This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 009311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR - CLATANOFF 
GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS AND CHAMBERLIN 
LABOR FOR ILAB - JORGE PEREZ-LOPEZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: ELAB PHUM PGOV ETRD PTER CO ILO
SUBJECT: ILO STUDY: REMOVING POLITICS FROM LABOR RELATIONS 
REDUCES VIOLENCE AND STRENGTHENS DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 3866 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 3913 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 4950 
     ¶D. BOGOTA 3736 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) The relationship between labor violence and political 
activity is widely accepted by labor leaders and academics in 
Colombia.  For many trade unionists, unions act as surrogate 
political parties and avenues for political activity. 
Because illegal armed groups perceive trade unionists, 
particularly teachers, as political actors, some labor 
leaders have actively discouraged trade union involvement in 
political activity.  Using actual case studies, a report 
prepared by the DOL-funded ILO technical cooperation program 
in Colombia concludes that removing politics from labor 
relations can play an important role in improving tripartite 
dialogue and reducing levels of violence against trade 
unionists and management.  In three of the report's seven 
case studies, the exclusion of politics from labor relations 
and the elimination of pressure from illegal armed groups 
facilitated greater cooperation between unions and 
identification of common ground between labor and management. 
 The report also presents potential strategies, which might 
be employed to reduce violence against trade unionists.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Linkage of Politics and Labor Relations Hurts Unions 
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¶2. (C) The political orientation of some Colombian labor 
unions has been the subject of several academic studies that 
attribute the overt linkage of politics and labor relations 
in Colombia to a historical absence of strong political 
parties.  According to Fabio Zapata (protect), Human Rights 
Director for the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE), 
Colombia's left-wing labor unions, particularly those 
affiliated with the United Workers Central (CUT), do not make 
a distinction between political activity and labor activism; 
the former is part and parcel of the latter.  Carlos 
Rodriguez (strictly protect), President of the CUT, has 
repeatedly told us that left-wing activists within the CUT 
see Colombia's political parties as corrupt or, at best, 
unrepresentative of Colombian workers.  Rodriguez has worked 
diligently throughout his tenure as CUT President -- largely 
without success -- to press union members to make a 
distinction between politics and labor activism (ref A).  He 
maintains that the linkage harms union leaders by increasing 
the risk of violence against them, alienating potential union 
members whose political views differ from union leadership, 
and diverting attention from traditional labor priorities. 
 
¶3. (C) According to Norberto Rios (protect), director of the 
National Labor College ("Escuela Nacional Sindical," or ENS), 
a well respected Colombian labor rights NGO, paramilitaries 
target labor leaders for violence primarily because they 
perceive them to be, at best, members of the radical 
political opposition, or, at worst, covert guerrilla 
collaborators.  Moreover, ENS statistics show that 
paramilitaries disproportionately target members of the CUT, 
Colombia's most left-leaning and politically activist labor 
federation (ref B).  Carlos Jose Guarnizo (protect), a 
project coordinator in the ILO's technical cooperation 
program in Bogota, told the Embassy that the intrusion of 
partisan politics into labor relations contributes to 
violence against representatives of both labor and 
management.  Although not generally noted by Colombian human 
rights activists, business leaders and managers are often the 
victims of kidnappings, threats of violence, and extortion 
attempts by paramilitary and guerrilla groups, for both 
political and economic reasons. 
 
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Politically Active Teachers Targeted 
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¶4. (C) Forty-one of the 90 trade unionists murdered in 2003 
were teachers.  Many more teachers were threatened by illegal 
armed groups or voluntarily displaced to other locations in 
order to escape violence.  Of the estimated 312,000 teachers 
in Colombia, approximately 270,000 are members of FECODE, a 
CUT affiliate.  Most of the others belong to independent 
teachers' unions not affiliated with FECODE.  According to 
FECODE's Zapata, illegal armed groups target teachers 
primarily because they believe teachers disseminate 
propaganda in the classroom.  FECODE's 2003 human rights 
report states that educators are targeted because of their 
vocal opposition to forced recruitment of children by illegal 
armed groups, their pedagogical, labor, and community 
leadership, and paramilitary and guerrilla perceptions that 
teachers are "enemy collaborators."  In a recent meeting with 
the Embassy, Zapata, who drafted the report, told us illegal 
armed groups consider unionized teachers to be political, 
rather than economic, actors, regardless of whether they 
actually engage in political activities.  Zapata attributes 
this perception to the prevalence of left-wing political 
activism within FECODE.  The Presidential Program for Human 
Rights is working with FECODE and local teachers unions to 
design a nationwide program to assist and protect at-risk 
teachers (septel). 
 
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Absence of Politics Opens Space for Dialogue 
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¶5. (U) A report recently published by the DOL-funded ILO 
technical cooperation program in Colombia -- buttressed by 
three of the report's seven case studies -- provides evidence 
that the exclusion of political themes from union demands can 
improve the quality of dialogue and reduce violence 
perpetrated against trade unionists.  In some cases, partisan 
and non-partisan unions previously divided by political 
differences were able to cooperate in negotiations with 
employers after the politicized unions abandoned ideological 
approaches.  In other cases, the removal of vague political 
ideals helped union leaders articulate concrete, tangible 
demands they could explain to rank-and-file workers and 
negotiate more effectively with management.  Ultimately, the 
abandonment of left-wing politics convinced both labor and 
management that they were not negotiating with "the enemy," 
but with a common partner.  This development helped both 
sides identify common interests and understand the other's 
position. 
 
