This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUWAIT 000656 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, INR, AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF A GROWING, 
INFLUENTIAL FORCE 
 
REF: 03 KUWAIT 03536 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Introduction: The Islamist movement in Kuwait reaches 
into every aspect and sector of Kuwaiti society.  From 
grass-roots businesses to senior positions in government, 
Islamists have a strong voice throughout this country. 
Paradoxically, Islamists lead the national dialogue in 
calling for democratic reforms and political parties while at 
the same time calling for limiting the freedom of social 
expression and speech when they consider an issue to have 
infringed upon their interpretation of Islam.  They hold 
influential political positions on the future of women's 
political rights, human rights practices, and educational 
reform.  Through the medium of the rural tribes, their 
numbers and influence are growing in government and 
throughout the society.  The mainstream Islamist rhetoric and 
ideology link them with more extremist Islamic elements, 
however their public rejection of extremist violence allows 
them to continue to operate and thrive in this already 
conservative Islamic society.  Islamists are the most 
organized, well-funded, and aggressive political movement in 
Kuwait and appear to be growing in strength and influence. 
This overview cable on Kuwait's Islamists is an introduction 
to the many facets of Islamists and political Islam in Kuwait 
and is meant to highlight issues that will be researched and 
covered in greater detail in future reports.  Post intends to 
investigate the role and influence of Islamists in Kuwaiti 
society and illuminate the key issues and complexities 
surrounding this social, ideological, and political movement. 
End Introduction 
 
A Nation of Muslims or A Muslim Nation? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Kuwait is unquestionably a nation of Muslims, but is 
it a Muslim nation?  Even if this is answered in the 
affirmative, the definition must be made clear.  What 
consensus is reached on the definition will in large part 
determine the direction of Kuwait's social, political, and 
economic development.  While almost all Kuwaitis profess to 
be Muslims, there is a significant and growing number of 
Kuwaiti Islamists who are socially, ideologically, and 
politically motivated to proactively subjugate all Kuwaiti 
laws and customs to Qur'anic interpretation.  They do this 
primarily through an open political process in the National 
Assembly, GOK ministries, and a wide-ranging cultural 
dialogue.  Although not a monolithic group, Islamists also 
effect social change through conservative tribal influence 
and cultural strong-arming.  Their influence has grown 
tremendously over the last three decades as Islamists have 
become prominent in Parliament and throughout government 
ministries.  Many Kuwaitis blame the Al-Sabah ruling family 
for continuing to support the Islamists as a balanace against 
"liberals" claiming the regime feels threatened by liberal 
calls for reform.  Some members of the ruling Al-Sabah family 
are politically and personally close to influential 
Islamists. (Note: Energy Minister Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fahd is 
known to be close to some Islamist MPs like hard-line 
conservative Dr. Awad Barad.  His brother, Kuwait State 
Security (KSS) head Athbi Al-Fahd, is known to be sympathetic 
to Islamist issues and to have close contacts with some 
notoriously anti-Western Islamists, and speculation is strong 
that Shaykh Salem Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, chairman of the 
body responsible for Gulf War POWs and brother of FM Shaykh 
Dr. Mohammed, financed Islamist MP Faisal Mislim's successful 
2003 campaign for the National Assembly.  However, these 
personal ties are outweighed by the general tendency of the 
Al-Sabah leadership to avoid internal conflicts with the 
Islamists.  End Note.)  As Islamists continue to advance 
their conservative agenda in Kuwaiti society, there is an 
ongoing public debate on whether their success is a result of 
the political support and permissiveness of the GOK or 
represents a successful political and social strategy that 
ranges from the grass-roots elements of local neighborhoods 
to the senior levels of government. 
 
The Political Islamists: Who are They? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) There are many shades of Islamists in Kuwait (reftel). 
 An Islamist is generically characterized as one who 
practices, or appears to practice, Islam in a very 
conservative and pious manner and who favors political or 
cultural initiatives to ensure that society is in line with 
proper Qur'anic interpretation.  This definition, however, 
still leaves Islamists with plenty of room for political 
self-definition.  The issues that dominate Kuwait's Islamist 
political platform are often social ones.  They are 
highlighted by an overwhelming effort to legislate morality 
in all sectors of life including education and human rights, 
and a general support for ensuring all legislation is in 
accordance with Shari'a interpretations.  Foreign affairs 
issues are viewed through an anti-Israeli optic, and 
increasingly, an anti-Western and anti-U.S. one, particularly 
with respect to Western social and cultural practices. 
 
