This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG IS SY GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: PERES: SUCCESS OF LIKUD-LABOR COALITION 
NEGOTIATIONS COULD BOIL DOWN TO PORTFOLIOS 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 6007 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Prior to the Likud Central Committee's 
positive vote on December 9 to  open coalition negotiations 
with the Labor Party, United Torah Judaism, and Shas (see 
septel), an obviously exhausted Labor Party leader Shimon 
Peres stressed to the Ambassador the depth of his own 
problems in convincing the Labor Party to join the coalition. 
 Peres repeatedly emphasized the "limits in my capacity" to 
bring Labor into a coalition without an offer from Prime 
Minister Sharon of at least one, and more reasonably, two 
major ministerial portfolios.  Peres also underlined his 
desire to see disengagement proceed and said elections in 
2005 would be a "waste of five-to-six months" during which 
time disengagement could have been implemented.  In a 
separate meeting with the Ambassador December 9, Labor Party 
Whip Isaac Herzog echoed Peres' worries, and laid out a 
likely Labor Party timetable for approving a Sharon offer to 
join the coalition and possible ministerial assignments. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary cont'd:  In response to the Ambassador's 
query on the prospects of GOI negotiations with Syria, Peres 
stressed that it would not be feasible for the GOI to achieve 
settlement withdrawals both from Gaza and the Golan at the 
same time.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Unity Prospects Hinge on Portfolio Divisions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Labor Party leader Shimon Peres stressed to the 
Ambassador December 9 that if Prime Minister Sharon offers 
"meaningless portfolios" to Labor for joining the coalition, 
there are "limits" in his capacity to bring his party into 
the coalition.  Peres agreed with the Ambassador that this 
could present an immediate impasse in Labor's coalition 
negotiations with Likud.  Noting that Labor would constitute 
one-third of a unity coalition, Peres underlined that Sharon 
should understand that Labor should receive one or two major 
ministerial portfolios.  Sharon should understand that Labor 
can not be satisfied with  "secondary" portfolios just to 
help Sharon pacify Likud opponents to a unity government, 
Peres emphasized. 
 
¶4.  (C) Peres explained that if Likud votes in favor of 
opening coalition negotiations with Labor -- as it did later 
December 9 with a 62 percent majority -- and Sharon 
immediately invites Peres to the negotiating table, Peres 
must first bring the issue before the Labor Party Bureau's 
240 members, which requires 48 hours notice before holding a 
meeting.  Obtaining the Bureau's approval will be a "tough 
fight," Peres said, since it includes many ministerial 
portfolio contenders.  If the Bureau approves negotiating 
with Likud, Peres continued, the matter must then be taken 
before the party's Central Committee for a vote.  He did not 
specify when such a vote could occur. 
 
¶5.  (C) Labor Party Whip Isaac Herzog subsequently told 
Ambassador Kurtzer separately December 9, however, that Peres 
could bring the matter to the Party Bureau for a vote as 
early as December 11, and then to the Central Committee 
during its previously scheduled meeting December 12 when the 
party is supposed to decide on a date for party primaries. 
(Note: During the meeting with the Ambassador, Herzog 
received a call from Labor faction Chair Dalia Itzik to 
inform him that Ehud Barak and Peres had agreed on a 
compromise date for party primaries for June or July 2005, 
thereby avoiding a party showdown.  See reftel.  End note.) 
 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Herzog, Sharon intends to offer Peres 
eight ministerial portfolios, including what amounts to two 
ministerial portfolios in return for forgoing the foreign 
ministry.  In total, Sharon would offer 11 portfolios to 
Labor, UTJ and Shas, Herzog noted.  He said that Sharon would 
likely first bring Labor and the UTJ into the coalition and 
may even "find a way later" to return Shinui to the 
coalition.  Herzog opined that the main "stumbling block" in 
the portfolio negotiations will be that Sharon will not give 
Peres the portfolio of alternate prime minister, a post 
currently held by Likud MK and strong Sharon ally Ehud 
Olmert.  He said that Peres will likely be offered a role 
relating to implementing disengagement.  Labor may ask for 
the ministries of Interior, Transportation, and Education, 
but Herzog quickly added, "I don't think we'll get them."  He 
opined that Sharon may offer instead the Internal Security 
and Labor and Welfare portfolios to Labor.  Herzog said that 
he believes Justice will remain with Likud MK Tzipi Livni. 
 
¶7.  (C) Herzog said that once a coalition agreement is 
reached with Likud, perhaps as early as December 16, Labor 
would then decide on its candidates for ministerial 
portfolios, most likely shortly after that decision.  He then 
shot off a list of Labor contenders for ministerial slots in 
order of importance, including Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Ephraim 
Sneh, Matan Vilna'i, Dalia Itzik, himself, Ofir Pines-Paz, 
and Shalom Simhon.  Herzog noted several times in the meeting 
that he was showing up as "very popular" within the Labor 
Party.  These candidates would likely be voted as ministerial 
candidates through either separate internal party votes or by 
a single vote on a "coalition list" that Peres would propose. 
 Herzog opined that Chaim Ramon may not be popular enough 
within Labor to receive a portfolio.  In response to the 
Ambassador's query, Herzog said that Barak would not seek a 
portfolio. 
 
--------------------- 
Window of Opportunity 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Peres noted said that while Sharon could create a 
majority government without Labor, such a coalition would not 
support disengagement.  Elections would likely be the result 
if a unity government with Labor can not be formed, Peres 
noted.  "I don't want this government to fall," Peres 
stressed, since elections would "waste five-to-six months" of 
2005 and postpone implementation of the disengagement plan. 
Reflecting his desire to join with Sharon now, Peres said 
that: "I feel if I don't put my strength into (advancing 
disengagement), it will not work.... I am fighting for a 
cause."  Peres noted that while he does not like the 
disengagement plan, it represents the best hope to move the 
peace process forward. 
 
¶9.  (C) Herzog also commented on the need to move 
disengagement forward speedily, but from the perspective that 
Peres himself is waning in strength and focus.  "Peres has 
the chance to help Sharon," Herzog stressed.  He noted, 
however, that there is only a small window of opportunity 
since Peres "is not the same...is weak and not focused."  On 
Labor support for disengagement, Herzog explained that the 
three main constituencies in Labor -- the "good" settlement 
movement consisting of Kibbutzim and moshavs, the 
Israeli-Arab sector, and the veterans and elderly -- 
reluctantly support disengagement for varying reasons.  He 
stressed that to gain the support of the elderly, Labor would 
have to bring some economic benefits for that group to the 
coalition table with Likud.  "There will be a big debate on 
economic issues with Likud," Herzog stressed.  "(Finance 
Minister Netanyahu) Bibi hates us and we hate Bibi," Herzog 
said. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Negotiations on the Golan, Not Now Feasible 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Asked by the Ambassador how he viewed opening 
negotiations with Syria, Peres noted that there is an "open" 
or public GOI position on this issue and a "private one." 
Peres explained that the GOI's public position is that it 
cannot agree to negotiations with Syria while that country 
continues to host terrorist organizations.  According to 
Peres, the GOI's realistic and private position is that 
Israel cannot -- for domestic reasons -- feasibly negotiate 
with Syria on settlement withdrawals from the Golan at the 
same time it moves forward with settlement withdrawal from 
Gaza.  Peres also noted it would be problematic for Israel to 
negotiate with President Assad, who represents only a 
minority in Syria and whose actions are based on his desire 
to improve his world image. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER