This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 001456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISLAMABAD - PLEASE PASS TO AMB. BLACK 
FOR AMB. BLACK FROM CDA ENTWISTLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC CE MV ECONOMICS LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF AMB. COFER 
BLACK 
 
Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Your visit comes at an important juncture in the 
30-month-old ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  A 
recent surge in assassinations by the LTTE, coupled with the 
lack of progress toward resumed negotiations, have raised 
concerns that the ceasefire may be unraveling.  While the 
LTTE is clearly to blame for most of the increased violence, 
President Kumaratunga's dependence on a contentious and 
precarious coalition has distracted the GSL's focus and 
undermined its ability to develop a unified policy on 
recommencing talks with the Tigers.  Recent ill-advised and 
widely publicized threats of a military response to LTTE 
violations issued by key GSL ministers have done little to 
defuse the situation.  Your visit will be interpreted locally 
as a strong vote of confidence for the GSL and a 
reaffirmation of our policy to retain the Tigers on the 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations list until they renounce 
violence both in words and actions.  At the same time, you 
should impress upon GSL interlocutors the need to move 
quickly and cohesively to resume negotiations.  In the 
Republic of Maldives, the Government has justified the swift 
suppression of pro-reform demonstrations on August 12-13 by 
attempting to paint them as inspired by anti-American 
"extremists" and "fundamentalists."  Although we do not know 
the affiliations of all 180 individuals detained in 
connection with the demonstrations--and although one 
Maldivian citizen is being held in Guantanamo for suspected 
al-Qaeda activities--we remain generally skeptical of the 
Government's attempts to link well-known pro-reform activists 
to shadowy "extremist" elements.  End summary. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
CEASEFIRE HOLDING, 
BUT FRAYING AROUND THE EDGES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) has been broadly 
supportive of U.S. efforts on the Global War on Terror.  In 
late 2002, for example, the GSL granted the U.S. blanket 
overflight clearance for military aircraft.  For most Sri 
Lankans, however, "terror" generally means domestic terror, 
as perpetrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), who since 1983 have waged a violent ethnic insurgency 
aimed at creating a separate state for ethnic Tamils in the 
north and east of the island.  Some Sri Lankan observers 
credit the USG's Global War on Terror with pressuring the 
LTTE to sign a Ceasefire Agreement with the GSL in February 
¶2002.  The 30-month-old ceasefire has shown some alarming 
signs recently of coming apart at the seams, however.  The 
split with Karuna, the LTTE's Eastern Military Commander, in 
March sparked a renewed wave of violence, as LTTE 
"headquarters" targeted and killed his supporters in the east 
in a brutal bid to reassert authority and intimidate the 
population in the region.  Moreover, the LTTE's (likely 
well-founded) suspicion that the GSL aided and abetted 
Karuna's defection has increased the Tigers' mistrust of the 
GSL and upped the stridency of their anti-government rhetoric 
in subsequent months. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Since the beginning of July, suspected LTTE 
militants have assassinated 32 political opponents, Karuna 
supporters and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) informants, rivaling in a 
mere seven weeks the Tigers' twelve-month total of 36 
civilians slain in 2003.  The Tigers characteristically 
refuse to claim responsibility for the assassinations, 
blaming those occurring in LTTE-controlled territory on 
"rival factions," while faulting the GSL for failing to 
prevent those occurring in government-controlled territory. 
(Note:  About one-third of the recent killings have taken 
place in Colombo or its suburbs.  End note.)   Nor has the 
violence been entirely one-sided.  Eight LTTE cadres, 
including two relatively senior members, have been killed 
(most likely by Karuna supporters) over the same period. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The successful targeting of purported SLA 
informants in Colombo and its suburbs has raised GSL fears 
that the Tigers have exploited the freedom of movement 
afforded by the ceasefire to improve their intelligence and 
to infiltrate the capital.  Perhaps the most disturbing 
development was the July 7 suicide bombing at a Colombo 
police station (located diagonally across the street from the 
U.S. Embassy), which killed four policemen.  The bomber 
detonated explosives attached to her body after suspicious 
police escorted her from the office of her likely intended 
target, an anti-LTTE politician who is a minister in 
President Kumaratunga's Cabinet, to the station for 
