This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR S/CT, EUR, DS, DSS, DS/IP/EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2015 
TAGS: ASEC GR PTER AMB
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH MPO FOCUSED 
ON RECENT ATTACK 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 4660 
 
     ¶B. TD 314/002126-05 
     ¶C. ATHENS 4040 
     ¶D. SECSTATE 9866 
 
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (B) 
 
 ¶1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  The Ambassador paid an introductory 
call on the Minister of Public Order, Yeorgos Voulgarakis on 
Tuesday, January 18.  The MPO provided an update on the 
investigation into the shooting of a Hellenic Police Special 
Guard on December 31, and discussed his views about terrorism 
in Greece.  The MPO indicated that it is not clear yet 
whether or not this was a terrorist incident, but he said he 
is satisfied with the investigation to date.  The MPO told 
the Ambassador that he may travel to the U.S. at the end of 
February and was interested in an official schedule in 
Washington.  RMAS Chief provided the information in reftel B. 
 End Summary 
 
¶2. (S/NF)   The Ambassador held his first meeting with 
Minister of Public Order, Yeorgos Voulgarakis on Tuesday, 
January 18.  Ambassador was accompanied by the RSO and RMAS 
Chief.  After the Ambassador offered condolences for the 
recent murder of the Hellenic Police Special Guard (reftel 
A), the MPO gave an update on the investigation, stressing 
that it was difficult to make a final determination as yet 
whether this was a terrorist incident.  Nothing in the 
December 31 incident was typical of previous N17 or ELA 
attacks.  The MPO believed that this attack was particularly 
"cruel;" terrorists didn't typically fire so many shots 
(total of 16 were fired) at their victim.  Furthermore, while 
his investigators expected a proclamation by the perpetrators 
to be delivered sometime after the attack; this has yet to 
occur.  The MPO did seem to lean towards linking the attack 
on the Special Guard to the attack on the police bus convoy 
in October (Reftel C).  There had been no proclamation left 
after that attack either, but in his mind, that was clearly 
an extremist attack.  He stated that if these attacks were 
terrorist attacks, they were something totally new and 
demanded extensive and systematic investigation from Day 1. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The MPO then confided to the Ambassador that there 
was some indication that this may not be a terrorist attack, 
but that he didn't want to provide the details at this point. 
 He would have a better handle on this situation in about one 
month's time with the help of several witnesses who are 
enabling the police to construct a picture of what happened. 
This information includes surveillance at the British 
residence a month prior to the attack.  The MPO feared that 
if he went public with this information, the pace and 
intensity of the investigation (in his own building) would 
slow, and that it was critical to investigate this as a 
terrorist attack until proven otherwise.  The MPO told the 
Ambassador that both the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
are being routinely apprised as to the exact status of the 
investigation. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  The RMAS chief provided the MPO with the 
information provided in reftel B.  The MPO's reaction was 
that the group responsible for the attack could be a new one 
that is receiving its inspiration from previous terrorist 
attacks in Greece.  The MPO described Greek attempts to 
investigate this new wave of terrorism (multiple recent 
attacks against the police, but not necessarily this specific 
attack alone), but admitted they were having difficulties 
penetrating domestic groups due to the fact that foreigners 
(Albanians and Bulgarians specifically) were being recruited 
to commit the crimes.  He indicated that the GoG would 
attempt to utilize foreignors itself to penetrate these 
groups.  He stated that the Hellenic police were proceeding 
positively in their exploitation of cell phones and that he 
was satisfied with the results of the investigation so far. 
Ambassador offered the services of US law enforcement 
agencies, especially forensics assistance, stating that we 
needed to know whether or not we have to change our security 
profile to better protect ourselves against an impending 
attack.  Ambassador assured MPO that if he utilized 
assistance, the USG would work to keep that fact out of 
public view.  The MPO reiterated his view that this attack 
was not meant to target the UK military attache.  He stated 
that the Attach had not wanted extraordinary protection 
(other than the Special Guard who was killed).  On December 
31, in fact, he had been outside of the residence for quite 
sometime before the attack saying good-bye to guests.  Had 
the terrorists wanted to attack him, it could have been done 
easily.  The MPO also asked the Ambassador if the Embassy was 
satisfied with our current police protection.  The RSO stated 
that for now, we were happy with the coverage. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The meeting concluded with the MPO advising the 
Ambassador that he intended to travel to the U.S. during the 
last ten days in February--in NY, Washington and possibly 
Chicago-- to speak on the Summer Olympics to Greek-American 
groups.  In this connection he would be seeking official 
meetings in Washington.  The Ambassador inquired if the MPO 
had heard about the planned Counterterrorism conference in 
Riyadh scheduled for early February (reftel D).  The MPO 
stated he had heard nothing about it from the MFA, but would 
look into it. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment: The MPO seemed open in his discussions 
about the attack on the Special Guard.  He also appeared 
frustrated and unwilling to offer any firm conclusions about 
the attack.  Given that reftel B hit so close to home, it 
should provide an impetus for deeper cooperation with US 
authorities in this investigation, possibly opening the doors 
for better discussions during the MPO's proposed trip in 
February. End Comment.