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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI1764, SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL PRAKASH,S MARCH 19-28 VISIT TO USA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI1764 2005-03-08 05:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 NEW DELHI 001764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHSA MASS MOPS PTER PK XD IZ IN

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL PRAKASH,S MARCH 19-28  VISIT TO USA 
  Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford.  Reason 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Admiral Clark, we greatly appreciate your  willingness to host the upcoming visit to the USA of your  counterpart, Admiral Arun Prakash, India's Chief of Naval  Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.  President  Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agree that Indo-US  relations have ""never been as close as they are at present.""  Expanded defense cooperation has been integral to our growing  ties.  We expect your interaction with Admiral Prakash will  present numerous opportunities to build on our existing  military cooperation and to help fulfill President Bush's  vision of a long-term strategic partnership with India. 
 
2. (C) With your help, our military cooperation program with  India has expanded steadily since the waiving in September  2001 of US sanctions imposed after India's 1998 nuclear  tests.  We now routinely engage in mil-mil exercises of  growing scope and sophistication.  I was pleased to attend  the USN hosted reception for the MALABAR 2004 Naval Exercise,  which included the first visit of a US nuclear powered  warship to India, the first use of the newly developed USN-IN  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), our first sub vs sub  exercise, and the first use of the Navy Fuels Transfer  Agreement.  In another example of our growing exercise  program, during Cooperative Cope Thunder the Indian Air Force  deployed four Jaguars and an IL-76 tanker to Alaska - as a  demonstration of their newly acquired tanking capability. 
These exercises, and numerous others, were well covered in  the Indian press and viewed as opportunities for the Indian  military to demonstrate their professional prowess and to  gain credibility as a region  al power.  Our recent mil-mil cooperation in tsunami relief  in Sri Lanka and elsewhere provides a template for what we  expect will be increased Indo-US cooperation to manage crises  and address common threats in the region from Southeast Asia  to the Arabian Gulf and East Africa. 
  3  (C) Although our military sales relationship remains  underdeveloped, the government's serious consideration of US  suppliers for its next generation multi-role fighter reflects  a new willingness to consider the US for a major hardware  purchase.  US arms sales have struggled to overcome the  perception that the US is not a dependable partner (based on  our sanctions), and heavy competition from the Russians,  Israelis, and French for a very price sensitive customer.  We  believe a significant contract would further cement Indo-US  defense ties and we continue to see good potential for the  sale of P-3C Orions.  In 2004 the Indian Navy signed a LOA  for Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle services worth $700,000  and they have indicated a desire to test this capability as  soon as possible.  The recently enacted budget includes a 7.8  percent increase for the military to fund ongoing  modernization and purchases. 
 
4.  (C) I think you will find Admiral Prakash to be a highly  professional and thoughtful officer, well disposed toward the  United States, and progressive in his thinking.  He will be  direct and engaging in conversation.  He attended the US  Naval War College, graduating in 1990.  He has fond memories  of his time in Newport, and is looking forward to the  opportunity to speak at the college during this visit. 
Admiral Prakash is a Naval Aviator with 2,500 hours of flight  time.  He attended flight training in the UK and was the  first commanding officer of an Indian Navy Harrier squadron. 
He has commanded four ships including the Indian Navy  aircraft carrier INS Viraat.  He was promoted to flag rank in  1993 and as a Rear Admiral served as the Commander of the  Eastern Fleet.  As Vice Admiral he served as the  Commander-in-Chief, Andaman Nicobar Command (India's only  operational joint command), and Commander-in-Chief, Western  Naval Command.  He was appointed Chief of Naval Staff and  promoted to Admiral in August 200  4 and became the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee  (CJCS equivalent) in January 2005. 
 
5.  (C) Admiral Prakash leads a highly professional,  regionally dominant Navy with growing capability and blue  water aspirations.  Most importantly, India shares many of  our key maritime concerns - maritime terrorism, use of the  seas for proliferation of WMD, safety of sea lines of  communication (particularly for Arabian Gulf Oil), piracy,  smuggling, and un-regulated dhow traffic.  Regrettably, we  expect Admiral Prakash's leadership will be somewhat  constrained by a lumbering and sometimes corrupt bureaucracy  (particularly in procurement), a coalition government that  includes representation of two regional Communist Parties,  and some old-think (in a few cases anti-American) government  officials.  We ask that you join us in continuing to search  out practical, mutually beneficial ways to expand military  cooperation, understanding that this is part of a long term  effort to build a substantial, reliable, useful 21st century  partnership with India.  A priority in this area is to bring  India into the Proliferation  Security Initiative (PSI), since it has unique assets it can  bring to bear in this region. End Summary. 
