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Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON233, NPT: AMBASSADOR SANDERS DISCUSSES REVCON 2005 WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05WELLINGTON233 2005-03-21 02:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Wellington
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 WELLINGTON 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR SANDERS 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/MNA, EAP AND EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ NPT
SUBJECT: NPT: AMBASSADOR SANDERS DISCUSSES REVCON 2005 WITH 
NZ OFFICIALS 
 
REF: STATE 18228 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC COUNSELOR KATHERINE HADDA, 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Special Representative of President for the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Jackie 
Sanders, told New Zealand officials that the May 2005 Review 
Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons must focus on the greatest threats to global 
security: noncompliance by non-nuclear-weapon states with 
their nonproliferation obligations and non-state actors 
interested in nuclear weapons or involved in clandestine 
networks to supply nuclear technology or materials.  She 
cited as unconstructive efforts by New Zealand and other New 
Agenda Coalition members to place equal emphasis on 
disarmament by nuclear states.  New Zealand officials 
strongly support nonproliferation efforts, but they continued 
to insist that "balance" between the three NPT "pillars" 
(nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses) is 
essential.  But after Ambassador Sanders and her team 
outlined the many steps the United States has taken towards 
disarmament in recent years, the officials admitted that the 
United States has a good case to make and encouraged Sanders 
to make similar presentations to other NPT parties.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DISARMAMENT KEY TO NPT PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Special 
Representative of the President for the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, met on February 11 with John McKinnon, 
Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs at New Zealand's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), to discuss preparations 
for the May 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  Sanders was 
accompanied by John Mentz, Special Assistant for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
Elizabeth Murphy, Foreign Affairs Specialist, NP/MNA; the 
Ambassador's Special Assistant Renick Smith; and Katherine 
Hadda, Political-Economic Counselor at Embassy Wellington 
(notetaker).  McKinnon was joined by Deborah Pankhurst and 
Charlotte Darlow, Deputy Director and Policy Officer in 
MFAT's Disarmament Division. 
 
3.  (C) McKinnon said he appreciated that Sanders had come to 
New Zealand, and said he hoped her visit would enable the two 
sides to identify areas of agreement and difference about 
what the RevCon should accomplish.  Sanders said this was 
exactly the reason for traveling to the region.  She said 
that she had made the decision to visit even before New 
Zealand had decided to assume the chair of the New Agenda 
Coalition (NAC) in the run-up to and at the RevCon because 
she was interested in hearing New Zealand's views.  She also 
wanted to lay out for her NPT counterparts what the United 
States believes are the real threats that NPT parties must 
address at the May RevCon. 
 
4.  (C) The United States intends to address all aspects of 
the NPT in the run-up to and at the RevCon, but the chief 
U.S. focus will be on noncompliance, Sanders told McKinnon. 
The United States was proud of its progress toward the goals 
of NPT Article VI.  However, the real threat to global 
security does not come from the nuclear-weapon states (NWS), 
it comes from non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) noncompliance 
with their nonproliferation obligations and non-state actor 
involvement in clandestine networks to supply nuclear 
equipment and material.  Disarmament will not occur in a 
vacuum; proliferation of WMD will necessarily impact 
disarmament.  All signatories have obligations under the 
treaty, and all should comply.  Sanders noted U.S. 
expectations that the RevCon will debate the issue of the 
need to control nuclear fuel cycle technology.  She 
reiterated that Article IV rights to the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy are clearly tied to compliance with the 
nonproliferation obligations outlined in Articles II and III. 
 Sanders said that she hoped parties would not try to focus 
the RevCon solely on disarmament, as it was in all parties' 
interest to keep the Treaty together and strengthen 
compliance with its nonproliferation objectives.  Mentz added 
that all parties' security is at risk when parties do not 
honor their obligations. 
 
