This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015 
TAGS: SNAR MARR MOPS PINR BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING FOR AIR 
BRIDGE DENIAL 
 
REF: WHA/BSC (MALHEIRO) - EMBASSY (HEARNE) CLASSIFIED 
     E-MAIL 2 FEB 05 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 
(B)(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ref query requested Embassy views on the 
potential for sharing U.S. information (particularly ROTHR 
data) with the GOB as part of cooperative regional effort at 
air bridge denial (ABD) that may also include Colombia.  In 
summary form below are our observations, based on the history 
of this issue and consideration of the current shootdown 
program in Brazil.  We believe that it is worthwhile and an 
opportune moment, given Brazil's success to date with its ABD 
program, to approach the Brazilians about expanded 
cooperation.  Options for moving ahead include an offer of 
direct assistance, perhaps taking advantage of the visit of 
Secretary Rumsfeld, or an indirect approach in which 
 
SIPDIS 
U.S.-origin information (including ROTHR data) is provided to 
Brazil via Colombia in the context of their bilateral 
cooperation in aerial surveillance and interdiction. We are 
prepared to make preliminary inquiries on these issues with 
the GOB if instructed.  End summary. 
 
History 
 
¶2. (C) Since circa 1999-2000, the USG has periodically made 
inquires to the Brazilian Goverment (GOB) and air force 
(BRAF) regarding information sharing with Brazil for aerial 
surveillance and ABD efforts.  Mission personnel, as well as 
senior visitors from State, DOD and SOUTHCOM, have all 
registered with Brazil, formally and informally, our 
willingness to explore cooperation ranging from limited 
bilateral information sharing to larger-scale regional 
programs to develop a common operating picture (COP). 
 
¶3. (C) The centerpiece of the USG discussion has usually been 
our interest in providing low-altitude tracking data from the 
USG's Puerto Rico Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) 
installation to Brazil, as a complement to the data generated 
by Brazil's own assets (especially the SIVAM Amazon 
surveillance system), which are focused primarily on 
higher-altitude coverage.  We have been willing to discuss 
different operational modalities, including enhancing 
Brazil's liaison program at JIATF-South in Key West and/or 
installing real-time ROTHR terminals in Brazil's SIVAM center 
in Manaus. 
 
Mixed Reactions, No Progress 
 
¶4. (C) Brazilian reactions to these queries have been mixed, 
and there has been no progress on the issue.  On a technical 
level, some of the BRAF's best officers -- e.g., former SIVAM 
Commission President Brigadier Orlando Bellon -- have a keen 
understanding of the advantages of integrating ROTHR data 
into the SIVAM spread, and over the years have informally 
expressed enthusiasm for the options outlined in para 3 and 
even beyond (i.e., BRAF officers a few years ago informally 
discussed with USAF and Raytheon officials the idea of 
installing a ROTHR in Brazil).  As recently as August 2004, 
during a visit to JIATF South, Brazilian air defense chief 
Brigadier Azambuja indicated his desire to assign a BRAF 
representative in Key West (the current Brazilian liaison 
officer is from the civilian intelligence service) to 
facilitate ROTHR data feed to BRAF air defense operations 
centers. 
 
¶5. (C) However, other BRAF officers -- notably current Chief 
of Air Staff Brigadier Astor -- have been hesitant, and the 
following factors appear to be impediments: 
 
-- Dissing SIVAM: Astor said directly to Mission officers one 
year ago, as Brazil's multi-million dollar SIVAM system was 
becoming fully operational, that incorporating ROTHR into 
Brazil's surveillance program could appear to some -- notably 
in Brazil's prickly congress and media -- as an admission 
that SIVAM is inadequate. That this view is short-sighted and 
parochial seems obvious to us, but Astor is not necessarily 
wrong to fear the worst from Brazil's politicians and press 
when it comes to money issues, the military and virtually 
anything to do with the U.S.  However, now that SIVAM is up 
and running, Astor's concerns (and a related BRAF technical 
concern that incorporating ROTHR terminals could delay 
getting SIVAM installations on line) may have lessened. 
-- Sovereignty:  On a related theme, and is often the case in 
Brazil, sovereignty concerns and suspicions about U.S. 
motives (ranging from mild reluctance about appearances of 
needing outside help to outright conspiracy theories about 
U.S. designs on the Amazon) sometimes color GOB and BRAF 
attitudes toward closer cooperation.  In the past, concerns 
have been heard from the fever swamps of the nationalist 
fringes of both left and right that SIVAM, which was largely 
built by Raytheon, is perhaps secretly wired for penetration 
by U.S. intelligence.  Hence real cooperation in 
surveillance, including ROTHR, could be potentially 
controversial in the BRAF's view. 
 
