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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1424, TECHNICAL TALKS ON POSSIBLE RETURN OF U.S.-ORIGIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV1424 2005-03-10 14:54 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 001424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/NE KRASS AND NEA/IPA 
DOE FOR DOE/NA-212 KASIA MENDELSOHN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: KNNP ENRG TRGY PREL IS ISRAEL RELATIONS COUNTERTERRORISM ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBJECT: TECHNICAL TALKS ON POSSIBLE RETURN OF U.S.-ORIGIN 
SPENT FUEL FROM ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES 
 
REF: A) 04 STATE 251040 B) 02 TEL AVIV 4869 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene Cretz; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and 
 (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: A joint DOE/State technical team led by Kasia 
Mendelsohn from DOE's Office of Global Nuclear Material 
Threat Reduction met with officials from the Israeli Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEC) on January 12-13 to discuss possible 
Israeli participation in the Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) 
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program.  Both sides 
agreed on a summary of discussions (text in paragraph six), 
including a detailed fuel inventory for the Soreq nuclear 
facility, a list of specific follow-on actions, and a 
proposed implementation schedule for a possible Israeli SNF 
shipment in September 2005.  The Israelis raised a number of 
issues that would require the USG to modify -- or make 
exceptions to -- the current FNR-SNF program, including 
continued operation of Soreq on high-enriched uranium (HEU) 
fuel, financial concessions, and a closely-coordinated public 
diplomacy strategy.  The U.S. team took Israel's requests 
back to Washington for discussion in the interagency process. 
End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Mendelsohn noted that the FRR SNF Acceptance Program 
requires participating reactors to terminate the use of HEU 
(high-enriched uranium) fuel as soon as LEU (low-enriched 
uranium) fuel is available within the program policy period 
(i.e., by 2016).  She also told IAEC officials that Israel, 
as a high-income economy country as defined by the World 
Bank, would be required to pay for transportation costs and a 
DOE management fee in order to ship SNF under this program. 
She added that transportation costs could be reduced if 
Israel participated in a joint shipment with other nations, 
such as the one planned for September 2005. 
 
3. (C) IAEC Deputy Director for Policy Eli Levite stressed 
that Israel does not contemplate closing Soreq in the 
foreseeable future and is unable to convert to LEU due to a 
lack of a guaranteed fuel source.  He quoted from a USG 
non-paper (reftel A) to back his contention that the USG had 
already agreed that Soreq could continue to operate, saying 
Soreq would not have to convert until "Israel can acquire 
LEU."  Mendelsohn noted that the FRR SNF program could only 
accept fuel from a reactor that converts to LEU.  Levite's 
second major concern is that the cost of the SNF program, 
which he noted is not included in the IAEC's budget for 2005. 
 On several occasions, IAEC officials suggested that the USG 
could find a way to reduce the DOE management fee. 
 
4. (C) Levite told the U.S. delegation that the extremely 
sensitive nature of Israel's nuclear program would require a 
coordinated public affairs strategy.  He listed four elements 
that Israel wants included in any press guidance or public 
statement to be issued only after a possible shipment takes 
place: 1) the shipment was made at the request of the USG, 
but not under U.S. pressure; 2) Israel is not being 
singled-out, but is part of a broader program; 3) the 
shipment is part of a more general non-proliferation effort; 
and 4) the shipment does not reflect any safety or security 
concerns about Israeli storage procedures.  Levite also 
insisted that the summary of discussions be labeled 
"confidential."  The U.S. team undertook to take Israel's 
requests for exceptions to FRR SNF guidelines back to 
Washington and discuss them in the normal interagency 
process.  The two sides agreed that public release of 
information on the potential shipment be strictly limited 
until after any possible shipment takes place. 
 
5. (C) Embassy comment and recommendation: Post sees no 
reason to make the significant exceptions to the SNF program 
rules requested by the IAEC.  The GOI routinely pushes to the 
limit during negotiations in order to get the best deal 
possible, especially on financial matters.  The IAEC is 
certainly aware that the limited fiscal outlay required for 
any spent fuel shipment would be more than offset by having 
the USG permanently remove the dangerous material from 
storage at Soreq.  When considering whether to grant Israel's 
requests for exceptions to the SNF program rules, it should 
also be noted that the public relations benefits derived from 
any Soreq shipment could possibly be overshadowed by 
questions of why the USG is not addresing Israel's nuclear 
program in Dimona.  End Comment and recommendation. 
 
6. (C) Begin text of agreed U.S.-Israeli summary of 
discussions, marked "confidential" by Israeli officials: 
 
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) 
Soreq Research Reactor 
Tel Aviv, Israel 
 
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS 
IRR-1 
January 12 -13, 2005 
 
IAEC and DOE agree that the contents of this document and 
related communications are considered "confidential" unless 
stated otherwise. 
 
