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Viewing cable 05BANGKOK980, THAI ELECTION: THAKSIN IN AN "AVALANCHE"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK980 2005-02-07 11:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TH
SUBJECT: THAI ELECTION:  THAKSIN IN AN "AVALANCHE" 
 
REF: (A) BANGKOK 955 (B) BANGKOK 954 (C) BANGKOK 953 
 
     (D) BANGKOK 948 (E) BANGKOK 801 (F) BANGKOK 
     685 (G) BANGKOK 673 (H) 2004 BANGKOK 5989 
 
 1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has 
won a massive mandate in the February 6 parliamentary 
election -- unprecedented in Thai history -- for a second 
term as Thailand's Prime Minister.  The results are still 
unofficial (and won't be finalized for a few days), but 
reliable estimates on February 7 indicate that Thaksin's Thai 
Rak Thai (TRT) will win over 370 constituency and party list 
parliamentary seats (out of a total 500) in the lower house 
of the Parliament.  This strong majority will allow him to 
govern without coalition partners.  The main opposition 
Democrat Party (DP) is likely to drop to 93 seats.  DP Leader 
Banyat Bantadtan has announced his resignation.  The Chart 
Thai (CT) party, which was in Thaksin's last coalition, looks 
to win 31 seats and will likely move into the opposition 
camp.  Thaksin's opponents, now significantly reduced in 
power relative to the TRT party, warn gloomily that Thailand 
has fewer checks and balances and could be on the way to 
becoming less democratic as a one-party state.  PM Thaksin, 
sounding a more conciliatory tone in victory, says that he 
will prove to his critics his good intentions for the 
country.  With an absolute majority in Parliament apparently 
in his hands, Thaksin will be in a strong position to pursue 
his political agenda into the foreseeable future.  In any 
event, the Thai people have clearly spoken, and made their 
preferences known.  End Summary. 
 
NO DOUBTS ABOUT A HUGE THAKSIN VICTORY 
 
2.  (U)  Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party won in all 
regions of the country save for the Democrat Party's (DP) 
traditional base in the southern constituencies.  According 
to morning after unofficial estimates on February 7, Thaksin 
could pick up over 370 constituency and party list 
parliamentary seats.  According to surveys by media 
broadcasting and Nation TV, the TRT has won at least 67 of 76 
seats in the northern region, 126 of 136 in the northeast, 79 
out of 97 in the cental region and 32 of 37 seats in Bangkok. 
 The only region where the opposition Democrat Party (DP) 
prevailed was in the South where the Democrats reportedly won 
at least 48 of the region's 54 seats. TRT appears to have 
picked up over 60 of the 100 Party List seats.  (These are 
national, non-constituency seats awarded proportionately to 
those parties who pick up five percent or more of the 
separate countrywide vote on party lists.) 
 
3.  (U)  Voter turnout was estimated at 70% nationwide (i.e. 
over 31 million voters), with some areas in Bangkok reporting 
over 90% of eligible voters streaming to the polls on a hot, 
sunny Sunday marked by unusually light traffic in the 
capital.  Voting was generally peaceful throughout the 
country (including in Thailand's trouble-plagued deep South), 
with only some reports of shooting near Korat in the 
country's northeast. 
 
OFFICIAL RESULTS NOT AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY 
 
4.  (U)  By midday February 7, about 60 percent of the vote 
had been counted, Election Commission officials told us. 
Announcement of the official results should begin to come in 
over the next several days.  According to article 159 of the 
Constitution, Parliament must be seated within 30 days of the 
election.  The official results will likely be announced in 
tranches over the next several weeks.  The law allows 
considerable leeway for challenges and, though most will not 
be sustained ultimately, scores of complaints of election 
illegalities will have to be considered.  February 21 has 
been designated as the date for re-run elections if any 
February 6 contests are set aside for electoral law 
violations.  The first tranche of official, handcounted 
results should be announced by February 9. 
 
DEMOCRATS DRUBBED: NO OPPOSITION POWER TO CENSURE PRIME 
MINISTER 
 
5.  (SBU)  If initial results hold true, the DP could end up 
with less than 100 seats in Parliament, including Party List 
seats.  For the DP the vote dashed its hopes to win enough 
seats to be able officially to censure the Prime Minister. 
By law, the opposition needs over two fifths of the 500 seat 
Parliament - at least 201 votes - in order to bring a censure 
motion against the Prime Minister.  With an apparent win of 
over 370 seats, Thaksin looks to be comfortably beyond reach 
of his opposition, whether it be the DP alone or a coalition 
of the DP and the Chart Thai Party.  Immunity from censure 
probably won't apply to Thaksin's cabinet - the opposition 
only needs over one fifth of Parliament, or at least 101 
votes, to censure individual ministers.  That could be done 
if DP and Chart Thai cooperate. 
 
TRT LOSES DEEP SOUTH TO DP IN PROBABLE BACKLASH TO SECURITY 
POLICIES IN THE REGION 
 
6.  (SBU)  One bright spot for the DP was in the three 
southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, where 
the Democrat Party made a political comeback to dominance, 
sweeping 10 of 11 seats.  Six TRT incumbents were unseated. 
Chart Thai picked up one seat.  Most of the new DP MPs in the 
deep South are younger new faces for DP.  Their victories 
indicate a popular backlash to the government's heavy-handed 
security policy against Muslim separatist violence over the 
last year.  In Nakhorn Si Thammarat, former Foreign Minister 
and DP leader Surin Pitsuwan survived a strong challenge from 
TRT (ref. D) and was re-elected to his constituency seat. 
(In the last election, Surin had been on the DP party list 
slate, but he had served five previous terms in the 
constituency.) 
 
