Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI1938, INDIA WANTS HIGH FIDELITY MISSILE DEFENSE EXERCISES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI1938.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI1938 2005-03-14 08:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 001938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2015 
TAGS: KOMC MARR PGOV PREL TNGD IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIA WANTS HIGH FIDELITY MISSILE DEFENSE EXERCISES 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.5 (B, D) 
 
1.  (S) Summary: In her remarks at the initial working group 
meeting of the US-India Missile Defense (MD) Workshop in 
Hyderabad on March 3-4, MEA Additional Secretary for 
International Security Meera Shankar affirmed New Delhi's 
desire for a cooperative MD technology relationship with the 
US over the long term, and said that the GOI would like to 
formulate its overall strategic MD objectives in cooperation 
with the USG.  The subject of "Framework MOU,s" for 
facilitating missile defense cooperation, similar to what the 
US has with a select group of other countries, was raised by 
the Indian side.  On the planned Workshop exercises, the 
Indian delegation hoped for a very high-fidelity simulation 
of actual threats and missile defenses that would generate 
hard data for use in MD strategic and acquisition planning. 
The Indian delegation presented a classified briefing 
reflecting their perception of the ballistic missile threat 
to India, and a separate briefing characterized as the GOI 
"wish list" for US-India Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
modeling and simulation exercises.  After it became clear 
that GOI desires were beyond the scope of the MDA's 
International Modeling and Simulation (IMS) tool, the US 
delegation re-focused the Indian delegation on the original 
proposal for a realistic, but lower fidelity, plan to 
exercise decision-making at the policy and operational levels 
during a simulated missile attack.  The GOI agreed, but asked 
for much higher fidelity modeling and simulation exercises in 
the future.  A framework for upcoming Planning and Command 
Post Exercises (PLANEX/CPX) was agreed upon, and options for 
the GOI to pursue high-fidelity MD exercises with the USG 
were discussed.  Noticeably lacking from the discussions were 
explicit references to indigenous MD production, categories 
of assets India might like to defend against missile attack, 
or co-production of BMDS hardware with the US.  Hosted at one 
of India's most sensitive missile research facilities, this 
exchange reflected the deepening level of candor in the 
US-India MD relationship.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S) While welcoming the US delegation, Dr. V.K. Saraswat 
of the Defense Research and Development Organization's 
Research Centre Imarat (DRDO/RCI) discussed the common 
missile threats facing both India and the US, and the mutual 
benefits of working together on them.  He hoped that the 
US-India MD Workshop would lead to a formulation to mitigate 
such threats.  In her opening remarks, A/S Shankar added 
several key points, including: 
 
- Both countries have the political commitment to advance 
missile defense cooperation and strengthen US-Indian ties; 
 
- Both sides emphasize MD as a stabilizing tool to support 
the global security environment; 
 
- India was among the first countries to recognize and 
support US missile defense proposals; 
 
- The GOI welcomes the US offer to make the Patriot Advanced 
Capability-2 (PAC-2) MD system available as part of NSSP 
(Next Steps in Strategic Partnership) Phase 1; 
 
- India hopes for close cooperation with the US on missile 
defense technology over a long time horizon; 
 
- Missile defense can help India maintain a credible "No 
First Use" nuclear posture; 
 
- By itself, the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime cannot stem proliferators, which "tend to collect in 
our neighborhood"; and, 
 
- India is in an "arc of proliferators," and MD might help 
stabilize the situation and neutralize those using "nuclear 
blackmail." 
 
3.  (SBU) Phil Jamison, OSD Office of Missile Defense Policy, 
noted the February 22 PAC-2 briefing in New Delhi at which US 
missile defense policy, including cooperation with allies and 
friends, had been discussed extensively.  He tied those 
discussions to the meeting in Hyderabad, suggesting that both 
sides might be able to look back and view these two weeks as 
the beginning of what could be a long-term missile defense 
relationship.  A/S Shankar agreed. 
 
US Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Update 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4.  (SBU) Robert Ciarrocchi, Chief of MDA/ISA's Asia and 
Middle East Division, presented a status update on the US 
BMDS.  He emphasized Presidential guidance to deploy 
available missile defenses while working on future systems, 
and to cooperate with existing allies and new friends. 
Ciarrocchi explained MDA efforts to carry out that guidance, 
including a spiral development program that is moving from 
lower-tier missile defenses to overarching systems that 
integrate sensors, communication links, and interceptors for 
combating ballistic threats in boost, mid-course, and 
penetration phases.  He also underscored expanding MD 
cooperation with allies and friends worldwide. 
 