¶4. (C) There are several active and influential Islamist 
political organizations in Kuwait: 
 
-- The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) "al-haraka 
al-dostoriyah al-Islamiya" is the political arm of the Sunni 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, is represented by 2 MPs and 
constitutes part of the Sunni Islamist Bloc. 
 
-- The Traditional Salafis (a.k.a. the Salafi Call) "al-da'wa 
al-salafiya" are strict Sunnis influenced by the Saudi 
Wahhabi brand of Islam.  It is represented by 2 MPs and is 
part of the Sunni Islamist Bloc. 
 
-- The Salafi Movement (a.k.a. the Scientific Salafis) 
"al-haraka al-salafiya" is a hard-line offshoot of the 
Traditional Salafis, is represented by 3 MPs and is part of 
the Sunni Islamist Bloc. 
 
-- The National Islamic Alliance (NIA) "al-tahalof al-Islami 
al-wantani" is a pro-Iranian Shi'a group that some affiliate 
with Kuwaiti Hizballah, however, it has no representation in 
Parliament. 
 
-- The Shi'a Clerics Congregation "tajam'u ulama' al-shi'a" 
is a Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani-influenced moderate 
Islamist group and has no representation in Parliament. 
 
-- Lesser known Shi'a groups with no Parliamentary 
representaion are the non-violent Peace and Justice group and 
the Consensus group  (see reftel for a 2003 description of 
the groups.) 
 
¶5. (U) Although there are officially only 13 Sunni Islamist 
MPs in the National Assembly, post places the number of 
Islamists in the 50-member elected Parliament at around 
18-19, if four of the five Shi,a MPs and a few independent 
tribal MPs with heavy Islamist leanings are included.  The 
Shi'a Islamists rarely work with the Sunni Islamists in 
support of public policy.  Beyond this, several other MPs 
have varying degrees of Islamist political leanings and vote 
with known Islamists in support of issues such as educational 
segregation, legislating Islamic morality, and opposing 
women's suffrage.  The reach of the Islamists on these and 
other political issues is great and allows them to wield more 
influence than their raw numbers would suggest.  Even 
conservative members of the vocal anti-GOK Popular Action 
Bloc support, on some issues, the political agenda of the 
Islamists.  Islamists hold influential sway in Parliament and 
wield a strong social veto against liberal and GOK policies 
that run counter to their political goals.  Additionally, the 
GOK periodically permits Islamists to gain ground on heated 
political issues.  Islamist influence also extends to the 
parliamentary committees as Sunni Bloc MPs chair five out of 
ten of the National Assembly standing committees and three 
out of nine ad hoc committees.  The ad hoc Human Rights 
Committee is comprised completely of Islamists. 
 
¶6. (U) Recent Islamist victories include several religiously 
motivated political "grillings" in the National Assembly, the 
gender segregation of Kuwait University, official fatwas 
placing restrictions on music concerts, legal leniency for 
suspected Islamist extremists, and the closing of movie 
theaters during the last ten days of Ramadan to "encourage 
people to spend more time reflecting on their faith."  Other 
Islamist political initiatives include efforts, thus far 
unsuccessful, to amend Article II of Kuwait's constitution to 
make Islamic Shari'a law "the only" source of legislation for 
Kuwait and some fringe campaigns to ban all music in Kuwait. 
 
¶7. (U) Post hears from many of its liberal and conservative 
contacts that Islamists succeed politically because they are 
better organized and better funded from the grass-roots 
level.  The opposite appears to be true for the more liberal 
secular groups -- they are known to be poorly funded and 
organized and some liberal interlocutors have admitted 
candidly that liberals are politically lazy, whereas their 
Islamist counterparts are very vocal, organized, and active. 
(Note: A Kuwaiti "liberal" is a progressive and relatively 
secular individual who typically espouses more Western-style 
conventions of equality and liberty whereas a Kuwaiti 
"conservative" tends to support a strict application of 
Islamic law and conservative bedouin traditions. End Note.) 
 
