This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN RU USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU OSCE CONSULTS FOCUS ON RUSSIA 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The September 21 U.S.-EU OSCE consultations 
focused largely on Russian intransigence toward outside 
influence in its "near abroad."  Both sides agreed that the 
CIS Astana Declaration is an attempt to undercut the OSCE 
role in human rights and democratization.  Similarly, the EU 
reported a "growing gap" between it and Russia on the 
"European neighborhood" countries (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Georgia), with Russia openly declaring that region to be of 
"more interest to Russia than to the EU."  On Kazakhstan, the 
Kazakh desire to hold the 2009 OSCE Chairmanship should be 
leveraged to promote progress on democratization.  On 
appointing OSCE Special Representatives for anti-Semitism and 
discrimination, the EU bottom line was that all forms of 
racism be equally acknowledged.  U.S.-EU agreement on Russia 
opens the way for cooperating with the EU on initiatives to 
oppose Russian attempts to marginalize the OSCE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Participants 
------------ 
 
¶2. (U) 
 
EU Delegation 
------------- 
 
Netherlands (current EU Presidency): 
 
Frank van Beuningen, Head of Delegation, Security Policy 
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA Hague 
Mark Versteden, Senior Policy Office OSCE, MFA Hague 
 
Luxembourg (successor to Netherlands in EU Presidency): 
 
Ronald Mayer, Ambassador to the Council of Europe 
Beatrice Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative to the OSCE 
Fabienne Rossler, Attache, MFA 
 
European Commission 
Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe, 
DG for External Relations 
Mario Mariani, OSCE Desk, DG for External Relations 
Louise Head, Adviser, DG for External Relations 
Nicole Taillefer, EC Delegation to the internal organizations 
in Vienna 
Raul de Luzenberger, Moldova Desk, DG for External Relations 
Konstandinos Vardakis, Kazakhstan Desk, DG External Relations 
Robert Liddell, Caucasus and Central Asia Unit, DG for 
External Relations 
 
EU Council Secretariat 
Alison Weston, Administrator, OSCE & CoE Desk Officer, (DG E 
IX) 
Carl Hartzell, Moldova/Belarus Desk Officer, Policy Unit 
 
U.S. Delegation 
--------------------- 
Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE 
Bruce Connuck, Political Counselor, USOSCE Vienna 
Steven Steger, Political Officer, USOSCE Vienna 
Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels 
Sean Kimball, Intern, USEU Brussels 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ASTANA DECLARATION: A RUSSIAN TRIAL BALLOON? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) USOSCE Ambassador Minikes characterized the CIS 
Astana Declaration of September 15 as a Russian "trial 
balloon" to see how far Russia could go in perverting OSCE 
priorities and principles in its own interests.  He warned 
that not responding would encourage Russia to go farther in 
weakening OSCE commitment to promoting human rights and 
democratization in the former Soviet space.  Dutch OSCE 
Office Director Frank van Beuningen agreed, observing that 
Russian frustration with the OSCE had been building for a 
long time.  He said Astana did not bode well for achieving 
consensus with Russia and other CIS states on important 
issues at the upcoming OSCE Ministerial in Sofia.  European 
Commission Head of Unit for OSCE Affairs Gilbert Dubois 
pointed out that the Astana Declaration explicitly 
characterized itself as having been built upon the July 
Moscow Statement, which forcefully called on the OSCE to 
observe "(the fundamental Helsinki principle of) 
non-interference in internal affairs...of States." 
 
¶4. (C) USOSCE PolCouns Connuck said that the Moscow and 
Astana declarations substantively contained nothing new -- 
the documents' themes pulled together what Russia had pushing 
for day-in, day-out in Vienna for a long time.  Connuck also 
pointed out that the Astana Declaration's language on 
reinforcing OSCE efforts against terrorism by "reducing OSCE 
expenditures in the highest-cost-prone sectors" was a thinly 
veiled attempt to undercut OSCE field missions. 
 
