This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR NP/CBM, EUR/PRA, EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2025 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC HK PK CM GM FR MTCRE

SUBJECT: MTAG 04 - 04:  DEMARCHE ON FRENCH FIRM'S  ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S) 
  REF: SECSTATE 270425 
  Classified By: EST Counselor Robert W. Dry for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  On 30 December 2004, EST officer delivered a  demarche to French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)  Point of Contact (POC) David Bertolotti, MFA Deputy Director  of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-proliferation, concerning the  10 December shipment of telemetry equipment from the French  firm In'Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being  New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with  Pakistan's ballistic missile program.  Prior to the EST  officer presenting the demarche, Bertolotti asked if the  issue pertained to a shipment to Pakistan, to which EST  officer replied in the affirmative.  Bertolotti then noted  that the issue had been raised in Washington, and that  British government officials had been actively engaging the  French.  Following these comments, EST officer then presented  the demarche. 
 
¶2.   (S)  In response to the demarche, Bertolotti provided  EST officer with comprehensive comments on the shipment and  the reasons behind the Government of France's (GOF) decision  not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue on to  Pakistan.  The reasons provided included logistical  considerations, timing issues, legal concerns, and  insufficiently precise information.  Bertolotti said that  while the GOF was fully engaged and concerned about this  transaction, it was operating within the constraints imposed  by French law, and that the onus of responsibility rested on  the British and United States governments to provide more  specific, actionable information regarding the purportedly  illegal cooperation between In'Trad and Pakistan's ballistic  missile program. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Bertolotti said that a British Embassy officer  had brought this same matter to his attention on 10 December,  only hours before the shipment was set to depart Charles de  Gaulle/Roissy airport for Pakistan.  He added, however, that  British security representatives in Paris had met with French  security counterparts earlier in the day and had requested  French intervention to investigate, and, if appropriate, to  stop the shipment from departing France.  French POC told EST  officer that his assumption was that the U.S. Government  (USG) was acting on the basis of information provided by the  British government, and was double-tracking the British  efforts.  Bertolotti claimed that the eleventh-hour  notification and the non-specific nature of the information  provided by the British had left the GOF in an untenable  position.  He then briefed EST officer on the legal and  logistical hurdles the GOF had to contend with regarding the  shipment, as well as the broader considerations that went  into the French decision to allow the shipment to reach  Pakistan. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Bertolotti noted that not all telemetry equipment  was subject to dual-use licensing in France, and that the  equipment may have, in fact, been legal for export.  He added  that the 10 December shipment had already cleared customs,  and that, short of a direct threat to the safety of the  flight, GOF customs officials had no legal authority to seize  and then search the shipment.  Bertolotti added that the  imprecise nature of the information provided by British  government officials supporting their concerns had made it  all the more difficult for the French to take direct action. 
Bertolotti further remarked that, from a logistical  standpoint, the request for seizure of the shipment had  presented obstacles.  Primary among these was the fact that  the physical location of the shipment was unknown, and that  it could have been stored in one of twenty customs storage  facilities at the airport.  Bertolotti also noted that a  similar shipment of telemetry equipment from In'Trad to the  Pakistani National Development Complex (NDC) had been  investigated and then cleared for delivery to Pakistan by  British Customs officials at a London area airport on 04  April. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Regarding plans for future French action and  monitoring of In'Trad, Bertolotti informed EST officer that  French authorities had contacted the director of the  four-employee In'Trad firm, and that he had adamantly denied  that the telemetry equipment shipped had been prohibited for  export, and insisted that the firm was involved only in  completely legitimate transactions. These denials  notwithstanding, the GOF had, as of 11 December, begun to  monitor the activities of this company more closely and was  prepared to check all future exports from it.  Bertolotti  added that, starting sometime in early 2005, the GOF was  planning to begin an official, interagency investigation into  the company, but added that this was a formal process and  often took months to complete. 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Finally, Bertolotti noted that the GOF wanted to  be more helpful regarding the suspect cooperation between  In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities, and to implement the  necessary action against In'Trad if the firm was, in fact,  complicit in shipping prohibited equipment for use in  Pakistan's ballistic missile program.  He added, however,  that in order to take focused, legal action against In'Trad,  the GOF needed more precise information regarding the type of  equipment being exported, as well as clearer indications that  the end-users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic  missile program.  He then informed EST officer that French  security services had already requested more specific  information from their British security counterparts linking  In'Trad to the NDC, but had not yet received any such  information.  Bertolotti then queried EST officer if he knew  whether the USG was basing its suspicions of In'Trad solely  on information provided to it by the British government, or  if it was acting in part on corroborating information  obtained independently of the British.  EST officer replied  he was not privy to the sourcing of the information regarding  In'Trad, but would raise the issue with Washington. 
Bertolotti then requested that the EST officer pass on the  GOF request for the USG to provide additional, more precise  information that would aid the GOF in its investigation of  In'Trad.  EST officer replied that he would raise this  request with Washington.  EST officer said that the USG in  any event would appreciate French government investigation  and enhanced watchfulness of In'Trad  
Leach