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Viewing cable 05BANGKOK1008, THAILAND: THE SOUTH - IMPRESSIONS FROM FEBRUARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK1008 2005-02-08 11:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: THE SOUTH - IMPRESSIONS FROM FEBRUARY 
1-2 VISIT 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 869 
 
     B. 04 BANGKOK 8377 
     C. 04 BANGKOK 7171 
     D. 04 BANGKOK 6647 
     E. 04 KUALA LUMPUR 4806 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke.  Reason 1.4(d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  On February 1-2, Emboffs made a 
pre-election visit to Songkhla and Pattani provinces as part 
of an ongoing effort to monitor the situation in southern 
Thailand.  In meetings with local businessmen, bankers, 
politicians, and journalists, they repeatedly heard claims 
that significant numbers of non-Muslims are abandoning the 
far south out of fear.  Local business leaders reported that 
the worsening security has scared off new investment in the 
region and caused labor shortages, despite positive economic 
factors that normally should attract investors and workers. 
Just prior to the February 6 election, the Thaksin 
administration expanded existing security measures and 
increased the number of military personnel in the South.  The 
phenomenon of increasing numbers of non-Muslim Thais leaving 
the region as a result of separatist violence, if accurate, 
would have serious consequences for the South. End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (SBU)  Embassy Political and Economic officers completed 
a joint reporting trip to the southern Thai provinces of 
Songkhla and Pattani February 1-2 as part of Embassy 
Bangkok's continued close observation of the situation in 
southern Thailand.  They met with local political leaders, 
leading businessmen and bankers, and journalists. 
 
TALES OF HEAVY MIGRATION -- CLAIMS THAT 100,000 NON-MUSLIMS 
HAVE FLED THE SOUTH 
 
3.  (C)  As noted reftels B and C, anecdotal evidence is 
growing that the immediate goal of the separatist militants 
in southern Thailand is to drive non-Muslims out of the 
region.  This theme was echoed repeatedly and more intensely 
across the entire range of interlocutors who met with 
Emboffs.  A respected journalist said that he and other local 
observers estimate that 100,000 Buddhist and ethnic Chinese 
Thais have abandoned the three southernmost provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat over the past year, moving to 
Songkhla province, or further north.  He said local security 
officials have similar estimates on the number of non-Muslims 
who have left the region.  Chairat Thavarorit, the Senior 
Executive for the southern region for the Bank of Thailand, 
and a long-time regional resident, voiced an assertion 
repeated by many people during this visit: the separatist 
militants aim to destroy the bonds between the Buddhist and 
Muslim communities and to raise tensions to a point where 
non-Muslims leave; and they have succeeded.  (Note:  Official 
confirmation of these numbers is difficult.  According to 
census figures from the Department of Religious Affairs taken 
in 1999, there are approximately 1.7 million people in the 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.  Of those, 
approximately 400,000 are Buddhists.  Residents are required 
to inform their district office when they move, but this 
regulation is only loosely enforced.  In any case, the RTG 
does not centrally collect such data.  End Note.) 
 
THE MIGRATION'S ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
4.  (C)  Regardless of the exact number of people who have 
fled the region, the business community claims that migration 
out is having a noticeable economic impact.  Boonlert 
Laparojkid, the President of the Songkhla Chamber of 
Commerce, and other chamber members insisted that the 
militants' push to drive non-Muslims out of the three 
southernmost provinces has resulted in business people 
leaving for Hat Yai, or locations further north.  Some 
families moved to the next province north while the 
breadwinner continues to work in his/her job in the troubled 
area.  (Note:  These comments echo earlier sentiments 
expressed by members of the Narathiwat Chamber of Commerce - 
reftel B - End Note.)  Boonlert claimed that "all the top 
people -- those with money and potential -- have left the 
south out of fear."  Chamber members noted that the 
construction and housing industry is booming in Hat Yai 
because of the greatly increased demand for housing from 
people fleeing the deep south.  Rosarin Sojiphan, the 
Director of the Government Savings Bank in Songkhla, 
confirmed this trend.  Rosarin said that her bank handled a 
large increase in requests for housing loans in the Hat Yai 
area over the past year.  Rosarin identified ethnic Chinese 
and Buddhist Thais from the far south as the applicants 
searching for homes in Hat Yai.  Members of the Pattani 
Chamber of Commerce expressed similar opinions.  They claimed 
to have observed a steady migration of Buddhist and ethnic 
Chinese Thais from the south, and said that at a minimum, 
these populations were moving out of the villages to larger 
urban areas. They noted that rubber and agricultural 
production has been impacted because militants often target 
agricultural works for shooting or intimidation and arson 
attacks. 
 