¶5. (C) Minikes said that the Russians had traction on their 
attempts to marginalize the OSCE because not all OSCE members 
bought into OSCE principles on human rights and democracy. 
Minikes said, and the EU agreed, that the U.S. and EU needed 
to decide when to say "enough."  One way to do so might be 
some sort of explicit recommitment to OSCE principles at 
head-of-state level. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
RUSSIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA, GEORGIA/CHECHNYA BMO 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C) Van Beuningen reported that the EU was looking for 
ways to "internationalize" negotiations on South Ossetia, but 
that Astana was yet another sign that Russia was unlikely to 
agree to such internationalization (neither in South Ossetia, 
nor in Moldova).  Minikes reported that, in South Ossetia, 
the Russian flag was now flying alongside the South Ossetian 
flag.  Van Beuningen remarked on a recent radio interview in 
which South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity said South Ossetia 
would never be a part of Georgia.  The atmosphere, he said, 
was worsening, and Russia was probably playing a role in 
those developments. 
 
¶7. (C) According to van Beuningen, if the mandate for the 
Georgia/Chechnya Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) is not 
extended beyond December 31, the EU will consider, with 
partners such as the U.S., another type of international 
presence.  Minikes said, with instability in the region even 
worse after Beslan, the BMO must continue; the U.S., EU, and 
OSCE must engage Moscow to that end. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MOLDOVA: A RUSSIAN 'NYET' TO THE EU 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ronald Mayer, the Ambassador of Luxembourg to the 
Council of Europe, reported that Moldova discussions at a 
September 20 EU Political and Security Committee Meeting with 
Russia had been "strikingly negative."  Russia rejected any 
EU role in five-sided talks on Transnistria; a proposed 
resolution to the schools crisis; and the withdrawal of 
ammunition from Moldova in line with the Istanbul 
commitments.  (According to Mayer, the Russians said they 
"need the ammunition" in the area.)  Carl Hartzell, 
Moldova/Belarus Desk Officer in the Policy Unit of the EU 
Council Secretariat, confirmed that Russian resistance to EU 
influence in the region through tools such as the European 
Neighborhood Policy was "becoming greater every day." 
Hartzell said the EU was facing "a tremendous challenge" -- a 
"growing gap" between the EU and Russia on dealing with an 
area that for both of them was the near abroad.  Hartzell 
said the EU would continue to work with the U.S. to create a 
"broader international platform" to deal with 
Moldova/Transniestria.  He said the EU was deliberating 
whether the Security and Stability Pact for Moldova proposal 
might be a basis for progress. 
 
¶9. (C) European Commission Moldova Desk Officer Raul de 
Luzenberger said the "double-checking" proposal for Moldovan 
steel was in the final stages of preparation.  He said the EU 
should have a common proposal by the end of September, after 
which there would be an exchange of letters with Moldova and 
the system would be put in place.  On border monitoring, de 
Luzenberger said the European Commission was ready to 
participate, but that the border first had to be demarcated. 
Hartzell said the EU would like to compare notes with the 
U.S. on possible further measures, such as freezing assets, 
to "make the status quo uncomfortable" for Transnistrian 
leaders.  Van Beuningen said the EU wanted the schools crisis 
solved before resumption of the five-sided talks.   Hartzell 
asked rhetorically whether it would be wise to invite Russia 
to such talks, given the risk that Russia would reject the 
offer. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
BELARUS: EU UNDECIDED ON ODIHR REFERENDUM OBSERVATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Mayer said the EU was divided on whether the OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
should accept Belarus' invitation to observe the October 17 
referendum on eliminating presidential term limits, because 
of concern about possibly "legitimizing" the referendum.  It 
would therefore be unlikely that there could be an EU 
decision to push ODIHR to observe the referendum.  Minikes 
responded that the OSCE would not be able to comment 
authoritatively on the referendum if ODIHR did not accept the 
invitation. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
KAZAKHSTAN 2009 CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE CANDIDACY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Robert Liddell of the Caucasus and Central Asia Unit 
of the European Commission expressed concern over the 
fairness of the September 19 elections in Kazakhstan, but 
said that the EU nevertheless saw Kazakhstan as the most 
viable leader in Central Asia, a region that needed 
leadership.  Konstandinos Vardakis, European Commission 
Kazakhstan Desk Officer, said the EU expected Kazakhstan to 
be exporting as much oil in 2012 as Russia does today. 
Therefore, it was in the EU's vital interest to promote 
democracy and stability there.  Minikes proposed that the 
U.S. and EU look at ways to cooperate in leveraging the 
Kazakh candidacy for OSCE CiO in 2009 to push for substantial 
progress on human rights and democracy.  Minikes suggested 
meeting with the Kazakhs regularly, not to single them out, 
but to help them.  Connuck reported that the Kazakhs at the 
working level in Vienna believe they have enough momentum for 
2009 as to make their candidacy unstoppable, partially 
because there has not been a concerted effort to leverage the 
Kazakh CiO candidacy.  The Kazakhs and some other CIS states, 
he said, are convinced that they hold the U.S. and EU hostage 
on this issue, not the other way around.  Van Beuningen 
agreed that action on leveraging the Kazakh candidacy had to 
come soon, or it would be too late. 
 
