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Viewing cable 04PARIS9159, GOF LAUNCHES ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO FOSTER MORE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04PARIS9159 2004-12-28 15:36 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 009159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2014 
TAGS: KISL PREL PGOV PTER KDEM FR
SUBJECT: GOF LAUNCHES ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO FOSTER MORE 
MODERATE "FRENCH" ISLAM AMID FRENCH MUSLIM COUNCIL DISARRAY 
 
REF: 2003 PARIS 3213 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Internal power struggles continue to plague 
the Council for the Muslim Faith (CFCM), the GoF-created 
umbrella organization which serves as the official French 
Muslim interlocutor with the government.  Meanwhile, in the 
political arena, two leading contenders in the 2007 
presidential race have offered competing proposals to foster 
the integration of France's estimated five to seven million 
Muslims.  Newly-elected President of the Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy has advocated that the seminal 
law of 1905, which officially separated the church from the 
French state, be amended to allow for the state to finance 
mosques and train imams. Interior Minister Dominique de 
Villepin followed with a counterproposal to create a 
state-supervised foundation that would oversee the collection 
of money for the construction of centers of worship and 
expand efforts to educate imams in the French language, 
institutions, and culture. The main objectives of the 
Villepin plan are to foster a more moderate "French Islam" 
through training of imams which could eventually become a 
condition for visa issuance, and to seek greater control over 
foreign and domestic financing of Islamic projects (including 
mosque construction and halal meat sales) in France.  Though 
MOI officials stress that the Villepin plan will begin slowly 
and expand gradually, the same officials suggest a "take it 
or leave it" approach with opponents of the plan, including 
the fundamentalist-leaning Union of Islamic Organizations of 
France (UOIF).  End summary. 
 
CFCM SPLIT 
---------- 
 
2.  (U) The CFCM has been beset by infighting, based both on 
doctrinal and national origin differences, since its creation 
by then-Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy in April 2003 as 
an official interlocutor for the Muslim faith with the GoF 
(ref A).  New elections to the council are expected to occur 
on June 5, 2005.  Current president Dalil Boubakeur has 
announced that he will not run for re-election and it is 
unclear whether delegates from his moderate Federation of the 
Grand Mosque of Paris will participate in the June vote. 
Boubakeur has argued that the CFCM's rules penalize his 
federation and favor the more radical UOIF and National 
Federation of French Muslims (FNMF).  In addition to the 
differing degrees of orthodoxy espoused by France's three 
principal Muslim groups, each is also aligned with a 
different country or outside movement, which tends to 
intensify differences.  Boubakeur and the Grand Mosque are 
linked with the Algerian government, while the FNMF is close 
to Morocco, and the UOIF maintains ties to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and, according to press reports, garners 
significant funding from Saudi and Gulf donors. 
 
3.  (U) Boubakeur's position was weakened in September when 
he was unable, for health reasons, to take a leading role in 
French Muslim efforts to assist in the liberation of the 
French hostages in Iraq.  Instead, leaders from the UOIF and 
FNMF took center stage in the highly publicized mediation 
attempts.  Further injury was added to insult when the head 
of the Moroccan-linked FNMF met and openly embraced Abbas 
Madani, exiled founder of the radical Algerian Islamic Front 
of Salvation (FIS).  Meanwhile, comments by Interior Minister 
Villepin suggest increased impatience with CFCM infighting 
and questioning of its relevance, which may reflect concern 
about a radicalized CFCM emerging from its June elections. 
In a recent interview, Villepin asserted that the CFCM did 
not represent the "diversity and moderation" of Islam in 
France, and that some 40 percent of French Muslims were not 
affiliated with the main groups making up the CFCM. 
Villepin's criticism is partly motivated by a desire to 
upstage his predecessor at the Interior Ministry, ruling 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
 
