This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL ECPS IN PK INDO PAK

SUBJECT: PROPOSED BUS SERVICE STALLED BY DOCUMENT DISPUTE;  RAIL LINK MOVING SLOWLY 
  REF: NEW DELHI 5796 
  Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The December 7-8 talks in New Delhi on  beginning a bus service between the two parts of Kashmir made  no progress after the governments failed to break the impasse  over documentation and modalities for crossing the LOC.  Each  side offered what they termed compromise solutions, but none  were mutually acceptable.  Demonstrating continued  political-level commitment to Indo-Pak rapprochement, the GOI  embraced a proposal for LOC-crossing certificates that first  surfaced in the Track-II ""Neemrana"" dialogue.  Commenting  that India favored opening the road largely for economic  reasons, a member of the GOI delegation told D/Polcouns that  it became evident during the meeting that Islamabad would not  agree to any mechanism that could allow the LOC to become a  de facto border.  The December 2-3 meeting on the proposed  Munnabao-Khokhrapar train connection was only slightly more  successful, in that both sides agreed to open links, but not  on a timeframe to do so.  New Delhi complains that Islamabad  is demanding unnecessary infrastructure changes that will  drag out the rail link for at least three years, and cites  this as evidence of GOP opposition to people-to-people links. 
 Five working-level sessions remain before the two Foreign  Secretaries meet in Islamabad on December 27-28 to review 
  SIPDIS  Round 2 of Composite Dialogue talks.  End Summary. 
  Deadlocked by Document Dispute 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite recent public comments by NSA Dixit and  Foreign Ministers Natwar Singh and Kasuri that the proposed  Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service would start ""soon,""  observers in New Delhi were not surprised when the December  7-8 talks in New Delhi on the technical aspects of such a  service failed to yield results over documents required for  crossing the LOC (reftel).  The GOI dropped its past  insistence for visas, suggesting instead a separate entry  certificate issued by the respective High Commissions, but  wanted passports as a form of identification for issuance of  this document.  New Delhi also conceded that the entry  permit, and not the passport, would be stamped at crossing,  and also offered that the permits could be issued at stations  set up in J&K to remove the hardship of Kashmiris having to  journey to New Delhi for documentation.  The Pakistanis  responded that the use of passports for identification was  inconsistent with their characterization of Kashmir as a  ""disputed territory"" and insisted (according to the Indian  government) that this service be available only to  ""Kashmiris"" (without elaborating how to define this  population).  No date was set for resumption of talks on this  issue although we expect it to be addressed in the next  session of the Dixit-Aziz ""back-channel."" 
 
¶3.  (C) J&K Resident Commissioner Parvez Dewan (protect) told  D/Polcouns on December 8 that the meeting was cordial and  friendly, but observed that Pakistan had made no comparable  compromises.  The sides met for about two hours on December  7, and for only a few minutes on December 8, on the grounds  that it made no sense to resume talks given the impasse.  He  said Islamabad had refused to accept the use of any passports  at all, because that would endow the LOC with the legal  status of a border, which Pakistan adamantly opposes. 
Commenting that India was eager to open the road for economic  reasons, Dewan called Pakistani proposals to use UN documents  as in the case of Cyprus and Red Cross certificates as in the  case of Korea ""unacceptable.""  The Pakistani High Commission  confirmed to us that the GOI turned down these two models --  as well as a restoration of the pre-1953 ""Rahdari"" system by  which travelers used documents issued by local officials on  both sides of the LOC -- as ""not applicable in the context of  J&K.""  All-Parties Hurriyat Conference leader Mirwaiz Umar  Farooq told us December 8 that he was partial to the Rahdari  system. 
¶4.  (C) Indian media were quick to claim that the GOP came to  New Delhi intending to keep the discussion ""political"" as  opposed to ""technical.""  Journalists noted that three of the  four members of the Pakistani delegation were from the  Foreign Ministry, while their nine Indian interlocutors were  led by a Joint Secretary in the Transport Ministry and  included members from the Foreign and Home Ministries and the  J&K government, which suggested the GOI was prepared to  address specific details. 
  Who Travels on Which Transport Company 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Discussion further bogged down over who would be  permitted to travel on the bus.  New Delhi sought to treat  the service as any other public conveyance and allow all  Indian citizens access, which would reinforce its position on  passports as identity documents.  Islamabad, in contrast,  wanted the bus to carry only residents of Kashmir.  The  prospect of non-Kashmiris crossing the LOC raised the  likelihood that passports, and not documents issued in  Kashmir, would be required.  Dewan added that Islamabad  called for a national bus company to be the carrier, because  it did not wish the J&K Road Transport Company to travel  between the two sides, commenting that this was impossible,  because all of India's bus companies are state level.  This  was only one of the ""red herrings"" the Pakistani delegation  introduced into the talks, he stated.  (The current  Delhi-Lahore bus is operated by the respective state  transport companies.) 
  Infrastructure Problems Also Remain 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Analysts pointed out that even if an agreement on the  political and technical aspects of the bus service were  hammered out, it would take months to refurbish the currently  unused road that transits the LOC.  Laborers are reportedly  working overtime to complete repairs to the Indian side of  the road, which even military vehicles cannot currently  traverse.  Meanwhile, the bridge that actually crosses the  LOC faces at least four months of repair work, and its  location straddling the LOC will undoubtedly complicate the  process, according to J&K-based journalists. 
  Other Roads Won't Open 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The lack of agreement over travel documents continues  the impasse over what could become a network of cross-LOC  transport connections.  In recent weeks the GOI has proposed  buses running Kargil-Skardu, Poonch-Mirpur, and Jammu-Sialkot  routes, but the deadlock over documents will hamstring  progress on all these CBMs. 
  Side Proposal for Kashmiris Floated 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Separately, ""Asian Age"" reported on December 7 that  the GOI had put forward an idea for designated points along  the LOC where divided Kashmiri families could meet on a  regular schedule.  This would be a marked improvement over  the current practice of families arriving at their respective  sides of the LOC and calling to each other from across a  river or check-point. 
  Proposed Train Link Gathering a Little Steam 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The December 2-3 talks in Islamabad on the proposed  Munnabao-Khokhrapar rail link connecting Rajasthan and Sindh  were more successful, with the delegations announcing on  December 3 that they had agreed to an ""early resumption of  the rail link"" and to replace and refurbish the rail  infrastructure.  The agreement remained hampered, however, by  Islamabad's estimate of ""two to three years"" to lay new gauge  track to accommodate such rail service.  This represented a  significant delay over Natwar Singh's recent pronouncement  that this southern Indo-Pak land crossing could commence  business by October 2005 -- which the GOI says would be  possible if the two sides stuck to the current meter gauge  system. 
  Remaining Composite Dialogue Discussions 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) The below schedule for the remaining meetings in  Round 2 of the Composite Dialogue reflects the rescheduling  of the anti-narcotics and Foreign Secretaries meetings: 
  December 9-10 (New Delhi): Meeting of the Committee of  Experts regarding trade issues. 
  December 13-14 (New Delhi): Meetings between narcotics  control authorities. 
  December 14-15 (Karachi): Joint survey of the boundary  pillars in the horizontal section of the Sir Creek area. 
  December 14-15 (Islamabad): Expert-level meeting on nuclear  CBMs, including discussion on a draft agreement for prior  notification of missile tests. 
  December 15-16 (Islamabad): Expert-level meeting on  conventional CBMs. 
  December 27-28 (Islamabad): Foreign Secretaries meeting to  review issues discussed this month and to set a schedule for  another round of talks, possibly to begin in February 2005. 
  Comment 
------- 
  ¶11.  (C) As NSA Dixit confirmed to the Ambassador on December  7 (reftel), PM Manmohan Singh remains personally committed to  opening the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road, but it will not  become a reality until both sides climb down further from  their positions.  This will require engagement at the  political level on both sides, although there are voices in  the GOI that are calling for India now to call Pakistan's  bluff and agree to its demands.  The MEA, in particular, is  concerned that Islamabad opposes new connections between the  two sides of Kashmir because this would tend to deflate the  jihadist movement.  The issue of bus and rail service may  arise again at the December 27-28 Foreign Secretaries talks  in Islamabad or in the Dixit-Aziz back-channel, but the  enduring deadlock over documents for cross-LOC travel is  inextricably linked to each nation's views on Kashmir, and  compromise will be difficult.  This will delay further the  large number of Kashmiris who wish to travel across the LOC  for family, tourism, and economic reasons. 
  ¶12.  (C) As the Composite Dialogue continues, it is becoming  increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that Pakistan  is holding concrete progress on important CBMs hostage to  Indian concessions on Kashmir.  Atmospherics in India remain  remarkably positive, but the intrinsically zero-sum nature of  Kashmir is preventing the CD from living up to its potential  to build new constituencies for peace and reduce the risk of  renewed crisis. 
MULFORD