VISITING TEAM 
 
Ms. Kasia Mendelsohn, Office of Global Nuclear Material 
Threat Reduction, DOE/NNSA (Policy POC) 
Tel: (202) 586-0275 
Fax: (202) 586-6789 
Email: kasia.mendelsohn"at"hq.doe.gov 
 
Mr. Charles Messick, NA-212, DOE - Savannah River Site 
(Technical POC) 
Tel: 803-725-9494 
Fax: 803-725-8856 
Email: charles.messick"at"srs.gov 
 
Dr. Allan Krass, Department of State, Bureau of 
Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs 
Tel: (202) 647-3272 
Tel: (202) 647-0775 
Email: KrassAS"at"state.gov 
 
Mr. Michael Dunsmuir, Westinghouse-Savannah River Company 
(WSRC) 
Tel: (803) 557-6107 
Fax: (803) 557-6133 
Email: michael.dunsmuir"at"srs.gov 
 
Mr. Randy Dunavant, WSRC 
Tel: (803) 557-6146 
Fax: (803) 557-6133 
Email: randall.dunavant"at"srs.gov 
 
U.S. EMBASSY 
 
The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv is supporting these activities. 
The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv POCs are: 
 
Shawn Crowley, Political Officer 
Tel: 972-3-519-7385 
Fax: 972-3-519-1035 
Email: crowleysp"at"state.gov 
 
Robert Tansey, Science Officer 
Tel: 972-3-519-7478 
Fax: 972-3-519-1035 
Email: tanseyrj"at"state.gov 
 
KEY PERSONNEL IN ISRAEL: 
 
Israel Atomic Energy Commission: 
 
Dr. Ariel (Eli) Levite, Principal Deputy Director General 
(Policy) 
Tel: 972-3-6462913 
Fax: 972-3-6462570 
Email:  alevite"at"iaec.gov.il 
 
Dr. Chen Zak, External Relations Director IAEC (Policy POC) 
Tel: 972-3-6462914 
Fax: 972-3-6462570 
Email:  czak"at"iaec.gov.il 
 
Dr. Jacob Gilat, Safety and Licensing Division 
Tel: 972-3-6462958 
Fax: 972-3-6462539 
Email:  gilat"at"soreq.gov.il 
 
Mr. Ronen Lahav, Legal Advisor 
Tel: 972-3-6462593 
Fax: 972-3-6462974 
Email:  rlahav"at"iaec.gov.il 
 
Ms. Nili Lifchitz, Spokesperson 
Tel: 972-3-6462919 
Fax: 972-3-6462570 
Email:  nlifchitz"at"iaec.gov.il 
 
Soreq, NRC: 
Mr. Hanoch Hirshfeld (Technical POC) 
Tel: 972-8-943 4493 
Fax: 972-8-943 4157 
Email:  hirshfel"at"soreq.gov.il 
 
Mr. Michael Bettan, Reactor Director 
Tel: 972-8-9434615 
Fax: 972-8-9434133 
Email:  bettan"at"soreq.gov.il 
 
PURPOSE OF THE VISIT 
 
The purpose of this visit was: (1) to discuss U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation policy and program issues concerning the 
Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) 
Acceptance Program; (2) discuss contractual requirements for 
research reactors located in "countries with high income 
economies"; (3) conduct a brief assessment of the IRR-1 SNF 
condition; (4) evaluate the equipment and capabilities of the 
facility to package and prepare the material for shipment; 
and (5) determine shipment needs and requirements. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1952.  The 
Israel Research Reactor, IRR-1 (5 MW), was installed and 
commenced operation in 1960.  IRR-1 continues to operate and 
has no plans to shut down in the foreseeable future.  DOE 
currently does not have a contract with IAEC.  However, a 
Letter of Intent (LOI) was signed September 2004 between IAEC 
and DOE to include issues related to the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI). 
 
FUEL INVENTORY 
 
The IRR-1 Research Reactor fuel assemblies are MTR-type 
assemblies.  Characteristics of IRR-1 fuel and control 
assemblies that may be returned to the United States are 
provided below. 
 
SPENT  HEU (111 SNF assemblies) (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS SHOULD 
READ "116 SNF assemblies."  END NOTE). 
 
1. Standard MTR (196 gr): 75 
Consisting of: (18 curved plates), 
Enrichment: 90 - 93 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Al alloy 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 196 gr 
Burn-up: 45 percent average 
Average decay time: 20-28 years 
Note: Two standard assemblies are instrumented. 
 