SARKOZY PROPOSAL 
---------------- 
 
4.  (U) Just prior to leaving his position as Finance 
Minister in the Chirac government,  Sarkozy published a book 
titled "La Republique, les religions, l'esperance" (The 
Republic, Religions, Hope). In it Sarkozy proposed changing 
the 1905 law that formally separated church and state in 
France in order to permit state funding of Muslim religious 
institutions thereby lessening the influence of Arab States 
and radical movements on France's Muslim population.  Sarkozy 
argues that Islam was almost non-existent in France prior to 
1905 and thus was not considered, as were the Christian and 
Jewish faiths, in the law's dispositions.  Sarkozy has also 
advocated affirmative action proposals ("positive 
discrimination" in French) to provide opportunities for 
minorities, particularly Muslims.  (Note: President Chirac 
has rebuffed publicly the idea of "positive discrimination" 
as contrary to republican values and encouraging 
sectarianism.  End note.) 
MOI ON VILLEPIN PROPOSAL 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Newly appointed Ministry of Interior Cabinet Advisor 
on Religious Affairs Michel Lafon recently briefed us on 
Villepin's various plans to foster a more moderate "French 
Islam" and keep better tabs on financing of Islamic projects 
in France.  Lafon prefaced his remarks by criticizing the 
legacy of Villepin's MOI predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, whom 
Lafon described as having created the CFCM in a rushed 
fashion, "by forceps."  As a result, in Lafon's view, the 
CFCM was known more for its internal discord rather than 
concrete accomplishments.  One of Villepin's first actions as 
Interior Minister was to bluntly tell the CFCM members that 
they had to work together, come up with a plan of action, and 
reverse the organization's negative image.  According to 
Lafon, the CFCM's most pressing problem was not how to 
resolve the elections dispute between Boubakeur and other 
organizations, but rather to demonstrate the CFCM's 
usefulness to the French public.  (Comment: Lafon's 
dismissiveness of the CFCM did not square with Villepin's 
heavy reliance on the organization in the initial GoF 
response to the crisis involving two French journalists in 
Iraq last August.  In this instance, the CFCM not only sent a 
delegation to Baghdad, but offered a united front against the 
hostage-takers' initial demands that France rescind its ban 
on religious symbols.  This CFCM position of solidarity with 
the GoF, particularly by the powerful UOIF component, which 
had been a vocal opponent of the headscarf ban in schools, 
eased the start of the fall 2004 school year for the GOF. 
Upon liberation of the hostages on December 21, the hostage 
takers cited intervention from Muslim groups as a factor 
behind the release.  End comment.) 
 
6. (C) Adding to the criticism of Sarkozy, Lafon noted that 
Villepin arrived in office only to find a lack of clear-cut 
government intelligence on the realities "on the ground" 
involving the French Muslim community.  Villepin commissioned 
an urgent, 15-day study by French security services and 
police to determine the number of Muslim places of worship in 
France, who frequents such mosques, the number of Muslims 
relative to the overall French prison population, and other 
relevant indices.  Echoing remarks made by Villepin to the 
press, Lafon asserted that the MOI study found that of the 
approximately 1,200 imams in France, most were poorly trained 
and educated, 75 percent were not French, and only 30 percent 
of the total could speak French. (Note: Villepin has stressed 
other statistics in public remarks to suggest that France's 
Muslim population is more moderate than generally believed, 
including the claim that only 10 percent of France's 5 
million Muslims are practicing and that of the 1,685 mosques 
in France, less than 50 can be regarded as radical.  End 
Note.)  Lafon conceded that one surprise in the MOI study was 
the finding that some 45 to 50 percent of the French prison 
population is Muslim; the GoF had previously estimated this 
figure to be 30 to 35 percent.  The overriding implications 
of the MOI study were that the GoF had been too slow in 
responding to the need to assert greater control over 
financing of Islamic projects in France, and the need to 
ensure that imams in France speak French and are properly 
trained and conversant in French civic values. 
 
