of 
  someone else.  Bankers have indicated that they have 
  problems obtaining reliable identification documents, due to 
  the fact that most people in Tanzania do not have an 
  official identification document.  Bankers indicated that a 
  more enhanced ongoing customer due diligence procedure is 
  being conducted, with a view to the detection of suspicious 
  transactions. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Reporting of suspicious transactions 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.   (SBU) Banks and other financial institutions (defined 
  as any person authorised by the BoT to engage in banking 
  business not involving the receipt of money on current 
  account subject to withdrawal by check) have the obligation 
  under Circular No. 8 to report suspicious transactions 
  relating to money laundering to the BoT.  Circular No. 8 
  does not cover instances of suspected terrorist financing. 
  The annex to the Circular gives examples of suspicious 
  transactions.  The bank will do an initial investigation and 
  then, if reported to the BoT, the BoT will do an 
  investigation before determining if a report should be sent 
  to the police, who will then conduct their own 
  investigation. Feedback varies widely (the Mainland seems to 
  be better than Zanzibar).  Some of the foreign banks have 
  indicated that they report first to their own headquarters 
  before reporting to the BoT because of the lack of a safe 
  harbour provision, and then the headquarters decides whether 
  to report to the BoT. 
 
6.   (SBU) Circular No. 8 requires every bank or financial 
  institution to formally designate an officer responsible for 
  compliance with the regulations.  Procedures and a training 
  program for personnel should be in place. 
 
7.   (SBU) As mentioned above, the circular does not provide 
  for a safe harbour provision, and bankers have indicated 
  that they feel uncomfortable filing reports. "Tipping off" 
  is prohibited.  The BoT indicated that it has received less 
  than 10 suspicious transaction reports since the reporting 
  requirement came into effect. 
 
8.   (SBU) The BoT sends the UN list of designated 
  terrorists and terrorist organizations to all of the banks, 
  who review their accounts against the list to see if they 
  have any accounts in the name of anyone on the list.  The 
  bankers stated that, in general, they did not review the 
  list when new accounts are opened or when transactions are 
  conducted; however, a couple of international bank branches 
  indicated their local headquarters have automated tools to 
  check their systems. 
 
--------- 
Training 
--------- 
 
9.   (SBU) The BoT provides training for its own staff. 
  Banks indicated that they have internal training procedures 
  and receive training from international banks and donors. It 
  appears that banks on the Mainland were more knowledgeable 
  about anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing 
  (AML/CTF) issues than banks and branches of banks in 
  Zanzibar.  The banks said they need more training and 
  guidance in order to be able to comply with AML/CTF 
  regulations. 
 
---------------------- 
Supervision/Compliance 
---------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Money laundering is not viewed as a serious 
  problem in Tanzania.  The BoT supervises banks and non- 
  banking financial institutions. The BoT website indicates 
  that one bureau de change is registered as a non-banking 
  financial institution, because it receives deposits.  The 
  financial sector of Tanzania also includes numerous (small) 
  savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs), and micro- 
  finance companies, that are not yet under any supervision. 
  However, new legislation is intended to bring the larger of 
  these institutions under supervision by BoT. 
 
11.  (SBU) It is not clear if all supervised institutions 
  mentioned above are subject to on-site inspections. 
  Examinations include selected branches of banks.  The BoT 
  examination manual includes questions on compliance with AML 
  regulations.  The BoT has 60 examiners for all banking 
  supervision throughout the country, but banks on the 
  Mainland said that the BoT examiners did not seem to be 
  specifically trained for AML/CTF supervision.  Six 
  representatives from the GoT attended the U.S. AML/CTF 
  training for foreign supervisors in March 2005. 
 
12.  (SBU) The BoT has full access to the files of the 
  supervised institutions and can share this information with 
  the police.  The BoT reported difficulties in sharing 
  information with foreign supervisors, but indicated this 
  problem is being addressed and the situation is improving. 
 
13.  (SBU) Based on Circular No. 8, the BoT has the power to 
  impose administrative sanctions for failure to comply with 
  the regulations both by the covered institution as well as 
  by any director, offices or staff of a covered institution. 
14.  (SBU) Presently, there are no requirements for gold or 
  gem dealers, dealers in high value goods, insurance 
  companies, or gatekeepers.  Several OTA trip reports stated 
  that casinos are subject to AML/CTF requirements, based on 
  the Gaming Act of 2003 and Tanzania Gaming board 
  regulations.  The Gaming Act was developed with assistance 
  of the US IRS, which provided assistance to the Tanzania 
  Revenue Authority under a USAID funded technical assistance 
  program.  Casinos will also be required to report suspicious 
  transactions under the amendments to the Proceeds of Crime 
  Act. 
 
------------------------------ 
Alternative Remittance Systems 
------------------------------ 
 
15.  (SBU) Both Western Union and Moneygram operate in 
  Tanzania and Zanzibar.  Western Union operates only through 
  the state-owned Postal Bank system.  The BoT indicated that 
  all international transfers must go through the banking 
  system.  The Postal Bank indicated that Western Union 
  transfers are only for educational, medical or business 
  transactions.  In Zanzibar, the average outgoing remittances 
  total roughly 15 million Tshillings daily; the average 
  incoming transfers are 100,000 - 6 million Tshillings daily 
  (at the time of the assessment, the exchange rate was 
  approximately 1100 Tshillings to 1 USD).  The economy in 
  Tanzania is, to a large extent, cash based. Only a small 
  portion of the money flow goes through the 28 banks and non- 
  banking financial institutions.  Due to the nature of the 
  economy, Zanzibar authorities stated hawala is frequently 
  used to transfer money among family members and from workers 
  abroad.  On the Mainland the bus system is used to transport 
  cash.  An individual will give the money to the driver, who 
  gives the sender a password to provide to the recipient of 
  the funds.  When the bus arrives, the recipient provides the 
  password and gets the money. 
 
16.  (SBU) There are presently no cross-border cash 
  controls.  There are no registration requirements or 
  compliance reviews.  The use of alternative remittance 
  systems is viewed as a normal method to move cash and the 
  risk inherent in such systems is perceived as the risk of 
  theft or non-receipt of the funds.  It is not considered to 
  be a risk in relation to money laundering or terrorist 
  financing. 
 
------------------- 
Pending Legislation 
------------------- 
 
17.  (SBU) Amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1991, 
  (POCA) are pending.  These amendments will extend the 
  definition of covered institutions to include operators of 
  gaming enterprises, cash dealers, insurance brokers, 
  intermediaries, securities and futures brokers and dealers, 
  dealers in gold, precious metals and stones, travellers 
  checks or financial instruments, investment fund managers, 
  lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents.  The customer 
  identification and suspicious transaction reporting 
  requirements also will be incorporated in the new law.  The 
  new law will add a safe harbour provision but, if the 
  current language is adopted, "tipping off" will no longer be 
  prohibited.  The proposed provision only addresses 
  situations where the banker believes an investigation will 
  be jeopardized if the person whose activities are being 
  reported or a third party is told about the report. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
--------------------------------- 
 
18.  (SBU) Tanzania does not currently have an FIU. The 
  amendments to the POCA provide for the establishment of an 
  FIU that will be an independent entity within the Ministry 
  of Finance. In addition to its basic functions of receiving, 
  analyzing and disseminating information on suspicious 
  transaction reports, the proposed FIU will also, in 
  consultation with the relevant regulatory authorities, issue 
  reporting and recordkeeping guidelines to banks and other 
  reporting entities.   It will also liaise with investment 
  and business licensing authorities in vetting prospective 
  investors. 
 
19.  (SBU) The amendments also provide for the establishment 
  of a Multi-Disciplinary Committee on Anti-Money Laundering 
  that will serve as a policy advisory body for the GoT. The 
  Committee will be composed of representatives from various 
  agencies, including the Ministries of Finance and Foreign 
  Affairs, the BoT, the Attorneys General's Chambers of 
  Tanzania and Zanzibar, the Police, and the Capital Markets 
  and Securities Authority, in addition to the Commissioner of 
  the FIU. 
--------------- 
Legal Framework 
--------------- 
 
20.  (SBU) The POCA currently provides the only legal 
  mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of money 
  laundering crimes.  Under this law, only money laundering 
  predicated upon drug trafficking is an offense.  Although 
  the law states that it applies to both Mainland Tanzania and 
  Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Director of Public Prosecutions 
  explained that unless a penal law affects national security, 
  it is not a "Union" matter and thus, the POCA would be 
  unconstitutional if applied to Zanzibar.  In that case, only 
  Mainland Tanzania has a money laundering offense.  However, 
  because the FIU is a financial matter, the reporting 
  requirements created by the new amendments will apply to 
  Zanzibar. 
 
21.  (SBU) The POCA creates several types of narcotics 
  predicated money laundering offenses with seizure and 
  forfeiture provisions for money laundering cases directly 
  related to narcotics-trafficking.  All forfeiture in 
  Tanzania is conviction based.  If a conviction is obtained, 
  the frozen assets are forfeited and turned over to the 
  general treasury fund.  There is no separate asset 
  forfeiture fund.  The police manage seized and forfeited 
  assets; there is no specialized bureau for managing seized 
  or forfeited assets.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  receives all foreign requests for mutual legal assistance, 
  and passes the request to the Mainland Attorney General or 
  to the Attorney General of Zanzibar, as appropriate. 
 
22.  (SBU) The Government of Tanzania is currently preparing 
  new amendments to the POCA, which will expand the predicate 
  offenses for money laundering beyond crimes involving drug- 
  trafficking, to include terrorism, terrorism financing, 
  illicit arms trafficking, corruption or bribery, fraud, 
  counterfeiting, armed robbery, theft, insider dealing and 
  market manipulation, or any other offense that the Minister 
  of Finance might declare.  The GoT hopes to introduce the 
  amendments in the April session of Parliament; otherwise, it 
  is doubtful the amendments will be enacted before February 
  2006.  Under this bill, money laundering continues to be a 
  separate, autonomous offense, without a requirement to 
  obtain a conviction for the underlying predicate crime, and 
  extends to anyone who acquires, possesses, uses or 
  administers property, which he knows or ought to know is the 
  proceeds of the predicate offenses.  The law also 
  criminalizes acts of concealment if the person knows or 
  ought to have known the property is the proceeds of the 
  predicate offenses.  One part of the law appears to create a 
  strict liability offense, making criminal any transaction 
  involving the proceeds of the predicate offense.  In 
  discussing this provision with the National Anti-Money 
  Laundering Committee, it was clear that this was not the 
  drafters' intent, and the committee asked for assistance in 
  correcting the language.  The team provided comments on the 
  draft amendments to the drafting committee by separate 
  correspondence.  (Some members of the FSAT who attended the 
  ESAAMLG meeting the following week had the opportunity to 
  discuss the comments the team provided to the drafting 
  committee, who was also in attendance.  The drafting 
  committee had a number of general questions about an AML 
  regime, and some very specific questions on the structure 
  and function of an FIU.)  The bill adds asset forfeiture 
  sharing provisions, conspiracy as a criminal offense, 
  creates corporate criminal liability, provides law 
  enforcement the ability to conduct electronic surveillance 
  and freeze assets, and provides witness and judicial officer 
  protection measures such as trial by video link, relocation, 
  and non-disclosure of a witness' identity. 
 
23.  (SBU) Terrorism and terrorist financing are defined in 
  The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002, which defines 
  terrorist activities and establishes punishments of up to 30 
  years in prison.  The Act also makes it possible to 
  administratively freeze the assets of UN designated 
  terrorists or terrorist organizations as well as those added 
  to a list by the Minister of Home Affairs.  All persons are 
  required to report suspicious transactions related to 
  terrorism to the police.  The Permanent Secretary at the 
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that there is a multi- 
  disciplinary government group (consisting of officials from 
  the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, 
  Justice, the BoT, the Police and the President's office,) 
  that reviews information coming from the UN on persons and 
  entities relating to terrorism.  On mutual legal assistance 
  matters pertaining to terrorism, the Inspector General of 
  the Police or Commissioner of the Police is the central 
  authority for foreign requests. 
 
--------------- 
Law Enforcement 
--------------- 
 
24.  (SBU) Lacking the technical and practical expertise, 
  enforcement authorities find it difficult, if not 
  impossible, to investigate and prosecute sophisticated 
  criminal organizations and complex crimes such as money 
  laundering.  Despite having a money laundering law for over 
  ten years, none of these offices has dedicated specific 
  resources for investigating and prosecuting money 
  laundering.  There is neither a specialized prosecutorial 
  unit for the prosecution of money laundering nor a 
  specialized financial investigations unit within the police. 
  Additionally, the prosecutors' offices do not have any 
  dedicated financial analysts or forensic accountants to 
  assist them with the preparation of their cases. 
  Nationwide, there are thousands of criminal cases under 
  investigation, and there are not sufficient police 
  investigators or prosecutors to adequately handle the load. 
 
25.  (SBU) In addition to the lack of qualified personnel to 
  investigate and prosecute money laundering, the personnel 
  currently available do not have the necessary knowledge or 
  experience to conduct effective financial investigations or 
  the technical tools to assist them in these investigations. 
  Currently there are no prosecutors trained to conduct 
  financial investigations, and the DPPs for the Mainland and 
  Zanzibar desperately need financial investigative training 
  for members of their offices, police investigators and 
  judges.  In January 2005, OTA conducted a Financial 
  Investigation training course for 40 Tanzanian officials 
  from the Police, DPP and Public Corruption Bureau.  This 
  training included presentations by Tanzania experts on their 
  laws, criminal procedures and investigative techniques.  The 
  DPP for the Mainland has identified six prosecutors to be 
  specially trained in the prosecution of money laundering 
  offenses, but it is not clear whether these prosecutors will 
  be formed into a specialized unit.  Thus, the training of 
  investigators, prosecutors and judges is a clear and 
  immediate necessity to enable them to effectively carry out 
  their responsibilities to identify, investigate and 
  prosecute money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
------------------------------------- 
 
26.  (SBU) The GoT created the Office of the Registrar of 
  NGOs/Charities, located in the Office of the Vice President. 
  The office is only six weeks old, despite the fact that The 
  Non-Governmental Organizations Act (NGOA) was passed in 
  2002, because it took over two years to write the 
  implementing regulations.  The NGOA requires the 
  registration of all NGOs and each NGO, with certain 
  exceptions for very small, local organizations, is required 
  to file an audited financial statement and list of 
  activities every year, which are available to the public. 
  However, an NGO is not required to indicate its sources of 
  funding.  Various officials estimate that there are between 
  4,000 and 6,000 NGOs in Tanzania.  The NGOA also requires 
  the creation of a board to certify new NGOs, as well as the 
  creation of a council that coordinates all NGOs operating in 
  Mainland Tanzania (this law does not apply to Zanzibar). 
  The Registrar stated that his office will create a database 
  of all NGOs and a website where information on registered 
  NGOs will be posted. 
 
27.  (SBU) Failure to comply with the NGO law can result in 
  the rescission of registration.  If the NGO continues to 
  operate, it is up to other agencies or law enforcement to 
  investigate and prosecute. 
 
28.  (SBU) Registration occurs on three levels: district, if 
  operating in one district, regional, if operating in a 
  region larger than a district, and national if it is an 
  international NGO or if its scope of operation extends 
  beyond more than one region.  Eventually, each district will 
  have an official representative of the Registrar's office, 
  who will be responsible for registering NGOs in that 
  district.  There are 136 districts in the Mainland.  It is 
  unlikely that each district office will be computerized or 
  able to plug into a database because of a lack of funds. 
  The district representative will have to use the postal 
  service to mail registration and other information back to 
  the Registrar's office in Dar es Salaam. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
29.  (SBU) The GoT has ratified the International Convention 
  for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and within 
  the next year anticipates ratifying the Palermo Convention, 
  and, as a member of ESAAMLG, agreed to application of the 
  FATF Forty Recommendations and the Nine Special 
  Recommendations on Terrorism.  To fully comply with these 
  conventions and recommendations, the following additional 
  measures must be taken on both the Mainland and in Zanzibar: 
 
--Enact, without further delay, the amendments to the POCA 
to expand the predicates for money laundering, create an 
FIU, expand customer identification requirements, and 
mandate suspicious transaction reporting by a wide-range of 
reporting entities; 
 