5.  (C) Questions from the Indian delegation on Ciarrocchi's 
brief included: 
 
- What types of MD memoranda of understanding does the US 
have with its partners? 
 
- Are MD systems specifications based on the needs of friends 
and allies, or just on US needs? 
 
- How important is interoperability with allies in US BMDS 
design? 
 
- Does the US intend to have global missile launch and 
tracking sensors with regionalized interceptor batteries? 
 
- What is the status of SBIRS (Space Based Infrared Radar 
System)? 
 
- Are kinetic energy interceptors and spaced based missile 
defenses integrated or separate programs? 
 
- What does the US mean by "near-peer" ballistic missile 
threat? 
 
PLANEX/CPX Dialogue 
------------------- 
 
6.  (S) Scott Barham, an SRS Technologies contractor for the 
MDA's Joint National Integration Center (JNIC), next opened a 
dialogue on the background, assumptions, scope, and agenda 
for the MD Workshop.  During those discussions, a large gap 
between GOI desires and what JNIC was prepared to deliver 
quickly became obvious.  MDA plans suggested a PLANEX and CPX 
using the JNIC's generic International Modeling and 
Simulation (IMS) software to provide ballistic missile attack 
planning and execution experience for policy-makers and air 
defense commanders.  While also anticipating a PLANEX and 
CPX, India hoped for very high-fidelity modeling and 
simulation that incorporated parameters of actual threats, 
including MD countermeasures, and parameters of 
actual/planned defense options against a variety of ballistic 
attack scenarios.  In short, the GOI wanted hard data for 
developing BMDS strategy and making acquisition decisions. 
 
7.  (S) Barham explained that IMS can approximate threat and 
BMDS parameters well enough to aid in concept of operations 
development and to refine MD tactics, techniques and 
procedures, but that it was not an appropriate tool to 
generate data for acquisition decisions.  The Indians were 
concerned that the proposed exercises were not much of a step 
up from modeling and simulation demonstrations previously 
presented, but the US delegation assured them that the 
proposed PLANEX and CPX were fully interactive with outcomes 
that vary based on the decisions of the participants. 
 
8.  (S) Jamison recommended that India initially focus on a 
realistic, but lower fidelity, plan to exercise 
decision-making at the policy and operational levels during a 
missile attack.  Specifically, he recommended an initial 
exercise scenario set in the 2008 time-frame.  He emphasized 
the importance of having a cross-section of relevant 
government policy-making organizations participate -- i.e., 
MOD and the PM,s security staff as well as MEA.  After 
further discussion, the Indian side agreed to the following 
vision for the PLANEX/CPX: 
 
- Detection ability and intercept parameters as close as 
possible to BMDS planned for the 2008 time-frame; 
 
- A two-part exercise with one iteration using stand-alone 
missile defenses and a second incorporating early warning 
sensors and upper-tier BMDS; 
 
- Survivability of BMDS assets as part of the model; 
 
- Simulation of geography and terrain that is relevant to 
India; 
 
- Demonstration of differences in missile threats "by way of 
timeline"; 
 
- An exercise scope that includes land and sea-based 
(submarine launched) multi-directional ballistic attacks (no 
winged aircraft or cruise missiles) including missile 
launches from short, medium, and long distances; and 
 
- Policy involvement at an appropriate level. 
 
9.  (C) Additional dialogue centered around how JNIC could 
incorporate as many of the GOI desires as possible into the 
PLANEX/CPX using existing IMS software. 
 
10.  (C) PolOff suggested that, in light of the gap between 
Indian desires for higher fidelity modeling and simulation 
and what the MDA was currently able to offer, the GOI could 
define their requirements and transmit a separate letter of 
request to the USG while continuing with the current effort. 
Jamison also suggested that both sides look for another forum 
to discuss missile defense policy-program issues, such as 
some type of US-India missile defense working group on the 
margins of other political-military technical discussions. 
 
