This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 003163 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, IO/PHO, AND AF/RSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: KPKO PREL MOPS GT HA BY IV SU CF UN
SUBJECT: GUATEMALAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS IS GROWING 
 
REF: A. USDAO GUATEMALA IIR 6 838 996 05 (DTG 061836Z 
        OCT 04) 
     ¶B. USDAO GUATEMALA IIR 6 838 9986 05 (DTG 031812Z 
        NOV 04) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Hamilton, reason: 1.4(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In addition to deployment of a military 
police company to Haiti, the Guatemalan military has military 
observers in the Ivory Coast and Burundi, has finished 
training military observers for deployment to Sudan, and has 
promised to send a Special Forces company and a military 
police company to the Congo.  The Guatemalan military 
leadership views participation in peacekeeping operations as 
a means to increase military professionalization, provide a 
revenue source for military modernization, and reinforce 
reorientation of the military away from internal security 
missions.  Resource and personnel constraints may keep the 
Guatemalan military  from fully realizing its ambitions for 
participation in international peacekeeping efforts, but we 
should applaud and support this trend whenever and however 
possible.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The October 2004 deployment of a company-size (70 
man) military police contingent to join the UN Mission For 
Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) represents Guatemala's 
second experience with peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in 
Haiti; Guatemala also participated in the  1994 Multinational 
Force and its UN successor.  This contingent is primarily 
responsible for security of MINUSTAH headquarters.  The 
Guatemalan military had been approached by the UN about 
sending an infantry battalion to Haiti in early 2005 as a 
replacement for the military police contingent (Ref A); 
current Guatemalan planning, however, only envisions rotation 
of the military police contingent in April 2005. 
 
¶3. (C) The Haiti follow-on contingent issue was intertwined 
with proposals to create a multinational Central American 
peacekeeping battalion that would include company-size 
contingents from at least Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua.  This idea has been discussed in meetings of 
the Conference of Central American Armies (CFAC), but has 
apparently encountered political difficulties in some of the 
member countries.  With no more need for additional troops 
for Haiti, the Guatemalans are now exploring formation of a 
Central American battalion outside of CFAC auspices to avoid 
political and legal constraints related to CFAC sponsorship. 
 
¶4.  (U) Guatemala's return to peacekeeping was spurred by two 
events: the October 2003 simultaneous creation of an Army 
peacekeeping operations school and a PKO section in the 
Operations Department of the General Staff; and, the November 
2003 signing of an MOU between the UN and GOG, which 
committed Guatemala to the Standby List for PKOs.  The first 
course in the PKO school began in January 2004; the school 
offers courses designed for various personnel participating 
in UN-led PKOs, such as military police, military observers, 
staff officers, and commanders. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The PKO school has just completed training of 15 
military observers for future deployment to the Sudan; 
Guatemala currently has three military observers each in the 
UN missions in the Cote D'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Burundi (ONUB), 
respectively.  Guatemala is also planning to send a 100-man 
Special Forces and a 100-man military police contingent to 
the UN mission in the Congo (MONUC) in early 2005.  The 
mission of the Special Forces company will apparently include 
rescue of hostages. 
 
¶6.  (C) In conversations with Embassy officers, Guatemalan 
Chief of the Defense Staff Major General Bustamante has made 
it clear that he sees participation in PKOs as an important 
vehicle for increasing the professionalization of the 
Guatemalan military.  MG Bustamante noted that opportunities 
to work with more advanced military forces provide unequaled 
training opportunities for the Guatemalan military, and that 
the experience of equipping, training, and deploying 
Guatemalan forces to foreign theaters in itself provides 
valuable training. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Guatemalan military leadership also views 
participation in UN PKOs as a funding source, albeit a modest 
one, for military modernization.  Part of the UN funding will 
go to enhanced salaries for the Guatemalan soldier but a 
portion will be paid directly to the GOG.  The Guatemala 
military anticipates that these funds will be for 
modernization of the military, a line item in the GOG budget 
that is to be financed by sale of military property and/or 
foreign donations.  (Note: Since the GOG has decreed that 
surplus military property will be donated to other Guatemalan 
national, departmental, or municipal entities, foreign 
donations or soft loans appear to be the only viable funding 
source for military modernization.  End Note.) 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  There are resource and personnel 
constraints facing full realization of Guatemalan ambitions 
for PKO participation.  The Guatemalan military will be 
reimbursed by the UN for expenses in equipping its Haiti 
contingent but may face problems in advancing funds to 
similarly equip its units destined for the Congo, especially 
as it will be a larger contingent with a more complex and 
dangerous mission.  Future commitments, including rotations, 
may face similar funding problems.  On the personnel side, 
the current size of the Guatemalan military means that 
Guatemala may not be able to commit more than a 
battalion-size force to PKO participation, given the 1 to 3 
ratio needed to support foreign deployments, as well as the 
fact that close to one third of the Guatemalan military is 
currently involved in supporting joint police-military 
security patrols.  (The Guatemalan military has proposed to 
at least partially address the personnel issue by not 
counting deployed peacekeepers against the official personnel 
strength ceiling - an idea that may face opposition from 
civilian authorities, human rights groups, and/or 
international donors.) 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment continued:  Left unspoken, but presumably in 
the minds of at least some officers, increased participation 
in PKOs would constrain the GOG's ability to increase the 
number of military personnel involved in joint 
police-military patrols.  The Guatemalan military clearly 
chafes at this role, believing it is a drain on scarce 
military resources and worrying about fallout from possible 
military involvement should there occur an incident involving 
use of excessive force.  The military is also concerned that 
joint patrols represent an open-ended commitment, and one 
that will grow larger given - in the military view - the 
incompetence of the police. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment continued:  Guatemala's interest in and 
commitment to a growing role in international peacekeeping is 
very positive.  We should encourage it politically and 
support it logistically (as contemplated in the release of 
frozen MAP funds) whenever possible. 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
HAMILTON