Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BANGKOK2088, THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH THAI NSC SECRETARY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BANGKOK2088.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK2088 2005-03-23 09:24 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, PRM, EAP/BCLTV. GENEVA FOR RMA. HQ 
USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 
TAGS: PREF PREL PTER PGOV TH BM BURMA
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH THAI NSC SECRETARY 
GENERAL WINAI 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason:  1.4 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Thai National Security Council Secretary 
General Winai told the Ambassador on March 21 that after two 
postponements of the original August 2004 deadline for the 
move of the urban Burmese to the border camps, there would be 
no further extensions of the current deadline of March 31. 
Only a small percentage of the urban Burmese have registered 
so far for the camp transfer.  The Ambassador emphasized U.S. 
concern about the camp move and expressed hope that there 
would be no general crackdown on urban Burmese who did not 
register, and particularly no refoulement of urban Burmese 
refugees.  Winai said the RTG was not planning any crackdown 
or searches for urban Burmese but Thai immigration law would 
be applied to those who were detained by Thai authorities. 
The Ambassador noted U.S. interest in further discussions 
with the RTG on refugee resettlement from the Burma border 
camps and the planned April visit of PRM DAS Ryan in which 
this issue could be explored further.  Winai welcomed the 
news of Ryan's visit and said the RTG was open to 
resettlement from the camps.  Winai also described the 
evolution in the RTG's assessment of the violence in southern 
Thailand.  The RTG had not initially understood the situation 
and that real sensitivities and grievances existed which 
needed addressing.  The RTG believed the strategy of those 
behind the violence was to separate the people from the 
government and internationalize the issue.  The latter and 
the possibility that the southern situation would become a 
religious conflict were what the RTG feared most.  At the 
conclusion of the meeting, Winai told the Ambassador that he 
did not expect to remain long in his position.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On March 21, Ambassador called on General Winai 
Phattiyakul, Thai National Security Council Secretary 
General, and raised refugee issues and the situation in 
southern Thailand. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Urban Burmese Refugee Issue 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) General Winai began the discussion by expressing Thai 
gratitude for the U.S. resettlement programs for the Hmong 
and urban Burmese.  Winai noted that both groups were in a 
difficult situation and had few opportunities in Thailand. 
The urban Burmese in particular faced an uncertain future. 
It was unclear whether there would be positive political 
developments in Burma that would allow them to return there. 
Winai said that some in the group were driven by political 
principles and were involved in political activities.  Others 
were engaged in criminal activities.  Thailand had to exert 
some control over them.  The Ambassador replied that the 
Hmong resettlement program had been delayed by a disease 
outbreak that would delay the completion of the program for 
several months.  He asked General Winai to explain the 
background of the urban Burmese situation and the current 
plan to move them to the border camps. 
 
4. (C) Winai recounted that political demonstrations in 
mid-2003 by urban Burmese outside the Burmese Embassy in 
Bangkok, which criticized Thai and Burmese government 
policies had led Prime Minister Thaksin to direct that the 
urban Burmese be moved to the border camps by August 2004 and 
not engage in political activities.  Winai added that the 
Prime Minister had also accused UNHCR at the time of 
conducting refugee status interviews for this group without 
informing the Thai government.  (Comment.  UNHCR had in fact 
regularly kept the Thai Foreign Ministry appraised of its 
refugee interview activities.  End comment.)  The Thai 
government had decided also that the urban Burmese could 
choose resettlement to third countries.  UNHCR had not 
contested the Thai government position.  Winai continued that 
the United States had then stepped in and offered to resettle 
the urban Burmese.  As August 2004 approached, the United 
States and UNHCR had asked for an extension of the deadline 
for the border camp move.  The RTG had agreed to this and 
also to a subsequent request to postpone the deadline to the 
end of March 2005.  Over this period the number of urban 
Burmese whom UNHCR said had refugee status had increased from 
about 1,800 to about 4,400.  Resettlement countries had taken 
so far about 2,000 of the 4,400. 
 
5. (C) Winai said that there could not be further extensions 
of the March 31 deadline.  He added that there was space for 
1,800 persons in three of the refugee camps near the 
Thai-Burma border.  To ensure there was enough room in the 
camps, the urban Burmese could be staged into the camps 
according to their position in the resettlement pipeline. 
That is, those who had been refused by resettlement countries 
should be moved first and those who had appealed a negative 
decision by a resettlement country could be moved next. 
Those who already had a date for departure to a third country 
should be the last to move to the camps.  Winai noted that 
only a small number of urban Burmese in Bangkok had 
registered so far for the camp transfer.  The number in Mae 
Sot was about 400.  UNHCR had told the urban Burmese that 
they would lose their right to resettlement if they did not 
report for the transfer.  Resettlement countries would be 
able to continue processing of the urban Burmese after they 
went to the camps. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that there was serious 
concern among NGOs and in the U.S. Congress about the planned 
move.  He added that some of the refugees had worries about 
camp conditions.  Others might have medical or security 
problems if they moved to the camps.  The Ambassador said 
that the U.S. hoped that there would not be a strong RTG 
reaction against those urban Burmese who did not register for 
the camp transfer.  In particular the United States opposed 
any refoulement of refugees. 
 