  Background 
---------- 
 
6.  (C) PM Singh's Congress Party came to power in an upset  election victory over the BJP-led coalition in May 2004. 
Although Singh's senior advisors had been out of power for  eight years, they wasted no time articulating their  priorities for India's foreign and defense policies.  They  have stressed that an expanded and mutually beneficial  partnership between India and the US on regional and  transnational security issues is a high priority for the new  government.  There is still, however, lingering suspicion in  some parts of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition  and the GOI about this new relationship.  The PM's team is  divided between modernizers who favor stronger ties with the  US, and Nehruvian socialists whose views of the US have  changed little since the Cold War.  The modernizers clearly  are in the driver's seat, however. Defense Minister Pranab  Mukherjee sees practical advantage in cooperating with the US  to modernize India's military equipment and strategy while  advocating for transparency  in defense acquisitions. 
 
7.  (C) As noted in ""The Congress Agenda on Security,  Defense, and Foreign Policy,"" the Party seeks to improve the  function and transparency of India's national security  decision-making process, reform the intelligence services,  address Service personnel issues, and combat domestic  terrorism.  Unlike the BJP which concentrated national  security decision-making largely in the Prime Minister's  office, Congress has a more diffuse, transparent, and  collective approach which utilizes a resuscitated National  Security Council (NSC), expanded Cabinet Committee on  Security (CCS), and reenergized Strategic Policy Group (SPG)  and National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). 
 
8.  (C) Defense Minister Mukherjee, an economist and former  Foreign Minister with no defense background, will likely  acquiesce to the senior Congress leadership (particularly  Sonia Gandhi, who remains the power behind the throne) on  matters requiring broad consensus.  A proponent of  maintaining strong mil-mil ties with Russia, we expect  Mukherjee to adhere to the larger Congress agenda toward the  US by continuing to move US-India defense ties forward,  albeit with less public rhetoric than the BJP, out of  deference to the leftist parties. 
  Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
----------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C/NF) On September 17, the US and India signed Phase One  of the President's ""Next Steps in Strategic Partnership""  (NSSP).  The NSSP lays out an ambitious path of cooperation  in four strategic areas:  civil nuclear energy, civilian  space programs, high-technology commerce, and dialogue on  missile defense.  These areas of cooperation are designed to  progress through a series of reciprocal steps that build on  each other.  Completion of Phase One has enabled the US to  make modifications to US export licensing policies that will  foster cooperation in commercial space and civilian nuclear  energy programs, remove the headquarters of the Indian Space  Research Organization (ISRO) from the Department of  Commerce's ""Entities List,"" and offer an FMS sale of the  PAC-2 missile defense system.  On February 22, the GOI  received a classified briefing on the capabilities of the  PAC-2 GEM PLUS missile defense system as a deliverable for  successful completion of Phase One.  The Indian government  has now requested a missile  defense technical cooperation agreement of the sort we have  with other key allies.  In his role as Chairman, Chiefs of  Staff Committee, Admiral Prakash will have a role in shaping  Indian nuclear and missile defense policy.  We believe the  visit to NORAD was proposed by the Indian Navy specifically  to offer Admiral Prakash a view of US policy in these areas. 
 
10.  (S) Phase Two of the NSSP requires intensive efforts by  the GOI to adopt national legislation governing technology  transfer, adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime and  Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, and strengthen export  controls.  In turn, the US commits to undertake cooperation  on US-Indian commercial satellites, approve the sale of the  PAC-2 system and offer a classified briefing on the PAC-3  system.  Until now, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs  (MEA) has the lead in this effort, with the MOD playing a  supporting role. 