questioning.  The abortive assassination attempt marked the 
first time that the Tigers have reverted to their time-tested 
tactic of suicide bombing since signing the Ceasefire 
Agreement in early 2002.  The LTTE's disavowal of involvement 
in the incident has only confirmed suspicions, both within 
the GSL and throughout the international community, that the 
LTTE will continue to use terror and violence, despite the 
ceasefire, to intimidate its opponents and put pressure on 
the government. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
FRAGILE COALITION MEANS INCONSISTENCY, 
INATTENTION ON GSL SIDE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) While the Tigers' sporadic violence is a depressing 
trend, the response thus far from President Kumaratunga's 
four-month-old government offers little reassurance that it 
is formulating a cohesive, well-coordinated policy to bring 
the LTTE back to the negotiating table.  The President's 
dependence on a fractious, precarious coalition to retain her 
office has complicated efforts to resume negotiations with 
the Tigers, who walked out of talks with the previous 
government in April 2003.  In particular, the pro-nationalist 
Jathika Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front or JVP), 
former Marxist revolutionaries turned Parliamentarians who 
control nearly one-third of the seats in her coalition, 
vehemently oppose discussion of the Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA) proposed by the LTTE as the first agenda 
item for resumed negotiations.  Unable to count on support 
from her own government--let alone an entrenched Opposition 
only too eager to see her fail--the President has shied away 
from tackling controversial subjects like Tamil autonomy and 
the ISGA, focusing instead on preserving her fragile 
coalition and her endangered political career.  The disparate 
and competing viewpoints within the GSL, as well as the 
President's own disinclination to share information and 
delegate authority, have contributed to a lack of consistency 
in GSL statements on possible negotiations.  The dissonance 
has grown most acute over the past few weeks, when the 
President's absence from the country (she is in the UK on a 
personal holiday) has coincided with the spike in LTTE 
violence.  The Army Chief, the Government spokesman and the 
Acting Defense Minister have all been widely quoted in the 
press recently, spouting thinly-veiled ultimatums to the 
LTTE, with the Acting Defense Minister lacing his comments 
with accusations that the Scandinavian-sponsored Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission, which documents reported ceasefire 
violations, is "one-sided."  (Note:  When President 
Kumaratunga's party was in the Opposition, its members 
frequently lambasted the Norwegian facilitators as pro-LTTE. 
End note.)  While such saber-rattling may play well before 
the Sinhalese majority in the south of the country, the GSL 
cannot afford either the political or financial costs of a 
return to hostilities.  These statements have increased 
tensions on both sides and prompted popular speculation of an 
imminent break in the ceasefire. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Behind the scenes, knowledgeable GSL officials 
describe the latest noises as largely a media frenzy, with 
politicians using the media to sound tough.  The same 
officials tell us that, objectively, the chances of a return 
to fighting are no higher now than a few months ago.  In a 
welcome development, the Army and the LTTE have agreed to 
hold talks in the precarious East at the end of the week, an 
event orchestrated by the indefatigable Scandinavian 
ceasefire monitors. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In view of the on again/off again nature of the 
peace process, the LTTE's intentions remain unclear.  Many of 
our interlocutors belive that the status quo--a protracted 
ceasefire wiht no imminent return to talks--favors the LTTE, 
affording them freedom of movement to redistribute their 
cadres, including in Colombo, improve their 
intelligence-gathering capabilities, icrease their 
recruitment (including of children) and re-pad their 
finances.  Clearly, the President's precarious political 
position benefits the Tigers, allowing them to criticize her 
for "stalling" and to question her sincerity in pursuing 
talks.  Meanwhile, besides demonstrating they retain the 
ability to carry out the political assassinations noted 
above, the LTTE continues to maintain its terrorist capacity, 
including the most sophisticated suicide technology in the 
world, and may be expanding its links to other groups 
regionally and internationally.  The LTTE receives 
significant amounts of military supplies by sea; indeed its 
own merchant fleet provides weapons and munitions directly to 
its cadres and traffics throughout South and Southeast Asia 
weaponry procured through its global network.  Human and 
narcotics smuggling, black-market sales of gemstones and 
other high-value items, possibly including terror weapons, 
help fund the LTTE. 
 
 
------------------ 
ECONOMIC FRONT 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Sri Lankan economy has been on an upward trend 
the past three years, though the recent change in Government 
has left investors and local business representatives 
uncertain about the direction it is headed in the future. 
While the immediate past-Government was pro-reform and moving 
forward with a fairly aggressive liberalization program, the 
current government has taken a more "go slow" approach.  The 
current Government's political make-up (particularly the 
inclusion of the Marxist JVP) has made coming to an economic 
consensus on important issues difficult. 
 
¶9.  (C) On the counterterrorism front, Sri Lanka is engaged 
in two port-related initiatives of particular value - CSI and 
Megaports.  Sri Lanka and US Customs entered into an 
agreement to establish Colombo as a CSI Port last year, but 
the implementation process was interrupted by this year's 
political upheaval.  The current Government has decided to 
move forward, however, and should be purchasing the necessary 
scanning equipment and building needed infrastructure over 
the next three months.  Once established, US Customs will set 
up a permanent presence in Colombo, and container traffic to 
the US from this major transshipment point will be far more 
secure.  Megaports is a relatively recent phenomenon.  The 
MOU was signed by the Minister of Ports and Aviation during a 
visit to Washington in June.  The technical survey team has 
just completed its work.  The current plan is to have 
Megaports equipment up and running at the port by March 2005. 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  On the terrorist financing front, neither Sri Lanka 
nor Maldives is an important regional financial center.  The 
LTTE, however, runs a sophisticated terrorist financing 
network, including NGO fronts and well-heeled members of the 
Tamil diaspora.  Sri Lanka's Central Bank has circulated the 
list of individuals and entities included on the UN 1267 
Sanctions Committee's consolidated list, but to date no 
assets have been identified.  Sri Lanka is party to the UN 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and to the 1988 Drug Convention.  The GSL is 
currently drafting legislation to enhance its ability to 
combat money laundering and set up a financial intelligence 
unit.  Maldives is also interested in pursuing anti-money 
laundering legislation, but is presently focused on internal 
political problems.  US Treasury is providing technical 
assistance to both nations on anti-money laundering efforts. 
 
------------ 
THREAT LEVEL 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (C)  Colombo is rated HIGH on the SETL for Crime, 
Indigenous Terrorism, Transnational Terrorism, and Political 
Violence.  Americans are rarely targeted for violent crime, 
and there is no recent history of Americans being 
specifically targeted for terrorism in Sri Lanka.  During the 
past year the Ambassador received a death threat via email, 
and a USAID contractor received a written death threat, 
neither of which were believed to be credible.  In August the 
Embassy closed for three days due to an anthrax hoax that 
included a letter, written by a person claiming membership in 
the "Sri Lanka al-Qaeda," threatening President Bush and the 
White House.  Even though it has not targeted American 
interests, the LTTE remains a deadly terrorist organization. 
We monitor the growing frustration expressed by the Muslim 
community at the LTTE attacks directed against them.  In 
general, however, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka is 
comparatively moderate.  Politically, the Muslim community 
suffers from the same divisiveness and factionalism that 
bedevil the Tamil and Sinhalese communities.  Threat 
information will best be addressed during your meeting with 
Keerthi Gajanayake, Director General of the Directorate of 
Internal Intelligence (DII). 
 
------------------------------ 
SECURITY FORCES' CAPABILITIES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (C) The ability of the police to respond effectively to 
the criminal and terrorist threat is severly limited.  Local 
police have proven themselves effective in containing 
political disturbances and demonstrations.  A strong 
relationship with senior  police, due in part to ATA training 
opportunities, enables the Embassy to receive excellent VIP 
protection, perimeter protection and bomb disposal services 
upon request.  The average officer on the street, however, is 
poorly trained, underpaid, and under-motivated to perform 
routine law enforcement duties.  During the past twenty years 
of civil war, the police were used primarily for 
counter-insurgency and thus many never developed basic police 
skills in crime investigation, community policing, or traffic 
enforcement.  Police are in desperate need of training in 
these areas.  At the most senior level, police are 
significantly hampered by a culture of patronage that 
discourages professionalism and encourages political 
favoritism.  In the past year the President has replaced the 
Minister of Interior, the Secretary of Interior, the 
Inspector General of Police and the Director of Internal 
Intelligence.  The President recently "restructured" the 
Ministry of Interior into the Ministry of Public Security, 
Law and Order.  In a recent conversation, Inspector General 
of Police Indra De Silva indicated that he may step down in 
the near future.  The Special Task Force (STF), a highly 
trained elite police unit tasked with providing security in 
the Eastern Province, has effectively integrated ATA training 
into their operations. 
 
¶13.  (C) Sri Lanka's roughly 150,000-man military is 
attempting to develop enough combat power to defeat the LTTE 
if the ceasefire fails--a capability the military now lacks. 
In March 2002 all three services of the Sri Lankan military 
approached the Embassy with significant requests for military 
sales.  In September and October of 2002, three U.S. 
Department of Defense Assessment teams evaluated the Sri 
Lankan military's capabilities and needs.  Their findings 
point to systemic and operational weaknesses, especially 
shortcomings in doctrine, mid-level leadership and training. 
In addition, severe equipment shortfalls were highlighted in 
four areas:  maritime surveillance and interdiction, 
battlefield intelligence and surveillance, military 
communications and mobility and basic soldier items were 
deemed most critical to the future success of the Sri Lankan 
military.  In spite of these problems, the Sri Lankan 
military remains a worthy engagement partner and has offered 
unlimited access to the experiences (both positive and 
negative) and lessons learned by all three services during 
nearly twenty years of fighting the world's most prolific 
users of suicide technology and IEDs.  Recent exchanges and 
exercises held in Sri Lanka have resulted in information that 
will directly improve the survivability of U.S. forces 
serving in harm's way. 
--------------- 
USG ASSISTANCE 
--------------- 
¶14.  (C)  ATA has a successful history of training in Sri 
Lanka, investing approximately $1 million to train an 
estimated 138 police since 1999.  Past ATA courses include 
Post-Blast Investigation, VIP Protection, 
Countersurveillance, and Hostage Negotiation.  Practically 
all senior police officials to be encountered during your 
visit have attended at least one ATA course, a fact that 
offers substantial returns to the USG in the form of police 
support.  Regrettably, all ATA training for 2004 was 
cancelled due to other priorities in the region, and no 
training is anticipated for 2005.  On the positive side, INL 
funds totaling approximately $500,000 have been identified 
this year to establish an International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) contractor 
position in Sri Lanka and to coordinate projects with the 
police in narcotics interdiction and community policing.  We 
believe development of community policing initiatives in Sri 
Lanka is essential to a successful peace process, and 
therefore advocate training in that area.  In March the 
TIP/PISCES program was introduced to Sri Lankan authorities. 
However, due in large part to the massive shift of law 
enforcement personnel previously mentioned, the proposal lost 
momentum, and a MOI has yet to be signed.  We have recently 
heard, however, that the proposal will be accepted, pending 
approval by the Cabinet.  TIP/PISCES will be an important 
topic for discussion Tilak Ranaviraja, the Secretary of 
Public Security.  We may sign an agreement during your visit. 
 Extraditions are another possible topic.  By the time of 
your arrival, the successful extradition from the U.S. of a 
Sri Lankan citizen wanted here on child molestation charges 
should have taken place.  We may also have learned if the Sri 
Lankan Magistrate decides to extradite a Catholic priest to 
California to face child molestation charges.  If successful, 
this will be the first test of the extradition treaty, 
ratified in April 2001, between our countries. 
 
¶15.  (C)  The 2002 Department of Defense teams' 
recommendations have helped focus our military engagement and 
assistance, and continue to serve as guideposts for 
engagement despite the additional burdens faced by the 
military, poor recruitment and retention, lack of training 
and  operational resources and a continuously decreasing 
budget.  Sri Lanka began receiving FMF in FY 2004 and 
receives, in an expanding program, funding for International 
Military Education and Training (IMET).  Sri Lanka is 
eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under 
Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and recently took 
ownership of the ex-US Coast Guard Cutter "Courageous," 
scheduled to arrive in Sri Lanka in December of 2004. 
 
--------------- 
POINTS TO MAKE 
--------------- 
 
¶16.  (C)  Your visit follows closely upon the August 19 
statement issued by the Department condemning the recent 
violence and urging both parties to return to the table, as 
well as an August 16 press statement from the EU sounding the 
same themes.  As noted above, many Sri Lankans, including 
those with links to the Tigers, credit the USG's strong 
anti-terror posture with providing the pressure needed to 
prompt the LTTE to agree to a ceasefire.  Your visit will be 
interpreted--correctly--as a show of support for the GSL and 
an unambiguous reminder to the LTTE that it will remain 
listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until it renounces 
violence in word and deed.  It is thus important that you 
underscore to GSL and other interlocutors the need to refocus 
their divided attention upon the peace process and work 
together toward resuming negotiations.  Points you may wish 
to emphasize follow below: 
 
--Convey thanks for GSL support on Global War on Terror; 
 
--Express strong support for the peace process and underscore 
need for restraint in public statements; 
--Stress the need for progress toward resuming talks; 
 
--Reiterate our support for the Norwegian facilitating role; 
--Encourage continued movement on new anti-money laundering 
legislation; 
 
--Press for continued progress toward CSI implementation at 
Port (particularly new building and equipment procurement). 
 
--------------------- 
OVERVIEW OF MALDIVES 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  Although you will not have the opportunity to 
travel to Maldives during this visit, we include the 
following background information in the event that the topic 
arises during your discussions in Colombo: 
 
--One Maldivian citizen is being held on suspicion of links 
to al-Qaeda at Guantanamo Bay.  The GORM has asked for his 
release. 
 
--Following demonstrations on August 12-13, the Government of 
the Republic of Maldives (GORM) detained 180 people and 
declared a State of Emergency, which allows the detainees to 
be held for extended periods without charge and without 
access to legal counsel.  Included among the detainees are a 
number of prominent pro-reform activists, including about 10 
MPs, a former Attorney General, a member of the National 
Human Rights Commission, and a former SAARC Secretary 
General.  Although a number were subsequently released, none 
of the remaining 76 detainees has been charged thus far. 
 
--The GORM has justified the declaration of the State of 
Emergency (and hence their prolonged detention) by attempting 
to link the pro-democracy leaders with Muslim "extremists" 
who may also have participated in (and perhaps even 
precipitated) the demonstrations for different reasons.  So 
far, however, the GORM has offered no firm evidence of a 
connection between the pro-reform activists and the 
"extremists," or between the "extremists" and any terrorist 
organization. 
 
--An EU delegation to the Maldivian capital met some of the 
detainees on August 23-24, while our DATT met another group 
of detainees in a separate prison on August 30.  The DATT 
reported no visible signs of torture or maltreatment on the 
prisoners he interviewed.  One of the detainees interviewed 
by the EU delegation alleged maltreatment, and another showed 
distinct signs of psychological trauma.  In an August 16 
public statement, the Department has urged the GORM to 
continue the process of political and constitutional reform 
begun a year ago and to respect the human rights of 
detainees.  Separately, we have pressed the GORM to sign a 
formal agreement with the ICRC allowing it access to all 
detainees. 
 
--The Maldivian UN PermRep will meet with the Deputy 
Secretary in Washington on September 1. 
 
SIPDIS 
ENTWISTLE