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Viewing cable 05CAIRO2536, WHAT IF YOU HELD A COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05CAIRO2536 2005-03-31 15:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 002536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: WHAT IF YOU HELD A COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION AND NOBODY SHOWED UP? 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 2516 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. CAIRO 2506 
     C. CAIRO 2254 
     D. CAIRO 1926 
     E. CAIRO 1509 
 
Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------------------------ 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
 
1. (C) President Mubarak's late February proposal to amend 
Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution will, once parliament 
has hammered out the modalities, allow for direct, 
competitive presidential elections for the first time in the 
country's history.  Although no announcement has yet been 
made, recent statements make it increasingly clear that 
Mubarak will stand for a fifth term this fall.  So far, the 
President's declared opponents include a prominent (but 
domestically controversial) dissident now on an academic 
fellowship in Washington, an erratic former MP currently in 
Europe (some say for good), and a feminist academic with an 
unreconstructed Marxist ideology.  It is unlikely that any of 
these three will meet the criteria, once they are 
established, for legal candidacy.  Ayman Nour, the only 
declared opponent with a political party organization, a seat 
in parliament, and something of a public constituency, would 
appear to pose the most serious potential challenge to 
Mubarak, but he is scheduled to go on trial for forgery (in a 
case he alleges is fabricated by the GOE) in late June.  Of 
the other opposition parties represented in parliament, none 
currently shows any sign of putting forward a candidate, with 
one party leader tipped as a potential candidate asserting 
that he "refuses to be an extra in a bad movie." 
 
2. (C) Though Mubarak's constitutional move initially 
received a warm welcome, skepticism is growing about the 
modalities, particularly the formula (yet to be established) 
through which candidates will be legally qualified to run. 
In sum, prospects appear dim this year for a presidential 
election in which multiple and credible candidates compete 
with the incumbent on a level playing field.  On the other 
hand, Mubarak's proposal is a concession of the principle 
that a competitive electoral process, rather than either a 
rubber-stamp referendum or a military pedigree, is what 
confers real legitimacy on a head of state.  Thus, respected 
observers also believe that this amendment will effectively 
end the lock the Egyptian military has held on the presidency 
since 1952.  Mubarak's move may well set the stage for a more 
seriously contested race in the next election (barring 
regressive developments in the meantime), and it likely opens 
the door to further constitutional amendments that could have 
major ramifications for Egypt's system of government.  End 
summary and introduction. 
 
------------------------- 
The Incumbent Emerging... 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C) President Mubarak has yet to announce his intentions 
regarding this fall's presidential elections.  The elections, 
after the constitutional amendment proposed by Mubarak in 
late February (ref E), will be the first competitive, direct 
presidential election in Egypt's history.  Although the 
President is remaining mum on the subject, most observers 
fully expect him to stand for a fifth presidential term. 
This conviction was buttressed by a March 23 press conference 
held by ruling NDP official, presidential son, and presumed 
aspiring successor, Gamal Mubarak.  In the conference, Gamal 
stated clearly that he would not be a presidential candidate 
this fall and described opposition rhetoric about 
"inheritance of rule" as groundless. 
 
4. (C) Though both Gamal and his father have long sought to 
downplay public speculation about the first son's 
presidential aspirations, they have also generally avoided 
statements which explicitly rule out certain scenarios.  In 
this context, we interpret Gamal's March 23 statement as the 
clearest indicator to date that any plan he may have to 
succeed his father will not be initiated before this fall's 
elections.  In the March 23 conference, Gamal was also 
careful to note that his father "had not made any decision" 
on his own potential candidacy this fall, though we doubt 
Gamal would rule out his own candidacy at this time if there 
was any possibility that his father would not run.  Moreover, 
ruling NDP Secretary-General Safwat Sherif told the Egyptian 
media on March 30 that President Mubarak was the party's 
choice to run this fall, though a final announcement on the 
President's own decision would not be made before May. 
Again, it is very unlikely Sherif would make such a statement 
without a green light from Mubarak, who in turn would 
probably not be taking this tack if he was preparing the 
ground for someone else to run. 
 