5.  (C) McKinnon noted that he was not an expert on the NPT, 
which is normally handled at MFAT by Deputy Secretary 
Rosemary Banks, who was on travel.  But he stressed the 
importance of the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
to New Zealand.  New Zealand views the NPT as an underpinning 
for security and a balance between competing interests.  New 
Zealand's goal is to see all aspects of the treaty 
strengthened, although it realizes there are challenges to 
the very foundation of the NPT, as made clear by that day's 
claim by North Korea that it possessed nuclear weapons.  All 
elements of the treaty must be equally enforced.  The NPT's 
original purpose was to balance the interests of both NWS and 
NNWS in order both to prevent proliferation and to allow for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  If the three pillars get 
"too out of kilter," said McKinnon, New Zealand feels the 
overall thrust of the treaty will weaken.  For this reason, 
the NAC aim at the RevCon will be disarmament and its 
promotion, but without blindness to the threat of 
proliferation.  According to McKinnon, noncompliance and the 
possibility of "break-out" from the Treaty are key issues. 
However, without recognition of NNWS interest in disarmament 
concerns, the basis of the Treaty will weaken.  In New 
Zealand's view, disarmament benefits the integrity of the 
system; counterproliferation is better off in an environment 
of progress on disarmament.  Perceptions are important, and a 
degree of confidence on disarmament would facilitate progress 
on proliferation.  McKinnon noted that U.S. and New Zealand 
positions on nonproliferation are similar, but urged a 
balanced approach at the RevCon to get the nonproliferation 
outcomes both the United States and New Zealand want.  New 
Zealand does not want the RevCon to fail or reach an 
inadequate outcome.  New Zealand wants a RevCon outcome that 
preserves the regime and moves it forward on all fronts. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Sanders said that the United States would 
explain in detail all the steps it has taken on Article VI at 
the RevCon.  She agreed that parties considered all three 
pillars of the NPT when they signed on, but she countered 
McKinnon's point by noting that ultimately states adhered to 
the NPT to serve their own security interests by preventing 
proliferation.  She also reminded McKinnon that New Zealand 
should look at other NWS progress on Article VI.  Sanders 
offered that the United States has done more, and in a more 
transparent way, with regard to nuclear disarmament than any 
other state.  The United States has spent billions to 
eliminate both U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons.  Likewise, 
the United States is the largest donor to international 
cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, although 
Congress could reconsider funding if it lacks confidence that 
the nonproliferation regime can effectively ensure that the 
NPT is not used as cover for the development of nuclear 
weapons programs. 
 
 
7.  (C) McKinnon and Sanders agreed that this RevCon will be 
a difficult one.  Sanders noted that the United States is 
committed to working toward a consensus outcome, but the 
Treaty itself is more important than any possible RevCon 
document.  We should not raise expectations that the RevCon 
will reach agreement.  Parties should focus on the key 
threats to the Treaty and international security, and conduct 
a healthy debate.  She noted that some NPT parties seem to 
feel that only the NWS benefit from the NPT, when in reality 
proliferation threatens the security of all.  McKinnon 
assured her that New Zealand conveys its concerns about 
disarmament to all the NWS; Pankhurst agreed that the United 
States was the most transparent of the P-5. 
 
8.  (C) Mentz related to McKinnon that some parties see 
alleged NWS lack of progress on Article VI as an excuse for 
NNWS noncompliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations. 
Mentz strongly objected to this view, arguing that 
assessments of their own security and regional tensions drive 
these states; Article VI was not the driver.  McKinnon agreed 
that connections between noncompliance with nonproliferation 
obligations and Article VI were "inchoate."   Mentz and 
Sanders told McKinnon that when parties talk about the need 
for "balance" in the NPT Review process, they seem really to 
mean there is a need to criticize the P-5 on disarmament 
without addressing nonproliferation.  This is a mistake in 
2005 when there needs to be a united front against 
proliferation.  Pankhurst said that New Zealand and the 
United States agree on many points, noting that New Zealand 
was the first to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). 
However, when countries first signed the NPT in 1970, they 
thought the P-5 would completely disarm by 1995.  Clearly 
this has not happened.  New Zealand recognizes how much the 
U.S. has done to disarm, but New Zealand wants more on all 
fronts.  Pankhurst expressed concern about the atmosphere as 
the RevCon approaches and asked why the U.S. is reluctant to 
refer to the 2000 RevCon outcome in the provisional agenda 
for the 2005 RevCon.  Sanders said the United States does not 
dismiss the 2000 RevCon, but the 2000 outcome should not be 
the only reference point; the developments of the past five 
years are important as well.  She reminded Pankhurst that 
some that want 2000 as the sole benchmark have their own 
agenda.  Iran, for example, wants to draw attention away from 
its post-2000 activities.  Sanders, Pankhurst, and Darlow all 
agreed that the Chair at last year's third session of the 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom III) for the 2005 RevCon was 
partly to blame for the PrepCom's failure to reach agreement 
on a RevCon provisional agenda.  Sanders offered that the 
non-aligned movement also played a negative 
role. 
 