2. Standard MTR (282 gr): 13 
Consisting of: (23 flat plates) 
Enrichment 93 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx- Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr 
Burn-up: 45 percent average 
Average decay time: greater than one year minimum prior to a 
shipment. 
 
3. Partial MTR (192 gr): 1 
Consisting of: (9 curved plates), 
Enrichment: 90 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr. 
 
4. Control Assemblies: 26 
Consisting of: (9 curved plates), 
Enrichment: 90 - 93 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Al alloy 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 98 gr 
Burn-up: 45 percent average 
Average decay time: 16 FAs - 20-28 yrs; 10 FAs - > than 28 yrs 
Note: One control assembly is instrumented. 
 
5. Control Assemblies: 1 
Consisting of: (17 flat plates), 
Enrichment: 93.3 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr. 
 
FRESH FUEL ASSEMBLIES (10 FAs) 
(Not considered for inclusion in a current shipment) 
 
6. Standard MTR (282 gr): 9 
Consisting of: (23 flat plates), 
Enrichment 93 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr. 
 
7. Partial MTR (192 gr) 1 
Consisting of: (9 curved plates), 
Enrichment: 90 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr. 
 
IN-CORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES (27 FAs) 
(Not considered for inclusion in a current shipment) 
 
8. Standard MTR (282 gr): 23 
Consisting of: (23 flat plates), 
Enrichment: 93 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr. 
 
9. Control Assemblies: 4 
Consisting of: (17 flat plates), 
Enrichment: 93.3 percent 
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion 
Clad: Al 
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr. 
 
CONDITION OF FUEL 
 
SNF fuel assemblies are stored in the IRR-1 storage section 
of the reactor pool, except for 24 SNF fuel assemblies stored 
in a storage facility located adjacent to the reactor pool. 
Spent fuel is stored in stainless steel/aluminum racks in the 
reactor pool and spent fuel stored in the storage facility is 
stored in aluminum racks. 
 
An evaluation of fuel was conducted by WSRC and a detailed 
report will be issued by WSRC at a later date.  However, 
initial examination of the fuel indicated no significant 
problems associated with transportation or storage of the 
fuel at the Savannah River Site.  The team saw no indication 
of any significant corrosion or mechanical damage.  The 
facility noted that no fuel was removed due to indication of 
a failure. 
 
FACILITIES RELATED TO PACKAGING 
 
The overhead bridge crane capacity is 12 metric tons. 
 
The reactor building access doors are approximately 355cm 
wide x 312cm high.  The floor load is effectively unlimited. 
 
The reactor pool is 10 meters deep and there is no capacity 
to set a heavy cask in the reactor pool without design 
modifications for a platform. 
 
The facility has a demineralized water supply and has a high 
capacity compressed air supply.   Electrical power is 220 
volts/50 Hz. 
 
IAEC possesses an on-site transfer cask (capacity of 4 fuel 
assemblies) for movement of fuel between the pool and the 
storage facility, and IAEC would transfer all fuel from the 
storage facility to the reactor pool prior to transport 
package loading. 
 
POTENTIAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTE FROM THE REACTOR TO THE PORT 
OF EXPORT 
 
Israel is a high-income economy and would be responsible for 
any in-country transportation activities. 
 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
 
The IAEC is the regulatory agency for Israel. 
 
POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
 
No significant problems have been identified. 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
1. The following documents were provided by DOE: 
 
-- Compilation of contract clauses for high-income economy 
countries (electronic) 
 
-- Appendix A and Appendix B (electronic) 
 
-- FRR SNF Acceptance Program Environmental Impact Statement 
Record of Decision with Changes 1 through 3 and Fee Policy 
notices. 
 
2. Kasia Mendelsohn, U.S. Department of Energy, made opening 
remarks summarizing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI) and the FRR SNF Acceptance Program, emphasizing two 
main points: 
 
-- The program requires participating FRRs to terminate the 
use of HEU fuel as soon as a suitable LEU fuel is available 
within the program policy period; and 
 
-- Israel, as a high-income economy country as defined by the 
World Bank, is required to pay for transportation costs and a 
DOE management fee in order to ship SNF under this program. 
Ms. Mendelsohn noted the unique opportunity to participate in 
a September 2005 joint shipment which could significantly 
reduce transportation cost. 
 
3. Ariel (Eli) Levite, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, made 
opening remarks: 
 
-- The general attitude of IAEC is positive toward shipping 
SNF to the United States and participating in the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI); 
 
-- Continued operation of IRR-1 is essential and there is no 
intention to shut down in the foreseeable future; 
 
-- The IAEC and DOE will work together to craft a positive 
public affairs approach, including appropriate statements to 
be made in the event of public inquiries in advance of the 
shipment and an appropriate press release (includes public 
statement) to be issued upon completion of the shipment. 
 