5.  (C)  Banker Rosarin Sojiphan noted that skilled workers, 
and even civil servants, are moving north because they have 
transferable skills.  In addition, laborers from Northeast 
Thailand (Issan), who normally make up the majority of 
construction and factory workers, have stopped coming to the 
south out of fear.  A journalist contact agreed that laborers 
from Issan have disappeared from the deep south, making it 
difficult for construction companies to hire adequate labor 
for ongoing projects.  Fishing industry executives complained 
about similar labor problems, saying that many Burmese 
laborers have left for safer regions. This apparent labor 
exodus is underway despite the fact (per Bank of Thailand 
reports) that factory workers in the south are paid higher 
daily wages (about Bt200/US$5.1) than counterparts elsewhere 
in Thailand (Bt139/US$3.6) 
 
6.  (C)  Thawon Senniem, a Democratic Party (DP) leader in 
Songkhla province, noted that while rubber prices are at 
record highs, many Buddhist rubber tappers are afraid to 
collect at their groves because of attacks and intimidation. 
Chairat Thavarorit, senior Bank of Thailand official, agreed. 
 He said that violence is also having a direct impact on 
overall investment in the region.  New investment in 
additional or expanded rubber plantations is lacking despite 
high prices for raw latex and rubber products.  Olarn Uyakul, 
the Chairman of the Songkhla chapter of the Federation of 
Thai Industries, averred that he and other business people 
are prepared to invest additional capital in their southern 
operations, but not until the security situation improves. 
Banker Chirat concurred that if there is a further escalation 
of violence in the region, existing businesses will rapidly 
disinvest.  He said that the recent closures of hotels 
(reftel B) and restaurants, and the absence of Malaysian and 
other tourists, are only the first signs pointing to future 
business failures.  Pattani business contacts complained that 
their businesses are being affected by the reluctance of 
government product inspectors from outside the region to 
conduct their normal safety and health inspections due to 
perceived dangers from terrorists. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Despite all these reported problems, the economy 
in the three southern provinces has in fact remained fairly 
stable due to the strong demand for rubber and the region's 
seafood -- the largest contributors to the southern economy. 
A car/motorcycle dealer said his business is good.  The 
assistant manager of the Pattani "Big C" department store 
(reftels B, C) also reported steady profits. Only those whose 
businesses are directly tied to tourism (mostly Malaysian) 
seem to be suffering decline. The Bank of Thailand regional 
economist told Emboffs that the price of the area's rubber 
crop has increased 16.2 percent in 2004 and that the economic 
effect of this flowed through the entire regional economy. 
(Economic statistics are not broken out by province). 
 
ELECTIONS - HEIGHTENED SECURITY, BUT POLITICIANS AFRAID TO 
CAMPAIGN 
 
8.  (C)  Emboffs found the security presence in Pattani more 
visible than in previous trips there.  Checkpoints that 
before had not been manned, or were only nominally manned, 
now had fully armed troops inspecting passing vehicles. 
According to the Pattani Election Commission (EC), these 
measures were not specifically directed at election security 
but are part of the government's overall plan to increase the 
number of security forces in the region.  (Note: The week of 
Emboffs' visit the RTG announced plans to create the 15th 
Infantry Division for southern Thailand, a force that 
reportedly will focus on civil affairs projects.  End Note.) 
EC members noted, however, that the troops would be on a 
heightened state of alert during the election.  (Note: There 
were no serious instances of violence on election day.  End 
Note.) 
 
9.  (C)  The increase in security forces apparently did not 
reassure candidates in the region.  DP leader Thawon Senniem 
told Emboffs that many politicians were afraid to campaign in 
much of the deep south, especially outside of the cities.  In 
the past large rallies where held, but during this year's 
campaign, most politicians had opted for small gatherings 
only.  Thawon noted that even when former DP Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai went on a southern campaign swing, his 
appearances were deliberately subdued due to security 
concerns.  The Pattani MP candidate of Thaksin's Thai Rak 
Thai (TRT) party, Atthachan Chaowanit, sounded similar 
concerns.  He said lack of confidence in security had 
directly impacted the TRT's election strategy in the south. 
Members of the Pattani EC repeated these observations, noting 
that campaigning for the February 6 election was very 
different in style from the past because politicians were 
afraid to be in public. 
 
10.  (C)  Comment:  Increased emigration of non-Muslim Thais 
from the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat -- and 
rising intra-communal tensions -- resulting from the current 
violent situation would have serious consequences for the 
south, for all the reasons outlined by Embassy interlocutors. 
 It may be that the emigration trend has not garnered 
sufficiently widespread attention inside and outside Thailand 
partially because it is happening on a family-by-family 
basis.  Daily shooting, bombing and arson attacks get the 
headlines, and certainly would draw attention away from the 
possible reality on the ground:  non-Muslim Thais are leaving 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
 
11.  (C)  The premise of the Thaksin government's response to 
the problems in the South is that economic hardship is the 
underlying source of the Muslim discontent (reftel A).  None 
of Emboff's interlocutors agreed with this assessment, citing 
instead lack of justice, the corruption of local officials, 
social issues and "troublemakers" as the real causes of the 
problem.  There is no shortage of jobs, both skilled and 
unskilled, in the southern region, and wages are higher than 
average, so the poverty argument seems weak.  Rather than 
economic issues being the source of the violence, the 
violence could be the cause of emerging provincial economic 
difficulties.  (Note:  After the failure of Thaksin's TRT 
party even to hold its ground in the South in the February 6 
election, the Prime Minister indicated that he may rethink 
his strategy there.  End Note.) End Comment. 
BOYCE