This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 009146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BY CF CG CT EK GB RW TP ZF XA
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND CENTRAL AFRICA (SOUTH) 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  France continues to seek solutions for the 
crisis in the Great Lakes through policies designed to 
support DRC President Kabila and the transition process and 
to block Rwandan interference in Congolese affairs.  France's 
history in the Rwandan genocide complicates their ability to 
engage with Rwanda, leading the GOF, whether by inclination 
or out of necessity to seek P3 cooperation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC) 
 
¶2. (C) French President Chirac believes that DRC President 
Joseph Kabila is "a decent man who deserves support...part of 
the solution...a man of the future"  Coupled with continuing 
suspicion between Paris and Rwanda's "anglophone, Tutsi" 
leadership, Chirac's belief informs the French policy process 
regarding the Great Lakes region.  Our MFA contacts feel that 
Kabila is doing as well as can be expected, but is poorly 
advised by the "dinosaurs" in his entourage who want him to 
assume total control, at the expense of his four 
Vice-Presidents, something the GOF feels would imperil the 
transition process. 
 
¶3. (C) The GOF acknowledges that the presence in DRC of the 
ex-FAR/interahamwe has provided a pretext (not a 
justification) for military operations by Rwanda and/or its 
surrogates, principally the RCD/G.  Accordingly, the French 
have focused on the need for credible DDR programs, 
occasionally suggesting that such programs be coupled with 
the establishment of a buffer force along the DRC/Rwanda 
border,  all of this to be undertaken by the UN.  Thus, we 
have seen consistent French support for increased MONUC force 
levels with a vigorous Chapter VII mandate. 
 
¶4. (C) The French are proud of their leadership of the EU's 
operation Artemis in Bunia during the summer of 2003.  Asked 
by UNSYG Annan in May to intervene until sufficient UN forces 
could be deployed, Chirac laid down several conditions, 
including UNSC approval, participation by British troops, and 
U.S. and UK political support to ensure cooperation from 
Uganda and Rwanda.  With these conditions met, Chirac ordered 
a reluctant military to deploy.  The French military had 
expressed a desire to solicit U.S. military assets for the 
mission, but the MFA, perhaps fearing a rebuff or the opening 
of a debate on Berlin-plus, finally confirmed to us that the 
GOF was not seeking any USG contribution beyond political 
support.  By September, at the end of the mission, Defense 
Minister Alliot-Marie was bragging about the total success of 
the French-led operation.  However, when Belgian FM Michel 
suggested in June 2004 that the EU might send troops to the 
Kivus, the French had no appetite for a reprise of operation 
Artemis, insisting that MONUC deal with the fighting. 
 
¶5. (C) With many in the GOF believing that the U.S. and the 
UK tacitly or implicitly blessed the 1998 invasion of the DRC 
by Rwanda and Uganda, the French now see U.S. policy on the 
Great Lakes as converging with their own.  The French are 
also pleased to see the back of UK International Development 
Secretary Clare Short, seen in Paris as an unconditional 
 
SIPDIS 
supporter of Rwanda and a persistent thorn in their side on 
Great Lakes issues. 
 
¶6. (C) A number of factors have led to what we believe has 
been a reduction in the level of French activism on Great 
Lakes issues.  First, France's problems in Cote d'Ivoire 
have, at times, been all-consuming for senior French Africa 
policy-makers.  The transfer of Ambassador Levitte, who was 
heavily engaged on the Great Lakes, from New York to 
Washington, and the subsequent departure of Dominique de 
Villepin, a committed Africanist, from the Quai d'Orsay has 
also affected French engagement.  The French have been 
seeking for some time to organize a joint visit to the Great 
Lakes region by FM Barnier and UK Foreign Secretary Straw, 
possibly including other Europeans, but no mutually 
acceptable date has been found.  Given their difficulties 
with Rwanda (see below) we anticipate that the GOF will 
continue to seek to coordinate policies on the Great Lakes 
with Washington and London. 
 
RWANDA 
 
¶7. (C) The French believe they have made several efforts in 
recent years to overcome difficulties with Rwanda arising 
from their support of former President Habyarimana, the 1994 
genocide, and the role played by French forces in "Operation 
Turquoise."  In August 2001, during the first visit to Rwanda 
by a French Foreign Minister since the genocide, Hubert 
Vedrine claimed to have "broken the ice" with the Rwandans by 
raising the effect of the genocide in France.  While 
complaining about the portrayal of France's role in Rwandan 
media, Vedrine told the Rwandans that the genocide had 
traumatized France as well as Rwanda.  In Paris, commentators 
noted that Vedrine made no apology and attended no ceremony 
to pay respects to the victims of the genocide.  Vedrine 
returned to Kigali in January 2002, accompanied by UK Foreign 
Secretary Straw, who delighted the French by delivering a 
 
SIPDIS 
tough message to President Kagame on the need to end the 
Rwandan presence in eastern Congo. 
 