  Regional Political-Military Issues: Tsunami Relief 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
  11. (C) The Indian military reacted exceptionally well to the  recent tsunami disaster.  The rapid and effective deployment  of resources to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and later Indonesia,  in addition to India's hard hit Andaman and Nicobar Islands  clearly demonstrated India's regional force projection  capability.  At the peak of operations, the Indian Navy had  31 ships, 22 helicopters, four aircraft and 5,500 personnel  assigned to disaster relief.  The Air Force, Army and Coast  Guard were just as heavily involved.  The Indian military was  hit hardest on the island of Car Nicobar.  The Indian air  force lost 103 personnel on this island and the Navy lost  about half that.  During the operation, the Indian Navy  converted three hydrographic ships to 47 bed hospital ships  (a design feature of the class) and sailed them to Sri Lanka,  Indonesia and Chennai, India.  During the relief effort the  Indian military was unusually responsive to questions about  their intentions and provided almost daily briefings.  We  reciprocate  d with the PACOM force lay down.  The Indian government also  coordinated closely with us as a founding member of the  Tsunami Core Group.  Later, India provided two MPAT planners 
  SIPDIS  to CSF-536 in Utapao, Thailand and sent an liaison officer  (Indian Naval Attache in DC) to PACOM Hqs and a liaison  officer to CSF-536 (Indian Air Attache in Bangkok).  This  exchange of information assisted both countries in channeling  relief to those areas most in need while avoiding duplication  of effort. 
  Pakistan 
-------- 
  12.  (C/NF) While India and Pakistan are currently in their  most intense period of dialogue in decades, the GOI continues  to place a high priority on containing Pakistan's nuclear  threat.  Following the positive Indo-Pak Foreign Ministers'  talks (dubbed the ""Composite Dialogue"" or ""CD""), the  successful Singh-Musharraf meeting in September, and an  attempt at developing a ""Kashmir Roadmap"" based on the PM's  first visit to Kashmir in November,  a mood of cautious  optimism has emerged in India that Islamabad and New Delhi  have indeed started on a path of sustainable rapprochement. 
During these recent CD meetings, India put forward a total of  72 CBMs, of which Indian FM Singh and his Pakistani  counterpart FM Kasuri agreed to 13 including to: continue the  LOC ceasefire; conduct a joint survey of the International  Boundary along Sir Creek; implement the outcome of the August  meeting of Defense Secretaries regarding the Siachen Glacier;  and discuss trade cooperation.  The Ministers also agreed to  technical talks on  conventional and nuclear CBMs among other issues during the  fall.  As expected, the two sides disagreed on infiltration  levels and the centrality of Kashmir, but have expressed  commitment to continue their dialogue on these issues.  The  February 16 agreement to begin bus service between Srinigar  and Muzaffarabad beginning April 17 has been hailed as the  most important Kashmir-specific CBM since the November 2003  ceasefire. 
  13.  (S) Despite recent Indian allegations of mortar firing  by Pakistan against Indian positions along the LOC twice in  three days (January 18 and 20, 2005), both governments have  responded in a measured and serious manner, conscious that  the 14 months of silence along the LOC has come to symbolize  the de-escalation of the Indo-Pak conflict, while providing  tens of thousands of Kashmiris the longest respite from daily  shelling since the 1999 Kargil War.  The ceasefire, the first  formally observed in peacetime between the two countries  since 1947, has fueled hopes for broader progress in military  CBMs.  These instances of shelling, if they do not stop,  could spill over into the Composite Dialogue and negatively  affect the broad sense of goodwill that exists in India for  fixing relations with Pakistan. 
  14.  (C/NF) Despite positive progress on these pending issues  and growing acceptance of ""de-hyphenating"" America's  relationships with the two neighbors, reports in the Indian  press of possible renewed consideration of F-16 sales to  Pakistan has brought long-held fears to the fore again.  The  widely-held view in India is that such weapons are  inappropriate for destroying terrorist assets and that  Islamabad ultimately seeks F-16s as a nuclear weapons  delivery system to be used against New Delhi, thereby  sparking a regional arms race.  Moreover, Indians often  complain of a lack of balance in US policy which Indians  believe favors Pakistan.  The US is seen as soft on  proliferation issues regarding Pakistan and harsh in its  judgment on India.  The fear among the Indian security and  military establishment is that new weapons for Pakistan will  cause Pakistan to become more aggressive against India. 
  Siachen Glacier 
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  15.  (C) In 1984, India and Pakistan occupied parts of the  Siachen Glacier and the Saltoro Ridge, which became the  highest altitude battleground in the world.  Siachen is  politically relevant as it is linked to unresolved border  disputes with Pakistan and China.  This remote region lacks  military strategic relevance, leading many Indians to  question the economic cost of such a burdensome deployment. 
In 1994, in an effort to lower tensions, New Delhi and  Islamabad almost reached an agreement on demilitarizing the  Glacier.  If redeployment/demilitarization along the Siachen  Glacier were to take place, monitoring mechanisms would need  to be implemented to provide both sides confidence that  reoccupation of the ridge lines was not occurring.  The  cease-fire along the LOC on the Glacier, in effect since  November 26, 2003, remains in effect, and the two sides  continue to discuss the matter as part of the Composite  Dialogue.  India's main demand is that positions currently  occupied by both armies be verified. 
  Afghanistan 
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  16.  (C) On Afghanistan, India has backed up its strong  political support for President Karzai with generous economic  assistance (over $500 million).  India provided in-kind  assistance for the October elections, has offered to assist  in training Afghan diplomats, army, and police, and has  committed to construction of a power line connecting Kabul to  Baghlan province in the north.  With the imminent completion  of the GOI program to outfit the ANA with military vehicles,  New Delhi is now assessing what more India might do to assist  with the Afghan Army's development. 
  Iran 
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  17.  (C) India views Iran as a source of energy, a corridor  for trade to Central Asia (most importantly to Afghanistan),  a partner in stabilizing Afghanistan, and as a counterweight  in Pakistan's regional calculations.  Increased high-level  exchanges and intensified cooperation in the energy sector  illustrate the degree to which the GOI values the  relationship.  There has been considerable movement recently  in the Indian position on the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India  pipeline.  India has removed its MFN and transit corridor  conditions and given Cabinet backing for the Petroleum  Minister to negotiate with Iran and Pakistan.  At the same  time, the GOI is strongly opposed to Iran's acquisition of  nuclear weapons.  New Delhi is pursuing a low-key but engaged  policy toward Iran, attempting to achieve its strategic goals  in the Gulf without jeopardizing its growing ties with the US  or Israel.  New Delhi portrays itself as a moderating  influence on Tehran, particularly on nuclear issues where  Indian and US interests o  n nonproliferation converge. 
  Nepal 
-----  18.  (C) New Delhi responded swiftly and with unusual  firmness to King Gyanendra's February 1 decision to dissolve  the multiparty government in Nepal and reserve all power for  himself, calling the action ""a serious setback to the cause  of democracy.""  The GOI has expressed a strong desire to  coordinate with the United States as the situation unfolds in  Kathmandu and remains concerned about the effect of the  King's actions on the ongoing Maoist insurgency.  Prior to  these developments, New Delhi had expressed concerns about  the Maoist influence in Nepal, the potential for violence and  political instability to spill over into India, and  repercussions for Indian interests in Nepal.  The US and GOI  have coordinated closely in response to the coup, providing a  template for the sort of security partnership we would like  to apply elsewhere.  Although we have not joined India in  publicly declaring a suspension on supplies of weapons, the  US and India broadly agree on the problem and the way forward. 
  Bangladesh 
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  19.  (C) The wave of terrorist attacks in early October in  the northeastern Indian states of Nagaland and Assam are  raising alarms that violence and political instability in  Bangladesh are now affecting India, courtesy of the United  Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).  These follow other  incidents such as the August attack on former Prime Minister  Sheikh Hasina and seizure of a major arms shipment in  Chittagong in April.  Dhaka has accused New Delhi of  contributing to its deteriorating political situation while  Delhi maintains that the source of Bangladesh's problems is  Islamic fundamentalism and terrorists the GOB is unwilling or  unable to control.  Despite these differences, both  countries' Foreign Ministers recently agreed to work together  to address each others' security concerns.  The GOI is also  considering increasing its deployment of security forces  along its border with Bangladesh and constructing a fence,  similar to the LOC fence in Kashmir, along the border. 
