This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
OSD FOR OSD/ISA (STERN AND POWERS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND:  AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES THE SOUTH WITH KEY 
THAKSIN CONFIDANT 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 8377 
 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 7177 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON 1.4(D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On January 27, I called on Pansak 
Vinyaratn, a principal advisor to Prime Minister Thaksin. 
Our conversation focused on the violence in southern Thailand 
and how the situation affects Thailand's ability to deploy 
additional troops to Iraq; how Thaksin is learning, slowly, 
to deal with Islam; and RTG policy approaches to the south 
based on economic development.  See para. 10 for a 
biographical note on Pansak, perhaps the most influential 
member of Thaksin's inner circle.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  I called on Pansak Vinyaratn, principal advisor to 
Prime Minister Thaksin, at Government House on January 27. 
Pansak and I had worked together closely during the late 
1980s when he was one of former Prime Minister Chatichai's 
advisors.  The conversation quickly moved from renewing old 
acquaintances to a frank discussion about the current 
situation in the violence-plagued southernmost provinces of 
Thailand. 
 
TROOPS FOR IRAQ -- REMEMBER THE SOUTHERN CONTEXT 
 
¶3.  (C)  Pansak noted the Thai deployments of military 
engineers and medical personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq as 
evidence of the close Thai/U.S. relationship.  However, he 
added that the situation in the Muslim deep south must be 
taken into consideration when discussing a future Thai 
deployment to Iraq.  Pansak said another deployment would 
have an impact on the situation in southern Thailand, because 
"it would give the thugs in the south another issue to rally 
around."  He said the Prime Minister was not trying to get 
out of the commitment he had made to the President to 
re-deploy troops to Iraq, but would have to keep the context 
of the situation in the south in mind.  Pansak claimed that 
the presence of Thai troops in Iraq was a very sensitive 
issue for Thailand's Muslim neighbors, as well as for Thai 
Muslims. 
 
ARREST IN MALAYSIA 
 
¶4.  (C)  Pansak raised the issue of the Malaysian capture of 
Doramae Kuteh (AKA Chae Kumae Kuteh), who the Thai claim is a 
leading militant leader and responsible for the January 4, 
2004 raid on a Narathiwat armory.  Pansak said he had advised 
Thaksin to handle the arrest carefully and quietly and to 
avoid praising Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi publicly. 
Pansak said he was aware of Badawi's own political 
sensitivities at home with Islamic extremists. "Badawi needs 
to protect his flanks," he said.  Pansak wryly conceded that 
Thaksin had ignored his advice through his very public 
handling of the issue, and now the RTG has to deal with the 
diplomatic and media fallout over Thaksin's public trumpeting 
of the arrest. 
 
¶5.  (C)  (Note:  While in Phuket January 28-29 for the 
Tsunami Early Warning System Conference, I also spoke with 
 
SIPDIS 
Malaysian Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Fuzi Abdul 
Razak about the Kuteh case.  Fuzi said the absence of an 
extradition treaty was not the issue, as there was a 
British-era document that could suffice.  The problem was 
that in previous cases where Malaysia had quietly turned 
individuals over to Thailand, "they disappeared."  He implied 
that detention in Malaysia under the ISA was preferable to 
such an uncertain fate in Thailand. End Note.) 
 
THAKSIN'S LEARNING CURVE ON ISLAM 
 
¶6.  (C)  Pansak admitted that when dealing with issues 
related to the violence in southern Thailand and Muslims, 
Thaksin is often guided by his gut feelings and largely heeds 
his own counsel.  Pansak's opinion was that Thaksin's 
judgment was "not perfect" in these matters.  I pursued this 
theme, asking if Thaksin considered Muslim sensitivities in 
the south, and regionally, when he made decisions.  Pansak 
conceded that Thaksin, along with many others in the Thai 
leadership, needed to be educated about Islamic issues.  He 
included himself among those with much to learn, noting, "I'm 
62 years old, and I've had to read 40 books on Islam this 
year." 
 