---------------------- 
Did They Get the Memo? 
---------------------- 
5. (C) While the NDP elites have been artfully improvising 
their public posture on the presidential election question, 
the ruling party worker-bees have also been active, although 
they appear to be drawing from the referendum-era playbook: 
In the past three weeks, banners have sprung up across Cairo 
neighborhoods and heavily trafficked intersections 
proclaiming in large print and vivid colors "Yes to Mubarak, 
yes, yes, yes!"  Although, in Egyptian politics, any time is 
a good time for sycophantic expressions of support for the 
President, and the election year is underway, the appearance 
of these banners might have more to do with the recent 
increased activity of the umbrella protest group Kifaya 
("enough") (ref A), which has adopted "No to Mubarak; No to 
another term," as one of its principal slogans.  On the other 
hand, one zealous NDP supporter recently launched a 
pro-Mubarak website "Mish Kifaya/'Not Enough'" calling on the 
President to serve another term. 
 
--------------------- 
And In This Corner... 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) With one possible exception, none of those who have so 
far thrown their hats into the ring as opponents would pose a 
credible electoral challenge to Mubarak.  The prominent civil 
society activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (SEI), though widely 
admired abroad, has long been targeted by reactionaries in 
the Egyptian media and smeared, with considerable success, as 
a greedy and craven "foreign agent."  SEI, not long after 
announcing his candidacy, made plans to spend the spring 
semester on an academic fellowship in Washington.  Another 
personality who announced his candidacy in late 2004 is 
Mohammed Farid Hassanein, an erratic former MP who has made 
several abrupt turns in his political ideology, most recently 
casting his lot with the liberal reformers and joining the 
board of SEI's Ibn Khaldoun Center.  Hassanein, who once 
exhorted crowds to burn down the U.S. Embassy during an 
anti-Iraq war demonstration, has been in Europe for several 
months, and according to one of his associates, "is not 
coming back."   A third declared candidate, the celebrated 
feminist author Nawal es-Saadawi, has long been reviled in 
the mainstream Egyptian media as a cultural iconoclast and 
zealous atheist.  Her political views are generally 
old-school Marxist.  (Note:  In the absence of political 
party affiliation, it is highly unlikely that any of these 
three will qualify for legal candidacy, once the criteria are 
established.  End note.) 
 
7. (C) The one Egyptian politician who has both declared his 
intent to run and could conceivably pose at least a partial 
electoral threat to Mubarak is Ayman Nour.  Nour, 40, has 
been an MP for 10 years and leads the generally progressive 
and liberal Ghad Party, legally licensed in the fall of 2004. 
 A fierce critic of the Mubarak regime and a strong proponent 
of sweeping political reform, Nour is as ambitious and 
aggressive as any politician in Egypt and has demonstrated 
strong media skills and sharp political instincts.  Nour and 
his supporters believe it is for these reasons that he became 
the target of a criminal forgery investigation and was jailed 
for six weeks.  Nour, with five codefendants he alleges 
framed him on behalf of the government, is scheduled to stand 
trial beginning June 28.  This trial, which could last for 
months, will likely deprive Nour and his party of much of the 
time and energy they would need to make a significant 
electoral showing this fall.  With characteristic bravado, 
Nour has vowed to "put the government on trial with me," and 
predicted to us that the trial would increase his public 
support. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  It is currently very difficult to quantify 
Nour's public support.  An (unscientific) Cairo University 
survey last summer found that Nour was Egypt's "most popular 
MP," a finding which reportedly got the poll's organizer into 
trouble with his superiors and infuriated parliament speaker 
Fathy Surour.  In discussions with us, Nour appears to 
believe that he has tangible popularity on the Egyptian 
street, though this may be based on his appearances in his 
own constituency of Bab Sharyea, a lower middle class 
neighborhood in central Cairo.  Our own sense is that public 
support in for Nour is neither particularly broad nor deep, 
though his name recognition has increased sharply since his 
arrest and he does not appear to have been seriously tainted, 
so far, by media insinuations that he is a puppet of 
outsiders.  (See refs B, C, and D for more on the Nour case.) 
 End comment. 
 