Democracy As Islamists' Best Friend 
----------------------------------- 
¶8. (U) Many Kuwaiti Islamists see democracy as their sure 
path to power.  Islamists are leading the calls for further 
democratization in Kuwait and are calling for full GOK 
transparency and political parties, which are currently 
unauthorized.  (Note:  In January, Salafis held a press 
conference to announce the establishment of the Hizb Al-Ummah 
political party.  Liberals and the GOK criticized the party's 
ideology and the GOK was outraged at its call for the legal 
establishment of political parties.  Both were also critical 
of Embassy attendance at this public event. End Note.)  For 
the more conservative, religious Kuwaiti in the political 
minority or outside of the ruling regime, democratic reforms 
hold the promise of a fair and internationally accepted means 
by which to rise to power.  Many liberal commentators 
theorize pessimistically that were Kuwait to become a fully 
functioning democracy, Islamists would undoubtedly rise to 
power with some speculating that women's suffrage would help 
the Islamists disproportionately.  Some further speculate 
that Islamists might use the democratic process only to 
subvert it in order to prolong their power. 
 
The Shi'a 
--------- 
 
¶9. (U) Not all of Kuwait's Islamists are Sunni.  One third of 
Kuwait's citizens are Shi'a and among those are a large 
number of religiously conservative Muslims who advocate for 
more religion-based policies.  Nonetheless, there are only 
five Shi'a MPs and no current Shi'a ministers.  The Shi'a are 
politically fragmented and not nearly as organized as the 
Sunni, and because they are the minority, they must 
constantly jockey for political rights and mainstream 
religious acceptance.  Speculation fuels some suspicion that 
Kuwaiti Shi'a hold loyalties toward Iran.  This appears to be 
mostly unfounded as Kuwaiti Shi'a generally consider 
themselves Kuwaitis first and Shi'as second and thus enjoy 
great economic and social benefits, almost certainly 
minimizing any meaningful question of allegiance. 
 
¶10. (C) The National Islamic Alliance (NIA) is the best-known 
Shi'a political grouping and is believed to be affiliated 
with pro-Iranian Kuwaiti Hizballah, an organization many 
claim doesn't exist.  There has been speculation that Iran 
intends to finance future NIA and Shi'a parliamentary 
candidates -- a claim refuted by current Shi'a MPs.  One 
liberal columnist claimed that the Kuwaiti Hizballah was very 
active and actually uses the NIA as cover.  As an example of 
this, he pointed to the NIA's spring 2004 meeting at the 
Iranian Embassy in Kuwait, a story widely reported in local 
dailies.  He added that Shi'a from other political factions 
ousted all NIA-affiliated MPs in the 2003 National Assembly 
elections and remarked that Hassan Jowhar is the only current 
MP who is close to the NIA.  Although Jowhar's brother has 
been linked to Hizballah, MP Jowhar is not "publicly" 
affiliated with NIA, and is known as a moderate MP.  In 
addition to the NIA there is the Shi'a Clerics Congregation, 
a Sistani-influenced moderate Islamist group; Sayed Mohammed 
Baqr Al-Mohri, a prominent Shi'a political figure, leads the 
group.  Other lesser known groups are the non-violent Peace 
and Justice group, founded in 2003, and the Consensus group, 
which formerly had ties to the NIA.  None of the Shi'a 
members of Parliament are affiliated with these groups. 
 
Islamists in Government 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Islamists are prevalent throughout the ministries, 
the military, the police, and all other sectors of the 
government.  They are advancing in prominence throughout the 
ranks of mid-level bureaucrats and even to some senior 
positions.  (Note: There are three Islamist Cabinet members: 
Justice Minister Ahmed Baqer, Awqaf Minister Dr. Abdullah 
Al-Maatouq, and Health Minister Dr. Mohammed Al-Jarallah. End 
Note.)  Liberal Kuwaitis claim that to get ahead in the 
ministries one must grow a beard and speak the language of 
Islamists.  Some point out that most of their managers, 
whether in a ministry or in the National Assembly, are 
Islamists, or at the very least, tend to favor Islamists. 
Others claim that junior, less qualified employees often 
bypass more seasoned, politically moderate employees because 
of their ideology.  (Comment: While there are still a great 
many politically moderate, non-Islamist Kuwaitis throughout 
the GOK bureaucracy, PolOffs have noted that many mid-level 
ministry and parliamentary interlocutors are Islamists or 
appear to be sympathetic to Islamist politics. End Comment.) 
 
¶12. (C) Islamists and rural conservative bedouin are also in 
the military in significant numbers -- perhaps one quarter or 
more are at least culturally Islamist or bedouin.  (Note: Not 
all bedouin are Islamist, although many are.  While bedouin 
and Islamists share many of the same cultural beliefs, tribal 
ties, and conservative mores, bedouin do not necessarily 
always subscribe to a fundamentalist Islamic political 
agenda. End Note.)  Liberal contacts claim that in some units 
there is professional and peer pressure to behave more 
piously and adopt conservative attitudes.  Some units are 
populated more heavily by bedouin than others.  Two members 
of an artillery unit believed to be predominantly "bedouin" 
were arrested in early January 2005 for planning to attack 
U.S. military forces during an exercise.  It is also 
popularly believed that the Islamists "control" the police 
and the prisons -- conservative bedouin are known to be 
heavily employed in both government sectors. 
 
¶13. (U) Despite assurances from Salafi Justice Minister Ahmed 
Baqer that the judicial process is wedded to the rule of law 
and not influenced by political forces, many liberals claim 
it is run by Islamists.  All judges are subject to GOK 
approval and many judges in Kuwait's court system are 
non-citizens who serve out 1-3 year renewable contracts, 
which almost certainly undermines their independence.  Many 
non-citizen judges are Egyptians trained in Shari'a law and 
not Kuwaiti civil code, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
rulings based on religious interpretation.  Lenient 
sentencing of Kuwaiti extremists has also raised questions 
about the objectivity of the judicial system. 
 
It's A Tribal Thing 
------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) The tribes in Kuwait make up a sizable and 
influential portion of the society.  They are not necessarily 
Islamist, but because of a combination of their conservative 
bedouin mentality and strong emphasis on cultural Islam, the 
message of the tribal Islamist parliamentary candidates 
resonates more convincingly among this growing segment of 
society.  The increase of rural Kuwaitis is an important 
political demographic development because few urban Kuwaitis 
have more than one wife and typically have smaller families, 
while many among the rural bedouin are known to have several 
wives and numerous children.  The growth of conservative 
Islamic culture in Kuwait owes much to the influence of the 
tribes -- even urban Kuwaitis are still very "tribal" in 
their understanding of politics, culture, and society.  Among 
more than fifty prominant tribes in Kuwait, the Utaibi, Ajmi, 
Enezi, Mutairi, Mulaifi, Hajiri, and Kandari are some of the 
largest and some extend from Saudi Arabia to Iraq. 
 
¶15. (U) Islamist parliamentary candidates are elected to 
serve their rural constituents, not primarily to debate and 
address national policy.  They are chosen from within the 
tribes and put forward with the near-certain backing of many 
families.  This is partly attributed to the small electoral 
district system.  Tribes are influential because they are 
chains of families that support and defend the interests of 
one another.  As a member of a tribe, who your spouse is, 
where you work, and what your position in life is are all 
matters often arranged or guided by the tribe.  Familial 
relationships often trump rule of law throughout Kuwaiti 
society, but especially among the rural bedouin tribes.  The 
tribes have a provincial, almost sheltered, quality to them 
that also make them a potential breeding ground for the 
growth of intolerant ideologies.  (Note: Many interlocutors 
have raised concerns that the cross-border tribal ties with 
Saudi Arabia allow for easy exchange of radical ideology and 
indeed even militants. End Note.) 
 
¶16. (C) Kuwait University Sociology professor Dr. Khaldoun 
Al-Naqeeb calls tribalism the "disease of the soul."  Because 
the average Kuwaiti will put his tribe first before all 
outsiders, he ends up treating people differently.  This 
element adds immeasurably to the filter through which many 
Kuwaitis view the world: favoring local identity over 
outsiders.  Although the culture as a whole remains 
conservative, strong blends of liberalism and conservative 
thought, which might conventionally be seen as contradictory, 
appear to coexist within the mindset of many Kuwaitis.  At 
base, Dr. Khaldoun explained, there is a fear of the unknown 
that pervades the region.  This fear leads most people 
invariably back to their roots, back to the known, and 
therefore back to a conservative Islamic worldview. 
 
Not All Al-Qaeda 
----------------- 
 
¶17. (U) The perception that the majority of Muslims support 
violent extremism, particularly Arab Muslims who proclaim a 
less tolerant version of Islam and who dress the part -- 
wearing the shorter dishdasha and a longer beard -- is wrong 
in most cases.  Further, those who align themselves with 
conservative religious groups such as the Salafis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood should not be assumed to be intolerant to 
all things Western.  While a clear majority of those in these 
ideological camps oppose many elements of U.S. Middle East 
policy, especially where support for Israel is concerned, 
many in these groups can also be pragmatic on broader issues 
such as Iraqi reconstruction and Iranian proclivities in the 
region. 
 
