This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 000776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
WHA ALSO FOR USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
SUBJECT: LAVALAS TORN BETWEEN BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS AND 
MOVING FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Lavalas movement remains divided between 
leaders who argue for moving beyond Aristide and 
participating in elections this fall, and those who continue 
to call for Aristide's return and threaten a boycott of 
elections if their hard-line conditions are not met.  The 
division is not clear-cut.  There are indications that some 
of the principal hard-liners are in fact interested in 
participating in elections; this is especially true of Father 
Gerard Jean-Juste, who has emerged as a hard-line leader.  A 
group of Lavalas moderates around former PM Cherestal 
continues to lay the groundwork for a new party that would 
attempt to capture the Lavalas vote, but some of them still 
hope to unite both factions under one umbrella.  The many 
U.S.-based Lavalas members and "solidarity" activists 
complicate the picture; they are pushing a tough boycott 
position, but their distance from the process on the ground 
is likely to limit their influence.  Aristide's shadow 
continues to hang over the movement, with most people 
defining their positions in relation to him and many trying 
to use his name to rally for their position.  We anticipate 
it will not be clear for several more months how and whether 
the Lavalas movement -- either as Fanmi Lavalas or another 
party, or both -- will be represented in the elections.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In the wake of Aristide's departure, the movement and 
party he led are still trying to figure out their future. 
The internal debates and public arguments have now begun to 
focus on the concrete question of whether Lavalas should 
participate in this fall's elections or boycott them 
entirely.  The degree to which the Lavalas constituency 
participates in the election will be a large factor in the 
legitimacy of the elections, and we are therefore following 
developments inside the movement closely.  Over the past 
three weeks, we have spoken with a number of contacts -- 
Lavalas leaders, politicians from other parties, local 
analysts, U.S.-based activists, and others -- to put together 
a picture of the movement seven months ahead of the first 
(local) elections. 
 
Elections yes, elections no 
-------------------------- 

¶3. (C) The two main factions inside Lavalas can be outlined 
fairly simply.  Broadly speaking, hard-liners reject the 
legitimacy of the IGOH and electoral process and insist that 
elections cannot take place until Aristide is returned to 
power.  They focus on Fanmi Lavalas (FL) the registered 
political party and insist that only FL represents the 
legitimate Lavalas voice.  Father Gerard Jean-Juste, a 
longtime Lavalas activist and priest, has emerged in recent 
weeks as the most significant hard-line leader (spurred by 
his imprisonment last fall and his visit earlier this year to 
Aristide in South Africa).  He outlined his position at a 
March 5-6 conference of Haitian political parties (reftel): 
FL would boycott elections unless Aristide is returned to 
power, political prisoners are released, "persecution" of 
Lavalas partisans stops, and several other conditions are 
fulfilled.  He reiterated these in a March 10 conversation 
with PolCounselor, arguing that it was not only illegitimate 
to participate in elections, it was also impossible, since FL 
members could not meet or campaign safely.  The hard-line 
position is shared, at least publicly, by the leadership of 
the National Reflection Cell of Lavalas Popular 
Organizations, by pro-Aristide activists in Bel-Air and other 
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, and by pro-Aristide 
activists in other parts of Haiti (e.g. Milot mayor 
Jean-Charles Moise).  Some of these people are suspected of 
being involved in the pro-Aristide violence that has occurred 
in the capital since last fall. 
 
¶4. (C) Those in the moderate faction, more diverse and less 
vocal, insist they want to participate in the elections, that 
they represent the original spirit of the Lavalas movement, 
and that FL itself has been discredited by Aristide and his 
misgovernance.  The most significant group is coalescing 
around former Prime Minister Jean-Marie Cherestal, who has 
been quietly and cautiously preparing the groundwork to 
launch a new "Lavalas Renewed" party (ref B).  Cherestal told 
PolCounselor March 13 that he was satisfied with his progress 
in building support and said he was not worried that 
elections were only seven months away.  The party's basic 
message to Haiti's poor majority would be that Aristide's 
power had been a deceit; he was able to speak their language 
and raise their expectations, but he had not been able to 
deliver any true benefits to them.  Initial reactions to the 
draft Lavalas Renewed manifest had been positive, and 
Cherestal said he would soon "widen the circle" to bring more 
in, including former Lavalas Senators and Deputies like 
Gerald Gilles, Yvon Feuille, Rudy Heriveaux and others.  He 
said he was still hesitant about some of the these since he 
was not convinced they had fully distanced themselves from 
Aristide, but he knew it was important to bring them in if 
possible. 
 
