This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171653Z Mar 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IV FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH WELCOME DEMARCHE ON GBAGBO 
 
REF: STATE 42762 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Africa watcher met March 15 with Nathalie 
Delapalme, FM Barnier's Africa advisor, to share the elements 
of the demarche on Ivoirian President Gbagbo (reftel) and to 
discuss the situation in Cote d'Ivoire generally. 
 
¶2. (C) Delapalme welcomed the demarche on Gbagbo, noting that 
France had also found it necessary to take a stronger line 
with Gbagbo regarding his responsibility for the actions of 
militia groups.  She also commented favorably on the USG 
points on the way forward, noting that criticizing Gbagbo 
without showing him a plan for addressing issues was 
unproductive.  Delapalme agreed that Gbagbo should be 
reminded that it was in his power as head of state to move 
events forward, rather than continue to complain about the 
failures of the opposition.  Gbagbo, she said, had difficulty 
in abandoning his oppositionist's mentality in favor of 
acting as a national leader. 
 
¶3. (C) Delapalme revealed that FM Barnier had had a 
one-on-one meeting with Gbagbo while in Lome for the funeral 
of Togolese President Eyadema.  She declined to speculate 
what may have been said, noting that Barnier was a latecomer 
(i.e. not involved in Marcoussis) to Ivoirian affairs. 
Delapalme took the opportunity to comment that it was Barnier 
who was maintaining communication with Gbagbo, as President 
Chirac and Gbagbo had not spoken since the FANCI attack on 
French forces in Bouake in November. 
 
¶4. (C) Africa watcher and Delapalme reviewed the familiar 
disconnect between USG and French thinking with regard to 
ONUCI.  We noted that our support for ONUCI had, from the 
outset, been contingent on progress on the political front. 
With the parties making little progress, and showing less 
good faith, it would be difficult to support a large increase 
in ONUCI force levels or additional tasks.  Delapalme 
presented the French view that having ONUCI engage on 
planning for elections, DDR, and generally creating a context 
of security could encourage the parties to move forward. 
Delapalme also noted the imbalance between the force levels 
approved for UNAMSIL and UNAMIL and that approved for ONUCI. 
She continued that she feared that conditions were being 
created whereby combatants could continue to receive UN DDR 
funds in one country for weapons which could be cheaply 
replaced with the replacements being turned in for DDR funds 
in a neighboring country. 
 
¶5. (C) We sought to draw Delapalme out on the issue of the 
continued presence in Cote d'Ivoire of French Licorne forces. 
 In particular, we queried whether President Chirac's 
comments in Senegal about France remaining only if the 
Ivoirian government so requested, had been designed to force 
an explicit request from Gbagbo. Delapalme was (even by her 
normally closed-lipped standards) cautious in her reply. 
France, she said, was not planning to withdraw, and had no 
desire to withdraw from Cote d'Ivoire.  Licorne, she noted, 
was present as a UN-mandated force, and it was for the UN to 
decide whether or not Licorne should remain.  She allowed, 
however, that a public demand by Gbagbo for Licorne's 
withdrawal would place the issue in a different context. 
 
¶6. (C) Finally, we asked Delapalme whether she planned to 
meet with Gbagbo's advisor, Pastor Moise Kore.  Delapalme 
acknowledged having met him previously, and was aware that 
Kore was in Paris, but said there had been no request in 
either direction for a meeting.  Had Kore requested a 
meeting, Delapalme said, she would have declined. 
Leach