Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05TEGUCIGALPA331, HONDURAS: ONEROUS PORT FEES COULD THREATEN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05TEGUCIGALPA331.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TEGUCIGALPA331 2005-02-11 20:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tegucigalpa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000331 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/TRA, WHA/EPSC, AND WHA/CEN 
STATE FOR EB/TRA (DHAYWOOD) 
TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS 
COMMERCE FOR AVANVUREN, MSIEGELMAN 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015 
TAGS: EWWT ETRD ECPS EINV PGOV KMCA HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS:  ONEROUS PORT FEES COULD THREATEN 
SUCCESS OF MCC AND CAFTA EFFORTS (PART I) 
 
REF: A. A) 04 TEGUCIGALPA 2165 (UNDP PROCUREMENT I) 
 
     B. B) 04 TEGUCIGALPA 2267 (UNDP PROCUREMENT II) 
 
Classified By: Economic Chief Patrick Dunn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In December 2004, the GOH National Congress 
approved legislation obligating the government to pay a hefty 
per-container fee of USD 18 for empty containers and USD 37 
for loaded containers for x-ray scanning.  The law dictates 
that the Ministry of Finance pay these fees to the service 
provider but is silent on the question of whether these costs 
will then be passed on in whole or in part to importers and 
exporters.  The GOH has attempted to paint private sector 
concerns about these fees as reactionary by stressing that 
there is no requirement for such cost-sharing.  We consider 
this disingenuous, since the GOH has already begun 
exploratory talks with the private sector on passing along 
these fees.  Effectively a tax on both imports and exports, 
if passed on in full, these fees would nearly double total 
costs to port users and render Puerto Cortes the most 
expensive port by far in the region.  This hidden tax would 
also threaten the anticipated benefits of CAFTA ratification 
and of the pending 200 million-dollar Millennium Challenge 
Account grant.  It is too early to tell how much of the fee 
will be passed on to port users, but history suggests it will 
be substantial.  Post has conveyed the message to several 
senior GOH officials that passing too steep a fee on to users 
could seriously impede job creation, economic growth, foreign 
investment, and continued development assistance. 
 
2. (C) Summary (cont'd):  This is the first part of a two 
part report on the port fees issue, examining the claims and 
counter-claims in the ongoing public debate and the potential 
impacts on export-driven growth.  Part two will look more 
closely at port costs and the potential for trade diversion 
caused by the new fees.  End Summary. 
 
Background: Terms of the Contract 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Throughout the final months of 2004, the GOH, assisted 
by the UNDP, sought to procure x-ray scanning services for 
Puerto Cortes, on Honduras' northern Atlantic coast.  The 
announced goal was to increase customs collections and 
decrease customs evasion by improving inspections.  This bid 
solicitation proved highly controversial (refs A and B) and 
was used as a weapon in politically-charged debates over port 
privatization and UNDP-managed procurements.  Overshadowed by 
the fiery rhetoric at that time were the private sector's 
concerns over the pricing structure of the proposed x-ray 
scanning project.  In December 2004, the GOH announced the 
award of the project to the consortium of Honduran firm 
CAMOSA and U.S. firm SAIC.  The decree containing the 
contract terms and fees, already approved by the National 
Congress, was transmitted in mid-January to President Maduro, 
who signed it despite a written request from the national 
umbrella group for private enterprise (COHEP) strongly urging 
him to veto the bill.  The Presidency has now sent it on to 
the Ministry of Finance to be published in the Gazette (the 
GOH Federal Register equivalent).  Upon publication, the 
contract takes effect. 
 
4. (C) The legislation, passed by the National Congress 
(Decree 194-2004) in December 2004, obligates the Ministry of 
Finance to pay the consortium USD 18 for scanning each empty 
container and USD 37 for each loaded container, both incoming 
and outgoing.  The bill is silent on whether these costs will 
then be passed on to importers and exporters, though the GOH 
clearly intends that some or all of the fees will in fact be 
passed on.  The private sector maintains that this USD 55 
increase in costs would raise the total cost of using Puerto 
Cortes to the highest cost structure in the region and would 
be more than sufficient to divert trade (and perhaps even 
investment) from Honduras. 
 