9. (C) Conspicuously absent from the presidential fray to 
date have been the leaders of the Egypt's other political 
parties.  Neither the nationalist/liberal Wafd, the leftist 
Tagammu', nor the Nasserists, whom, with the Ghad, are the 
only opposition parties represented in parliament, have yet 
shown any indication that they intend to compete in the 
presidential race, although each has long included 
competitive presidential elections on its list of demands. 
Interestingly, President Mubarak told CODEL Pelosi in late 
March that he was "begging" for someone to run.  Embassy 
contacts have told us that the GOE is putting pressure on 
Rif'at Said, head of the leftist Tagammu' party, to run, 
though Said has repeatedly denied interest in running and 
recently told a European diplomat he would "refuse to be an 
extra in a bad movie." 
-------------------- 
Devil in the Details 
-------------------- 
 
10. (C) A key to the competitiveness of this fall's 
presidential elections will be the criteria eventually set 
for prospective candidates to qualify to run.  There appears, 
so far, to be no consensus on a formula for qualification - 
the parliament is apparently concentrating on a system 
modeled on France, in which candidates must secure a 
percentage of endorsements from elected officials at the 
local, provincial, and national levels.  It is also widely 
anticipated that, for this year only, a "grandfather clause" 
will operate in which each party represented in parliament 
may nominate a presidential candidate, without an endorsement 
process.  (Note:  As discussed above, of the four opposition 
parties represented in parliament, only one, Ayman Nour's 
Ghad Party, has so far indicated an intent to compete.  It is 
likely that whatever criteria are finally established will 
exclude independents, particularly from the Islamist trend, 
from competition.  Parliament is expected to finalize the 
modalities for the amendment in May.  The proposal will then 
be put to a public referendum, some time this summer, and 
will thereafter be ratified as law.  End note.) 
 
11. (C) Though Mubarak's reform proposal was initially 
greeted warmly by a broad spectrum of political forces, 
elation has in the past month given way to skepticism, as 
many observers, particularly in the opposition press, predict 
that the bar will be set too high for candidates to qualify. 
One proposal currently being considered by parliament would 
require candidates to secure endorsements from 20 percent of 
elected officials at local, provincial, and national levels. 
For an opposition candidate, this would translate into 
securing literally thousands of endorsements from a pool of 
elected officials almost uniformly affiliated with the NDP. 
 
----------------------- 
A Democratic Legacy (?) 
----------------------- 
 
12. (C) Despite all of the justified skepticism and caveats, 
there is no doubt that Mubarak's February proposed amendment 
constitutes a potential landmark in modern Egypt's political 
history.  (See ref D for an overview and analysis of recent 
political reform steps in Egypt.)  Though Mubarak, and before 
him Sadat and Nasser, long contended that the occasional 
referendums, which always yielded 90-plus percent votes in 
favor of reelection, conferred real legitimacy on the head of 
state, the President, in calling for direct, competitive 
elections has now conceded this point.  Other observers 
believe the most significant outcome of the amendment will be 
to sharply reduce, if not eliminate, the military factor in 
presidential selection.  By establishing direct elections, 
the military, which has supplied each of Egypt's three 
republican presidents, will no longer confer legitimacy. 
Moreover, uniformed military personnel can neither run for 
office, nor even vote (unless they resign), and will 
necessarily play a less influential political role in the 
face of direct elections. 
 
13. (C) Beyond conceding the principle of direct, competitive 
elections, Mubarak's proposed amendment also shatters the 
taboo of constitutional reform, another opposition demand 
previously rejected by the ruling party.  With the precedent 
of amending one article set, proponents of amending other 
articles will probably gain significant momentum.  If 
constitutional reform proponents have their way, presidential 
powers could be curtailed and term limits imposed.  Finally, 
even though as of late March there seems little prospect for 
a serious presidential competition this year, the amendment, 
barring regressive steps in the coming years, may well set 
the stage for a more robustly contested race the next time 
around.  Should this scenario come to pass, Mubarak appears 
to be betting, history may remember him as a leader who ruled 
as an autocrat but left a democratic legacy. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY