Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05GABORONE243, OPPOSITION PARTIES CONSIDER COOPERATION, AGAIN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05GABORONE243.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05GABORONE243 2005-02-17 10:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Gaborone
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171032Z Feb 05

ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  DS-00    
      UTED-00  VC-00    H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   L-00     
      VCE-00   AC-00    NSAE-00  OMB-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    
      GIWI-00  PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    
      TRSE-00  FMP-00   IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   
      G-00     SAS-00     /001W
                  ------------------B9D25B  171308Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1721
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS  GABORONE 000243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AF/S FOR DIFFILY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV BC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES CONSIDER COOPERATION, AGAIN 
 
REF (A) 04 Gaborone 1816 REF (B) 04 Gaborone 1606 REF (C) 04 
 
Gaborone 1873 REF (D) Gaborone 56 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  Energized by growth in their share of 
the popular vote in the October 2004 elections, Botswana's 
opposition parties are debating with renewed vigor how 
cooperation could embarrass, if not unseat, the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in 2009.  In order to 
achieve that objective, opposition leadership will have to 
demonstrate a quantum shift toward a more pro-active, 
practical style and map out a coherent strategy.  Despite 
residual suspicious attitudes toward the U.S., the Mission 
will continue to reach out to opposition parties to 
cultivate more informed views on the U.S. and its policies 
in their growing ranks.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
OPPOSITION SUPPORT GROWING 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (U)  The results of the October 2004 elections have 
inspired opposition parties to re-examine the importance of 
solidarity with greater enthusiasm (Ref A). The Botswana 
National Front (BNF), the biggest opposition party, 
contested elections in partnership with the much smaller 
Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and Botswana People's Party 
(BPP).  The BNF garnered 12 parliamentary seats, doubling 
its previous number; BAM and BPP did not win any.  The 
Botswana Congress Party (BCP) lost its parliamentary seat 
from Okavango but gained one from the Gaborone Central 
constituency.  Both the BNF and BCP significantly increased 
their numbers of local council members. 
 
3. (U)  Although opposition parties won less than a quarter 
of the seats in the National Assembly, they attracted 48 
percent of the popular vote, up from 43 percent in 1999.  In 
twelve constituencies, a BDP candidate won with less than 
half the vote, thanks to competition between opposition 
parties.  In two more, the combined opposition vote fell 
short by fewer than 100 ballots.  Both the BNF and the BCP 
have unanimously acknowledged the need for cooperation if 
they want to avoid, in the National Assembly of 2009, a 
recurrence of their disproportionate under-representation. 
 
4. (SBU)  The response to these facts and figures on the 
part of the ruling BDP has been mixed.  Former party 
Executive Secretary and now specially-elected MP Botsalo 
Ntuane downplayed the likelihood that the opposition parties 
will find a means to combine their support in the next 
election.  In contrast, Ntuane's successor as Executive 
Secretary, Batlang "Comma" Serema, asserted that the BDP is 
 
SIPDIS 
in danger of losing the government.  MP and former cabinet 
minister Boyce Sebetela told the press "the numbers indicate 
that the opposition is taking power.  The writing is on the 
wall."  If, like Ntuane, the BDP over-confidently dismisses 
the threat posed by a united opposition, it could find 
itself with a significantly diminished parliamentary caucus 
in five years. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EARLY SIGNS POSITIVE FOR OPPOSITION UNITY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U)  Initial indications of the likelihood that 
opposition parties will devise a means of cooperation are 
positive.  Reports from Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 
internal consultative workshops in January suggest that the 
party leadership is leaning toward a pact-like arrangement 
with the other opposition parties.  Ironically, the BCP 
declined to join a similar joint venture for the 2004 
elections, arguing that the proposal emerged too late to act 
upon it.  The BNF has reiterated the imperative of 
opposition unity and expressed its desire to work with the 
BCP.  Some in the Botswana Alliance Movement have spoken in 
favor of merging all opposition groups into a single party. 
Such a merger would have to include the BNF and BCP to make 
an appreciable impact, but the BCP has already rejected the 
notion. 
 
6. (U)  Hard feelings between members of the BNF and BCP, 
stemming from their 1998 split, which contributed to their 
resounding defeat in the 1999 election, could impede 
attempts at unity.  Competition for coveted positions at the 
local level, however, poses a greater threat.  A senior 
leader in the BNF argued that shortsighted reluctance among 
council candidates to make way for their colleagues from 
other parties where the latter have an advantage could sink 
efforts to cooperate.  In the recent election, the Pact 
failed to prevent incidents of such rebellion when it 
 
consisted only of the BAM, BPP, and the much larger BNF. 
Adding the BCP, which actually contested more constituencies 
than did the BNF in 2004, would magnify this challenge. 
Given Botswana's relatively small political class, 
personalities and personality conflicts play a 
disproportionate role in national politics.  Whether or not 
old grudges and unwillingness to make short-term sacrifices 
frustrate attempts to forge opposition unity hinges on the 
leadership within these parties. 
 
------------------------ 
CHARISMA, WHAT CHARISMA? 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU)  Leaders within the two biggest opposition parties, 
the BNF and BCP, have an indifferent record of creating and 
exploiting opportunities to undermine support for the BDP. 
BNF Secretary General and leader of the opposition in 
parliament Akanyang Magama unwittingly but brilliantly 
captured part of this problem by stating in a February 7 
interview "I don't know about this charisma that people are 
talking about." Former BNF leader Dr. Kenneth Koma, by 
contrast, largely built the party on his ability to move a 
crowd.  Although the passing of Koma from the political 
scene has liberated the BNF from his personality cult and 
his ideological focus, the party's current leaders have not 
similarly aroused and inspired supporters. 
 