-- IAEC stated that conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU) 
fuel is based on Israel's ability to obtain LEU; 
 
-- IAEC recognized that the FRR SNF Acceptance program 
participation is connected to other GTRI and Letter of Intent 
(LOI) activities such as improvements in export controls, 
radioactive source control, etc; 
 
-- Cost effectiveness of economies-of-scale will need to be 
weighed against the cost of any management fee; 
 
-- Detailed questions must be resolved regarding, for 
example, lead time, personnel needs, security, etc. 
 
-- IAEC concluded by noting that quick turnaround may be 
possible when questions and concerns are resolved. 
 
-- The IAEC has expressed the political and diplomatic 
sensitivity of the issue of participating in this program. 
 
-- IAEC identified eight U.S.-origin Pu-Be sources, 
(approximately) 530 gms Pu, that it would like DOE to 
consider removing during the shipment of SNF to the United 
States.  DOE has referred this request to the Office of 
Global Radiological Threat Reduction for consideration and 
has identified Robert Campbell in the Office of Global 
Radiological Threat Reduction as the appropriate POC (Tel: 
202-586-7544).  Dr. Jacob Gilat was identified as the 
appropriate IAEC POC. 
 
Following opening remarks, the group departed for Soreq for a 
tour of the facility and detailed discussions of a 
compilation of clauses that may be used in a potential 
contract for shipment of the IRR-1 material under the FRR SNF 
program. 
 
-- IAEC has been informed that the shipment of SNF from the 
IRR-1 will likely be combined with other countries' shipments 
and as such it is possible that when the vessel arrives in 
Israel's port of export, it could have SNF from other 
facilities or countries on board. 
 
-- IAEC understands that because of possible competing 
shipments, DOE can not guarantee acceptance of SNF containing 
uranium enriched in the United States that is made available 
for shipment late in the Acceptance Program, which expires on 
May 12, 2019. 
AGREEMENTS AND ACTIONS 
 
1. DOE understands IAEC's concern regarding continued 
operation of IRR-1 and will review potential options that may 
alleviate such concerns. 
 
2. IAEC and DOE agreed to handle public affairs aspects 
cooperatively.  IAEC and DOE agreed to exchange points 
regarding a public affairs approach. 
 
3. IAEC identified eight U.S.-origin Pu-Be sources, 
(approximately) 530 gms Pu, that it would like DOE to 
consider removing during the shipment of SNF to the United 
States.  DOE has referred this request to the Office of 
Global Radiological Threat Reduction for consideration and 
has identified Robert Campbell in the Office of Global 
Radiological Threat Reduction as the appropriate POC (Tel: 
202-586-7544).  Dr. Jacob Gilat was identified as the 
appropriate IAEC POC. 
 
4. IAEC identified one fresh instrumented control assembly 
located at CERCA in France.  IAEC expressed interest in 
finding a way to return the assembly to Israel.  DOE agreed 
to refer this question to the appropriate authorities in 
Washington.  Resolution of this issue has financial 
implications for Israel's decision to participate. 
 
5. IAEC noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) must be notified sufficiently far in advance in order 
to apply appropriate safeguards.  DOE noted that it is IAEC's 
responsibility to notify IAEA of any intention to transfer 
SNF.  DOE understands its obligation under INFCIRC/84 to 
report receipt of the transferred material to the IAEA. 
 
6. DOE agreed to provide IAEC with a point-of-contact (POC) 
for known qualified shippers and cask vendors. 
 
7. DOE agreed to provide a POC regarding possible 
availability of SNF cropping equipment. 
 
8. DOE agreed to provide contractual points that might be 
applicable to IAEC-selected shipper under this program. 
 
9. DOE agreed to provide the non-proprietary portion of the 
DOE-NAC contract used for other-than-high income economy 
countries under this program. 
 
10. IAEC requests consideration for a reduction in overall 
costs for implementing a shipment in 2005. 
 
11. DOE will identify potential third parties that have 
participated in the program and would be willing to share 
experiences. 
 
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 
 
1. February 2005 - Agreement in principal to implement a SNF 
shipment in September 2005. 
2. March 2005 - Finalize Appendix A data. 
3 May 2005 - Approve IAEC-DOE contract. 
4 June 2005 - DOE issue "Authorization to Ship" letter. 
5. July 2005 - Transport packages arrive in Israel. 
6. August 2005 - SNF departs Israel. 
7. September 2005 - SNF arrives in the United States. 
 
End text of summary of discussions. 
 
7. (U) The DOE/State delegation has cleared this message. 
 
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