7. (C) Winai responded that, &frankly,8 the RTG was not 
planning a general crackdown or large-scale searches for the 
urban Burmese after the March 31 deadline passed.  However, 
the urban Burmese would be subject to Thai immigration law 
after March 31.  He added that the Thai government had not 
formally deported refugees to the Burmese authorities, but 
acknowledged that some were taken to the Burma border and 
released there, whereupon they typically returned to Thailand. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Burma Refugee Camp Resettlement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. was interested in 
resettlement of refugees from the Burma border camps.  As a 
start, the U.S. wanted to look at the Tham Hin refugee camp. 
Resettlement from that site could begin towards the end of 
this year.  He noted that PRM DAS Kelly Ryan would be 
visiting Thailand April 20-22 and would have more to say on 
this issue. 
 
9. (C) Winai responded that he looked forward to Ryan's 
visit.  He said that the situation in Tham Hin was not good 
and the refugees there had little opportunity to develop 
themselves.  Many had been in the camps for 20 years.  The 
best alternative would be if they had an opportunity to 
return to Burma.  Winai described how a recent Thai military 
delegation to Rangoon had raised this issue and Burmese 
leader Maung Aye had said that the Burmese government, in a 
policy shift, was now willing to issue passports to Burmese 
workers who returned to Burma from Thailand so they in turn 
could come back to Thailand under the Thai migrant worker 
registration program.  Winai said this statement by Maung Aye 
would have to be pursued further to determine if it 
represented a real change.  Maung Aye had also said Rangoon 
was willing to accept back to Burma those who had left 
because they were fleeing fighting.  However, Rangoon was not 
willing to permit those Burmese who rebelled against the 
government to return.  Winai said that it was not clear what 
distinction there was between the second and third groups. 
 
10. (C) Winai said that when he first took the position of 
NSC Secretary General, there had been concern in the RTG that 
any resettlement program from the border camps would be a 
pull factor and draw more Burmese into Thailand.  Now, 
however, there was little fighting in eastern Burma and so 
concerns in this area had lessened.  The RTG, including the 
Prime Minister, was agreeable to resettlement from the border 
camps.  Winai said it was important now also for the camp 
refugees to have greater educational and vocational training 
opportunities.  This would give them skills that they could 
use if they were able to return to Burma.  If, on the other 
hand, they stayed in Thailand and became Thai, they could 
make a contribution to Thai society. 
 
-------------------------- 
Situation in the South 
-------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Winai said that the RTG's views about the situation 
in southern Thailand had changed over the past two years. 
Initially, the RTG had thought that the perpetrators of the 
violence were bandits, criminals involved in illegal 
activities, or influential local persons who had differences 
with Thai officials.  The RTG also believed that some in the 
South, particularly the younger generation, still had notions 
of separatism, but did not have the means to put such ideas 
into action.  Later, the RTG realized the situation was more 
complex and that some Southerners felt that Thai society and 
Thai officials did not treat them justly.  These feelings 
were genuine, different from the feelings of other Thai. 
Southerners were very sensitive on this point.  The RTG also 
discovered that the Ministry of Education had little 
knowledge about the teachers and curriculum in the Muslim 
schools in the South.  It learned that many Thai students 
were going to schools in Indonesia.  The Indonesian 
government had asked for the Thai government's assistance in 
tracking the movements of these students. 
 
12. (C) Winai said those behind the southern violence wanted 
to separate the people from the government, draw foreign 
attention to the situation, and internationalize the issue. 
The RTG feared most that the situation would become a 
religious conflict and become internationalized.  Winai noted 
that it was not yet clear what role the newly formed National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by former Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun would play.  He thought it would 
try to identify legitimate grievances and what could be done 
to address them. 
 
13. (C) The Ambassador said that as a friend of Thailand, he 
was concerned about the situation in the South.  He 
understood the issue of the sensitivity of Muslim feelings 
based on his experience in Indonesia.  The Ambassador said 
there seemed to be disagreement on whether the disbanding 
several years earlier by Prime Minister Thaksin of the 
long-standing commission of military, police, officials and 
southern civilians that had addressed general problems in the 
region was a mistake and contributed to the current 
instability.  Winai responded that he felt the old commission 
had played a useful role.  However, the Prime Minister at the 
time had been told that law enforcement officials could 
handle the situation and that the number of persons with guns 
in the South totaled no more than 50.  In addition, the three 
southern provinces were a part of Thailand and should not 
necessarily be treated or governed differently from the rest 
of the country.  Winai added that the problems in the South 
had ebbed and flowed for about 100 years. 
 
14. (C) Winai said that the new RTG approach would be to 
accept that there were cultural differences with the South. 
These differences should be looked at as an asset. 
Southerners would also have full religious freedom.  However, 
there would be no special autonomy.  The RTG was now giving 
Southerners special preferences in the test for entering the 
police force since they would otherwise not pass.  Many of 
the 1,900 new police hired for the South would be from the 
region.  The Ministry of Education would also take a much 
more active role in improving the curriculum in the Islamic 
schools.  The schools currently did not teach regular 
subjects and this made it difficult for graduates to obtain 
jobs.  Winai stated that senior southern religious leaders 
had recently met with the RTG and said that they wanted a 
return to normalcy.  They asked the RTG to improve security 
in the South and said that most southerners wanted peace. 
 
15. (C) In an aside to the Ambassador at the conclusion of 
the meeting, General Winai said that he did not expect to 
remain long in his current position.  He hoped to return to 
the military and retire from there. 
 
16. (C) Comment.  Winai's comment that there are no plans for 
a general crackdown on urban Burmese after the March 31 
deadline is positive, but Embassy will watch this issue 
carefully.  UNHCR and the RTG are now working feverishly to 
put in place the necessary logistical arrangements for the 
camp transfer.  While some arrangements have been made 
already, whether they will be sufficient will likely depend 
on how many of the urban Burmese sign up for the camp move 
and the pace of the movements. 
BOYCE