This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PTER PINS MOPS PHUM FARC
SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS LOCALIZED TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 1812 
 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 2011 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 2304 
     ¶D. IIR 6819 1790-05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  This cable replaces Bogota 3073 which was 
transmitted in error.  Please destroy all prior copies. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Summary.  FARC violence in the first quarter of 
2005, although tactically aggressive, remained localized and 
below 2004 levels in all categories:  attacks against 
military and police, attacks against civilians, and attacks 
against infrastructure.  Intelligence since November 2004 has 
indicated the FARC's desire to increase violence and 
disorder.  It is not clear the degree to which these attacks 
are orchestrated by the FARC Secretariat or, more likely, are 
the product of a general order that operating units should be 
more aggressive.   Attacks are limited and asymmetrical, and 
may arise from a variety of motives: to weaken Uribe during 
the pre-election period, to force diversion of resources away 
from the Plan Patriota offensive against the FARC stronghold, 
to take advantage of the purported "security vacuum" left by 
demobilizing paramilitaries, or simply to demonstrate 
continued FARC capabilities after a bad 2004.  But the FARC's 
ability to achieve any of these goals through such pinprick 
attacks remains doubtful.  The FARC has succeeded in a 
limited spike in violence, but not more than that.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Colombian military statistics indicate that, in 
spite of anecdotal and press impressions of increased FARC 
terrorism, FARC violence is still substantially below 2004 
levels in all categories.  Statistics show that first quarter 
2005 attacks on military and police, and infrastructure, are 
all below the 2004 quarterly average and the first quarter of 
¶2004.  FARC attacks on civilians are virtually identical to 
the 2004 average or slightly higher (131 versus 124) than the 
first quarter in 2004.  By regions, FARC attacks in the first 
quarter are significantly lower in the Caribbean and the 
south, and dramatically lower (39 versus 86 incidents) in the 
northwest.  But attacks against civilians/civilians were 
greater in the west, the south and the east.  All of which 
indicates that, although the number of attacks is down 
overall, the FARC may be aiming at higher profile targets, or 
conducting operations that result in higher casualties (we 
don't have casualty information for the first quarter yet). 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Evidence suggests that FARC leadership at the 
highest levels planned and ordered the recent spike in 
violence, although the level of senior leadership in 
selection of targets and other operational decisions is 
unclear.  Some evidence suggests that FARC leaders simply 
called for all fronts to increase levels of violence by any 
means possible.  It is also possible that the FARC is seeking 
to increase attacks: in areas outside the Plan Patriota 
offensive in order to force the government to divert 
resources, to try to establish a presence in former 
paramilitary areas, or simply to demonstrate their continued 
capability for violence after a bad 2004.  Nevertheless, to 
what degree a strategic shift has occurred in FARC planning 
is less relevant than to what degree the guerillas can carry 
out attacks that influence the direction of the body politic. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) The attacks in first quarter 2005 demonstrate FARC's 
classic terrorist strategy to hit where the enemy is weakest. 
 This has proven for the FARC to be targets of 
opportunity--mainly elements of the Colombian military 
(COLMIL) taken off guard outside of the Plan Patriota area of 
operations, where the FARC remains weakened.  The terrorist 
organization has also shown slight strategic shifts with 
regard to kidnapping and pipeline attacks.  For example, the 
FARC kidnapped 11 people over the Holy Week holiday season in 
2005 in Colombia, but instead of the more typical roadblock 
method, took people hostage on remote farmland in Antioquia 
and Valle del Cauca.  The kidnapping figure was 24 people 
lower than in the same period of 2004, and showed the FARC's 
inability to control major roadways, which requires effective 
dominance of an area of territory.  Also, with regard to 
pipeline attacks, the FARC has increased the number of 
attacks, but shifted some of the focus away from Arauca 
Department in favor of attacks in Norte de Santander 
Department (ref C), where the pipeline traverses more remote 
and rugged terrain. Again, the FARC is moving to attack at 
the weakest points, but it shows little capacity in the face 
of a public security presence. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) The possibility that the FARC is positioning 
itself to take control of areas vacated by demobilized 
paramilitaries is of public concern.  First quarter attacks 
have shown some evidence of this, but not enough to suggest a 
pattern.  Examples include the Holy Week kidnappings in 
Calima, Valle del Cauca, and Salgar, Antioquia, former 
paramilitary strongholds, and the pipeline attacks in Norte 
de Santander.  Nevertheless, the FARC has yet to show a broad 
capacity to fill the purported "security vacuum" left by the 
demobilization of thousands of paramilitaries.  Rather than 
gaining control of new territory, it appears the FARC is 
conducting small attacks to divert attention and perhaps 
resources away from the Plan Patriota area.  The embassy will 
continue to monitor the status of former paramilitary held 
territory closely.  For the moment it appears the battle for 
public perception on the issue will be more defining than any 
actual battle for territory. 
 
¶7.  (U) Despite FARC military activity, public support for 
President Uribe during the first quarter of 2005 remained 
very strong.  In a Gallup/El Tiempo poll released March 17, 
72 percent of Colombians polled had a favorable impression of 
President Uribe, and 67 percent were in favor of the idea of 
re-election for a second term.  Further, 83 percent had a 
favorable opinion of the COLMIL, 73 percent voiced support 
for Plan Colombia, while 92 percent had a negative view of 
the FARC (and only 3 percent a favorable view).  Finally, 69 
percent of respondents said that they feel Colombia is more 
secure than one year ago, and 52 percent said they were 
against any exchange of FARC prisoners for the release of 
hostages. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Focusing more attention on the FARC's recent 
failed attempts, rather than dwelling on its strategic 
posturing, demonstrates that the FARC remains weakened and 
limited primarily to attacking targets of opportunity.  For 
example, the FARC recently tried to destroy key electric 
towers around Bogota in an effort to leave the capital city 
dark for up to 24 hours.  Not only were the explosive devices 
ineffective and poorly constructed, they were discovered by 
pedestrians who noticed suspicious packages in plain sight. 
The attempt showed bold intentions, but weak capacity. 
Another example was the FARC's inability to disrupt holiday 
travel during Holy Week, a key indicator of security levels 
and one felt personally by Colombians who remember what it 
was like to be under siege in the cities.  The FARC tried to 
place an illegal roadblock on the road between Florencia 
(Caqueta) and Neiva (Huila), but again proved incapable of 
carrying out what could have been a significant attack. 
 
¶9.  (U) In the year leading up to elections, the spike in 
violence in the first quarter of 2005 has already generated 
significant public debate.  The opposition is making 
exaggerated statements like that of leftist Representative 
Gustavo Petro that "what has happened is confirmation finally 
that Democratic Security is a failure."  The GOC response, 
that these attacks are lamentable but have not undermined the 
government's strategy, continues to resonate with most 
Colombians. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10.  (S/NF) No one should underestimate the FARC.  After 40 
years, they are patient.  The FARC has managed to make 
headlines in the first quarter of 2005, and the cost of their 
attacks has been real.  The COLMIL will need to avoid the 
mistakes that have led to losses during recent periphery 
attacks.  But, while helping them review tactical security 
issues, we are advising no change in their strategic approach. 
WOOD