RTG POLICY APPROACHES TO THE SOUTH 
 
¶7.  (C)  We discussed different scenarios and possible policy 
approaches to the south.  Pansak said the government would 
focus on economic development, and not further "concessions" 
to deal with the south.  He dismissed outright any idea of 
special autonomy for the region.  He claimed that Thailand's 
provincial system already provided individual provinces with 
a great deal of local autonomy.  Pansak conceded that many of 
the concerns in southern Thailand revolve around issues of 
Islamic education.  However, he stated that Islamic "pondok" 
schools in the south already enjoy special status and greater 
privileges not afforded to other ethnic or religious schools 
in Thailand.  He chose the Sino-Thai schools as one example 
of other ethnic schools that until recently had not received 
such special treatment.  Pansak also noted that Zakat and 
Ushr (almsgiving and Islamic banking) Islamic practices are 
in place, and accepted, in Thailand. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Pansak, who was an architect of the famous 
Chatichai-era policy of "turning a battlefield into a 
marketplace" in Cambodia, revisited familiar themes by saying 
that economic development was the key to stabilizing the 
south.  He said the RTG was "searching for an economic model 
for the south" and cited a few positive examples of job 
creation in the troubled region.  He noted that the 
Thai-owned Central Department Store company had recently 
opened a large discount retailer in Pattani in Southern 
Thailand (reftels) that was "providing jobs to the sons and 
daughters of Pattani."  Pansak also cited the success of the 
U.S.-owned company Kimberly-Clark in southern Thailand.  He 
said the Kimberly-Clark factory had never experienced any 
problems because the factory provided local Muslims with a 
"living wage."  Pansak said these were models that the RTG 
would take inspiration from to develop the south.  "Working 
people will not attack institutions in the south," he 
concluded. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Comment:  Pansak works hard to cultivate an image of 
a rumpled, iconoclastic intellectual, a style that is 
aggravating, and endearing, at the same time.  He 
chain-smoked throughout the meeting, fiddled with multiple 
pairs of glasses, and punctuated his comments with profanity 
and raucous laughter.  Regardless of appearances, most 
observers believe Pansak is the principal behind-the-scenes 
shaper of key policies for both the government and Thaksin's 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party.  Pansak is certainly one of 
Thaksin's most trusted personal advisors, and his opinions 
and suggestions carry considerable weight -- perhaps the most 
-- when Thaksin turns to his inner circle for advice.  End 
Comment. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Begin Biographic Note:  Pansak first gained 
recognition as an important member of the so-called "Ban 
Phitsanulok" advisory group working for the late PM Chatichai 
Choenhavan during 1988-1991.  He was the architect of that 
government's famous Cambodia policy of "turning the 
battlefield into a marketplace." 
 
A journalist by trade, Pansak has extensive connections with 
foreign and domestic press.  He is the main person entrusted 
to draft speeches for PM Thaksin's use in international fora 
and other major meetings.  The Far Eastern Economic Review 
once singled him out as the "Ex-Journalist behind Thaksin's 
Speech" after PM Thaksin's highly praised participation in 
the 2001 Fortune Global Forum in Hong Kong. 
 
Born on August 19, 1943, Pansak received a BA in 
International Law from London University.   After graduation, 
he returned to Thailand and worked briefly as an English news 
announcer for the Public Relations Department of the Prime 
Minister's office.  He later entered media circles by working 
at the "Bangkok World" newspaper.  In 1979 he resigned to 
establish his own newspaper firm "Chaturat," which eventually 
folded. 
 
Pansak was asked to join the advisory team for PM Chatichai 
in 1988, where he became valued for his sharp and novel 
ideas.  After the coup against the Chatichai government in 
1991, Pansak returned to media work as a senior editor for 
the "Asia Times" English-language newspaper.  It was during 
this time that his idea of "SME" (Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises) caught the attention of Thaksin, who was then a 
Palang Dharma (PDP) Member of Parliament.  In 1998, at the 
request of Thaksin, he became one of the co-founders of the 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) political party.  He has since played a 
pivotal role in shaping its policies. 
 
Pansak is currently an "ordinary" (i.e. not an MP or cabinet 
official) member of the TRT, who still clearly is one of the 
party's leading figures.   He once worked as an advisor to 
the NM Rothschild and Sons, Co., Ltd., and as a special 
lecturer at the National Defense College.  He is married. 
End Biographic Note. 
BOYCE