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Case Study #1: Banana Strike in Uraba 
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¶6. (U) The Uraba region of northwestern Antioquia department 
has long been characterized by a heavy presence of guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups, many of which engage in narcotics 
and weapons trafficking.  For decades, the region's banana 
growers -- plantation owners and laborers alike -- have been 
caught in the crossfire.  The Uraba banana industry employs 
approximately 17,600 laborers working on 344 farms that range 
from small producers to large-scale agribusiness. 
Paramilitaries and guerrillas, including the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army 
(ELN), traditionally exerted pressure on workers, managers, 
owners, and the general population, often at the expense of 
labor relations in the industry.  According to the ILO 
report, guerrilla infiltration of the region's unions in the 
1980s and early 1990s resulted in the extortion of business 
leaders, sabotage and theft of crops and plantation property, 
and, ultimately, paramilitary attacks against banana workers. 
 
 
¶7. (U) According to the ILO report, a stronger state presence 
and a series of successful demobilization programs have 
reduced the influence of illegal armed groups and contributed 
to improved labor relations in the region, including a 
reduction in violence.  The report states that labor and 
management, no longer separated by a political divide, have 
realized that each is necessary to the other's survival and 
that they must work together.  The industry's eight labor 
unions now negotiate jointly with the primary growers' 
association.  A sixteen-day strike in June was characterized 
by record low levels of violence, despite high levels of 
tension and significant crop loss.  Over the course of the 
strike, banana growers lost an estimated USD 25.5 million. 
The 16,000 striking workers lost an estimated USD 5.4 
million.  When President Uribe and acting Vice-Minister for 
Labor Affairs Mauricio Rubio traveled to Uraba to mediate 
between labor and management, the issues on the table were 
bread-and-butter labor concerns, permitting the Government to 
successfully pressure both sides to meet halfway over the 
course of a one-evening negotiating session. 
 
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Case Study #2: Chevron Texaco 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) The ILO report describes the state of play in labor 
relations within Chevron Texaco facilities in Colombia in 
¶2000.  Employees were represented by two labor unions, 
SINTRACHEVRONTEX and the Syndicated Workers Union ("Union 
Sindical Obrero," or USO).  The former split away from the 
latter in 1998 primarily because of disagreements over USO's 
political orientation and aggressive tactics.  The technical 
cooperation program conducted workshops for leaders of both 
unions in 2000 and 2001 and worked with labor and management 
to set up a permanent conciliation commission in which 
management explains the company's business plan and 
priorities and organized labor presents concerns about 
workplace issues.  Discussion of national oil policy and 
other political issues is off-limits.  As a result of the 
technical cooperation program's efforts, the two unions set 
aside their political differences and now jointly present 
labor concerns to management.  Collective negotiations 
conducted since 2002 have been resolved quickly with a focus 
on traditional labor relations.  The Chevron Texaco case 
study contrasts sharply with the May "political strike" 
declared by USO in protest of the GOC's restructuring of 
Ecopetrol, Colombia's state-owned oil company (ref C). 
 
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Case Study #3: Cementos Nare 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) According to the ILO report, conflict between Cementos 
Nare, which operates in the municipalities of Nare and 
Caracoli, Antioquia Department, and organized labor escalated 
in the 1970s when the Colombian Confederation of Unions 
(CSTC), a Communist labor union, convinced labor unions to 
take a more radical stance, oriented in the idea of class 
struggle, against management.  (CSTC and the radical 
Colombian Workers Union (UTC) merged to form the CUT in 
1986.)  Increased guerrilla activity in the region in the 
1980s radicalized labor unions even further.  Between the 
1970s and 1990s, violence against organized labor and 
management in the region escalated.  In 1986, Cementos Nare's 
Director of Industrial Relations and the union's president 
were assassinated by illegal armed groups.  In 1991, the firm 
closed its plant for 25 days after several workers were 
murdered.  The firm reopened the plant with the proviso that 
further violence would result in permanent closure.  The ILO 
report posits 1991 as a turning point in labor relations. 
Levels of violence declined substantially throughout the 
1990s as the firm increased social benefits for workers and 
social investment in the community and rank-and-file union 
members gradually voted the union's radical leadership out. 
Once workers' interests began to take precedence over 
political demands, levels of violence diminished quickly. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (C) The ILO study does more than support our conclusions 
about the nature of labor violence in Colombia, for it 
demonstrates that GOC strategies to strengthen state presence 
and demobilize illegal armed actors have played a role in the 
reduction of violence against trade unionists.  The ENS 
itself acknowledges that the paramilitary peace process has 
played the most significant role in the striking decline of 
violence against trade unionists (ref D) over the last 18 
months.  The ILO study provides models for future action 
through which unions may be convinced to leave politics to 
Colombia's political parties and focus instead on labor 
relations and the promotion of traditional labor priorities. 
Funding for the DOL-financed technical cooperation program 
will run out in May 2005.  We urge that serious consideration 
be given to extending this program or funding other programs 
-- perhaps under FTA-related capacity building assistance -- 
that will use the ILO's findings to develop sector-specific 
plans of action to reduce labor violence and improve labor 
relations. 
DRUCKER