¶5. (C) For their part, Feuille, Gilles, Heriveaux, and former 
Chamber of Deputies President Yves Cristallin told us March 
17 that they were still uncertain whether a new party was the 
right direction.  Feuille was the most convinced, saying he 
was committed to working with Cherestal, but he noted that 
financial resources were extremely limited for building a new 
party (a complaint not shared by Cherestal).  Gilles and 
Heriveaux said they worried about violent reactions from 
Aristide supporters, and also about the lack of funds.  All 
noted with some pain that Cherestal had not kept them very 
well informed about his activities. 
 
Hidden agendas make clarity difficult 
------------------------------------- 

¶6. (C) This being Haiti, the division between hard-liners and 
moderates is not precise.  In a political culture where 
hidden agendas are the norm, several appear to be at work 
inside the Lavalas movement; the most important of these may 
be Jean-Juste's.  Despite his hard-line rhetoric, nearly 
everyone we speak with is convinced that Jean-Juste in fact 
wants to participate in the elections and sees himself as a 
strong Presidential candidate.  MIDH President Marc Bazin 
told us he came away from an early March meeting with 
Jean-Juste convinced the priest was waiting until closer to 
the elections to declare his candidacy.  Voltaire, who has 
met frequently with Jean-Juste, also told us he believes 
Jean-Juste is interested in running for President or, failing 
that, in playing a power-broker role. 
 
¶7. (C) Whether all the "moderates" are really committed to 
participating in elections is another question.  Cherestal's 
suspicion of Gilles and Heriveaux is not without reason; both 
have acknowledged publicly and privately their continuing 
attachment to Aristide even as they portray themselves as 
ready to move on, and Heriveaux told us he would rather 
campaign with FL than with anybody else, even if Jean-Juste 
were the standard-bearer. Voltaire says he supports 
Cherestal, but he also describes himself as working to avoid 
a split in the movement over elections and to bring the two 
factions together.  Many in the movement see this as 
fence-straddling and dismiss him as an opportunist who has 
managed to hold Ministerial positions nearly uninterruptedly 
since 1990.  (Note:  We understand that Voltaire, an 
architect by profession, has been considering an offer to 
oversee the construction of the new airport in Caracas, 
Venezuela. End note).  Another professed moderate (and 
would-be presidential candidate), Jean-Claude Desgranges, was 
Aristide's last chief of staff and is married to a reportedly 
hard-line pro-Aristide FL activist who resides in Florida; 
Cherestal, among others, questions his "moderate" 
credentials. 
 
Electoral strategies for the post-Aristide era 
-------------------------------------------- 

¶8. (C) For most of the 1990's, the Lavalas movement 
represented the (poor) majority of Haitian voters, and 
Lavalas/FL could run on its own.  Defections from the 
movement and disillusionment with Aristide's record have 
diminished the electoral appeal of Fanmi Lavalas, but to a 
degree that is unclear.  Polling data from August 2004 showed 
that 8% of Haitians support FL, more than any other single 
party but a far cry from the 20-40% (or even 80%) that many 
Lavalas politicians insist the party enjoyed.  (That same 
poll, however, showed that Aristide was still the only figure 
in Haiti with a favorability rating above 50%.)  Thus it is 
not surprising that all of our contacts acknowledge the need 
for electoral alliances. 
 
¶9.  (C) Marc Bazin's MIDH party is most often cited as a 
likely partner.  Voltaire called Bazin "one of Haiti's most 
modern politicians" and said MIDH would give Lavalas 
technical credibility that it currently lacked.  Cherestal, 
too, said he hoped Bazin would join forces with his new 
party, but worried that he would make common cause with the 
hard-line faction instead.   Even Jean-Juste said that Bazin 
had become very popular within the Lavalas base because of 
his insistence on true reconciliation and his criticism of 
the IGOH's perceived harsh approach to Lavalas.  Bazin 
himself told PolCounselor in early March that he was very 
interested in an alliance with Jean-Juste because of the 
support it would bring him from the Lavalas base.  He 
dismissed the possibility of an alliance with Cherestal's 
party-in-formation, calling it "dead in the water."  (Note: 
Bazin frankly acknowledged to the Ambassador that he hopes to 
capitalize on the exclusion of Lavalas, especially the 
moderates.  He would be highly unlikley to step aside in 
favor of a Lavalas candidate.  End note.) Both MODEREH, the 
party of former Lavalas Senators Dany Toussaint and Pierre 
Sonson Prince, and KOMBA, the movement of former Lavalas 
official Evans Lescouflair and peasant leader Chavannes 
Jean-Baptiste, would appear to be potential allies of either 
FL or a Cherestal-led moderate Lavalas party.  Each has 
baggage though: Dany Toussaint is clouded by drug trafficking 
allegations and Chavannes Jean-Baptiste is seen by many 
hard-liners as a traitor to Lavalas. 
 