 
GOI Ballistic Missile Threat Perception 
--------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (S) A.S. Sarma, DRDO/RCI Air Defense Project Director, 
gave a classified briefing on the GOI's perception of the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to India.  The Indian delegation 
asked that information contained in the brief not be given 
wide dissemination within the USG, but controlled on a 
need-to-know basis.  The brief included threat rings from 
existing ballistic threats in the region, as well as those 
under development.  The main thrust was that the ballistic 
threat to India was not from a single sector, but, in a 
worst-case scenario, could include coordinated, simultaneous 
attacks from 360 degrees with multiple objects.  (Note: A 
hard copy of the briefing was not made available to the US 
delegation.  End Note.) 
 
GOI Proposals for Future Modeling & Simulation Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
12.  (S) As part of the classified brief, the Indian 
delegation offered to make DRDO experts available, at some 
unspecified point in the future, for a collaborative effort 
with the US to develop advanced BMDS modeling and simulation 
software.  Speaking in the context of MD modeling and 
simulation, Sarma listed available Indian expertise as: 1) 
System Analysis, 2) Modeling and Simulation, 3) Planning and 
Control, and 4) Software Development.  His bottom line: if 
the US wants India to do (future) hardware and software 
development, that could be used with "others," India wants to 
do it. 
 
13.  (C) N. Prabhakar, a DRDO/RCI Project Director, also 
presented a "BMD Simulation For Planning" briefing that he 
characterized as a GOI "wish list" for cooperative BMD 
exercises.  GOI areas of interest, from his briefing slides, 
include: 
 
- Threat Perception and Analysis; 
 
- Effectiveness and Cost Economics; 
 
- Design Considerations; 
 
- Macro/Micro Planning; and 
 
- Simulation Scenarios 
 
Under Simulation Scenarios, Prabhakar listed additional 
sub-points as follows: 
 
- Define the Parameters: 
  -- Ballistic Missile Threats 
  -- MD Countermeasures 
  -- BMDS 
 
- Interception Policy: 
  -- Effects of Change in the Threat Pattern 
  -- Adaptability/Growth Potential 
  -- Cost of Defense 
  -- Time Imperatives 
  -- Kill Assessment 
 
- Structure Definitions: 
  -- Impact of Lay-out Factors 
  -- Time-line Considerations 
  -- Hit to Kill/Near Miss 
  -- Warhead Kill Mechanisms 
  -- Multi-Sensors 
  -- Postulated Countermeasures 
 
- Optimized Defense Layout 
  -- Leakage Probabilities 
  -- Defended Assets List 
  -- Sensor Capabilities 
  -- Launch Platforms 
  -- Sensor Platforms 
  -- Interceptor Capabilities 
  -- Communication Requirements 
  -- Command and Control Strategies and Alternatives 
  -- Integrated Logistics Management 
  -- Trade-Offs 
 
- Nominal Performance 
  -- Worst Case Performance 
  -- Parametric Sensitivity 
  -- Monte Carlo (random "roll of the dice" scenarios) 
  -- Break Point Analysis 
 
PLANEX/CPX Road Map 
------------------ 
 
14.  (C) The working group reached broad agreement on the way 
ahead for a PLANEX as follows. 
 
- 2005 Agenda: 
  -- May: Demonstration and technical explanation, by JNIC, 
     of the IMS tool (in India); 
  -- August: Working Group meeting and Initial Planning 
     Conference for the PLANEX (in India); 
  -- December: PLANEX (in India). 
 
- Participation: 
  -- India: Representatives from the MOD, MEA, DRDO, NSCS, 
     and the military services; 
  -- US: Representatives from OSD/P, MDA/IS, MDA/IC, State, 
     and observers from PACOM. 
 
- Primary Points of Contact: 
  -- India: Ms. Nutan Kapoor, MEA/DISA 
  -- US: Mr. Robert Ciarrocchi, MDA/ISA 
 
- Purpose: Facilitated and iterative exercises to examine 
basic concepts of BMD planning and operations. 
 
- Objectives: 
  -- Demonstrate impact of very short response times; 
  -- Demonstrate relevant short, medium, and long-range 
     ballistic threats from multiple directions; 
  -- Demonstrate basic MD planning skills, BMDS design, and 
     allocation of defensive resources; 
  -- Provide a representation of key policy and operational 
     challenges associated with BMD planning and execution. 
 
