This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR P (DEHART) EUR (PDAS BRADTKE), EUR/ERA 
(VOLKER/BISHARAT), EUR/RPM (HOVENIER), EUR/SE 
(SILLIMAN/MARCIEL) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL MT TU CY EUN NATO USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: MALTA SEEKS US SUPPORT FOR PLAN TO RESOLVE NATO/EU 
PARTICIPATION ISSUE 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 4843 B. ANKARA 6402 C. VALLETTA 1048 
 
     ¶D. BRUSSELS 4082 E. NICOSIA 1974 F. 
     BISHARAT/BRENNER EMAIL NOVEMBER 16. 
 
Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy 
Brenner for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Malta's Ambassador to the EU was 
disappointed by the perceived lack of U.S. support for his 
proposal to resolve the issue of Malta's participation in 
NATO-EU strategic discussions.  Turkish representatives to 
the EU have expressed a desire to see a resolution to the 
issue.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  In discussions with Martin Xuereb, Foreign and 
Security Policy Attache at the Maltese Mission to the 
European Union, and subsequently with Malta's PermRep to the 
EU, we advised (per ref f) the need for the Maltese to talk 
directly with the NATO International Staff legal experts 
about their plan for resolving the issue of Malta's 
participation in NATO/EU strategic discussions and to stay in 
touch with USNATO.  Xuereb told us that the decision has now 
been made in Valletta to pursue a course of action under 
which they would argue that documents signed in 1994 at the 
time of Malta's entry into PfP remain valid, despite their 
withdrawal from active participation in the program in 1996. 
Given the complexity of the issue, and accompanying broader 
political problems, we cautioned Xuereb not to expect 
significant movement before the end of the year. 
 
¶3. (C)  Xuereb noted that he had already made contact with 
Ms. Burcu San, Deputy Director for EAPC in the NATO Secretary 
General's Private Office.  Ms. San was reportedly unfamiliar 
with the Maltese plan, but offered to have the Legal Advisor 
and a representative from the Political section (we 
understand that this will be D/ASYG Robert Simmons) present 
at their as-yet-unscheduled meeting. 
 
--------------------------- 
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH MESSAGE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) We were called later in the afternoon by the Maltese 
Legal Attache, asking us to attend another meeting with 
Malta's EU Ambassador Cachia-Caruana. The Ambassador said he 
was "very unhappy" with the U.S. position, characterizing it 
as showing a lack of support.  He fears that once the 
decision on Turkish accession is made, there will be little 
interest in resolving Malta's participation issue.  He 
reiterated his view that a solution to Malta's NATO-EU 
participation issue would simplify -- not complicate -- the 
Turkey/Cyprus problem in the weeks before the December 17 EU 
decision on accession.  According to Ambassador 
Cachia-Caruana, those who argue that a resolution to the 
Maltese problem would harm Turkey's EU prospects, "don't 
understand what's going on within the EU." 
 
------------------- 
FINDING A "SPONSOR" 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Cachia-Caruana said that dealing directly 
with the International Staff without a "sponsor" or a show of 
political support could result in Malta's proposal getting 
bogged down or lost within the I.S. bureaucracy.  He argued 
that if the political will were present, Malta's proposal 
could pass through the internal legal review very quickly. 
He said he has approached Javier Solana informally, and has 
suggested that he might go directly to NATO Secretary-General 
De Hoop Scheffer for support. 
 
--------------- 
TURKEY ON BOARD 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Cachia-Caruana also reported that the Turkish EU 
Ambassador had visited him on the morning of November 17 to 
express Ankara's support for a resolution to the Malta 
problem.  Turkey, according to the Maltese Ambassador, was 
"fully available" for any solution.  We spoke subsequently 
with counterparts in the Turkish Mission to the EU, who 
confirmed that Turkey sees a resolution of the Maltese issue 
as a positive step.  According to our contacts, Turkey sees 
this as a way to solidify Malta's positive vote for 
accession, and demonstrate flexibility and a positive will to 
other Member States.  Similar views are reported from Ankara 
(ref B).  The Turkish Foreign Minister will visit Malta on 
November 26, and we are told by Turkish EU Mission 
representatives that the Minister will pledge Turkish support 
for a resolution of the problem. 
 
------------ 
THE TIMELINE 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Cachia-Caruana will travel to Valletta on 
November 25.  He made clear to us that, in the absence of 
support for Malta's course of action, he will recommend that 
the idea be shelved.  The Maltese Prime Minister was to have 
raised this issue in discussions November 18 in Valletta with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Meyers. 
 
---------- 
THE STAKES 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  Until we can make progress on Malta/Cyprus 
participation, the NATO-EU dialogue will remain blocked. 
While we recognize that any possible solution to this impasse 
will likely have to await the EU's fateful December 17 
decision on Turkey, there is nothing to suggest that a "yes" 
vote will uncork the bottle for progress on EU-NATO 
cooperation.  The different EU and NATO decisions remain 
incompatible, and will still be in force.  Malta is proposing 
a procedural bandaid that meets its own political 
constraints.  Solving Malta's problem alone will do nothing 
unless a path for Cypriot participation opens as well. 
 
McKinley