  Iraq 
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  20.  (C) The escalating violence in Iraq, including the  taking of Indian hostages in July (who were subsequently  released), stories of abuse of prisoners, and inaccurate  reports of mistreatment of Indian laborers by US forces and  companies in Iraq have hardened public opinion against  Coalition activities.  The GOI, however, has a strong  interest in stability in Iraq and wants to preserve its  historic cultural, economic and political links with Baghdad. 
 Although their line remains firm against sending troops to  Iraq, the GOI has already disbursed half of its $20 million  commitment to Iraqi reconstruction, split evenly between the  UN and World Bank Trust Funds. 
  21.  (C) Despite the GOI's deliberately low profile public  and material support in the run-up to the elections, Indian  Government, media, and other observers welcomed the  successful completion of Iraq's first election on January 30. 
 The MEA called the election a ""noteworthy development"" and  reaffirmed Iraq's strategic importance to New Delhi. 
Circumspect about engaging the interim regime, the GOI will  likely engage the new Baghdad government with more  conviction, although practical and security concerns and  continued opposition from India's left wing parties will  present obstacles to a more visible Indian presence in the  near future. 
  China 
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  22.  (U) India's ""Look East"" policy, initiated in the 1990s,  envisions India as an equal player in the greater Asian  community, ideally and eventually as influential as China. 
Beijing, on the other hand, does not view New Delhi as a  geographic, strategic, or economic peer.  Dialogue on the  long-standing border dispute between the two countries plods  along with minor progress, the most recent being the  designation of trade markets on both sides of the disputed  border in August.  While India's direct dispute with China  about its border does not present much of a hurdle, China's  supply of material and technology to rival Pakistan has been  a more formidable obstacle to relations between the two  countries.  Much of India's political class continues to see  China as a long term military, economic, and political  challenge if not threat. 
  Russia 
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  23.  (C) By far the largest supplier of military equipment to  India for decades, Russia's exceptional military relationship  with the country is guaranteed for a long time to come and  was reaffirmed by Russian President Putin's December 04 visit  to Delhi.  The inconsistent quality of Russian-made materiel  as well as the difficulty of obtaining spares since the  break-up of the Soviet Union are common complaints among the  Indian military.  The Indians, however, are shopping more on  the global market for other sources of weaponry -- namely  Israel and France -- to improve their military capabilities. 
While not reneging on its traditionally strong bond to  Russia, the Congress Party has made it clear that more effort  must be spent on fostering India's relationship with the US  on a variety of fronts, especially in the areas of defense  and high-tech. 
  Israel 
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  24.  (C) Despite the return to power of India's traditionally  pro-Palestinian Congress party, the robust Indo-Israeli  relationship established under the previous government does  not appear to have lost steam.  This is largely a result of  India's growing reliance on Israel for military hardware,  technology, and training, and Israel's streamlined and less  public arms sales process.  Although official figures are not  available, Israel appears to be India's number two supplier  of military hardware (behind Russia).  Most recently, India  signed a $1.5 billion contract for three Phalcon airborne  radars.  Previous deals included infantry and special forces  equipment, UAVs, aircraft avionics, Barak missiles, sensors  for defense above the LOC, Green Pine radars, and assorted  munitions.  New Delhi is also considering acquiring the Arrow  ATBM from Israel, and is a strong contender for a  multi-billion dollar contract to upgrade and modernize the  Indian Army's artillery.  Recent reciprocal visits by top  brass from both arm  ies are paving the way for the first ever joint military  exercises between the two countries which may be held in  India some time in 2005. 
  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
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  25. (SBU) Reliability and Responsiveness of the USG - The  Indians remain concerned about the reliability (i.e., no  sanctions) and responsiveness of the US as a defense supplier  in general, although less so than previously.  These concerns  emanate from past experience with sanctions and delays in  responding to requests for information and pricing data. 
Four rounds of sanctions over the years have left some within  GOI with the impression that the US is not a reliable defense  supplier and that we practice ""light switch"" diplomacy.  The  sanctions that followed the 1998 nuclear tests in particular  left a deeply negative impression because they cut off  military supplies not just from the US, but also from third  party sources that contained US components.  On 1 December  2004, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Prakash sent a letter to  Admiral Doran expressing concerns about the status of FMS and  security assistance issues.  Three main issues raised concern  the Sub-Rescue contract, P-3 Orion, and Aviation Training. 
Admir  al Doran replied on 14 January 2005 with details on the  status of each program. 