------------------------------------- 
CHOOSING A NEW OSCE SECRETARY GENERAL 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Van Beuningen said that there was no EU candidate to 
succeed OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis as of yet.  Van 
Beuningen expressed annoyance at Bulgarian FM and OSCE CiO 
Passy's letter in which he created a "fait accompli" by 
stating that the SecGen candidate should have a "political 
profile."  Minikes stressed that the candidate for OSCE 
SecGen should be equal in stature to the NATO SecGen.  Van 
Beuningen agreed that a high profile figure would bring in a 
large network with access to other key leaders, but cautioned 
that the issue for the EU was not just the SecGen, but the 
leadership of the OSCE and the role of the CiO in providing 
political direction. 
 
------------------------------------- 
OSCE REFORM AND SCALES OF ASSESSMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Both sides agreed that reform could not be 
accomplished through the creation of more rules and that, 
while they were open to discussion, they thought reform 
should be done carefully, not with undue urgency. 
Underlining U.S.-EU concerns that some OSCE members wanted to 
use OSCE reform to undercut field missions, Connuck reported 
that CIS countries might be considering letting the mandates 
of OSCE field missions in the CIS expire as of January 1 
(which they can do by withholding consensus on mandate 
renewals at the end of the year).  On scales of assessment, 
Van Beuningen said the OSCE should consider the possibility 
of how to prevent the organization from coming to a 
standstill in the event of failure to come to a timely 
agreement.  He said CiO Passy's presentation to Dutch FM 
Bernard Bot of the "Chair's Guess" paper so irritated Bot 
that it had become more difficult to find a solution to the 
scales of assessment issue at a political level.  Van 
Beuningen affirmed that the EU supported the U.S. position on 
having two scales, and Nicole Van Taillefer from the 
Commission Delegation to the OSCE reported that the Russians 
had again insisted on one scale in a September 20 meeting in 
Vienna. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
SPECIAL REPS ON ANTI-SEMITISM, RACISM, XENOPHOBIA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶14. (C) Van Beuningen said the EU's bottom line was that all 
forms of discrimination needed to be combated.  Whether there 
should be one, two or three envoys was undecided, he said. 
The EU agreed with the U.S. that the special 
representative(s) position(s) should be temporary 
appointments and modeled on the Maarti Ahtisaari position of 
OSCE Special Rep for Central Asia -- no bureaucracy and no 
additional OSCE staff. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
KOSOVO FOLLOW-UP: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TORTURE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶15. (U) Mayer asked whether the U.S. could hasten resolution, 
via NATO, of the Council of Europe (CoE) and Kosovo 
Stabilization Force (KFOR) negotiations on implementation in 
Kosovo of the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Serbia and Montenegro committed itself to implementing the 
Convention when it joined the CoE in April 2003, but 
implementation in Kosovo is subject to negotiations with 
KFOR.  The U.S. side promised to pass the request on. 
 
------------------------------------ 
COMMENT: U.S.-EU CONSENSUS ON RUSSIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) These consultations affirmed a U.S.-EU convergence of 
views on the gravity of Russia's campaign to marginalize the 
OSCE and reassert Russian dominance in the CIS region.  Both 
sides agreed also that U.S. and EU inaction would encourage 
Russia to push even further.  The EU agreed in principle to 
explore the proposal of publicly recommitting the OSCE to its 
founding principles (see para 5) -- opening the way for 
U.S.-EU common action in making clear our commitment to 
promoting human rights and democracy throughout the OSCE 
region.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶17. (U) USOSCE has cleared this message. 
 
MCKINLEY