--Criminalize money laundering as it relates to activities 
in Zanzibar and ensure that such law provides powers to 
identify, seize, freeze, and forfeit assets involved in 
money laundering; 
 
--Examiners responsible for reviewing banks and financial 
institutions for compliance should receive specialized 
training in AML/CTF; 
 
--Bankers should receive awareness and specialized training 
on money laundering and terrorist financing; 
 
--Tipping off by personnel of banks, financial institutions 
and other entities that are covered by the revised proceeds 
of crime bill, and government employees who deal with 
suspicious transaction reports should be strictly prohibited 
in all cases; 
 
--The GoT should write regulations to implement the changes 
to the Proceeds of Crime Act and the BoT should rescind 
Circular No. 8 once it is replaced by the new regulations, 
as soon as possible; 
 
--The GoT should, as expeditiously as possible in order not 
to delay the coming into force of the new act, ensure that 
there is adequate supervision, including reviews for 
compliance, of all institutions covered by the revised 
Proceeds of Crime Bill and of alternative remittance 
systems; 
 
--The GoT should arrange for an awareness campaign and 
training for all covered entities to be sure they understand 
their responsibilities and are able to comply; 
 
--The language in the FIU section of the bill needs to be 
clarified, because it currently states that the Committee 
will oversee the operations of the FIU. If the FIU is to be 
truly independent, then the language should be changed to 
reflect this. Otherwise, the precise relationship between 
the FIU and the Committee needs to be clarified; 
 
--The FIU should be specifically authorized to receive and 
analyze suspicious transactions related to terrorist 
financing; 
 
--Once the FIU is established, the staff should receive 
adequate training so it can fulfill its responsibilities and 
achieve membership in the Egmont Group; 
 
--Expand the number of prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism; 
 
--Create a specialized unit within the prosecutor's office 
to investigate and prosecute all types of money laundering 
cases throughout Mainland Tanzania; 
 
--Create a specialized unit within the prosecutor's office 
to investigate and prosecute all types of terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism; 
 
--Train prosecutors and investigators on how to effectively 
conduct a financial investigation, including training to 
increase their understanding of financial records and 
corporate documents and their applicability to criminal 
prosecutions for money laundering; 
 
--Provide basic training for investigators to include case 
management, evidence collection and safeguarding, forensics, 
and forfeiture; 
 
--Provide task force training to the various agencies with 
reporting, investigating and prosecuting responsibilities 
under the new amendments; 
 
--Establish a Police Task Force that would include elements 
from key government organizations required by law to 
investigate criminal acts, such as customs, border patrol, 
and intelligence agencies; 
 
--Train prosecutors, judges and investigators to enhance 
their knowledge and understanding of the money laundering 
law and the complexities of "following the money"; 
 
--Train prosecutors and investigators to enhance their 
abilities to gather evidence from foreign countries on money 
laundering and terrorism; 
 
--Consider enacting additional legislation to create a non- 
conviction based forfeiture system, a separate bureau for 
the management of seized and forfeited assets, and the 
creation of an asset forfeiture fund; 
 
--The NGO Registrar's office should be required to report 
suspicious transactions to the FIU; 
 
--NGOs should be required to list their sources of funding; 
 
--The Office of Registrar of NGO/Charities should be funded 
and staffed at levels to permit follow up with organizations 
that fail to file annual reports, coordinate with other 
State bodies on organizations that are de-registered, and 
verification of annual reports filed by organizations; and 
 
--Implement cross-border reporting requirements. 
 
----------------------- 
END TEXT OF FSAT REPORT 
----------------------- 
 
30. (SBU) Post comment: USG efforts to combat money 
laundering and the finance of terrorism are an important 
part of post's MPP.  Post has supported the US Treasury's 
Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) in its two-year work 
plan to provide support to the GOT in developing an AML/CFT 
regime and in training examiners, investigators, and 
prosecutors.  Progress on new legislation has been slow, in 
part because the issue is not the GOT's highest priority. 
Still, GOT officials recognize the weaknesses of their 
financial regulatory system and are willing partners with 
the USG to address those weaknesses.  Post will continue to 
support USG programs that can help the GOT implement the 
recommendations listed above.  End comment. 
 
STILLMAN