8. (SBU)  In a prior meeting with the Ambassador, Magama 
presented himself as a reserved party man with policy views 
heavily colored by outdated ideological debates.  He failed 
to clearly outline his vision for Botswana and a strategy 
for expanding the BNF's support over the next five years. 
Although Magama was able to restore some order to the BNF, 
leadership with a different skill set, including crucial 
intangibles like charisma, would contribute powerfully to 
expanding the party's presence in BDP strongholds. 
 
9. (U)  The BNF's publicity secretary Mohammed Khan, who 
possesses some of these qualities, has announced his 
candidacy to replace Magama as party secretary general at 
its triennial congress in July.  Khan, who narrowly lost to 
the BDP candidate in Molepolole North, has long played an 
important role in the BNF and may well defeat Magama. 
 
10. (SBU)  Otlaadisa Koosaletse, President of the BCP, also 
lacks charisma.  The BCP prides itself in reaching out to 
the disaffected youth of Botswana.  Consequently, some argue 
that a younger candidate would more aptly fit the party's 
profile.  Koosaletse himself has recognized the importance 
of turning over the reins to a new generation within the 
party but indicated his willingness to remain president for 
another three-year term.  If Koosaletse were to make an 
early exit, however, it is not clear who would replace him. 
Therefore it seems likely that Koosaletse will remain as 
President of the BCP for another three years and use that 
time to groom a cadre of younger leaders. 
 
11. (SBU)  The personal appeal of Vice President Khama puts 
the opposition leaders at a particular disadvantage. 
Although Khama is reserved and speaks only rough Setswana, 
his background projects an aura of leadership.  Former 
Commander of the Botswana Defense Force, son of Botswana's 
first president and paramount chief of the Bamangwato, Khama 
fits the profile of a leader.  Charismatic personalities 
such as the BNF's Robert Molefhabangwe and the BCP's 
Dumelang Saleshando do exist within the opposition.  To 
defeat the BDP, the opposition must develop such talent. 
 
------------------------------ 
ATTACK BDP'S GOVERNANCE RECORD 
------------------------------ 
 
12. (SBU)  Opposition parties are already united in their 
assessment of the issues on which the BDP is vulnerable. 
Unemployment, poverty, unequal distribution of the benefits 
of growth, and lack of accountability were key themes of the 
2004 campaign and will remain relevant during the next five 
years (Ref B).  While opposition figures uniformly endorse 
Vision 2016, the GOB's development objectives for the 
nation's golden anniversary, they pillory the BDP for poor 
implementation.  Ephraim Setshwaelo, leader in the Botswana 
Alliance Movement, articulated lack of transparency in 
policy formation as an issue of popular concern.  He cited 
the uproar over the recently passed Abolition of Marital 
Powers Act, especially complaints that the Government rode 
roughshod over the House of Chiefs, ignored religious 
groups, and failed to build support among constituents. 
Setshwaelo depicted this incident as indicative of a growing 
 
consensus that the BDP has taken its position of power for 
granted. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BDP RIFT A WINDFALL FOR OPPOSITION? 
----------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU)  A third prong of opposition parties' nebulous 
strategy for 2009 is to exploit the factional fighting 
within the BDP.  The BDP has never been as divided as it is 
today (Refs C and D).  A leading light of the BCP told 
PolOff that the opposition parties are in contact with the 
disaffected members of the BDP and are positioning 
themselves to woo potential defectors.  Their ability to do 
this will rest on their success in forming a common front 
and effectively mobilizing public discontent.  Open 
speculation by BDP Secretary General Daniel Kwelagobe about 
the possibility of a resurgent opposition and a breakaway 
faction of the BDP combining forces to dislodge the ruling 
party suggests that this strategy is not unrealistic. 
 
----------------------------- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS 
----------------------------- 
 
14. (U)  An ascendant opposition likely has no significant 
negative impact on U.S. interests in Botswana.  Some BNF 
leaders have publicly criticized the U.S. for its role -- or 
lack thereof -- in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the war in 
Iraq, and the U.S.' alleged domination of the UN, but many 
within the BDP share the same misgivings.  More 
significantly, the socialist ideological background of the 
BNF, and its spin-off party, the BCP, is gradually receding. 
Whereas the BNF previously rejected privatization of state- 
owned enterprises outright, they now recognize that 
privatization and foreign direct investment have a role to 
play in development.  In short, the opposition parties have 
come to terms with the changing world since 1989. 
 
------------------------------------- 
INSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
------------------------------------- 
 
15. (U)  Certain institutional and demographic factors 
beyond the control of the opposition parties have a 
significant impact on their prospects in the medium to long 
term.  The campaign finance regime and first-past-the-post 
system of representation favor the BDP.  Although opposition 
parties routinely assail this practice as unfair and 
undemocratic, it is unlikely to change soon.  But 
demographic factors, particularly migration from rural to 
urban areas and the gradual passing of the generation old 
enough to vote in the early post-independence period, favor 
the opposition.  These trends mark the end of the BDP's 
extended holiday in power and the beginning of an era in 
which the BDP will have to earn each vote. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16. (SBU)  Continued growth in support for opposition 
parties will fundamentally transform the role of opposition 
leaders.  Previously, these individuals acted as gadflies to 
the government, ever vigilant to condemn policy mistakes, 
maladministration and corruption but not necessarily bound 
to identify and advance development solutions.  Their 
growing constituency -- among the youth and the urban 
unemployed -- will require that they act as leaders, not 
only of a political movement but also of the nation.  As the 
role of opposition parties changes, Mission will target its 
outreach efforts, aiming to instill in this constituency a 
better understanding of the U.S. and its policies. 
 
HUGGINS 
 
 
NNNN