¶18. (U) An example of mainstream Kuwaiti Islamist moderation 
is the local political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
ICM. The ICM is not necessarily always in step with the 
international Muslim Brotherhood and differs significantly, 
for example, on the use of force in Iraq.  The ICM, although 
upholding the anti-Israeli position of the international 
Muslim Brotherhood, strongly supported the U.S.-led 
coalition's liberation of Iraq and supports U.S. post-war 
Iraqi reconstruction and development efforts.  (Note: The 
ICM's support for U.S.-led military actions is most likely a 
result of their experience under Iraqi occupation. End Note.) 
 Most Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood members in Kuwait reject 
publicly any support for terrorist activities.  While there 
is apparently a growing number, however small, of those who 
are actively supporting terror cells in Kuwait, few, if any, 
will publicly announce such support. 
 
Kuwaiti Jihadist Movement Not So Small 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) In light of the string of shoot-outs and unearthed 
terror plots, many are now considering that the growth of an 
extreme jihadist ideology in Kuwait is not isolated among a 
few dozen "misguided" citizens.  While extremists still make 
up only a small fraction of Kuwaitis, their numbers are 
almost certainly rising.  The recent January 2005 shoot-outs 
with Kuwait security forces coupled with extensive 
investigations and media coverage, beginning last summer, of 
known terrorist supporters and Kuwaiti jihadis has revealed a 
disturbing trend in Kuwaiti membership in these 
organizations.  Many Kuwaitis contend that the numbers are 
still small, but post suspects that the numbers of 
militant-minded Kuwaitis willing to support or conduct terror 
operations in Iraq or Kuwait could be above the thousand 
person estimate to which only the most liberal in this 
society will admit.  However our intelligence and insight 
into the militant wing of political Islam is limited, so any 
estimate should be viewed with skepticism.  So far, the 
number of Kuwaitis who are ready to die for their Islamist 
beliefs appears quite small. 
 
¶20. (U) After the recent terror events in Kuwait, mainstream 
Islamists are scrambling to launch awareness campaigns 
against violence and extremism.  They are desperate to show 
they are not the same as those extremists who not only 
advocate violence but carry it out.  Islamist groups are 
expected to meet to develop a mechanism to fight radicalism. 
A campaign is growing containing fatwas from scholars and 
verses from the Qur'an, which call for tolerance and reject 
terror and violence.  The new attitude might prevent such 
episodes as that in late 2004, when Saudi preacher and known 
jihad advocate Nasser Al-Omar was permitted to enter Kuwait 
-- despite a GOK decision to prevent him from lecturing or 
participating in seminars or political activity in Kuwait -- 
and to speak at the diwaniyas of Islamist MPs.  All 
mainstream Islamists officially deny that they support or 
sympathize with violent extremism.  While most are probably 
honest in characterizing their ideology, some clearly limit 
their comments, or actually lie, to hide their true beliefs. 
Amer Khlaif Al-Enezi -- the captured militant imam involved 
in the January shoot-outs with security forces who recently 
died of "heart failure" while in custody -- when questioned 
last year, maintained that he was against terrorism and 
extremist ideologies.  An Awqaf Ministry official said, "It 
is surprising Amer always spoke ill of terrorists and 
terrorism, but surprisingly he himself indulged in these 
activities." 
 
¶21. (U) Most of the Kuwaiti jihadists come from rural tribes 
in western and southeastern Kuwait.  Islamist spring youth 
camps and summer clubs, most affiliated with either the 
Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafis, are known to inculcate 
young Kuwaitis in religious ideology -- viewed by many 
non-Islamists to be an intolerant ideology.  These camps have 
no GOK oversight or regulation.  Further, there are fringe 
Kuwaiti Islamists who run secret camps known to teach violent 
jihad.  Kuwaitis who have attended both mainstream and jihadi 
camps are known to have supported, recruited, and facilitated 
jihadis inside Kuwait -- and some have even taken part in 
militant jihad in Iraq.  (Note: A September 11, 2004 
Washington Post article noted that Khalid Sheik Mohammed 
confessed that "he was drawn to violent jihad after joining 
the Brotherhood in Kuwait at age 16 and attending its desert 
youth camps." End Note.) 
 
¶22. (U) Some liberals and moderates blame mainstream 
Islamists for the growth of jihadism in Kuwait.  Until 
recently, all considered this mentality to be a foreign one; 
however, that assessment is changing.  The intolerant 
political message of the mainstream Islamists has been 
allowed to spread without restraint, and some would argue 
with GOK acquiescence.  Many believe that these "mainstream" 
messages have fueled the hatred and intolerance now driving 
the extremists.  After the mid-January shoot-outs, MP Walid 
Al-Tabtabaei was criticized by moderates for his 
too-little-too-late criticism of the spreading violence after 
he was a chief purveyor of anti-Western rumor-mongering and 
intolerant rhetoric. 
 
Liberals Critical of Growing Islamism 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Some liberals claim that the Islamist movement has 
been permitted by the GOK to grow unchecked for several 
decades.  One liberal columnist remarked that since Shaykh 
Jabir became Amir in the late 1970s, the GOK has played a key 
role in pursuing "backward" policies.  He pointed out the 
growth of the Kuwait Finance House, an "Islamic bank" which 
is financially supported by the GOK, the rising influence of 
the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, and the 
segregation of the sexes at Kuwait University.  He said that 
the problem is that people are in a state of confusion.  If 
PM Shaykh Sabah had his way, he explained, there would be a 
noticeable move to more liberal policies, but, he explained, 
Shaykh Sabah must still work within the conservative system 
established by his brother the Amir.  In contrast, many 
contacts claim that Islamism grew tremendously in Kuwait 
after large numbers of Kuwaitis returned in 1991 from exile 
in Saudi Arabia while waiting out the Iraqi occupation.  Many 
of the returnees brought with them elements of the Saudi 
Wahhabi ideology.  Some Kuwaiti Islamists own date farms in 
Saudi Arabia -- some in the Qaseem area where Saudi 
extremists are prevalent -- and travel there regularly. 
 
¶24. (C) Another liberal columnist said he is concerned that 
democratic freedoms in the Middle East will bring Islamists 
to power.  While he supports democratic freedoms, 
"Islamists," he remarked, "choke society's political and 
social life."  He alluded to the Taliban as the ultimate 
example of a dysfunctional Islamic society.  He also claimed 
that there is a dearth of intelligentsia in the Arab world 
and this is hurting the region.  No one, because of his 
affiliation with one group or another, he explained, is free 
to speak his mind about real reform.  They all carry heavy 
biases, he stated, and will not oppose the ideas of their own 
group even if such opposition would benefit their country. 
 
¶25. (C) A liberal professor and former cabinet minister 
offered to PolOff some examples of how Islamists take 
ownership of religion to suit their actions and causes.  He 
explained that during the 2003 general elections Islamist 
campaign banners were posted in unauthorized locations, but 
authorities were hesitant to take them down because the name 
of God was printed on the banner -- removing the name of God 
from a public venue could be seen as anti-Islamic.  He also 
recalled when an Islamist student walked in late to a class 
he was teaching at Kuwait University.  He scolded the student 
for arriving late and interrupting the class.  The student 
justified his tardiness by claiming that he was coming from 
afternoon prayers.  The professor responded that study was 
valued more than prayer in the Qur'an.  He explained to the 
student that the very first word in the Qur'an is the command 
to read.  The student, he recounted, was indignant that a 
liberal professor would instruct him about Islam. 
 
Kuwait Historically Conservative 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (U) Kuwaiti society has always been conservative relative 
to much of the Middle East -- although it is seen as somewhat 
moderate in the Gulf -- and while some argue convincingly 
that conservatism has gained momentum over the last three 
decades, it should surprise no one that many Kuwaitis, at the 
very least, want to portray themselves as pious Muslims. 
Kuwait's constitution, adopted in 1962, identifies Islam as 
the state religion and Islamic Shari'a law as "a main source 
of legislation."  Some Sunni Islamists argue that Kuwait 
moved away from its natural conservatism during the 
nationalist movement in the 1950s and 1960s and is only now 
moving back to its "cultural norms."  While most Islamists 
are accurately characterized as supporting more conservative 
social policies and are often outspoken about any issue 
regarding Israel and increasingly the U.S., the overwhelming 
majority publicly reject the politics and violence of Islamic 
extremism. 
 
¶27. (U) Islamists see themselves not as intolerant or 
narrow-minded, but as champions of a noble and moral cause. 
By definition, they claim a religious and moral high ground 
that infuses them with a great sense of confidence in their 
mission.  They, in turn, often see liberals as agents of the 
West and licentious purveyors of immorality and ideas that 
are not in-line with the tenets of Islam.  They argue that 
many liberal goals undermine society and that they must fight 
to defend their faith and culture, albeit in non-violent 
ways, against immoral or alien influences. 
 
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