The U.S. faction 
----------------- 

¶10. (C) In addition to the hard-line and moderate Lavalas 
factions here in Haiti, there is in effect a third "faction" 
with agendas and influence that play a significant role: the 
U.S.-based community of staunchly pro-Aristide FL 
members-in-exile and "solidarity" activists.  The former are 
grouped together in the "FL Communications Commission" 
(www.hayti.net) that asserts the exclusive right to speak on 
behalf of the party.  Members include former FL interim 
chairman Jonas Petit, former Interior Ministry Angelot Bell, 
former government spokesman Mario Dupuy, former Aristide 
advisor Maryse Narcisse, and former deputy Gilvert Angervil 
(Yvon Feuille and Rudy Heriveaux are also members, but have 
effectively been ostracized by the others).  The solidarity 
activists come from a wide variety of organizations, many of 
them with connections to the former Aristide government. 
Many are grouped under the Let Haiti Live coalition 
(www.lethaitilive.org) and have been sharply critical of the 
IGOH and U.S. policy in Haiti.  We believe that some of them 
are in regular contact with Aristide. 
 
¶11. (C) According to a well-placed contact inside this group, 
there are regular consultations among key leaders of both 
groups, leading hard-line figures in Haiti, including 
Jean-Juste and OP leaders such as Lesly Farreau and Lesly 
Gustave, and members of Aristide's entourage in South Africa. 
 According to this same contact, the U.S.-based members 
recently "decided" that Lavalas should boycott the elections 
this fall and should be prepared for a long-term campaign to 
destabilize and delegitimize the IGOH and the government 
installed next February.  This group's distance from the 
process on the ground, however, constricts its influence.  We 
have seen clear indications, for example, that Jean-Juste has 
refused to accept this "decision" and has insisted that 
decisions be made by the people on the ground.  Nonetheless, 
the U.S.-based activists will play an important role in 
determining how and whether Lavalas participates in the 
elections. 
 
The Aristide Shadow 
--------------------- 

¶12. (C) Hanging over all of this is the shadow of Aristide, 
who remains popular among much of the Lavalas popular base 
and remains the legal head of the Fanmi Lavalas party.  Many 
see Jean-Juste as Aristide's designate ("clone" according to 
one businessman), and Jean-Juste has not shied away from 
playing the "Titid" card with the faithful.  Even those who 
say they are committed to moving beyond Aristide fear his 
reach; Gilles, for example, makes no bones about his fear for 
his physical safety if he is seen as "betraying" Aristide. 
But overall we believe Aristide's influence is waning and it 
is not clear he can influence events on the ground from South 
Africa as much as many think.  Jean-Juste's relationship with 
Aristide was never close and he gives the distinct impression 
of someone looking for his own path.  Typically, Aristide has 
not made his views on electoral participation known publicly, 
leaving his options open for a decision either way. Clearly 
his preferred outcome would be to disrupt the electoral 
process; second-best would be to delegitimze the process and 
the electoral results.  However, if it appears that a 
successful and legitimate process is underway and cannot be 
stopped, participation-by-proxy may become the course he 
chooses, especially if he thinks a loyal Lavalas slate of 
candidate could win. 
 
Comment 
---------- 

¶13. (C) It will take several months for the differing 
divisions and agendas within Lavalas to sort themselves out, 
and the results could vary widely depending on a few key 
variables.  First and foremost is what Aristide decides to 
push and the degree to which he is successful.  Second is 
what Jean-Juste does.  If he holds to the hard-line and calls 
for a boycott, especially if he does it in the name of 
Aristide, then many pro-Lavalas voters will likely heed his 
call.   If this happens in the context of credible claims of 
anti-Lavalas bias by election authorities and/or anti-Lavalas 
violence by ex-FADH or other elements, this could call into 
question the legitimacy of the election results.  A third 
variable is how successful Cherestal and his group are in 
formulating a compelling message for former Aristide voters. 
(Related to this is whether corruption charges will be 
brought against him that could take him entirely out of the 
running; in the past ten days there have been murmurs in the 
press of a series corruption-related arrest warrants being 
prepared, including against Cherestal.)  Finally, there is 
the possibility (which we cannot really judge at this point) 
that former Lavalas President Rene Preval could enter the 
fray.  Preval has been out of the political scene since he 
left the Presidency in 2001, but of late has started meeting 
with some political leaders.  At least a few observers 
believe he is interested in getting involved and many tell us 
he would be a more formidable Presidential candidate than 
either Jean-Juste or Cherestal  For what it is worth, 
Desgranges told us after meeting with Preval recently that 
Preval said he is not going to run. 
 
¶14. (C) U.S. interests argue for encouraging the maximum 
possible voter participation and the active involvement by 
the full political spectrum, including the Lavalas sector. 
We have made clear to all factions that we will support the 
development of a democratic, modern Lavalas political 
vehicle, whatever the name, as long as there is a clear break 
with Aristide's legacy of violence and misrule. 
FOLEY