-- Neighbors first:  BRAF and MOD officials have also 
indicated to USG officials at different times that their 
priority interest is pursuing bilateral information sharing 
agreements with neighboring countries, and hence possible 
Brazil-U.S. cooperation or a unified regional effort toward a 
COP appear to be well down the road.  We are aware that, in 
the past several months, Brazil has signed information 
sharing agreements with both Colombia and Peru, but the GOB 
has not provided us details of the accords.  We believe 
Brazil is also in discussions with Venezuela and Bolivia, but 
have not confirmed this yet with the GOB. 
 
A Way Ahead -- Two Options 
 
¶6. (C) Bilateral: Despite the history and challenges noted 
above, we believe it is worth pursuing enhanced cooperation 
in air surveillance and ABD, and now may be an opportune 
time.  The GOB has trumpeted its October 2004 implementation 
of its national ABD program (shootdown) as a success.  BRAF 
and MOD statements to the media have claimed a substantial 
decrease in suspicious air traffic, and the Federal Police 
have reported through the press that traffickers are now 
resorting to landing aircraft over the frontier in Paraguay 
and transporting cocaine by land into Brazil.  BRAF data 
supplied to us confidentially for a U.S. congressional 
reporting requirement is less dramatic than media reports, 
but still encouraging: i.e., an approximately one quarter 
drop in suspect flights from October through the end of 2004, 
one force down event (in which no drugs were seized), and no 
necessity for use of either warning shots or lethal force to 
secure compliance from intercepted aircraft. Brazilians are 
deeply worried about the drug-related organized criminal 
violence ravaging Rio and other cities, and good news is 
welcomed by the public and GOB. Increased cooperation with us 
in enhancing Brazil's capabilities against illegal aerial 
trafficking may be more attractive now, as Brazil seeks to 
build on success.  The possible visit of Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld would offer an ideal opportunity to reiterate to the 
Brazilians at the minister level that we want to do more to 
help and have technical assets that can complement SIVAM.  We 
see little to lose in making another overture for direct 
bilateral cooperation. 
 
¶7. (C) Via Colombia: Another option would be an indirect 
approach via Colombia.  Brazil is already committed to 
greater cooperation with Colombia, witness their signing of a 
cooperation accord last year. That presents a potential 
building block for regional cooperation that includes 
providing U.S. information to both governments (Colombia 
directly, Brazil via Colombia).  We defer to experts on the 
question of whether there would be any U.S. legal impediment 
to Colombia's sharing U.S.-origin information (including 
ROTHR tracks) with Brazil for ABD operations, since both 
countries have Presidential Determinations to address 
liability under U.S. statutes.  But we anticipate the 
Brazilians would definitely want our legal judgment on that 
question before moving ahead.  (Note: The terms of annexes to 
the U.S.-Brazil exchange of diplomatic notes indicate the GOB 
will not share U.S.-origin information or intelligence with 
another country without express permission from the USG. End 
note.).  Receiving U.S. information via Colombia could 
ameliorate some of the Brazilian concerns outlined in para 5 
above, as it can be couched within the context of 
Brazil-Colombia cooperation. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment. There is appreciation in the GOB for the 
USG's efforts to secure a Presidential Determination for 
Brazil's ABD program, especially in light of its success to 
date.  That fact and the visit of our defense secretary may 
create a favorable environment for momentum on ABD and 
surveillance cooperation.  That said, the Brazilians 
repeatedly emphasized during our negotiations on the PD last 
year that their ABD program is truly and exclusively national 
in its operational scope and technical assets.  In that 
regard, we would need to determine early on whether receiving 
U.S.-origin information -- directly from us or via Colombia 
-- is simply unattractive to the GOB for political or other 
reasons that go beyond the known reservations noted above. 
On that key point and other questions, we are prepared to 
engage informally with the GOB (MOD, BRAF and perhaps foreign 
ministry), if instructed.