  26. (U) Aero India the largest aerospace tradeshow in South  Asia, took place from 9-13 February 2005 at the Yelahanka  Indian Air Force Base in Bangalore.  The centerpiece of press  attention for Aero India 2005 was the participation of five  US military aircraft on static display and fifteen US defense  contractors.  The US demonstrated the largest foreign  presence at this show.  Two themes emerged from Aero India: 
1) All MoD officials and military personnel were very pleased  and impressed with the USG's participation in this event and 
2) There are still serious doubts about the USG's reliability  as a defense supplier.  Having established the seriousness of  US commitment to competing in the Indian arms market, the  challenge now is to come to the table in a timely fashion  with competitively priced products for a major military  platform. 
  27.  (SBU) P3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft - In response to  their request, the Indian Navy was provided P&A data in  September 2003 for 8 P-3B(H) Orion maritime reconnaissance  aircraft.   These aircraft would be brought out of long-term  storage and fully refurbished, bringing them up to P-3C Plus  capability.  The total case value for 8 aircraft with  associated weapons, equipment, spares and training would be  approximately $1 Billion.  When the Indian Navy learned that  P-3Cs might be available they expressed interest in these  aircraft instead of the P-3Bs.  A P-3C aircraft and sensor  package has since been cleared for release to India and a  weapons package is under development.  The US Navy's  International Programs Office sent a delegation to New Delhi  from February 15-16, to discuss P&A information for P-3C with  the Indian Navy.  Currently, the US Navy's International  Programs Office is exploring Indian Navy requests for the  ""hot"" transfer of one or two P-3Cs to the Indian Navy and is  exploring the possibili  ty of lowering the total costs of this proposed sale. 
  28.  (SBU) SH-60 Sea Hawk helicopters - In September 2003 the  Indian Navy requested pricing data for the purchase of 16 Sea  Hawk helicopters to replace their aging Sea Kings.  This P&A  data is expected in early 2005. ODC has learned that GOI will  probably release a global Request for Proposal (RFP) to meet  this requirement.  If that happens the Sea Hawk will face  stiff competition from French and Russian aircraft, which are  likely to be aggressively priced. 
  29.  (SBU) E-2C Hawkeye aircraft - In July 2003 Northrop  Grumman provided the Indian Navy with an open source brief on  the E-2C Hawkeye, which led to a request for P&A data for 6  aircraft.  This P&A data has just arrived, with a total case  value of approximately $1.3 Billion for 6 aircraft and  associated equipment.  The Indian Navy's interest in the  Hawkeye waned however, when they learned that it would not be  able to operate from their newly acquired aircraft carrier  Admiral Gorshkov.  As a result, the Hawkeye sale is on hold  for the foreseeable future. 
  30.  (C) Deep Sea Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) - The DSRV case was  initially opened in 1997 but was suspended in 1998 due to  sanctions.  The case was restarted after September 2001.  In  March 2004, the Indian Navy approved an amendment to the DSRV  case and made an initial deposit of $158,425.  The total  value of the DSRV amendment is $734,443.  ODC is currently  working with the Indian Navy to update the DSRV case to allow  for modifications to their model 209 submarines so they are  compatible with the DSRV.  The Indian Navy has indicated  their desire to conduct a demonstration of this rescue  capability. 
  31.  (C) Excess Defense Articles.  On 15 February the Indian  Navy was briefed by Navy IPO that the US will be retiring MHC  and LPD class ships in FY 2006 and 2007.  The Indian Navy has  indicated an interest in these vessels and specifically asked  that this information be kept confidential (possibly to avoid  interference from Indian shipyards). 
  Challenges to Defense Cooperation with India 
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  32. (SBU) The Indian bureaucracy is large and slow moving. 
Every case revolves around a ""file"" that contains everything  related to the case and which must physically move from one  agency to another for approval.  There is little delegation  of authority, so decisions of any importance are made at very  high levels.  In general, decisions are made by committee,  which diffuses responsibility and is a legacy of past arms  scandals.  One by-product of past arms scandals is that the  Indians are beginning to prefer FMS to DCS for defense sales  because government-to-government transactions have less  potential for allegations of corruption. 
  US-India Joint Military Exercises Continue to Expand 
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  33. "