PLAN FOR STATE SUPERVISED FOUNDATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Lafon described the Villepin plan for establishing a 
state-supervised foundation as a means to ensure transparency 
and assert greater control over foreign financing of mosque 
construction in France, while remaining respectful of the 
principles of the 1905 law.  Lafon estimated the total of 
such foreign financing to be in the range of "tens of 
millions" of euros.  The proposed foundation, which Villepin 
publicly pledged to set up by April 2005, would accept both 
domestic and foreign donations on a voluntary basis; the GOF 
would not contribute funds to the foundation.  The foundation 
would be made up of three "colleges," to include in group 
one, members designated by the CFCM; in the second group, GoF 
representatives from the ministries of Interior, Social 
Affairs, and Foreign Affairs; and in group three, "persons of 
quality," who were of Muslim origin but known for their 
accomplishments in non-religious fields, such as sports, 
politics, the arts and entertainment.  Lafon noted that the 
President of the foundation would likely come from group 
three, with some input on the choice from the CFCM 
representatives.  He added that the MOI had made good 
progress in identifying potential participants in all three 
groups; the remaining questions to be settled were whether 
the UOIF would participate and which additional "persons of 
quality" might be invited to join the third group.  Offering 
an example of the type of person the GoF had in mind for 
group three, Lafon cited the captain of the French national 
rugby team, who is Muslim and had financed the construction 
of a local mosque. 
 
8. (C) Lafon asserted that the foundation would make 
decisions on matters involving the construction of new 
mosques as well as renovation of existing ones.  He expressed 
confidence that the foundation would be able to attract 
sizable funding, despite its voluntary nature.  According to 
Lafon, the GoF had already approached a number of unnamed 
Middle Eastern governments, and found them amenable to the 
idea of channeling donations through the foundation, which 
could help boost such governments' image and ensure that 
donations did not fall into the wrong hands.  Villepin would 
continue to pitch the foundation during future visits to 
countries in the region.  Lafon did not offer a clear 
strategy on soliciting private foreign donors' contributions 
for the foundation, beyond noting that a process of 
elimination would reveal which private donors were choosing 
the route of transparency via the foundation and which 
declined to cooperate.  He added that tax benefit schemes 
could encourage private and corporate donors in France to 
channel funds via the foundation.  While stressing that the 
foundation would begin slowly, Lafon expressed confidence 
that the foundation could have at minimum 10 million euros in 
donations on hand by summer 2005. 
 
9.  (C) Lafon said that in addition to foreign financing of 
mosque construction in France, the GoF was preoccupied by 
fundraising for muslim institutions through halal butcher 
shops.  Halal butcher shops are common in muslim neigborhoods 
throughout France.  The GoF is considering an official 
certification process to insure that meat sold as halal is in 
fact prepared according to religious precepts.  This 
certification process would be financed by per kilo surcharge 
on halal meat sold.  Collecting the surcharge would permit 
monitoring of any fundraising activities through halal 
butcher shops. Remaining proceeds would go to the foundation. 
 
TRAINING, FIRST VOLUNTARY, THEN VISA REQUIREMENT? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
10.  (C) An additional function of the foundation would be to 
promote training for France's some 1,200 imams, whom Lafon 
described as overwhelmingly non-French and not integrated 
into French society.  The high percentage of non-French 
speaking imams was unacceptable; French imams must learn 
French and French values.   The Villepin plan on training was 
twofold: on the one hand, theological education of imams 
should continue via private, non-governmental channels, such 
as the two theological institutes run by the UOIF and the 
more moderate Paris Mosque.  At the same time, the GoF wanted 
to expand education of imams in French law, history and 
language, which remained a governmental responsibility and 
could be offered via French public universities.  Lafon 
described a possible five-year education training program, 
under which trainee imams could study two years of French 
language and institutions at a university, and then proceed 
with three years of theological training overseen by 
institutions such as the CFCM or the still-to-be established 
foundation.  The first such two-year civics/French language 
university diploma programs would start in Paris in September 
2005, with about 60 to 70 students.  Plans were underway to 
expand the diploma programs to Marseille and Lyon. 
 
11.  (C) When asked how the GoF could seek to impose 
requirements on training for imams when no hierarchy existed 
in Islam on designation of imams, Lafon responded by 
referring to French visa law.  While the GoF would encourage 
participation in training courses on a voluntary basis in the 
next few years, it was conceivable that five years from now, 
the GoF could impose requirements for residence permits or 
visa issuance to exclude those imams who failed to have the 
necessary training or diplomas.  When asked how the GoF would 
then deal with French-citizen imams who lacked or rejected 
the training being promoted by Villepin, Lafon responded 
vaguely that French nationals would be expected to adhere to 
the laws of the republic and those who did not would be dealt 
with accordingly. 
 
TOUGH TALK ON UOIF 
------------------ 
 
12. (C) Lafon was relatively dismissive when asked about 
objections to the Villepin foundation plan from the UOIF, 
which has decried the foundation plan as an attempt to 
"nationalize" French Islam and insisted that its funding is 
largely French-origin and not dependent on foreign donors. 
Lafon reiterated that Villepin was taking a firm approach 
with the UOIF which would continue to "exist" only if it 
continued to respect the laws of the republic.  Lafon 
reiterated that Villepin's message to organizations like the 
UOIF was that if they were ready to work with the GoF, the 
GoF was ready to help them; if they rejected French 
republican values, the GoF would deal with them accordingly. 
Lafon cited as an example the imam of Venisseux, whom 
Villepin had expelled from France after the latter made 
public remarks citing religious justifications for spousal 
abuse. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (C)   Comment: We are at once impressed by and skeptical 
of the Villepin plan.  On the one hand, the GoF is making an 
ambitious and far-reaching effort to offer education and 
training to foreign-origin imams, pursuing creative thinking 
to better track financing of Islamic projects in France, 
taking a firm stance against Islamic extremism, and seeking 
to broaden the role of prominent, secular French Muslims in 
representing the interests of France's varied and far from 
unified Muslim community.  At the same time, however, we see 
very flawed reasoning behind Villepin's apparent assumption 
that mere exposure to French language and culture will 
transform the thinking of imams in training and result in a 
moderate, uniquely "French Islam."  Similarly, there is 
little reason to expect that the new foundation will be less 
prone to disagreement and bureaucratic inertia than the CFCM, 
unless the group is GoF-controlled to the extent that it 
loses all semblance of independence and legitimacy.  The 
voluntary nature of foundation donations also greatly limits 
the ability of the GoF to gain real control over foreign 
donors to Islamic causes in France, who may simply bypass the 
new entity. 
 
14. (C) Comment continued: There is an undeniable political 
dimension to the competing Villepin and Sarkozy proposals, as 
both men are widely viewed as leading contenders for the 2007 
presidential race.  Now out of government, Sarkozy has the 
luxury of touting his plans without having to show they work. 
 Villepin, however, is under pressure to show that his 
policies as Minister of Interior are effective.  Sarkozy's 
proposal called for modifying the near-sacrosanct 1905 law 
that codified the French Republic's particular version of 
separation of church and state. Villepin, in his proposal, 
opted to leave the law intact -- even though his proposal 
appears to violate the spirit of the law.  Additionally, 
Villepin, (moved by Chirac from the Foreign Ministry to 
Interior in order to bolster Villepin's credibility as a 
presidential contender), is under pressure to produce 
something concrete to address the Muslim issue. His previous 
efforts in the area have stumbled, including having to deport 
the same imam twice, after French courts overturned his first 
attempt.  Villepin appears determined to distance himself 
from the Sarkozy-created CFCM and go one step further with 
his foundation in order to embellish his credentials and 
prove himself effective in the run-up to 2007.   End comment. 
 
 
Wolff