- Basic Event Configuration: 
  -- A relevant scenario, for India, using notional 
     geography; 
  -- A relevant baseline threat depiction 
  -- Workstation configuration that incorporates both 
     policy and operational considerations; 
  -- A first iteration relying on stand-alone BMDS; and 
  -- A second iteration demonstrating the added value of 
     additional threat sensors and upper-tier BMDS. 
 
15.  (C) The Indian delegation preferred not to set a time 
for the CPX Final Planning Conference or the CPX itself until 
after the PLANEX in December.  Details on the exact number 
and types of Indian participants and the IMS workstations 
needed to support them will be finalized at the August 
meeting. 
 
MEA Closing Remarks 
------------------- 
 
16.  (C) In her closing statement, A/S Shankar referred to 
the "wish list" briefing, and affirmed her hope that US-India 
MD cooperation would go well beyond the proposed PLANEX and 
CPX.  She claimed India may be interested in other BMD 
systems besides PAC-2, to include PAC-3, MEADS, and perhaps 
upper tier systems such as THAAD.  Shankar also stated that 
the GOI would like to build its overall strategic missile 
defense objectives in cooperation with the USG. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
17.  (S) While not stated explicitly, the GOI appears to 
desire extensive US-India cooperation on BMDS, along the 
lines of what is developing between the US and Japan. 
Questions on MOUs, next generation BMDS, and availability of 
sensor and tracking data to US friends and allies all point 
in that direction, as do stated desires to cooperate on MD 
technology and formulate overall MD strategic objectives in 
coordination with the US.  Moreover, the Indian delegation 
gave the impression of being willing to devote enough 
resources to missile defense to become a significant player. 
Indian strategic thinking on missile defense is in its 
infancy, but, as related in a conversation on the margins 
between PolOff and Dr. Saraswat, DRDO/RCI is on the cutting 
edge of strategic and acquisition planning with its technical 
focus on making hard data available to policy-makers. 
 
18.  (C) Noticeably lacking from the working group 
discussions were any significant GOI references to indigenous 
BMDS production, or reference to specific categories of 
targets they might like to defend against ballistic missile 
attack.  During the meetings they made no specific mention of 
co-production of BMDS hardware or other offsets that could be 
part of future MD collaboration, although in private 
conversation with Jamison, Saraswat hinted that such 
cooperation might be a desirable longer-term goal. 
 
Workshop Participants 
--------------------- 
 
19.  (SBU) Participants in the MD Workshop meetings included: 
 
Indian Delegation: 
- Dr. V.K. Saraswat, Director, DRDO/RCI 
- Meera Shankar, MEA Additional Secretary (Intl. Security) 
- Nutan Kapoor Mahavar, MEA Under Secretary (DISA) 
- Santosh Jha, MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas) 
- N. Prabhakar, DRDO/RCI Project Director 
- A.S. Sarma, DRDO/RCI Project Director (Air Defense) 
- Surendra Kumar, DRDO/RCI Project Dir. (Missile Defense) 
- N.V. Kadam, DRDO/RCI Emeritus Scientist (Mobile Systems) 
- S. Jaya, DRDO/RCI Project Director (Communications) 
- A.M. Tapas, DRDO/RCI Dep. Proj. Dir. (Regional Analysis) 
- Debasis Dutta, DRDO 
- Siva Kumar, DRDO/RCI (Microwave Sensors) 
- Col. R. Bhutani, Operational Director 
- Gp. Capt. S.K. Midha, Director of Air Defense 
- Air Cmde. P. Singh, Integrated Defense Staff 
- A.K. Chattergee, DRDO Director of Intl. Cooperation 
- K.V.S.S. Prasad Rao, DRDO Chief Controller, R&D (Tech.) 
 
US Delegation: 
- Robert Ciarrocchi, MDA/ISA Chief, Asia & Middle East Div. 
- Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP Asst. for Missile Defense Policy 
- Scott Barham, MDA/JNIC Contractor (SRS Technologies) 
- Maj. Rick Bairett, US Embassy New Delhi Pol-Mil Officer 
 
20.  (U) This message has been cleared by Robert Ciarrocchi 
MDA/ISA, and Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP. 
MULFORD