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C O N F I D E N T I A L  JAKARTA 012319 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2009 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM TT ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN DEFMIN SUDARSONO ON EAST TIMOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY, MILITARY REFORM 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR B. LYNN PASCOE.  REASON: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a December 13 introductory call by the 
Ambassador, Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said 
the GOI was working on a proposal to form a Commission for 
Humanitarian Reconciliation to address human rights 
violations perpetrated in East Timor in 1999.  The commission 
would consist of representatives of the GOI and East Timor, 
with the possibility of United Nations participation. 
Sudarsono candidly addressed the challenges he faced in 
imposing civilian control over the Indonesian military and 
bringing the military's revenues on-budget.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Minister Sudarsono noted that in a 1997 trip to 
Washington, he had given a speech at Georgetown University 
entitled "Managing the Strained U.S.-Indonesian Bilateral 
Relationship."  The theme was still relevant.  Ambassador 
Pascoe replied that in general, Washington perceptions of 
Indonesia were straightforward: the U.S. recognizes the 
importance of a stable and prosperous Indonesia to the 
Southeast Asia, and the significance of Indonesia as a large 
and successful Islamic democracy.  However, the U.S. has two 
requirements for normalized military-to-military relations: 
accountability for the East Timor human rights violations in 
1999, and transparency in the military budget.  Ambassador 
noted that it was difficult to provide assistance to an 
organization whose real budget and needs are unknown. 
 
East Timor Accountability 
------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Sudarsono said he had recently met with President 
Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda to discuss East Timor 
accountability.  The GOI, he said, was seeking a "legally 
sound and practically feasible" approach to the problem, and 
is now considering forming a bi-national humanitarian 
reconciliation commission with members of the East Timor 
government and perhaps some representation by the United 
Nations.  Sudarsono conceded that the Indonesian judicial 
system could not meet international standards of credibility 
on human rights issues due to administrative, logistical, and 
financial shortcomings.  These had resulted in bad verdicts 
in human rights cases in East Timor and Aceh.  Moreover, 
witnesses were often uncooperative due to their fear of 
judges and prosecutors.  Sudarsono noted that any intended 
inquiry into East Timor would face vociferous opposition in 
parliament (DPR).  Ambassador suggested that a UN role on the 
commission would be appropriate, given the promise by 
Indonesia to the UN that it would maintain the security of 
the 1999 referendum.  He said he understood that any 
commission had to be pitched to the DPR as helping Indonesia 
overcome its own concerns about 1999. 
 
TNI Transparency 
---------------- 
¶4. (C) Turning to TNI reform, Sudarsono said that although 
the new military law foresaw a five-year period for bringing 
all military revenues on-budget, he thought that eight years 
was a more practical timeframe.  He said that the GOI had 
taken a comparative approach to the issue, looking at how 
China, Thailand, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan had 
dealt with the matter.  Sudarsono said he hoped to secure 
"fast-track" authority from the Ministry of Finance to 
convert larger TNI-owned business into "semi-state-owned 
enterprises" with the government as a partial shareholder. 
Over the longer term, the TNI's budget must be increased to 
make up for the resulting shortfalls in revenues.  Ambassador 
Pascoe noted that presenting a credible plan for military 
budget transparency and beginning its implementation would be 
very helpful in assuaging concerns about the TNI's budget 
process. 
 
¶5. (C) Procurement, Sudarsono said, was another challenge. 
Unlike in the past, there are now many in the military with 
the ability to make procurement deals, creating "a room with 
many doors."  Many up-and-coming younger officers now were 
eager to take advantage of these lucrative opportunities.  He 
was working to bring this process under control. 
 
Civilian Control Over the Military 
---------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Sudarsono turned to the challenge of consolidating 
civilian control over the military.  Indonesia had a 
successful election, but is still in the process of 
transition to democracy. The civilian government would have 
to put its house in order before it could establish supremacy 
over the military. Although he had a "road map" to complete 
this over a three to four year period, the task might require 
fifteen years, he said.  It was difficult, he noted, to "add 
substance to the notion of democratic accountability." 
Resistance on the part of the Army was particularly stiff, he 
said.  Dealing with the other services, he said, was somewhat 
easier.  Part of the problem, Sudarsono noted, was that both 
the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Armed Forces 
sat in the Cabinet on an equal legal basis.  Moreover, while 
the President had direct authority over deployment, the 
Minister's authority was confined to "coordinating control" 
over budgetary, strategic, and logistical matters.  He said 
he was working with his friends in the DPR to amend the 
recently passed TNI law to strengthen civilian control. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Sudarsono candidly outlined the challenges he faces in 
consolidating civilian control over the military and bringing 
its revenues on budget.  In both instances, he freely 
acknowledged the formidable hurdles posed by ingrained 
institutional culture and generational attitudes, and 
conceded that the time frames designated in the TNI bill 
might not be adequate.  On East Timor accountability, we are 
encouraged by Sudarsono's willingness to break from the 
oft-heard official insistence on purely national or bilateral 
mechanisms and his implicit acknowledgement that the GOI must 
seek a new way to meet international standards of 
accountability.  This was in contrast to the Coordinating 
Minister for Policy, Legal and Security Affairs later the 
same day (septel).  End comment. 
 
 
PASCOE