BANYAT RESIGNS 
 
7.  (SBU)  Following its general debacle, the DP will have to 
decide on a new direction to revitalize the party.  A change 
in leadership will be the first order of business and DP 
Leader Banyat Bantadthan has reportedly obliged by resigning 
"to take responsibility" for his party's defeat.  The most 
obvious replacement for Banyat will be Deputy Leader Aphisit 
Vejjajiva.  The young, telegenic Aphisit lost a bitter 
leadership contest to Banyat after former Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai stepped down from the party's top post in 2003. 
 The party will now likely turn to Aphisit as the one DP 
leader who might be able to compete with Thaksin on charisma. 
 
 
CHART THAI POSITION UNCERTAIN 
 
8.  (SBU)  The Chart Thai party, erstwhile coalition partner 
of the TRT, has unofficially won about 31 seats in 
Parliament, including what appears to be a clean sweep of its 
Suphan Buri stronghold in central Thailand (ref. A).  The 
party also picked up a seat in Bangkok, its first in about 20 
years.  Flamboyant massage parlor tycoon Chuvit Kamolvisit, 
who joined the party following his strong showing in last 
year's Bangkok gubernatorial race (ref. H), appears headed 
for Parliament as a party list candidate.  Initial vote 
counting of the nationwide party list ballots indicates that 
CT will get up to eight of the allocated 100 seats.  Chuwit 
is listed 6th on the CT list. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Thaksin, exuding confidence in the days before the 
election and not in a conciliatory mood, told crowds of 
supporters that he did not need CT's partnership, no longer 
trusted CT leader Banharn Silpa-archa, and would not invite 
the CT into his government this time around.  On February 6, 
Thaksin reportedly said that he would consult with Banharn 
regarding TRT going it alone in the next government.  Banharn 
could be looking at a spell in the opposition camp.  Hinting 
in this direction, Banharn told the media that, though he 
would keep his earlier promise to support Thaksin for prime 
minister when Parliament reconvenes, he also acknowledged his 
party's duty to help bolster the system of checks and 
balances to counter the government. 
 
MAHACHON PONDERS ITS FUTURE 
 
10.  (SBU)  If the Democrat Party and the Chart Thai have 
seen their powers sharply diminished relative to the TRT, the 
Mahachon Party (MCP), formed only last year, may be on the 
way out.  Projected unofficially to have won only one seat, 
its ambitions to become the "third force" in Thai politics 
appear to have collapsed.  Even in the country's mostly 
rural, vote rich Northeast region, where it had expected to 
do well against TRT, MCP was swamped.  For example, in Nakon 
Ratchasima Province, TRT appears to have swept virtually all 
of the 16 seats.  The Mahachon Party had been tipped to win 
four of these seats (ref. F)  - instead it won none.  This 
former Chat Pattana (CP) stronghold is now solidly TRT 
country following CP's official merger with TRT late last 
year.  Mahachon party co-founder (and former DP kingmaker) 
Sanan Kachornprasart has reportedly told the media that he 
will resign his party position and that the party should 
consider dissolving itself if it really had picked up only 
one seat. 
 
WARNINGS OF DANGERS IN A "ONE PARTY STATE" 
 
11.  (SBU)  Thaksin's political opponents and critics alike 
are mourning the onset of a one party government.  In their 
public statements, other party leaders took on a plaintive 
tone.  Alluding to the possibility that he will be left out 
in the cold if Thaksin follows through on his one party 
government, Banharn expressed the wish that Thaksin would 
help the country's interests by making "more friends, not 
foes."  Banyat, inviting CT and Mahachon to join his DP party 
in the opposition, admitted that even with this coalition "we 
may have limited scrutinizing powers."  Mahachon leader Anek 
Laothamatas sniffed that the election "was akin to an 
election in a communist country." 
 
12.  (SBU)  Academics and members of the country's political 
institutions have been even more dire in their public 
comments.  Political Science Association of Thailand 
President Thiraphat Serirangsan, for example, warned that as 
the government's power grows, the public's rights and 
freedoms will contract.  More mildly, former Prime Minister 
Anand Panyarachum commented "absolute power is not a 
surprise.  What is important is how the power is used." 
(Privately, Anand is much more negative on the next four 
years.  See septel on Ambassador's conversation with Anand on 
February 7.) 
 
THAKSIN THE COLOSSUS 
 
13.  (SBU)  Comment:  Flush with the apparent magnitude of 
his victory (earlier he had predicted "not a landslide - an 
avalanche"), Thaksin has sounded a conciliatory note.  In an 
attempt to reassure his critics, Thaksin said on February 6 
that "four years from now, my critics in academia and the 
opposition will know me better.  They'll realize that I 
really had good intentions for the country."  Thaksin now 
appears to have the mandate to define what is good.  Though 
the counting continues, to all appearances he has virtual 
legislative carte blanche to push through his programs. 
Ironically, the "stability" that Thaksin is celebrating looks 
to his critics suspiciously like the end of real political 
diversity in Thailand.  Obviously that is not true.  The 
opposition still has a voice in and out of Parliament, the 
Thai media is not stifled (despite some legitimate concerns), 
and there is a sitting "watchdog" Senate and active civil 
society.  That said, the Thai electorate has given a clear 
sign to Thaksin that he will interpret as a mandate for his 
policies and satisfaction with where he has taken the country 
over the past four years. End Comment. 
BOYCE