Fees: Who Should Pay, and How Much? 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) On January 28 EconChief raised this issue with Daisy 
Pastor, General Manager of Seaboard Marine, the largest 
shipper active in Honduras.  Pastor said that it was her 
position that no fees whatsoever should be passed to the port 
users, since this is a project designed to raise customs 
revenue and to improve security.  Both functions should be 
financed by the state, as happens in other ports around the 
world.  Furthermore, she pointed out, following the GOH 
imposition of an additional fee for security upgrades, only 
two months ago the private sector had negotiated with the GOH 
a flat rate for all security-related costs at Cortes of USD 
12 per container.  While this would seem to undermine 
Pastor's own argument that the GOH should unilaterally 
shoulder security costs, it does provide ample precedent to 
lead the private sector to believe that the GOH will seek to 
push off on them much or all of the costs of this security 
upgrade as well. 
 
6. (C) This fee hike is all the more galling to the private 
sector, given its belief that the fees are unjustified to 
begin with.  According to the bid solicitation, the x-ray 
contract was sought to improve customs enforcement and reduce 
tax evasion by importers.  As such, in the private sector's 
view, there is no reason to scan export containers at all and 
certainly not 100 percent of all outgoing containers, even if 
empty, as is currently proposed.  Instead, a random sample of 
incoming containers could be scanned, with steep fines for 
violators.  The resulting increased customs revenues and 
revenues from fines could be used to pay for the x-ray 
service contract, with the remainder used to pay for port 
improvements or to fund general treasury expenses.  In their 
view, there is no strong reason why the private sector, and 
particularly the export sector, should be charged onerous 
additional fees for a service that is designed to increase 
tax revenue and that should be self-financing. 
 
7. (C) To counter the argument that "customs is the 
beneficiary so customs should pay," the GOH has also stressed 
-- perhaps overstressed -- the security and counter-drug 
contributions of the scanning program.  For example, Post has 
been told that the National Congress approved these fees only 
after hearing from outgoing Tax Director Mario Duarte that 
this technology is required by the U.S. and without it Cortes 
would lose its security certification.  This claim, if made, 
is entirely false, and Post questions Duarte's motives in 
distorting the facts to push so aggressively for the new 
fees.  Post has repeatedly clarified with the private sector, 
with UNDP, and with the Ministries of Finance (home of the 
tax and customs bureaus) and Transportation (home of the Port 
Commission) that no such requirement currently exists.  No 
member of Congress contacted Post to seek to verify Duarte's 
alleged false claims.  A more subtle justification, that the 
GOH is merely going beyond the letter of the law in search of 
greater security, is belied by the fact that no port other 
than Cortes is subject to these fees or inspections and that 
no similar tightening of security has been made at land 
crossings.  (Note: In point of fact, the GOH continues to 
demonstrate denial and defiance in the face of overwhelming 
evidence of corruption in the customs service so pervasive 
that it renders border security meaningless. End Note.) 
 
Minister Cosenza Belittles Private Sector Concerns 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8. (C) On January 27 EconChief spoke with Minister of the 
Presidency Luis Cosenza about this issue.  Cosenza expressed 
his "disappointment" with the private sector's attitude and 
its "lack of long-term vision."  He complained that the 
private sector always rejects any new fees as unbearable. 
(In a separate conversation with EconChief, Vice Minister of 
Transportation Rigoberto Funes was equally dismissive of 
private sector concerns in this regard, calling them, in not 
so many words, whiners.)  Cosenza stressed that the recently 
passed legislation is silent on who will pay the fees and 
obligates only the Ministry of Finance.  The GOH is 
discussing with the private sector the matter of who will pay 
the new fees only because the government cannot guarantee 
that customs revenue increases generated by the new system 
would be sufficient to pay the costs of the service contract. 
 Therefore, it could be necessary to have a mechanism for 
passing on part of the costs to the importers and exporters. 
 
 
9. (C) EconChief outlined the concerns over a sharp increase 
in fees that would price Puerto Cortes out of the regional 
market and the threat such a move would pose to export-led 
growth and to the viability of the numerous assistance 
programs predicated on it.  Furthermore, because all 
containers are x-rayed, the fee is a de facto export tax, 
with all the strongly negative consequences that implies for 
a developing economy.  Cosenza took these concerns on board 
but then turned again to criticizing the private sector, 
saying that they have also failed to consider the cost 
savings that arise from x-ray inspection.  For example, 
because x-raying is non-intrusive, pilferage by customs 
officials will decrease, as well as the need to hire private 
security to escort the containers while in inspection.  (In 
other words, apparently importers and exporters should be 
happy to pay the GOH a steep fee in exchange for reduced 
theft by GOH officials.) 
 
10. (C) (Comment:  Cosenza's first impulse was to deny the 
private sector concerns entirely, noting that there was no 
provision in the law saying they would be charged the fees. 
Yet, in the next breath, he admitted the GOH is in talks with 
the private sector over how much they will have to pay.  This 
is also inconsistent with his implication that the private 
sector will only be asked to pay what the tax authority 
cannot cover from increased revenues, as a last resort. 
Clearly the GOH is planning to saddle the private sector with 
some portion of the fees.  On the other hand, by assuming 
they will be forced to pay the full costs, the private sector 
has chosen to base its protest on the most extreme 
possibility.  Yet, given Cosenza's less-than-forthright 
discussion of the fees and manifest annoyance with the 
business community for raising the question, they are likely 
correct to be wary.  End Comment.) 
 
Potentially Undermining CAFTA and MCC Benefits 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) If set too high, these fees threaten the benefits of 
CAFTA, MCC, and other development programs.  MCC, for 
example, is in the midst of negotiating a grant ("Compact") 
with the GOH of approximately USD 200 million over five years 
to improve roads and production of value-added agriculture. 
The MCC's mandate is to promote poverty reduction through 
economic growth.  The current proposal does so by shifting 
subsistence farmers toward non-traditional agricultural 
exports and by investing in roads (the "dry canal") to 
facilitate delivery of these and other export goods to the 
international market via Puerto Cortes.  Thus, the GOH's 
proposed MCC project directly supports export-driven economic 
growth led by the value-added agricultural and maquila 
sectors.  In complete contradiction of these goals, the 
onerous port fees contained in the new legislation would 
threaten to render these nascent industries uncompetitive. 
By steeply increasing costs at Cortes (the destination of the 
increased production spurred by MCC), these fees would risk 
dramatically reducing the anticipated benefits.  If these 
fees are passed on in large part to exporters and importers, 
exports will not prosper, jobs will not be created, and the 
sustainable growth sought by the GOH and the MCC will not 
take hold.  A similar logic applies to the benefits of CAFTA 
and to any future trade agreements with the EU.  According to 
industry representative, these fees would render moot the 
current debates over whether Honduran textiles or bananas can 
compete:  with these added fees, they likely could not. 
 
Comment and Next Steps 
---------------------- 
 
12. (C) Post has demarched appropriate senior-level officials 
to encourage the GOH not to pass along steep additional fees 
that would render the port or the exporters who use it 
uncompetitive regionally and internationally.  Post will 
monitor this issue carefully as it develops and will continue 
to impress upon the GOH that the proposed fees are export 
taxes in thin disguise (and therefore economically damaging), 
that they potentially undermine the benefits of both CAFTA 
and the MCC program, and that they will result in growing 
diversion of trade and investment away from Honduras.  In 
Post's view, the fee should be paid largely or entirely from 
increased customs revenues, or at least should be minimized 
for importers, while exporters, the growth engine of this 
economy, should be exempted entirely. 
 
Pierce 
 
Pierce