9.  (C) Sanders reminded Pankhurst how significantly the 
world has changed since 1970; there are different threats and 
many assumptions no longer hold.  She asked about the NAC's 
goals and what parties could cooperate on.  Pankhurst noted 
that she was not speaking on behalf of the NAC, but NAC plans 
were still a work in progress.  The NAC had yet to meet to 
prepare for the RevCon, as New Zealand had only recently 
taken over the Chair after South Africa bowed out.  At the 
moment, the NAC is using as its basis its PrepCom II working 
paper.  Darlow posited that the NAC would likely build on its 
2004 UN First Committee resolution.  She also said that New 
Zealand plans to work with the G-10 in Vienna on 
nonproliferation initiatives and provide papers to the RevCon 
president on them. 
 
10.  (C) Pankhurst said that the P-5 could help shape 
perceptions and the RevCon atmosphere by facilitating 
agreement on an agenda beforehand; acknowledging the 13 steps 
agreed to at the 2000 RevCon; providing leadership on nuclear 
disarmament and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD); improving the Moscow 
Treaty by destroying weapons rather than just stockpiling 
them; making plans to destroy weapons not covered by the 
Moscow Treaty; putting in place confidence building measures 
on de-alerting weapons; and continuing contacts to improve 
the pre-RevCon atmosphere.  Darlow added that reporting was 
another area in which the NWS could facilitate agreement.  In 
response, Sanders said the United States is working actively 
on the conference agenda with the RevCon President-designate. 
 The United States has taken leadership in the CD, for 
example by putting forward proposals on FMCT and landmines. 
On nuclear disarmament, the United States has never held that 
an international treaty was a good idea.  As for the 13 
steps, parties should consider what the United States has 
done in relation to Article VI, not focus on artificial 
yardsticks.  Mentz added that there was great misperception 
about what the Moscow Treaty does.  Most stored weapons are 
in the pipeline for destruction, which is difficult and 
expensive.  However, the United States needs a credible 
deterrent; those weapons that remain must be safe and 
reliable.  This requires continual monitoring and occasional 
refurbishing. 
 
11.  (C) Pankhurst said that she and her colleagues had read 
A/S Rademaker's recent speech to the Arms Control 
Association, and said that it was very useful.  She suggested 
that more U.S. reporting on its Article VI activities would 
improve the environment at the RevCon.  For instance, she 
said that many do not know how many weapons have been 
destroyed or what the destruction process entails.  Sanders 
said that the U.S. will voluntarily provide details of its 
Article VI activities, but the U.S. does not believe formal 
reporting would be productive.  Smith said that countries 
should pay more attention to what the U.S. and Russia have 
done to make arms reductions possible.  Arms reductions under 
the Moscow Treaty were the products of improved security, not 
the cause.  Amb. Sanders assured Pankhurst that she plans 
extensive consultations with NPT partners to ensure a solid 
outcome to the RevCon.  Pankhurst said this would be useful, 
and asked what the United States will look for vis-a-vis 
compliance.  The Ambassador outlined U.S. priorities and 
turned over ref non-paper. 
 
12.  (C) Mentz said that the NAC and others seem to have 
misperceptions about the U.S. nuclear posture review (NPR). 
He noted that the NPR found that the United States needed 
fewer nuclear weapons given current threats.  Ultimately, the 
United States will have fewer weapons of higher quality. 
Sanders pointed out that the non-paper she had given them 
includes a discussion of misperceptions of the NPR.  Mentz 
noted that some parties treated the NWS as an 
undifferentiated group, when some NWS are increasing their 
nuclear stocks and are far less transparent than the United 
States.  Pankhurst reiterated that New Zealand engages with 
all the NWS individually, but did not respond when Ambassador 
Sanders asked if all the individual criticisms were made 
publicly.  (Comment: They aren't.  End Comment.) 
 