¶8. (C) Visiting Rwanda in September 2002, FM de Villepin also 
claimed to have had a positive meeting (in English) with 
Kagame, notwithstanding the vehement criticism by the 
then-permrep Jean-David Levitte of Rwanda's role in the May 
massacres in Kisangani.  Meanwhile, Kagame filed a lawsuit 
in Paris against Paris-based Cameroonian author Charles Onana 
for defamation.  Onana's book, "The Secrets of the Rwandan 
Genocide," asserts that Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front was 
responsible for the downing of Habyarimana's plane on April 
6, 1994 - the event generally accepted as the trigger for the 
launching of the subsequent genocide.  A separate French 
judicial investigation, on behalf of the widows of the French 
pilots, was leaked to the French press in March 2004, also 
implicating Kagame.  With the tenth anniversary of the 
genocide approaching, the French were concerned by the timing 
and pressed the Rwandans for assurances that their 
representative at the commemoration ceremonies not be 
subjected to anti-French rhetoric.  Despite Rwandan 
assurances, Kagame delivered an anti-French diatribe at the 
commemoration ceremony, causing the French representative, 
junior minister Muselier, to cut short his visit to Rwanda 
and, according to the MFA, undoing Villepin's efforts to 
establish a working relationship with Kagame. 
 
BURUNDI 
 
¶9. (C) Perhaps scarred by their experiences in Rwanda, the 
GOF was unreceptive to USG efforts in 2001/2 to coordinate 
contingency planning for potential mass killings in Burundi. 
The French response was "if you plan for it, you ensure it 
will occur."  French interest in Burundi briefly peaked in 
October 2002, following a call from Nelson Mandela to Chirac 
requesting funding for the deployment of an army of troops 
from Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya to engage the Burundi 
rebels military, an idea French officials characterized as 
"crazy."  Mandela's request came to nothing.  However, France 
did provide training for Ethiopian and Mozambican troops 
participating in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), but 
felt unable to offer financing or logistical support.  With 
significant expenses associated with French and African 
deployments in Cote d'Ivoire, an MFA official described 
Burundi as being in the "third circle" of French interests in 
Africa.  With no national funding available, France did, 
however, push EU partners to provide financial support to 
AMIB. 
 
¶10. (C) The French had a high regard for the efforts of 
Pierre Buyoya while President to move the political 
transition in Burundi forward.  In contrast, the GOF was 
skeptical about the qualities of then-Vice President Domitien 
Ndayizeye.  Thus, the French were surprised by the positive 
impression Ndayizeye left, following his January 2004 visit 
to Paris as President. 
 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 
 
¶11. (C) Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is a regular 
visitor to France, both for vacations and for meetings with 
Chirac with whom he enjoys warm relations.  Sassou's ideas, 
including on regional disarmament are taken seriously in 
France.  However, in early 1994 Chirac's African affairs 
advisor undertook a mission to Brazzaville to deliver a 
message to Sassou that he needed to adopt a more constructive 
attitude in implementing the peace and disarmament agreement 
with the armed opposition and in his dealings with the IMF. 
It should be noted, that Sassou, like Gabonese President 
Bongo (to whom he is related by marriage) is closely tied 
into the Franco-African Masonic network. 
 
¶12. (C) Yet another French judicial investigation has 
impacted on the bilateral relationship.  However, the inquiry 
into the circumstance into the May 1999 so-called Brazzaville 
Beach affair concerning the disappearance and probable 
killing of approximately 350 refugees was dismissed by a 
French court on November 22, 2004, essentially because the 
Congolese officials under scrutiny had no residence in France. 
 
GABON 
 
¶13. (C) Any visit to Paris, of which there are many, by Omar 
Bongo (aka Omar El-Haj Bongo Ondimba) is the occasion for a 
long procession to the Hotel Meurice of ministers, 
politicians, businessmen and industrialists all paying court 
to the Gabonese President.  Bongo sees Chirac whenever he 
wants to, and reportedly even advises Chirac on his 
ministerial appointments and other domestic French affairs as 
well as on African issues.  His tenure as President second by 
only a few months to the Dean of the African dictators, 
Togolese President Eyadema, Bongo and Chirac have known each 
other for decades.  Bongo can count on French support 
whenever he faces difficulty with the IFIs and Chirac can 
count on Bongo to engage in a manner useful to France in 
regional crises, as Bongo has done recently in Madagascar and 
the Central African Republic.  While, on assuming their 
duties as Foreign Minister, both Villepin and Barnier 
included Libreville among their first stops in Africa, any 
issues of importance to Gabon and France are discussed 
between the offices of each country's President. 
 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
 
¶14. (C)  While there is constant speculation in the French 
press about alleged USG plans to establish a military 
presence in Sao Tome, French officials have candidly 
described Sao Tome as unimportant to France.  Following the 
coup in July 2003, the MFA issued statements of condemnation, 
but neither Chirac nor Villepin were personally engaged. 
 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
 
¶15. (C) France's principal concern regarding Equatorial 
Guinea (EG) is the boundary dispute with Gabon over the islet 
of Mbane/Mbanie.  According to French officials, Gabonese 
President Bongo sees EG as the "little brother" which, due to 
its booming petroleum and gas revenues, has become the "big 
brother."  Beyond making the MFA's archives available to the 
UN mediator, France is careful to take no position on the 
legitimacy of either sides' claim.  They were thus offended 
by former Spanish FM Palacios' declaration in favor of EG's 
claim. 
 
¶16. (U) BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
Wolff