------------------------------ 
MINISTER FOR DISARMAMENT HOBBS 
------------------------------ 
 
13.  (C) Amb. Sander's group also met with Marian Hobbs, 
Minister for Disarmament.  Hobbs said that U.S. and New 
Zealand objectives are the same: a world free of nuclear 
weapons.  She reiterated that for this reason all three 
pillars of the NPT are important, and all members must take 
verifiable steps to reach their goals.  "This is the same 
thing I tell Iran," she said.  Sanders noted her appreciation 
at being compared with Iran, and the Minister beat a hasty 
retreat from the comparison.  Sanders said that the United 
States does see all aspects of the NPT as important, but 
noncompliance is the key threat.  Parties must focus on 
strengthening compliance with Articles II and III; parties in 
noncompliance with these obligations should not have access 
to nuclear cooperation.  Hobbs said she had recently attended 
a seminar on the NPT RevCon in Atlanta, where participants 
noted that were it not for the NPT, there might be 20 states 
with nuclear weapons.  This is why New Zealand signed the 
NPT.  New Zealand is interested in compliance, but compliance 
with both Article VI and the nonproliferation articles. 
Parties need to build trust; there should be reporting and 
verification of both sets of obligations.  Sanders assured 
Hobbs that the United States also believes in verification, 
but that frankly parties do not recognize all the United 
States has done to meet its obligations under Article VI. 
The United States realizes that many feel the NWS are not 
moving fast enough to disarm, but the NWS are not the true 
threat today.  The NWS are no longer targeting each other or 
any other state.  The real threat is North Korea, Iran, and 
non-state actors like the A.Q. Khan network, and until 
recently Libya and Iraq. 
 
14.  (C) As had McKinnon, Hobbs said New Zealand completely 
agrees that noncompliance is a key issue, which is why for 
example the country participates in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative.  But New Zealand does not believe that 
nonproliferation is more important than disarmament.  Both 
are important, and parties need to build trust in both by 
taking transparent steps on both.  There is also no mechanism 
to measure compliance.  Sanders said that this was one reason 
why the U.S. has recommended a special committee on 
safeguards and verification at the IAEA.  Moreover, it is the 
role of all parties to consider others' compliance on a 
case-by-case basis.  Hobbs asked for the U.S. view of 
Canadian proposals for new institutions such as reporting and 
a permanent NPT secretariat.  Sanders said the United States 
does not see the need for new institutions.  The United 
States does report voluntarily.  Another institution is not 
needed; what is needed is for states to ensure that the 
current institutions -- the IAEA and the UN Security Council 
-- work.  Hobbs noted that the PrepComs have been stymied; 
they failed to make progress or even to produce a RevCon 
provisional agenda.  Sanders offered that an effective 
PrepCom III Chair could have produced a RevCon provisional 
agenda and predicted the RevCon President-designate was 
likely to be far more effective. 
 
15.  (C) Amb. Sanders said the important thing was that while 
there are issues on which the United States and New Zealand 
do not agree, there are also many issues on which we do 
agree.  We need to stick together and cooperate for a good 
result, and must address real world threats at the RevCon. 
Disarmament is important, but addressing the threat of 
proliferation and the possibility of nuclear terrorism is far 
more pressing.  Hobbs acknowledged the threat of nuclear 
terrorism and the tragedy of 9/11, but said that New Zealand 
and the Pacific had faced the specter of nuclear testing in 
the region, even as the U.S. faces threats that New Zealand 
does not.  Sanders noted that New Zealand like all countries 
is not immune from the threat of terrorism.  Hobbs agreed, 
but reiterated that New Zealand sees both disarmament and 
nonproliferation as important. 
 
16.  (C) With regard to disarmament, Ambassador Sanders told 
Hobbs she hoped New Zealand would hold other NWS to account 
on disarmament -- China, for example.  Hobbs assured Sanders 
that New Zealand was very aware of all NWS activities; its 
interest in disarmament is not anti-American.  Sanders asked 
whether New Zealand has made any efforts to influence North 
Korea.  Hobbs said they try, but it is extremely difficult 
and she does not think New Zealand's efforts have any effect. 
 She called North Korea "unstable and scary," and said in 
addition to sending messages to the regime via New Zealand's 
Ambassador to Pyongyang, she herself had rejected the 
arguments of a visiting North Korean official and called him 
a liar.  Sanders said that the quickest way to encourage 
disarmament is to get the proliferation problem under 
control.  Hobbs disagreed, noting a parallel to trade: New 
Zealand had unilaterally reduced tariffs to encourage others 
to liberalize Hobbs said she intended to attend the 
nuclear-weapon-free zone conference that Mexico will host 
immediately prior to the RevCon and then to participate in 
the first few days of the RevCon. 
Swindells